hyperhive/docs/swarm/README.md
atlas eb8387bd73 docs(#3255): state the present, drop the changelog framing
mara: "pls remove historical wording, only present pls".

The correction was written as a diff against what the docs used to claim
-- "this used to say X", "where this is going", "the intended state for
now". That is a changelog, and a reader arriving cold has to reconstruct
the current truth from it. The reasoning about why the old shape was
wrong belongs in the PR that changed it, not in the file.

Now says what is true: the controller interprets a delivery and emits a
semantic message; receipt is all that is wired today because the
swarm->hive channel does not exist yet.
2026-08-18 12:35:27 +02:00

393 lines
17 KiB
Markdown

# Multi-hive swarms
A **swarm** is a collection of agents that share an identity and
coordinate across one or more hives. A single hyperhive instance
running on one host is already a swarm (one hive). This doc covers
the additional config needed when the swarm spans multiple hosts.
## Terminology
- **hive** — a single hyperhive installation on one host. Has its
own `services.hyperhive.domain` DNS name and its own set of agent
containers.
- **swarm** — one or more hives whose operators have declared them
as peers. Agents can be qualified as `agent@hive-domain`.
- **peer hive** — any hive in `services.hyperhive.swarm.hives` other
than this one. Peers are *derived*, not declared: the directory lists
every hive including yourself, and `hiveName` says which one you are.
## Hive identity config
```nix
services.hyperhive = {
swarm.domain = "example.com"; # required — the swarm's DNS domain
hiveName = "pr1ma"; # required — this hive's label in it
swarm.name = "constellat1on"; # shared swarm display name (optional)
# required — the directory, identical on every host in the swarm.
# Names only: each entry's `domain` defaults to <name>.<swarm.domain>.
swarm.hives = {
pr1ma = { };
edge = { };
};
};
```
`swarm.domain` and `hiveName` are **required** whenever hyperhive is
enabled; eval fails with a hint naming each. Neither is defaulted,
because a guessed value here is a wrong hostname that evaluates cleanly
and deploys — an eval failure asking the operator to write the address
down is the cheaper outcome. **Upgrading past this release means setting
both once.**
`domain` is required too, but you no longer *write* it: it is read from
this hive's own entry in the directory, whose `domain` defaults to
`<name>.<swarm.domain>`. So a conventional swarm states no addresses at
all, and a hive addressed by something else states it in the one place
the other hives read — `swarm.hives.edge.domain = "edge.elsewhere.example";`.
Setting `services.hyperhive.domain` directly still works and still wins,
with a **deprecation warning**. The reason it's deprecated is not tidiness:
that option is local to one host, the directory is copied to every host,
so a value written only there leaves every peer pointing somewhere else
with nothing detecting the disagreement.
⚠️ **Upgrading:** a hive that has been running on `swarm.domain` +
`hiveName` alone now needs its own directory entry —
`services.hyperhive.swarm.hives.<hiveName> = { };`, one line, no value.
Eval fails naming it if you forget.
`domain` drives `HYPERHIVE_HIVE_DOMAIN` in every container so agents can
form qualified labels (`iris@pr1ma.example.com`).
`swarm.name` is purely display — it surfaces in the dashboard chrome
header and per-agent system prompts, and federated hives at different
domains can share one. `hiveName` surfaces in the same places but is
*not* only display: it is the leftmost label of the hive's domain. That
`swarm.name` sits under `swarm` and `hiveName` does not is the whole
distinction — one names this hive, the other names the group it belongs
to.
See `docs/conventions.md` § Hive identity for the env-var chain
and `qualify()` / `qualified_label()` semantics.
## Swarm CA
A hive's internal TLS chains to a **swarm root CA**, so a peer that
trusts the root validates every hive in the swarm rather than being
pinned to each one by hand. Provisioning modes, what to hand a peer
(`trust-bundle.pem`, never `ca.pem`), the name constraints on a hive
CA, and how an existing hive adopts the hierarchy: [`ca.md`](ca.md).
## Running the swarm's shared services
One authelia, one matrix, one forge per swarm — which host runs them,
and what a hive that runs none of them configures instead:
[`services.md`](services.md).
