9407db69b5
Each store reader (forge's OIDC fetch and token publisher, matrix's OIDC fetch, the hive collector's fetch, Grafana's OIDC fetch and admin password, the queue's callout-xkey unit, the CI runner's token fetch, the swarm collector's OIDC fetch) used to read `deploy.bao.enable` in its own module to add `after`/`wants` on `container@<store machine>` and `after`/`requires` on `swarm-bao-pki.service`. Per the #3742 ruling, that cross-service read moves into glue-bao-readers-store-order.nix, which sets the same edges when the store and the reader are both on this host and restates each reader's own gate so no stub unit is rendered. Rendered `after`/`wants`/`requires` are identical as sets to main on 16 fixtures, store here and elsewhere. New module-eval cases in existing fixtures pin both arms. Part of #3742.
1259 lines
60 KiB
Nix
1259 lines
60 KiB
Nix
{
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pkgs,
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lib,
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config,
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...
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}:
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let
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cfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.forge;
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gatewayCfg = config.services.hyperhive.gateway;
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hyperhiveDomain = config.services.hyperhive.domain;
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swarmDomain = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.domain;
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tlsCfg = config.services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.tls;
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networkCfg = config.services.hyperhive.network;
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# Forgejo's name for the login source. A constant, not an option: it
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# is the key this module's own idempotency check looks up, so making
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# it configurable would buy nothing and add a way for the lookup and
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# the row to disagree. Duplicated in ./service.nix, which builds
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# `sso.redirectUri` from it; keep the two equal.
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ssoSourceName = "authelia";
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# `url` is the half of the authelia module that exists on EVERY hive —
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# null when no SSO provider is configured anywhere, which the
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# assertion below turns into an eval failure rather than a discovery
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# request to `null/.well-known/...`.
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autheliaCfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia;
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deployCfg = config.services.hyperhive.deploy;
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autheliaUrl = autheliaCfg.url;
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autheliaDiscoveryUrl = "${toString autheliaUrl}/.well-known/openid-configuration";
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# Where the plaintext lands inside the forge container. Under
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# /var/lib rather than /run: the forge may start before the delivery
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# unit on a later boot, and a secret that evaporates on reboot turns a
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# working login into an intermittent one.
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forgeSecretPath = "/var/lib/forgejo-oidc/${cfg.sso.clientId}.secret";
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# The same file seen from the host, where `swarm-bao-forge-oidc` writes it.
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# Follows `clientSecretFile`, so an operator-chosen path is where the
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# fetched secret lands.
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hostSecretPath = "/var/lib/nixos-containers/hive-forge${toString deployCfg.forgejo.sso.clientSecretFile}";
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# Where swarm-secret-publish on authelia's host leaves this client's secret.
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# The forge publisher's store role grants read on this one path.
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oidcStorePath = "secret/swarm/services/${cfg.sso.clientId}/oidc/client";
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# The swarm-controller's forge account. Same name as
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# `swarm-controller.nix`'s existing `queueClientId` — the account is
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# provisioned to *match* that identity, not invented independently —
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# "swarm controller having one identity with stuff derived from it is
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# the right shape" was the swarm-level design call this account
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# follows. A constant, not an option:
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# nothing here makes the name configurable without also updating
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# `swarm-controller.nix`'s own constant, so a shared option would
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# invite the two to drift rather than prevent it.
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swarmControllerForgeUser = "swarm-controller";
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# Where the minted token lands inside the forge container — under
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# forgejo's own state dir for the same "survives a reboot" reason as
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# `forgeSecretPath` above.
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swarmControllerTokenPath = "/var/lib/forgejo/swarm-controller-token";
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# The same file from the host, which is where its publisher reads and watches it.
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swarmControllerTokenHostPath = "/var/lib/nixos-containers/hive-forge${swarmControllerTokenPath}";
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# Where `swarm-bao-forge-publisher` puts it: `controllerForgeTokenLeaf` in
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# ../swarm-bao.nix, under the KV mount.
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controllerTokenStorePath = "secret/swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token";
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baoCfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.bao;
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storeRetry = import ../lib/store-retry.nix { };
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storeRefreshTimer = import ../lib/store-refresh-timer.nix { };
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atomicWriteSecret = import ../lib/atomic-write-secret.nix { };
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refreshConsumer = import ../lib/refresh-consumer.nix { };
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havePublisherIdentity =
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deployCfg.bao.forgePublisherClientCertFile != null
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&& deployCfg.bao.forgePublisherClientKeyFile != null;
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caTrust = import ../lib/hive-ca-trust.nix { inherit lib tlsCfg gatewayCfg; };
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# ROOT_URL forgejo advertises in clone links + outbound URLs.
