Setting declarativePlugins to any list -- the empty one included -- also sets upstream's plugins.preinstall_disabled, which nixpkgs defaults to declarativePlugins != null. Preinstall is what fetches the Drilldown apps on first start, so claiming the plugin directory removed them without touching anything a person had installed. The comment above that line reasoned about the plugin path and the update check and never about preinstall, and its closing claim -- nothing is taken over on a hive with no plugins -- was true only of plugins a PERSON installs. Upstream installs some itself, and those are the ones that went missing. Listing it as a package is better than the preinstall it replaces: store pinned, no runtime fetch from grafana.com, survives a state reset. Its Logs/Traces/Profiles siblings stay off -- they front Loki, Tempo and Pyroscope, none of which this swarm runs.
583 lines
26 KiB
Nix
583 lines
26 KiB
Nix
# The swarm's metrics UI: one Grafana for the whole swarm, in a
|
||
# `swarm-grafana` nixos-container next to the VictoriaMetrics store it reads.
|
||
#
|
||
# Two containers rather than one, on the operator's call: Grafana can be
|
||
# restarted, reconfigured or broken without taking the TSDB down with it.
|
||
# They are a pair, not a unit.
|
||
#
|
||
# Dashboards are provisioned from config, deliberately not deployed from git.
|
||
{
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||
pkgs,
|
||
lib,
|
||
config,
|
||
...
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||
}:
|
||
let
|
||
cfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.grafana;
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networkCfg = config.services.hyperhive.network;
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hyperhiveCfg = config.services.hyperhive;
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||
gatewayCfg = hyperhiveCfg.gateway;
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tlsCfg = hyperhiveCfg.tls;
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autheliaCfg = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.authelia;
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vmCfg = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.victoriametrics;
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swarmDomain = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.domain;
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||
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caTrust = import ./lib/hive-ca-trust.nix { inherit lib tlsCfg gatewayCfg; };
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# Total on a null swarm domain for the same reason every sibling module is:
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# the required-domain assertion in hive-network.nix should be what an
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# operator sees, not a coercion error from here.
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domainBase = if swarmDomain == null then "invalid" else swarmDomain;
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# The all-local case: this host runs BOTH Grafana and the swarm's authelia,
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# so the minted secret can be moved without an operator. Same split the
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# forge and matrix modules document.
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ssoLocal = cfg.enable && autheliaCfg.enable;
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autheliaUrl = toString autheliaCfg.url;
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# Where the plaintext lands inside the container. Under /var/lib rather
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# than /run: Grafana may start before the delivery unit on a later boot,
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# and a secret that evaporates on reboot turns a working login into an
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# intermittent one.
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secretPath = "/var/lib/grafana-oidc/${cfg.oidc.clientId}.secret";
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# Grafana's own datasource-encryption key. Generated in-container (see the
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# unit below) because nothing outside the container ever reads it — unlike
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# the OIDC secret above, whose other reader is authelia's container.
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secretKeyPath = "/var/lib/grafana-secret/secret_key";
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socketPath = "${cfg.socketDir}/grafana.sock";
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# Both static NixOS ids, and both checked rather than assumed: nginx has
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# `ids.gids.nginx = 60`, Grafana has `ids.uids.grafana = 196` — but there is
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# deliberately no `ids.gids.grafana`, which is why the OIDC-secret unit
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# below lands its file root-group at 0400 instead of reaching for one.
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nginxGid = config.ids.gids.nginx;
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grafanaUid = config.ids.uids.grafana;
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# Format-locked by Grafana: the generic OAuth callback is always
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# `<root_url>/login/generic_oauth`. Declared once here and read by both
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# the authelia client and Grafana itself.
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redirectUri = "https://${cfg.domain}/login/generic_oauth";
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in
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{
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options.services.hyperhive.swarm.grafana = {
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enable = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.bool;
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default = false;
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description = ''
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Run the swarm's metrics UI on this host. Off by default and not
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derived from {option}`services.hyperhive.enable`: a swarm has one
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Grafana, so enabling it is a decision about swarm topology rather
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than about whether hyperhive is installed.