## Single sign-on
Which secrets the SSO provider generates, which one has a reader in
another container, and the three ways that one gets delivered:
[`sso.md`](sso.md).
## Secrets
Every credential the swarm holds, who mints it, where it must live, and
which of the three topologies makes it the operator's job to place:
[`secrets.md`](secrets.md).
## Swarm UI
The operator-only web surface on the swarm apex, why reaching it needs
the `admins` group rather than just a session, and the four sites a
swarm service name has to be wired into: [`ui.md`](ui.md).
## The swarm's hive directory
```nix
services.hyperhive.swarm.hives = {
pr1ma = { domain = "pr1ma.example.com"; }; # this host, per hiveName
lab = { domain = "lab.example.com"; }; # a second hive in the swarm
};
```
One attrset describing **every** hive in the swarm, **including this
one**, keyed by that hive's `hiveName`. It is meant to be *identical on
every host* — write it once, share it, and each host reads it correctly
because `services.hyperhive.hiveName` says which entry is itself.
Empty (the default) means this host isn't in a swarm. Once non-empty it
**must** contain an entry for `hiveName`; eval fails naming the missing
hive. That assertion is load-bearing rather than pedantic — "my peers"
is derived as *everything that isn't me*, so a directory that doesn't
contain you derives every hive as a peer and you peer with yourself.
`domain` is required per entry and deliberately undefaulted: it is
conventionally `<name>.<swarm.domain>`, but a wrong domain that
evaluates cleanly points at a real machine that isn't the one you meant.
> **There is no per-hive CA field, and no per-hive cert pinning.** Trust
> inside a swarm comes from the swarm root ([`ca.md`](ca.md)): every
> hive chains to it, so one anchor replaces per-hive pinning entirely.
> What that genuinely drops is trusting a hive whose root this swarm
> does *not* own — another swarm's, or one keeping its own CA. That is
> a cross-swarm problem and wants a mechanism designed for it. (An
> earlier `certFingerprint` field existed for exactly that gap, pinning
> a peer's TLS leaf for hive-c0re's own peer HTTPS checks — removed
> along with the dashboard feature it existed to serve, since nothing
> else ever consumed it.)
## What the config does at runtime
1. **Swarm-wide hive roster** — swarm-controller reads this same
directory and serves it at `GET /api/hives`; `swarm-ui`'s overview
page renders it (`docs/swarm/ui.md`). This is the operator-facing
"what hives exist" surface — a per-hive dashboard "peer hives"
display existed here once and was removed in favour of it.
2. **Matrix federation** — when `matrix.enable` is on, tuwunel
federates with the peer's matrix server (discovered via the peer's
`.well-known/matrix/server` delegation, which the gateway serves).
Federation validates the peer's TLS certificate against the matrix
**container's** trust bundle, independent of this directory.
⚠️ **That container currently trusts no swarm-internal CA**, so a
self-signed gateway certificate does not federate. The swarm root
can't simply be listed there: `security.pki.certificateFiles` is
read when the system is *built*, and the root is a runtime file (its
key must never enter the store), so there is no build-time name for
it. Bridging that needs a runtime mechanism and is tracked as its own
issue. Until then, federation needs CA-issued certs (ACME). See
`docs/matrix.md` for federation firewall + TLS requirements.
3. **WireGuard mesh** (optional) — `swarm.wireguard.enable` reads each
entry's `wireguardPublicKey`/`wireguardEndpoint`/`wireguardAddress`
to configure `wg-hive`. See "WireGuard inter-hive mesh" below.
## One directory, not a bilateral declaration
Both hives hold the **same** `hives` attrset; neither declares the
other. What differs between the two hosts is only `hiveName`:
```
# hive A # hive B
hiveName = "pr1ma"; hiveName = "edge";
swarm.hives = { … }; swarm.hives = { … }; # byte-identical
```
That is the point of the shape, and it removes a class of bug rather
than saving typing: a per-host peer list let two hosts hold *different*
facts about the same third hive — a stale endpoint, a rotated
fingerprint — with nothing to detect the disagreement. One entry per
hive makes it unrepresentable.
## WireGuard inter-hive mesh (optional)
The peer config above uses public HTTPS for all inter-hive traffic.