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# `cfg.domain` doubles as both the forgejo `DOMAIN` setting AND the
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# gateway vhost server-name, so ROOT_URL just uses it directly. The
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# gateway always terminates TLS (self-signed is the implicit floor when
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# neither `tls.certDir` nor ACME is configured), so the forge is always
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# advertised over `https` on `httpsPort` — the canonical 443 elides the
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# port suffix. Operators can still override via `cfg.rootUrl` for
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# bespoke shapes. Both bindings are duplicated in ./service.nix, which
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# builds `sso.redirectUri` from them; keep the two equal.
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defaultRootUrl =
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let
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portSuffix = if gatewayCfg.httpsPort == 443 then "" else ":${toString gatewayCfg.httpsPort}";
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in
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"https://${cfg.domain}${portSuffix}/";
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effectiveRootUrl = if cfg.rootUrl != null then cfg.rootUrl else defaultRootUrl;
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# `actionsFromSelf` resolves `uses:` against this forge, which then has to
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# hold every action a workflow in `.forgejo/workflows/` names.
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actionsFromSelf = deployCfg.forgejo.actionsFromSelf;
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actionMirrors =
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map
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(name: {
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upstream = "https://github.com/actions/${name}";
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dest = "actions/${name}";
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})
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[
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"checkout"
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"upload-artifact"
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];
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# Minus any dest the operator already declared, which would duplicate it.
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effectiveMirrors =
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deployCfg.forgejo.mirrors
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++ lib.optionals actionsFromSelf (
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lib.filter (a: !(lib.any (m: m.dest == a.dest) deployCfg.forgejo.mirrors)) actionMirrors
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);
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# Share host netns — forgejo's HTTP / SSH listeners then look
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# exactly like a host-side service, no port forwarding dance,
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# and agent containers (which also share host netns) reach it
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# via plain `localhost`.
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privateNetwork = false;
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in
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{
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# Private Forgejo in a `hive-forge` nixos-container, shared host
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# netns, on the one host with `deploy.forgejo.enable`. Agents reach it
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# at `forge.<domain>` via the gateway. State at
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# `/var/lib/nixos-containers/hive-forge/var/lib/forgejo/` survives
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# restart. See `docs/networking/gateway.md::hive-forge container shape`.
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imports = [
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./service.nix
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(lib.mkRemovedOptionModule
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[ "services" "hyperhive" "deploy" "forgejo" "hostSwarmControllerTokenFile" ]
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''
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The forge publishes the swarm-controller's forge token to the swarm
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secret store (swarm-bao-forge-publisher), and the controller reads it
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there. Remove this definition; the file it named is read by nothing now
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and can be deleted.
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''
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)
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];
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# What ./service.nix declares is what the forge IS from any hive's point of
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# view: the names and ports it answers on, the URLs it advertises, and the
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# client id it is registered under. What lives here is what the host running
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# it decides — which build it runs, how it is served, what it mirrors, and
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# where its host-local secrets sit. Same rule as ./swarm-victorialogs.nix,
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# and the renames are in ./deploy.nix with the rest.
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options.services.hyperhive.deploy.forgejo = {
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package = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.package;
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default = pkgs.forgejo;
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defaultText = lib.literalExpression "pkgs.forgejo";
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description = ''
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Forgejo package to run inside the container. Defaults to
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`pkgs.forgejo` (the latest release line) rather than the
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nixpkgs-module default of `pkgs.forgejo-lts`, because LTS
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lags far behind on schema and the DB easily ends up "newer
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than the binary" if the operator ever ran a non-LTS forgejo
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against the same state dir. Override to `pkgs.forgejo-lts`
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if you actively want the slower release train.
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'';
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};
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openFirewall = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.bool;
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default = false;
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example = true;
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description = ''
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Open `httpPort` + `sshPort` in the host firewall. Off by
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default (secure-by-default): agent containers reach the forge
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at `forge.<domain>` via the gateway (not directly), and the
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host reaches it on loopback — so the firewall opens only
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matter for access from outside the host. Flip to `true` when
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you want the operator's browser or external git clients to
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hit the forge directly.
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'';
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};
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mirrors = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.listOf (
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lib.types.submodule {
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options = {
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upstream = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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example = "https://github.com/actions/checkout";
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description = "Upstream clone URL to mirror from.";
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};
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dest = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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example = "actions/checkout";
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description = ''
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Local `<owner>/<repo>` the pull-mirror is created at. The
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`<owner>` org is auto-created if missing. Keep mirror dests
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in their own orgs (e.g. `actions/*`) — separate from the
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hive-c0re-managed namespaces (config/shared/agents/core) so
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the seed never collides with core's own provisioning.