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'';
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};
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package = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.package;
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default = pkgs.grafana;
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defaultText = lib.literalExpression "pkgs.grafana";
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description = "Grafana package to run.";
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};
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machine = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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readOnly = true;
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default = "swarm-grafana";
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description = ''
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Container name. Read-only: the name appears in host paths and in
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`machinectl`, so it is a fact other modules may read rather than a
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knob.
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'';
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};
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domain = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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default = "grafana.${domainBase}";
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defaultText = lib.literalExpression ''"grafana.''${services.hyperhive.swarm.domain}"'';
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description = ''
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Name the gateway serves this on. A sibling of the swarm's other
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service names, so the swarm-services sub-CA can issue for it — see
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`hive-tls.nix` for why a service name being a sibling rather than a
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child decides which CA may sign it.
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⚠️ Changing this changes the OAuth redirect URI, which authelia
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matches exactly. Both sides move together because both derive from
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this option; an operator who pins one by hand breaks the login.
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'';
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};
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socketDir = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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default = "/run/swarm-grafana";
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description = ''
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Directory holding the unix socket Grafana serves on, shared between
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the host (where nginx runs) and the container (where Grafana runs).
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⚠️ **Grafana takes no TCP port at all, and that is the point.** Every
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swarm service container shares the host's network namespace, so a
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port is a swarm-wide resource that two modules can silently both
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claim — which is exactly what happened: Grafana defaulted to
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upstream's 3000, so does the forge, and `grafana.<swarm-domain>`
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served the forge with no bind error and nothing in any log.
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A socket has a path, and a path collision is a build-time conflict
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rather than a runtime coin toss.
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'';
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};
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datasourceUrl = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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default = "http://127.0.0.1:${toString vmCfg.port}";
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defaultText = lib.literalExpression ''"http://127.0.0.1:''${toString services.hyperhive.swarm.victoriametrics.port}"'';
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description = ''
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Where the provisioned datasource points. Defaults to the metrics
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store on this host, which is the only place it can be: that store
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binds loopback, so a Grafana somewhere else could not reach it
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anyway. Set explicitly if a deployment fronts VictoriaMetrics with
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something that does listen wider.
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'';
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};
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oidc = {
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clientId = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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default = "swarm-grafana";
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description = ''
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The authelia OIDC client id. Names the application rather than
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the protocol, per the convention in
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{option}`services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.oidc.clients`.
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'';
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};
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role = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.enum [
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"Viewer"
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"Editor"
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"Admin"
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];
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default = "Admin";
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example = "Editor";
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description = ''
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Grafana org role every SSO user is assigned.
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`Admin` by default, and that is a considered default rather than
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a permissive one: the login form is disabled whenever SSO is
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configured, so this is the *only* way anyone reaches Grafana —
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a `Viewer` default would produce a swarm nobody can administer.
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Passing authelia already means being an operator of this swarm;
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its user store is the small, `swarmctl`-managed one.
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Lower it if a swarm ever grows read-only operators, which is a
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one-line change here.
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'';
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};
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};
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plugins = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.package;
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default = [ pkgs.grafanaPlugins.grafana-metricsdrilldown-app ];
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defaultText = lib.literalExpression "[ pkgs.grafanaPlugins.grafana-metricsdrilldown-app ]";
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example = lib.literalExpression "[ pkgs.grafanaPlugins.grafana-piechart-panel ]";
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description = ''
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Grafana plugins to install, as packages. Declarative rather than
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installed through the UI, which is the only shape that works here:
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plugin management is **server-admin** scoped, and on an SSO hive
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nobody holds that role — `users.auto_assign_org_role` grants an
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*org* role, and the built-in local admin that does hold server
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admin cannot log in because the login form is disabled whenever
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SSO is configured.
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That is a deliberate pair of decisions rather than an oversight,
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and this option is the way through it: plugins live in the store
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and in git, so they survive a container rebuild and a state reset,
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and the container needs no runtime egress to grafana.com.
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⚠️ This list is the ONLY way a plugin reaches this Grafana.
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Setting it at all disables upstream's `preinstall` mechanism (see
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the `declarativePlugins` comment below), which is what normally
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fetches the Drilldown apps on first start — so a plugin left off
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this list is absent, not merely un-pinned.
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Metrics Drilldown is on by default because this swarm's Grafana
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exists to read VictoriaMetrics, and the queryless metrics browser
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is the part of that people actually reach for. Its Logs / Traces /
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Profiles siblings are deliberately NOT here: they front Loki,
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Tempo and Pyroscope, none of which this swarm runs, so they would
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install a UI for a backend that does not answer.