For private deployments — or to reduce latency and TLS overhead on
intra-swarm traffic — hive-c0re can configure a host-to-host
WireGuard mesh.
### Generating keys
On each hive host:
```bash
wg genkey | install -m 0400 /dev/stdin /etc/wireguard/hive.key
wg pubkey < /etc/wireguard/hive.key # → share this with peer operators
```
### Config example (two hives)
```nix
# hive A (pr1ma.example.com, mesh IP 10.100.0.1)
services.hyperhive = {
swarm.wireguard = {
enable = true;
privateKeyFile = "/etc/wireguard/hive.key";
address = "10.100.0.1/24";
listenPort = 51820; # optional, default 51820
};
# The same `hives` attrset both hosts hold — mesh fields included,
# since "where this hive can be dialled" is a fact about that hive.
swarm.hives = {
pr1ma = {
domain = "pr1ma.example.com";
wireguardPublicKey = "base64keyA=";
wireguardEndpoint = "198.51.100.1:51820";
wireguardAddress = "10.100.0.1/32";
};
edge = {
domain = "edge.corp";
wireguardPublicKey = "base64keyB=";
wireguardEndpoint = "203.0.113.42:51820";
wireguardAddress = "10.100.0.2/32";
};
};
};
# hive B (edge.corp, mesh IP 10.100.0.2)
services.hyperhive = {
swarm.wireguard = {
enable = true;
privateKeyFile = "/etc/wireguard/hive.key";
address = "10.100.0.2/24";
};
swarm.hives = { /* identical to hive A's */ };
};
```
### What the mesh does
- `networking.wireguard.interfaces.wg-hive` is configured on the host
(not inside agent containers; containers reach peers via the host's
routing table).
- UDP port 51820 (or `listenPort`) is opened on the host firewall.
- `swarm-wireguard.nix` reads each entry's `wireguardAddress` directly
from `services.hyperhive.swarm.peerHives` to build `wg-hive`'s
`allowedIPs`, so intra-swarm traffic can route over the mesh address
rather than the public domain.
- `persistentKeepalive = 25` is set by default; override or null to
disable (not needed when both sides have public IPs and no NAT).
### NAT / one-sided endpoints
If one host is behind NAT and can't accept incoming connections, only
that host needs a null `wireguardEndpoint` on the peer config — the
other side initiates. With keepalive on, the NAT hole stays open.
If both hosts are behind NAT, a STUN relay or a third host (exit node)
is required. Out of scope for v0.
## Snapshot store
One further option lives in this namespace but is documented with the
service it points at: `services.hyperhive.swarm.snapshotStore.{address,
port}` tells this hive where the swarm's `btrfs receive` endpoint is, so
`hivectl agent <name> subvol snapshot push` has somewhere to stream to.
It is genuinely swarm-scoped rather than per-peer — a swarm has exactly
one store, because the receiver keys destinations by *agent* so a
migrating agent keeps one unbroken incremental chain. See
[snapshot-store.md](../snapshot-store.md).
## Swarm controller
`services.hyperhive.swarm.controller.enable` runs the `swarm-controller`
daemon on this host. **Off by default and deliberately not derived from
`services.hyperhive.enable`**: a swarm has one controller, so enabling it
is a statement about swarm topology, not about whether hyperhive is
installed. Every hive runs `hive-c0re` (the agents on that host); one
hive additionally runs this (what is true across hives).
What it serves, why it is a unix socket rather than a port, and the
socket-directory constraint that governs where `socketPath` may point:
[`swarm-controller/README.md`](../../swarm-controller/README.md).
### Per-hive status (`GET /api/hives/status`)
One row per hive in `swarm.hives`, saying when it last reported and what
it said. Hives publish upward through the swarm queue; the controller
never reaches down to collect, so a hive that cannot reach the swarm
still knows its own state — you just cannot see it from here.