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'';
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};
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};
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}
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);
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default = [ ];
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example = lib.literalExpression ''
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[ { upstream = "https://github.com/actions/checkout"; dest = "actions/checkout"; } ]
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'';
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description = ''
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General-purpose Forgejo **pull-mirrors** to auto-seed on the local
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forge. Each entry is created as a real Forgejo pull-mirror (it
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re-syncs from `upstream` out-of-band), not a one-off pushed clone —
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so a host-resolver blip leaves a *stale* mirror, never a hard
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failure on whatever reads it.
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With {option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.forgejo.actionsFromSelf`
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enabled (the default on a host that runs the swarm-controller),
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`actions/checkout` and `actions/upload-artifact` mirrors are appended
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to this list.
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'';
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};
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actionsFromSelf = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.bool;
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default = deployCfg.swarm-controller.enable;
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defaultText = lib.literalExpression "config.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.enable";
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example = false;
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description = ''
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Resolve a workflow's `uses: <org>/<action>@vN` against this forge
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instead of `data.forgejo.org`, and add `actions/checkout` and
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`actions/upload-artifact` pull-mirrors to
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{option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.forgejo.mirrors` so those steps
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have something to resolve to. A CI job's actions then need no
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external DNS; only the mirrors' re-sync does.
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Defaults to on when this host runs the swarm-controller, which seeds
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the mirrors, and off otherwise. Setting it `true` on a host without
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the controller leaves both actions unresolved: nothing seeds the
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mirrors, and the warning about unseeded mirrors fires.
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Any other action a workflow names has to be mirrored here too. Set to
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`false` to resolve actions from `data.forgejo.org` and seed no mirror.
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'';
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};
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# The other half of the SSO pair: the client *id* is swarm-wide (it has
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# to match authelia's register), the secret is a path on this host. The
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# design note for the login source itself is with the id.
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sso.clientSecretFile = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
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default = null;
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example = "/var/lib/forgejo-oidc/forgejo.secret";
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description = ''
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Path **inside the forge container** holding the client
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secret's plaintext.
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A path, never a value: an OIDC client secret has two holders
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in two containers (authelia keeps a hash, this forge needs the
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plaintext), and a literal written here would be rendered into
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the world-readable nix store.
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Set to `/var/lib/forgejo-oidc/<client id>.secret` wherever the
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forge runs. `swarm-bao-forge-oidc` writes the secret here from the
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swarm secret store, whichever path this names.
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Null is refused at eval: a forge that boots with SSO
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half-configured presents as a login button that always fails,
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which is harder to diagnose than an eval error.
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'';
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};
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};
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config = lib.mkIf deployCfg.forgejo.enable {
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# This service's own gateway surface: the vhost that fronts it and
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# the name the hive resolver answers for. Declared here rather than
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# in the gateway so the forge's public face lives with the forge —
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# the gateway supplies the primitives (`lib.listen`, `lib.tlsFor`,
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# `lib.securityHeaders`) and never needs to know this service by
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# name.
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services.hyperhive.gateway.localNames = [ cfg.domain ];
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services.hyperhive.gateway.enable = lib.mkDefault true;
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# The forge container resolves the rest of the hive through dnsmasq.
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services.hyperhive.gateway.dns.enable = lib.mkDefault true;
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# The metrics endpoint, declared once: the collector both scrapes this
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# URL and derives from it the audience its token is minted for.
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#
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# ⚠️ Written as the exact URL a collector requests, because that is
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# what authelia compares against — this string agreeing with the
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# `location` block above it is the whole mechanism. A near miss is a
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# correctly minted token refused at the target.
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services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.publishedScrapeTargets = {
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forgejo = "https://${cfg.domain}/metrics";
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};
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# `server_name = forge.domain`, proxies all `/` → forgejo. Tuned for
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# git: `client_max_body_size 1G`, `proxy_read_timeout 1h` (multi-GB
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# clones). SSH stays direct on `forge.sshPort`. See
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# `docs/networking/gateway.md`.