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'';
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};
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};
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config = lib.mkIf (hyperhiveCfg.enable && cfg.enable) {
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# The gateway name and the quick-link, both inside `cfg.enable` — that
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# guard is the load-bearing part. Every hive in a swarm may know this UI
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# exists, but only the host that RUNS it may claim the name; a client
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# hive declaring the vhost would answer for a service it does not have.
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services.hyperhive.gateway.localNames = [ cfg.domain ];
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services.hyperhive.swarm.controller.links = [
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{
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label = "Grafana";
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icon = "📊";
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url = "https://${cfg.domain}/";
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}
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];
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# One declaration, two readers. Grafana's callback URL is format-locked
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# to its own root URL; making the operator restate it in authelia's
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# client list would be a second source of truth for a string whose
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# mismatch is a silently rejected login.
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#
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# `kind` is left at its `interactive` default: a person logs in here.
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services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.oidc.clients = lib.mkIf ssoLocal [
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{
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id = cfg.oidc.clientId;
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description = "HyperHive swarm metrics";
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redirectUris = [ redirectUri ];
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}
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];
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assertions = [
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{
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# Grafana reaches the token endpoint server-to-server, so a null URL
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# would become a request to `null/api/oidc/token` — a DNS failure
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# several layers from its cause. Only reachable by enabling authelia
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# and clearing its `url`, which is why it is an assertion and not a
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# fallback.
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assertion = !ssoLocal || autheliaCfg.url != null;
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message = ''
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services.hyperhive.swarm.grafana requires
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services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.url when authelia is enabled.
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Grafana exchanges its authorization code at
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`''${url}/api/oidc/token` from inside its container. With the URL
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null there is no endpoint to name.
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'';
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||
}
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];
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# Websockets: Grafana Live streams panel updates over one, and without
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# the upgrade headers dashboards load and then never refresh — which
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# reads as stale data rather than as a proxy fault.
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services.nginx.virtualHosts."${cfg.domain}" = (gatewayCfg.lib.tlsFor cfg.domain) // {
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listen = gatewayCfg.lib.listen;
|
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extraConfig = gatewayCfg.lib.securityHeaders;
|
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locations."/" = {
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proxyPass = "http://unix:${socketPath}:/";
|
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proxyWebsockets = true;
|
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extraConfig = ''
|
||
# Grafana builds its OAuth redirect from the ORIGINAL request.
|
||
# Without these every request looks like it arrived at 127.0.0.1
|
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# over plain http, and the redirect sent to authelia names a
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# host the browser cannot reach.
|
||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
|
||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $host;
|
||
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
|
||
'';
|
||
};
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
# Order the container after the host CA service so the bind source below
|
||
# exists before nspawn sets the mount up.
|
||
systemd.services."container@${cfg.machine}" = caTrust.containerOrdering;
|
||
|
||
# The socket directory, created host-side before the container starts.
|
||
# nixos-container refuses to start when a bind source is missing, so this
|
||
# rule is a prerequisite of the mount rather than a tidiness measure.
|
||
#
|
||
# Owned by Grafana's uid so it can create the socket, group nginx so the
|
||
# gateway can traverse; `0750` keeps everything else out. Numeric ids
|
||
# because the host has no `grafana` account — Grafana lives in the
|
||
# container, and only the number crosses that boundary.
|
||
systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
|
||
"d ${cfg.socketDir} 0750 ${toString grafanaUid} ${toString nginxGid} - -"
|
||
];
