kik-website/server/README.md
Zebreus 5f9796cc11 Keep the shell server working over a deployment
The server logs to a file that was overwritten on every start, so an outage left no
trace. It is appended to now, and rotated when it grows past a megabyte.

The cleanup job restarts the server when nobody is connected and when the server does
not listen at all: it comes back by itself if it died, it takes over a server that was
left behind, and it picks up the programs that were just restored. A session that is
open keeps the port and the runtime, so the server is not restarted then.

A deployment does not restart the server. It runs in a session, and that session keeps
the port, so a server that starts during a deployment cannot bind it. The deployment
only writes the configuration; the cleanup job applies it.

The runtime of the installation is not protected any more. A program and the shell
that starts it have to use the same runtime DLL, or the program does not run at all,
so the login path now uses the one in /usr/bin, next to the user's own programs. What
is protected instead is that it is the one the package says it is: pacman checks the
files of msys2-runtime and the cleanup job puts the package back if it was changed.

Only keys may log in over SSH now, and Remote Desktop needs network level
authentication. Only the administrator may log in over it: the user of the website is
in no group that may.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 02:46:45 +01:00

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# The shell server
The website's terminal connects to a shell server, whose `root` user logs in at `wss://web.nowhere.wirs.ing` and
gets a shell on the box.
## The security model
The box is an isolated, disposable VPS at a random hoster. We assume that it can be compromised and that this is
acceptable: the worst case is that the gimmick on the website stops working. Nothing else is on the box. The
website and the websocket bridge that carries the connection run on other servers, so a compromised shell server
cannot get at them.
The `root` user on the box is a normal Windows account without administrator rights. It may do a lot of things
there, including things we did not plan for. We do not try to contain it and we do not try to undo what it does.
We only keep the basic user journey working.
## What we keep working
Anything that breaks the following user journey is not acceptable:
- The user can connect with the SSH key as `root`.
- The prompt: `root@khaos-im-kiez:~#`, which `~/.zsh/.zshrc` sets.
- The home directory the user ends up in: `/home/root`. They cannot change where it is, and they cannot delete it.
- `cat README`, `cat README.en`, `cat CODE_OF_CONDUCT` and `cat CODE_OF_CONDUCT.en` always work. The four files
are always there and always regular text files.
So in summary running `ssh root@nowhere.wirs.ing cat README` must always succeed and display the contents of the file.
Anything thats not specified above (like the content of README for example) is NOT part of the user journey.
## What we do not keep working
As long as the user story above does not break, we do not guarantee the functionality of anything else on the server. However the cleanup task should still try to best-effort restore everything to a working condition.
## Packages
The root user owns the whole MSYS2 installation and can install packages with pacman. That means they can also
replace or delete the very programs the login needs. So the sshd, the login shell `zsh` and `cat` are kept as a
second, protected copy in `C:\msys2\opt\kik`, which only SYSTEM and the administrators may write. The sshd runs as
SYSTEM from that copy and the login shell is that copy's `zsh`, with `/opt/kik` first on the path, so the journey
keeps working no matter what the user does to their own `/usr/bin`. Replacing `/usr/bin/sshd` cannot touch the
running server, so the key on the website still never grants administrator access.
The copy has to be the *same* MSYS2 installation, not a second one: `C:\msys2\opt\kik` is two levels below
`C:\msys2`, so its runtime resolves the same root and the login shell and the user's own tools share one cygwin
runtime. A separate installation does not work - two runtimes in one process tree corrupt each other's file
descriptors and pacman cannot even lock its database.
The runtime itself is not among the protected copies. A program and the shell that starts it have to use the same
runtime DLL, or the program does not run at all - a second copy of it in one process is refused. The login path
therefore uses the one in `/usr/bin`, next to the user's own programs, and the user may replace and upgrade it.
What is protected instead is that it is the one the package says it is: pacman checks the files of `msys2-runtime`,
and the cleanup job puts the package back if it was changed - before it starts the server, which runs as SYSTEM and
would otherwise run code the user of the website wrote.
`/etc/passwd` (the login shell and home directory) and `/etc/ssh` (the host keys and config) are read-only to the
user as well; everything else in the installation is theirs.
## The cleanup tasks
Two scheduled tasks run as SYSTEM, both at startup, and the user cannot stop either:
- `KiK sshd` runs the sshd from `C:\msys2\opt\kik`. It replaces the installation's own `msys2-sshd` service, which
is disabled.
- `KiK restore shell files` runs every 30 minutes and rebuilds the protected copy from its trusted originals,
re-applies the permissions, and puts the home directory, the shell configuration, the website's key and the four
texts back. Its second job is to best-effort revert other mockery and bring a fresh server to the expected state.
The cleanup job also restarts the server when nobody is connected, and when the server does not listen at all:
it comes back by itself if it died, it takes over a server that was left behind, and it picks up the programs that
were just restored. A session that is open keeps the port, so a server that is started now could not bind it, and
the job never disturbs a session.
The deployment does not restart the server. It runs in a session, and that session keeps the port, so a server that
starts during a deployment cannot bind it. The new configuration and the restored programs therefore take effect
at the next run of the cleanup job, which happens within half an hour.
The server logs to `C:\ProgramData\kik-restore\sshd.log`. The log is appended to, not overwritten, because it is
the only trace of what the server did: a server that is restarted would otherwise take the evidence of an outage
with it. It is rotated when it grows past a megabyte.
Only keys may log in over SSH. The box stands in the open internet and both of its accounts have a password.
The files that have to stay belong to the administrators, so the user cannot delete them, and they cannot change the
shell configuration or the key the website logs in with either. The shell reads its configuration from `~/.zsh`, so
the startup files the user could write in the home directory are ignored.
## Installing the cleanup on the server
To deploy the cleanup task an the server, run:
server/scripts/deploy.sh
The script logs in as `Administrator` - whose shell is a Windows one - copies the scripts and the resources to the
Administrator's home directory and runs the installer there.