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services.nginx.virtualHosts = {
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"${cfg.domain}" = (gatewayCfg.lib.tlsFor cfg.domain) // {
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listen = gatewayCfg.lib.listen;
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extraConfig = gatewayCfg.lib.securityHeaders;
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locations = {
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"/" = {
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proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:${toString cfg.httpPort}/";
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proxyWebsockets = true;
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extraConfig = ''
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proxy_buffering off;
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client_max_body_size 1G;
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proxy_read_timeout 1h;
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proxy_send_timeout 1h;
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'';
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};
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# ⚠️ EXACT match, and that is what makes this safe. Forgejo
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# serves `/metrics` on the same listener the `/` prefix above
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# already proxies, so without a more specific location the
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# endpoint would ride that catch-all to anyone. `= /metrics`
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# outranks the `/` prefix in nginx, so this location — and its
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# auth — is the one that runs.
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"= /metrics" = {
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proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:${toString cfg.httpPort}/metrics";
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extraConfig = ''
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auth_request /__forge_metrics_authz;
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'';
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};
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# The subrequest. Same implementation and header set as
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# `swarm-ui.nix` uses, for the same reason: `X-Original-URL`
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# and `X-Original-Method` are what authelia's `auth-request`
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# implementation reads.
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#
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# ⚠️ NO `error_page 401 =302` here, and its absence is the
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# whole point. The swarm UI redirects an unauthenticated
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# browser to a login page; a scraper handed that 302 would
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# follow it and parse an HTML page as metrics. A machine-facing
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# location lets the 401 reach the client unchanged.
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"= /__forge_metrics_authz" = {
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# By NAME, not `127.0.0.1`: this gateway and authelia are not
|
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# required to share a host, so the loopback literal encoded a
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# co-location nobody had agreed to. The name resolves here
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# today and resolves off-host later without this line moving.
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proxyPass = "https://${autheliaCfg.domain}/api/authz/auth-request";
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# nixpkgs appends its OWN `Host $host` after extraConfig,
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# which would override verifiedProxyTo's — see the comment
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# on verifiedProxyTo in hive-gateway/vhost-lib.nix.
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recommendedProxySettings = false;
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extraConfig = ''
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internal;
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${gatewayCfg.lib.verifiedProxyTo autheliaCfg.domain}
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proxy_pass_request_body off;
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proxy_set_header Content-Length "";
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proxy_set_header X-Original-Method $request_method;
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proxy_set_header X-Original-URL $scheme://$http_host$request_uri;
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|
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $http_host;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
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'';
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};
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};
|
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};
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};
|
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assertions = [
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{
|
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# Fail at EVAL, not at boot. The alternative failure is a login
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# button that always 401s, three layers from the missing file.
|
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assertion = deployCfg.forgejo.sso.clientSecretFile != null;
|
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message = ''
|
|
The forge's SSO login source requires
|
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services.hyperhive.deploy.forgejo.sso.clientSecretFile — the path
|
|
(inside the forge container) holding the OIDC client secret's
|
|
plaintext.
|
|
|
|
It is set by default wherever the forge runs, and
|
|
swarm-bao-forge-oidc writes the secret there from the swarm
|
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secret store. Remove the definition that set it to null.
|
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'';
|
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}
|
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{
|
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assertion = cfg.rootUrl == null || lib.hasSuffix "/" cfg.rootUrl;
|
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message = ''
|
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services.hyperhive.swarm.forge.rootUrl must end with "/". forgejo's
|
|
ROOT_URL contract requires a trailing slash for correct
|
|
relative-link generation; without it forgejo emits URLs like
|
|
`https://forge.example.com.user.id` instead of
|
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`https://forge.example.com/user.id`. Got: ${toString cfg.rootUrl}
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'';
|
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}
|
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{
|
|
# `cfg.domain` can't be empty — would render `.<hive>` shaped
|
|
# garbage as both server_name (nginx wildcard catch-all) and
|
|
# /etc/hosts entry (invalid). The default derives a non-empty
|
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# `forge.<domain>`, but an operator-set empty string should fail
|
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# loud.
|
|
assertion = cfg.domain != "";
|
|
message = ''
|
|
services.hyperhive.swarm.forge.domain = "" is rejected. The
|
|
rendered URLs would be invalid (nginx wildcard catch-all
|
|
for an empty server_name, /etc/hosts rejects empty entries).
|
|
Either leave at default (auto-derives to
|
|
"forge.<services.hyperhive.domain>"), or set a non-empty
|
|
hostname like "forge.example.com" or "git.internal".