|
||
|
||
# The secret delivery. It runs on the HOST because that is the only place
|
||
# both container trees are addressable: they share this host's network
|
||
# namespace, which makes them feel co-located, but their filesystem roots
|
||
# are separate — Grafana cannot open a path inside authelia's tree
|
||
# however local the port looks.
|
||
#
|
||
# ⚠️ Deliberately a copy and not a `bindMounts` entry. nixos-container
|
||
# refuses to start when a bind source is missing, and this secret does
|
||
# not exist until authelia's first boot has minted it — so binding it
|
||
# would make Grafana wait on a file that waits on a container that starts
|
||
# after it.
|
||
systemd.services.swarm-grafana-oidc-secret = lib.mkIf ssoLocal {
|
||
description = "deliver Grafana's OIDC client secret from authelia";
|
||
after = [ "container@${autheliaCfg.machine}.service" ];
|
||
requires = [ "container@${autheliaCfg.machine}.service" ];
|
||
before = [ "container@${cfg.machine}.service" ];
|
||
wantedBy = [ "container@${cfg.machine}.service" ];
|
||
serviceConfig = {
|
||
Type = "oneshot";
|
||
RemainAfterExit = true;
|
||
SyslogIdentifier = "swarm-grafana-oidc-secret";
|
||
# ⚠️ Longer than the wait below, and that is the whole point:
|
||
# `DefaultTimeoutStartSec` is 90s, so a 120s bounded wait is killed
|
||
# by systemd at 90 — before it can emit the error naming the file it
|
||
# waited for. The timeout has to outlive the thing it is timing.
|
||
TimeoutStartSec = "180s";
|
||
};
|
||
path = [ pkgs.coreutils ];
|
||
script = ''
|
||
set -euo pipefail
|
||
|
||
src=${lib.escapeShellArg "${autheliaCfg.hostClientSecretDir}/${cfg.oidc.clientId}.secret"}
|
||
dst=${lib.escapeShellArg "/var/lib/nixos-containers/${cfg.machine}${secretPath}"}
|
||
|
||
# authelia's container is up, but its first-boot generator may still
|
||
# be minting. Bounded wait, then fail: a silent skip here produces a
|
||
# Grafana whose only login path dead-ends.
|
||
deadline=$(( SECONDS + 120 ))
|
||
while [ ! -s "$src" ]; do
|
||
if [ "$SECONDS" -ge "$deadline" ]; then
|
||
echo "authelia has not minted $src after 120s" >&2
|
||
exit 1
|
||
fi
|
||
sleep 2
|
||
done
|
||
|
||
# Owned by Grafana's own uid, unlike the matrix sibling which lands
|
||
# root-owned: tuwunel's secret is read by `LoadCredential` as root
|
||
# before the sandbox exists, whereas Grafana expands `$__file{}`
|
||
# itself, as itself, while parsing its config. These containers set
|
||
# no `privateUsers`, so the host uid is the container uid, and both
|
||
# sides take it from the same static NixOS id.
|
||
#
|
||
# Group is root, not grafana, and that is forced rather than chosen:
|
||
# `ids.uids.grafana` is a static id but there is no `ids.gids.grafana`
|
||
# — the group's gid is allocated at activation inside the container,
|
||
# so the host cannot know it at eval time. Harmless here because 0400
|
||
# grants the group nothing; if this mode ever widens, the gid has to
|
||
# be discovered at runtime rather than assumed.
|
||
install -D -m 0400 -o ${toString config.ids.uids.grafana} -g 0 "$src" "$dst"
|
||
'';
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
containers.${cfg.machine} = {
|
||
autoStart = true;
|
||
ephemeral = false;
|
||
# Shared host netns, like every sibling swarm container: the gateway
|
||
# reaches this at 127.0.0.1:<port>.
|
||
privateNetwork = false;
|
||
|
||
# The socket directory, shared with the host so nginx can reach in.
|
||
#
|
||
# ⚠️ It has to be a bind mount rather than a path both sides happen to
|
||
# know: a container's `/run` is an nspawn tmpfs, so it is NOT visible
|
||
# from the host at `/var/lib/nixos-containers/<name>/run`. The host
|
||
# creates the directory (tmpfiles rule below, which also fixes
|
||
# ownership) and nspawn mounts it in — the same shape the per-agent
|
||
# `/run/hive-agent/<name>/web.sock` already uses.
|
||
bindMounts = {
|
||
${cfg.socketDir} = {
|
||
hostPath = cfg.socketDir;
|
||
isReadOnly = false;
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
// caTrust.bindMount;
|
||
|
||
config =
|
||
{ ... }:
|
||
{
|
||
imports = [
|
||
(import ./swarm-container-resolver.nix {
|
||
inherit (networkCfg) bridgeIp;
|
||
dnsConsumers = [ "grafana.service" ];
|
||
})