A hive publishes only once it has been given the three
`swarm.statusPublish` coordinates below. A hive that has not reads
`never_reported` — it is not broken, it just has nothing to say upward.
| freshness | what to do about it |
|---|---|
| `fresh` | nothing — reported within `staleAfterSeconds` |
| `stale` | the hive stopped reporting. Its last payload is still shown, so check `age_seconds` and the payload for what it managed to say |
| `never_reported` | this hive has never reported at all — normally a deployment that hasn't happened, not an outage |
| `unknown` | something is publishing under a name that is not in `swarm.hives` — a typo in the roster, or a hive that was removed and is still running |
Every row also carries `last_seen_unix` and `age_seconds` if you want to
apply your own threshold. The timestamp is the one the queue recorded on
arrival, not one the hive put in its own payload.
Set `services.hyperhive.swarm.controller.staleAfterSeconds` (default
`120`) **above the rate hives publish at**, or everything reads `stale`
between reports. Hives publish once a minute, so the default tolerates
one missed report and flags two. It takes effect on the next request;
nothing has to re-publish.
### Making a hive report (`swarm.statusPublish`)
Three options, on the **hive**, set together or not at all — a
half-configured hive is an eval error rather than one that quietly never
reports:
| option | what to set it to |
|---|---|
| `natsUrl` | where the swarm queue listens, as this hive reaches it |
| `tokenEndpoint` | the swarm IdP's `/api/oidc/token` |
| `clientSecretFile` | path to this hive's client secret, plaintext |
On a host that runs the queue and the IdP itself, all three default to
the local ones and there is nothing to set. Any other hive needs them
spelled out, and needs the secret to physically be there: the swarm does
not distribute it. Copy `hive-<hiveName>.secret` out of the swarm host's
`swarm.authelia.hostClientSecretDir` with whatever secret management the
deployment already uses.
The identity is not a choice — a hive authenticates as `hive-<hiveName>`
and publishes under `hiveName`, the same name that keys `swarm.hives`.
If a hive stops reporting, its own dashboard is the place to look: a
failure to publish raises a warning banner there after three consecutive
misses. It stays `warn` rather than `crit` on purpose — a hive that
cannot reach the queue is not itself unhealthy, so it does not start
calling itself degraded for being unable to say it is fine.
The endpoint answers **503** when this host has no swarm queue
configured, or has one and cannot read it — deliberately not an empty
list, which would look like a silent swarm rather than a controller that
cannot see. The body says which. Status survives a controller restart:
it is stored in the queue, not in the daemon.
### Swarm-wide forge webhooks
At startup the controller registers two Forgejo hooks pointing at
itself — a `push` hook on `internal/knowledge` and a `pull_request` hook
on the `agent-configs` org, both under
`https://<swarm.ui.domain>/webhook/forge/`.
**Two hooks exist per swarm-wide repo: each hive's own, plus the
controller's.** Both are expected — **do not delete either.** Removing a
hive's hook stops that hive acting on knowledge pushes and config PRs;
removing the controller's just gets recreated on its next start.
The controller **interprets** a delivery and sends hives a specific
message — *the knowledge repo changed*, *deploy agent `foo` at rev
`abc123`* — rather than forwarding forge payloads for each hive to
re-derive. Approval happens once, at the swarm level: a hive receives a
decision, not an event to adjudicate. Today the controller logs each
verified delivery and sends nothing, because the swarm→hive channel does
not exist yet; the hive-side hooks are what act in the meantime.
Nothing to configure. The hooks are registered only when this host also
serves the swarm UI vhost — that is what publishes the endpoint, and a
hook the forge cannot reach would collect failed deliveries while
looking healthy. The HMAC secret is generated on first start and kept
(see [`docs/persistence.md`](../persistence.md)).
To check it is working, push to `internal/knowledge` and look for
`webhook: verified delivery` in `journalctl -u swarm-controller`. A
refused delivery logs `webhook: refused delivery` with the reason.
## Cross-references
- `docs/snapshot-store.md` — the swarm's `btrfs receive` endpoint, and
the `swarm.snapshotStore` option that points a hive at it
- `docs/conventions.md` § Hive identity — env vars, qualified labels
- `docs/matrix.md` — matrix federation, TLS cert auto-generation,
firewall posture
- `docs/swarm/ui.md` — the swarm-wide hive roster, now the operator
surface for "what hives exist" (superseded the per-hive dashboard's
old "peer hives" display)
- `docs/gateway.md` — nginx vhosts and the `.well-known/matrix/`
auto-discovery scheme