|
|
'';
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
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# Each mirror dest must be exactly `<owner>/<repo>` — the seed
|
|
# splits on the single slash to create the org + repo.
|
|
assertion = lib.all (m: lib.length (lib.splitString "/" m.dest) == 2) effectiveMirrors;
|
|
message = ''
|
|
Every services.hyperhive.deploy.forgejo.mirrors[].dest must be exactly
|
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"<owner>/<repo>" (one slash). Got: ${lib.concatMapStringsSep ", " (m: m.dest) effectiveMirrors}
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'';
|
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}
|
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{
|
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# Keep mirror orgs out of the hyperhive-managed namespaces
|
|
# (config/shared/agents/core) so the seed never races / collides
|
|
# with the provisioning of those orgs.
|
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assertion = lib.all (
|
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m:
|
|
!(lib.elem (builtins.elemAt (lib.splitString "/" m.dest) 0) [
|
|
"config"
|
|
"shared"
|
|
"agents"
|
|
"core"
|
|
])
|
|
) effectiveMirrors;
|
|
message = ''
|
|
services.hyperhive.deploy.forgejo.mirrors[].dest must not place a mirror
|
|
in a hyperhive-managed org (config / shared / agents / core) —
|
|
those are provisioned by hyperhive itself and a mirror there would
|
|
collide. Use a dedicated org (e.g. "actions/checkout").
|
|
'';
|
|
}
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
# `caTrust.containerOrdering` orders this unit after `hive-tls-ca.service`
|
|
# in self-signed mode (see the hive-ca-trust helper), so the CA bind
|
|
# source exists before nspawn sets the mount up.
|
|
systemd.services."container@hive-forge" = caTrust.containerOrdering;
|
|
|
|
containers.hive-forge = {
|
|
autoStart = true;
|
|
ephemeral = false;
|
|
# Journal files on the host, not inside the container: nixpkgs hardcodes
|
|
# --link-journal=try-guest, and EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS expands after it.
|
|
extraFlags = [ "--link-journal=host" ];
|
|
inherit privateNetwork;
|
|
# Self-signed mode: bind the hive's trust bundle read-only so forgejo
|
|
# can trust the gateway's self-signed leaf for outbound webhook
|
|
# delivery. The bind-mount, the `container@` ordering and the bundle
|
|
# the container's consumers read all come from the hive-ca-trust
|
|
# helper — see the container's `imports` for the consumption half.
|
|
bindMounts = caTrust.bindMount;
|
|
config =
|
|
{ pkgs, ... }:
|
|
let
|
|
# Build a custom static-root that is the standard forgejo data
|
|
# output with our theme CSS added. Using STATIC_ROOT_PATH instead
|
|
# of tmpfiles / bind-mounts means the theme is always present in
|
|
# the nix store — no separate hive-forge container rebuild needed,
|
|
# and no persistent-state directory involved.
|
|
staticRootWithTheme = pkgs.runCommand "forgejo-static-with-theme" { } ''
|
|
cp -r --no-preserve=mode,ownership ${deployCfg.forgejo.package.data}/. $out/
|
|
mkdir -p $out/public/assets/css
|
|
cp ${./theme-catppuccin-vibec0re.css} \
|
|
$out/public/assets/css/theme-catppuccin-vibec0re.css
|
|
# Replace the default Forgejo logo + favicon with the hyperhive
|
|
# mark. Files in public/assets/img/ are served before built-ins.
|
|
mkdir -p $out/public/assets/img
|
|
cp ${../../../branding/hyperhive.svg} $out/public/assets/img/logo.svg
|
|
cp ${../../../branding/hyperhive.svg} $out/public/assets/img/favicon.svg
|
|
cp ${../../../branding/hyperhive.png} $out/public/assets/img/logo.png
|
|
cp ${../../../branding/hyperhive.png} $out/public/assets/img/favicon.png
|
|
cp ${../../../branding/hyperhive.png} $out/public/assets/img/avatar_default.png
|
|
'';
|
|
in
|
|
{
|
|
imports = [
|
|
./../../container-modules/swarm-container.nix
|
|
# Ask the hive's dnsmasq, not the host's resolvers. The swarm
|
|
# names — the controller's webhook endpoint, the SSO issuer —
|
|
# resolve to the bridge and have no public records, so a
|
|
# container using the host's resolvers gets "no such host" for
|
|
# every one of them while the same name resolves fine one
|
|
# container over.
|
|
#
|
|
# Both units that make an outbound call are consumers, for the
|
|
# same reason the trust bundle below names both: an unordered
|
|
# resolver write is a race that only shows up on a cold boot.
|
|
(import ./../../container-modules/swarm-container-resolver.nix {
|
|
inherit (networkCfg) bridgeIp;
|
|
dnsConsumers = [
|
|
"forgejo.service"
|
|
"forgejo-sso-source.service"
|
|
];