|
||
# Grafana is Go, and `SSL_CERT_FILE` *replaces* the default store
|
||
# rather than adding to it — so it needs the system CAs and the
|
||
# hive CA concatenated, not the CA alone. Without it the browser
|
||
# half of the login succeeds and the server-to-server token
|
||
# exchange fails `x509: unknown authority`.
|
||
(caTrust.trustBundle {
|
||
inherit pkgs;
|
||
name = cfg.machine;
|
||
consumers = [ "grafana" ];
|
||
})
|
||
];
|
||
|
||
system.stateVersion = "26.05";
|
||
|
||
# This container shares the host netns, so its own firewall.service
|
||
# would rewrite the HOST ruleset at every boot. The host firewall
|
||
# owns all filtering.
|
||
networking.firewall.enable = false;
|
||
# resolvconf stays off because the resolver unit imported above
|
||
# owns /etc/resolv.conf. Leaving it on would let host-tracking
|
||
# regenerate the file empty, since the host's copy doesn't cross
|
||
# the boundary after start.
|
||
networking.resolvconf.enable = lib.mkForce false;
|
||
|
||
# Grafana's `secret_key` has **no default in nixpkgs** and an
|
||
# assertion refuses the build without one — which is how the first
|
||
# version of this module broke a deploy. It signs the datasource
|
||
# secrets in Grafana's own database.
|
||
#
|
||
# Generated in-container on first boot, like authelia's own keys and
|
||
# for the same reason: nothing outside this container ever reads it,
|
||
# which makes in-container generation right rather than merely
|
||
# easier. (The OIDC client secret is delivered host-side precisely
|
||
# because it has a second reader.)
|
||
#
|
||
# ⚠️ Generated ONCE and kept — the `-s` guard is load-bearing.
|
||
# Rotating this key does not re-encrypt what it already encrypted, so
|
||
# a fresh key on every boot would leave Grafana unable to decrypt its
|
||
# own stored datasource secrets. Under /var/lib, never /run.
|
||
systemd.services.swarm-grafana-secret-key = {
|
||
description = "generate Grafana's datasource encryption key on first boot";
|
||
wantedBy = [ "grafana.service" ];
|
||
before = [ "grafana.service" ];
|
||
serviceConfig = {
|
||
Type = "oneshot";
|
||
RemainAfterExit = true;
|
||
# Same User/Group/StateDirectory as grafana itself, so systemd
|
||
# creates the directory owned by the account that has to read
|
||
# the file — no chown, no mode juggling.
|
||
User = "grafana";
|
||
Group = "grafana";
|
||
StateDirectory = "grafana-secret";
|
||
StateDirectoryMode = "0700";
|
||
SyslogIdentifier = "swarm-grafana-secret-key";
|
||
};
|
||
path = [
|
||
pkgs.openssl
|
||
pkgs.coreutils
|
||
];
|
||
script = ''
|
||
set -euo pipefail
|
||
key=${lib.escapeShellArg secretKeyPath}
|
||
if [ ! -s "$key" ]; then
|
||
umask 077
|
||
openssl rand -hex 32 > "$key"
|
||
echo "generated Grafana's datasource encryption key"
|
||
fi
|
||
'';
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
# The group Grafana chgrps its socket to. Declared here because a
|
||
# container has its own user database — the host knowing gid 60 as
|
||
# `nginx` means nothing in here, only the number crosses.
|
||
#
|
||
# The name is local and arbitrary; the gid is the contract.
|
||
users.groups.gateway-nginx.gid = nginxGid;
|
||
users.users.grafana.extraGroups = [ "gateway-nginx" ];
|
||
|
||
services.grafana = {
|
||
enable = true;
|
||
package = cfg.package;
