61 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
61 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
# The operator/agent boundary
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Design rationale for hyperhive's two-principal trust model. The
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*implementation* work — container network isolation, the unifying
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gateway, core-daemon privsep — is tracked as `area:ops` issues on
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the forge.
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Today "the operator surface" and "the agent surface" are a
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*convention*, not a boundary — nothing stops a container from
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curling the core daemon on `localhost:<port>`, or another agent's
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web UI. Network isolation, the gateway, and privsep together turn
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that convention into an enforced boundary.
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## Two principals, two paths
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- **Operator** — reaches every UI (the dashboard + every
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per-agent page) through the gateway, on one origin.
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Operator-authority actions (approve / deny, answer-as-operator,
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lifecycle POSTs) are served by the core daemon and only
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reachable via the gateway.
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- **Agent** — speaks only for itself, only over its per-agent
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unix socket. The socket's identity *is* the agent (see
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`docs/conventions.md`, "identity = socket"). An agent must not
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be able to reach the core daemon's HTTP surface, another
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agent's socket, or another agent's web UI.
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## Design rule
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**Operator-authority actions never get a per-agent-socket entry
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point.** They live on the core backend.
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Worked example — answering an operator-targeted question is a
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`POST /answer-question/{id}` on the core dashboard, *never* an
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`AgentRequest` variant. If it were a per-agent-socket request, an
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agent could `curl` its own socket and spoof an operator answer.
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The per-agent web UI POSTs cross-origin to the core for these
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(see the inline-answer feature — the loose-ends section on each
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agent page).
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## Why network isolation is the load-bearing step
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Containers currently share the host network namespace, so a
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container can reach `localhost:<core-port>`, the dashboard, and
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every other agent's web port. Until that changes, the
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operator/agent split is on the honour system — every boundary
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claim above is aspirational. Network isolation is what makes the
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boundary *real*; the gateway and privsep are ergonomics and
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defence-in-depth layered on top.
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The `area:ops` issues followed this sequencing:
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1. **Gateway** — pure ergonomics win, unblocks same-origin (lets the
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cross-origin CORS shim on `/answer-question/{id}` go away), no
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behavioural risk. An nginx nixos-container now sits in front of all
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surfaces; per-agent UIs are proxied under `/agent/<name>/`.
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2. **Network isolation** — the load-bearing step that turns the
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honour-system split into an enforced boundary. In progress.
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3. **Privsep** — defence in depth on the core process; `hive-c0re`
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runs as the unprivileged `hive-core` user and delegates root
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operations to `hive-priv`, a narrow socket-activated helper. See
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[`docs/security.md`](security.md) for the privilege boundary table.
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