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
# Forgejo is Go, and `SSL_CERT_FILE` *replaces* the default store
|
|
# rather than adding to it — so it needs the system CAs and the
|
|
# store's root concatenated, not the root alone, or public mirror
|
|
# fetches lose every anchor they had.
|
|
#
|
|
# BOTH units that make an outbound HTTPS call are consumers, not
|
|
# just the obvious one: `forgejo-sso-source` fetches the issuer's
|
|
# `.well-known/openid-configuration` under the store's root, and it
|
|
# once shipped without the trust its sibling had.
|
|
(caTrust.trustBundle {
|
|
inherit pkgs;
|
|
name = "hive-forge";
|
|
consumers = [
|
|
"forgejo"
|
|
"forgejo-sso-source"
|
|
];
|
|
})
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
system.stateVersion = "25.11";
|
|
services.hyperhive.swarmContainer = { inherit privateNetwork; };
|
|
|
|
services.forgejo = {
|
|
enable = true;
|
|
package = deployCfg.forgejo.package;
|
|
database.type = "sqlite3";
|
|
lfs.enable = true;
|
|
settings = {
|
|
DEFAULT.APP_NAME = "HyperHive";
|
|
server = {
|
|
DOMAIN = cfg.domain;
|
|
ROOT_URL = effectiveRootUrl;
|
|
HTTP_PORT = cfg.httpPort;
|
|
START_SSH_SERVER = true;
|
|
SSH_PORT = cfg.sshPort;
|
|
SSH_LISTEN_PORT = cfg.sshPort;
|
|
BUILTIN_SSH_SERVER_USER = "git";
|
|
DISABLE_SSH = false;
|
|
# Point forgejo at our extended static root that includes
|
|
# the custom theme CSS baked straight into the nix store.
|
|
STATIC_ROOT_PATH = staticRootWithTheme;
|
|
};
|
|
# Local sign-up off. An agent's account is made by
|
|
# swarm-controller over the admin API, a human's by their
|
|
# first authelia login (`oauth2_client` below), which this
|
|
# does not block: forgejo's auto-registration checks only
|
|
# `ALLOW_ONLY_INTERNAL_REGISTRATION`
|
|
# (`routers/web/auth/oauth.go`, 16.0.5).
|
|
service = {
|
|
DISABLE_REGISTRATION = true;
|
|
REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false;
|
|
};
|
|
# A first login through the authelia source creates the
|
|
# account, named after authelia's `preferred_username` — the
|
|
# authelia username, not the opaque `sub`.
|
|
#
|
|
# ⚠️ `ACCOUNT_LINKING = login`, never `auto`. A login whose
|
|
# name is already taken does not create an account; `auto`
|
|
# would then hand the SSO user the existing one. Agents,
|
|
# `core` and `swarm-controller` all have local accounts here,
|
|
# the last two site admins, and `swarmctl user add` refuses
|
|
# none of those names. `login` asks for the existing
|
|
# account's own password instead, which an agent's or a
|
|
# service account's never leaves the forge.
|
|
oauth2_client = {
|
|
ENABLE_AUTO_REGISTRATION = true;
|
|
USERNAME = "preferred_username";
|
|
ACCOUNT_LINKING = "login";
|
|
};
|
|
repository = {
|
|
DEFAULT_BRANCH = "main";
|
|
DEFAULT_PRIVATE = "private";
|
|
};
|
|
# Not an option: a swarm-integrated, auto-deployed forge
|
|
# always has metrics, behind the protected `= /metrics`
|
|
# location on its gateway vhost.
|
|
#
|
|
# No `TOKEN` here on purpose. Forgejo can guard this itself
|
|
# with a static bearer, but the swarm authenticates the
|
|
# scraper at the gateway, so a second credential system per
|
|
# service would buy nothing and would be the one that stops
|
|
# getting rotated.
|
|
metrics.ENABLED = true;