|
||
|
||
# Passed through unconditionally, empty default included.
|
||
# Upstream distinguishes `null` from `[ ]`, and both differences
|
||
# favour always handing it a list:
|
||
#
|
||
# - `null` points the plugin path at grafana's mutable
|
||
# `<dataDir>/plugins`; any list points it at a store path.
|
||
# Switching on the day someone adds their first plugin would
|
||
# bury that change inside an unrelated one.
|
||
# - upstream defaults its plugin update-check to
|
||
# `declarativePlugins == null`, so a list also stops the
|
||
# container phoning grafana.com. That is the no-runtime-egress
|
||
# property this option exists for — it should not arrive only
|
||
# once a plugin happens to be listed.
|
||
#
|
||
# - 🩸 and the one this comment used to miss: it also sets
|
||
# upstream's `plugins.preinstall_disabled` (nixpkgs'
|
||
# grafana.nix defaults it to `declarativePlugins != null`,
|
||
# saying preinstall "causes issues with declarativePlugins").
|
||
# Preinstall is what fetches the Drilldown apps on first
|
||
# start, so claiming this directory silently removes them.
|
||
# That is why the option's default is not empty.
|
||
#
|
||
# The claim that used to sit here — "nothing is taken over on a
|
||
# hive with no plugins, manual installation is impossible anyway"
|
||
# — reasoned only about plugins a PERSON installs. Upstream
|
||
# installs some itself, and those are the ones that went missing.
|
||
declarativePlugins = cfg.plugins;
|
||
|
||
settings = {
|
||
server = {
|
||
# Already upstream's default (measured), but pinned rather
|
||
# than inherited: the gateway is the only intended client,
|
||
# and this being loopback is what keeps the UI from being
|
||
# published on whatever else the host is reachable on.
|
||
# A unix socket, not a port. `socket_gid` is nginx's, so the
|
||
# gateway can connect; `0660` keeps everyone else out.
|
||
#
|
||
# ⚠️ Grafana chowns the socket to `socket_gid`, and a
|
||
# non-root process may only chgrp to a group it is a MEMBER
|
||
# of — hence the group declared for `grafana` in this
|
||
# container's own user database below. Without that
|
||
# membership Grafana starts, fails the chown, and the socket
|
||
# is unreachable by nginx with nothing obviously wrong.
|
||
protocol = "socket";
|
||
socket = socketPath;
|
||
socket_gid = nginxGid;
|
||
socket_mode = "0660";
|
||
domain = cfg.domain;
|
||
# Grafana builds its own OAuth redirect from this. Left at
|
||
# upstream's `%(protocol)s://%(domain)s:%(http_port)s/` it
|
||
# would name `http://<domain>:3000/`, which authelia has
|
||
# never heard of.
|
||
root_url = "https://${cfg.domain}/";
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
analytics = {
|
||
reporting_enabled = false;
|
||
check_for_updates = false;
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
users.auto_assign_org_role = cfg.oidc.role;
|
||
|
||
# ⚠️ `$__file{}`, and required rather than optional: nixpkgs
|
||
# dropped the default and asserts on null, so without this the
|
||
# whole host fails to build. The unit below generates it.
|
||
security.secret_key = "$__file{${secretKeyPath}}";
|
||
|
||
# No local password path at all when SSO is configured. This
|
||
# is not tidiness: Grafana ships an `admin`/`admin` account,
|
||
# and this vhost is on the public gateway.
|
||
auth.disable_login_form = ssoLocal;
|
||
}
|
||
// lib.optionalAttrs ssoLocal {
|
||
"auth.generic_oauth" = {
|
||
enabled = true;
|
||
name = "HyperHive";
|
||
client_id = cfg.oidc.clientId;
|
||
# ⚠️ `$__file{}`, never the secret itself — anything else
|
||
# here is world-readable in the nix store. Note the module's
|
||
# own leak assertion does NOT cover this key (it checks
|
||
# `database.password`, `security.admin_password` and
|
||
# datasource `secureJsonData`), so nothing but this comment
|
||
# stands between a literal and the store.
|
||
client_secret = "$__file{${secretPath}}";
|
||
scopes = "openid profile email groups";
|
||
auth_url = "${autheliaUrl}/api/oidc/authorization";
|
||
token_url = "${autheliaUrl}/api/oidc/token";
|
||
api_url = "${autheliaUrl}/api/oidc/userinfo";
|
||
use_pkce = true;
|
||
};
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
provision.datasources.settings = {
|
||
apiVersion = 1;
|
||
datasources = [
|
||
{
|
||
name = "VictoriaMetrics";
|
||
type = "prometheus";
|
||
uid = "swarm-victoriametrics";
|
||
url = cfg.datasourceUrl;
|
||
access = "proxy";
|
||
isDefault = true;
|
||
}
|
||
];
|
||
};
|
||
};
|
||
};
|
||
};
|
||
};
|
||
}
|