|
|
# The two per-dimension breakdowns, alongside the endpoint
|
|
# itself: `gitea_issues_by_label{label=…}` and
|
|
# `gitea_issues_by_repository{repository=…}`. Off by default
|
|
# upstream because they are the only metrics here whose series
|
|
# count grows with the CONTENT of the forge rather than with
|
|
# its feature set — so the question is cardinality, and it was
|
|
# measured rather than assumed.
|
|
#
|
|
# Measured on this instance: ~19 distinct labels and ~29 repos
|
|
# ⇒ **well under 100 series**, against a store that took +2234
|
|
# from nine host scrapers. Two orders of magnitude below the
|
|
# cost that already argued against shipping a `process`
|
|
# scraper, so the breakdowns are affordable here.
|
|
#
|
|
# ⚠️ Both grow with repo and label count, not with traffic. A
|
|
# forge that grew to thousands of repos would want this
|
|
# revisited — that is a real trigger, unlike a time-based one:
|
|
# `count(gitea_issues_by_repository)` answers it directly.
|
|
metrics.ENABLED_ISSUE_BY_LABEL = true;
|
|
metrics.ENABLED_ISSUE_BY_REPOSITORY = true;
|
|
# Repo migrations / pull-mirrors fetch from the source
|
|
# URL *inside* Forgejo. hyperhive code is synced from
|
|
# `localhost` (and the host LAN), which Forgejo's
|
|
# migration guard blocks by default ("cannot import from
|
|
# disallowed hosts"). Allow loopback + RFC-1918 sources
|
|
# so an in-hive mirror of the hyperhive repo works.
|
|
migrations.ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = true;
|
|
# Forgejo's docs say an empty `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` allows
|
|
# every domain, but that's not true in practice on the
|
|
# versions we've hit this on — the migration guard still
|
|
# rejects genuinely public hosts ("cannot import from
|
|
# disallowed hosts") unless the wildcard is set
|
|
# explicitly (a known upstream doc/behavior mismatch,
|
|
# tracked upstream in the go-gitea project). Public-domain
|
|
# pull/push mirrors (agents' personal repos synced to
|
|
# forge.darkest.space, etc.) were failing every sync
|
|
# attempt without this.
|
|
migrations.ALLOWED_DOMAINS = "*";
|
|
# Forgejo's webhook SSRF allow-list, a strict whitelist.
|
|
# `external` (public unicast only) stays, or user-repo webhooks to
|
|
# github/slack break; both hyperhive hosts are added because their
|
|
# webhooks target a private gateway IP `external` denies. The
|
|
# swarm's host was the missing one, and every swarm-controller
|
|
# delivery was refused for it.
|
|
#
|
|
# Not gated on `deploy.swarm-controller.enable`: in a spread deployment the
|
|
# forge and the swarm host are different machines, so that
|
|
# per-host flag is false exactly where this entry is needed.
|
|
webhook.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = lib.concatStringsSep "," (
|
|
lib.unique (
|
|
[
|
|
"external"
|
|
hyperhiveDomain
|
|
]
|
|
++ lib.optional (swarmDomain != null) swarmDomain
|
|
)
|
|
);
|
|
log.LEVEL = "Warn";
|
|
# Pinned explicitly rather than left to upstream's default
|
|
# (currently `bleve`, a separate full-text index Forgejo
|
|
# builds/maintains itself). `db` searches the database
|
|
# directly instead — no second store that can silently
|
|
# disagree with it. Found via a false-positive search bug:
|
|
# `hive-forge list --search` returned matches with zero
|
|
# literal occurrences of the search term, consistent with a
|
|
# bleve index that drifted stale against the DB with
|
|
# nothing to detect the drift. At this repo's scale (~3.4k
|
|
# issues+PRs) a DB scan costs nothing worth noticing, and
|
|
# it's the same substring semantics `--search`'s own doc
|
|
# already promises — bleve's relevance ranking buys nothing
|
|
# we use here. Config-only (part of the forgejo unit, so a
|
|
# rebuild restarts it for free); the old bleve index
|
|
# directory is left on disk, unused, rather than risk
|
|
# deleting the wrong thing.
|
|
indexer.ISSUE_INDEXER_TYPE = "db";
|
|
ui = {
|
|
DEFAULT_THEME = "catppuccin-vibec0re";
|
|
THEMES = "catppuccin-vibec0re,forgejo-auto,forgejo-light,forgejo-dark,gitea-auto,gitea-light,gitea-dark";
|
|
};
|
|
# Point forgejo at the GPG key generated by the
|
|
# forgejo-gpg-init service below. SIGNING_KEY = "default"
|
|
# resolves via the forgejo process's git config
|
|
# (`user.signingkey`) — which forgejo-gpg-init sets to the
|
|
# generated key — not by scanning GNUPGHOME. GNUPGHOME is
|
|
# the keyring forgejo signs from; must be absolute +
|
|
# writeable by the forgejo user.
|
|
"repository.signing" = {
|
|
SIGNING_KEY = "default";
|
|
GNUPGHOME = "/var/lib/forgejo/.gnupg";
|
|
};
|
|
# Enable Forgejo Actions so the runner registration token
|
|
# API endpoint is available. Without this the endpoint
|
|
# returns "runner registration token not found" regardless
|
|
# of token scopes. swarm-controller's `forge::runner_token`
|
|
# reads it.
|
|
actions.ENABLED = true;
|
|
# With `actionsFromSelf`, resolve `uses: <org>/<action>@vN` from
|
|
# THIS instance (the seeded `actions/*` pull-mirrors)
|
|
# instead of the upstream default `data.forgejo.org` — keeps
|
|
# the checkout step on loopback, immune to a host-resolver
|
|
# blip. `self` = forgejo expands actions against its
|
|
# own ROOT_URL.
|
|
actions.DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL = lib.mkIf actionsFromSelf "self";
|
|
# F3 (federation) computes its data dir relative to the
|
|
# forgejo binary, which lands in the read-only nix
|
|
# store and crashes anything that touches the F3
|
|
# subsystem — including `forgejo admin user create`,
|
|
# which init-ses F3 even when ENABLED=false. Pin the
|
|
# path absolute alongside the disable so the init
|
|
# resolution succeeds before the flag is checked.
|
|
"F3" = {
|
|
ENABLED = false;
|
|
PATH = "/var/lib/forgejo/data/f3";
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
environment.systemPackages = [
|
|
pkgs.forgejo
|
|
pkgs.gnupg
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
# Forgejo's local Actions-artifact storage defaults to
|
|
# `{APP_DATA_PATH}/actions_artifacts` (=
|
|
# `/var/lib/forgejo/data/actions_artifacts`), but Forgejo does not
|
|
# pre-create that directory. The artifact endpoint ingests the
|
|
# chunked upload, then the merge-chunks step does an `lstat` on a
|
|
# tmp dir under it and fails:
|
|
# Error merge chunks: lstat
|
|
# /var/lib/forgejo/data/actions_artifacts/tmpNNN: no such file or
|
|
# directory
|
|
# so every `upload-artifact` step dies after the build succeeds.
|
|
# Pre-create the dir (forgejo-owned) so uploads actually persist.
|
|
# `actions.ENABLED = true` registers the endpoints; this gives them
|
|
# somewhere to write.
|
|
systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
|
|
"d /var/lib/forgejo/data 0750 forgejo forgejo - -"
|
|
"d /var/lib/forgejo/data/actions_artifacts 0750 forgejo forgejo - -"
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
# Ensure Forgejo has a usable GPG signing key so UI merges / CRUD
|
|
# commits are signed instead of erroring "does not have a signing
|
|
# key". This service (a) generates a key in forgejo's persistent
|
|
# keyring iff one isn't already present — keyed on the actual
|
|
# secret key, NOT a stamp file, so a partial state wipe that loses
|
|
# the key still regenerates it — and (b) points the forgejo user's
|
|
# git config at it (`user.signingkey` + commit/tag gpgsign), which
|
|
# is how `SIGNING_KEY = "default"` actually resolves. Runs as the
|
|
# forgejo user before forgejo on each start; idempotent (the keygen
|
|
# is guarded, the git-config is a cheap re-set).
|
|
systemd.services.forgejo-gpg-init = {
|
|
description = "ensure Forgejo's GPG signing key + git signing config";
|
|
# Start before forgejo so the key + signing config are ready when
|
|
# forgejo reads repository.signing on startup.
|
|
wantedBy = [ "forgejo.service" ];
|
|
before = [ "forgejo.service" ];
|
|
serviceConfig = {
|
|
Type = "oneshot";
|
|
User = "forgejo";
|
|
Group = "forgejo";
|
|
# Pin the journal identity (else it's the `script` store-path wrapper).
|
|
SyslogIdentifier = "forgejo-gpg-init";
|
|
};
|
|
# GNUPGHOME = the keyring forgejo signs from; HOME so
|
|
# `git config --global` lands where the forgejo process reads it.
|
|
environment = {
|
|
GNUPGHOME = "/var/lib/forgejo/.gnupg";
|
|
HOME = "/var/lib/forgejo";
|
|
};
|
|
path = [
|
|
pkgs.gnupg
|
|
pkgs.git
|
|
pkgs.gnugrep
|
|
pkgs.gawk
|
|
pkgs.coreutils
|
|
];
|
|
script = ''
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
mkdir -p "$GNUPGHOME"
|
|
chmod 700 "$GNUPGHOME"
|
|
|
|
# Generate only if no secret key is present (key-based guard,
|
|
# not a stamp — a stamp can outlive the key after a state wipe
|
|
# and wrongly suppress regeneration).
|
|
if ! gpg --list-secret-keys --with-colons 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^sec:'; then
|
|
printf '%s\n' \
|
|
'%no-protection' \
|
|
'Key-Type: RSA' \
|
|
'Key-Length: 4096' \
|
|
'Name-Real: HyperHive Forge' \
|
|
'Name-Email: forgejo@hive' \
|
|
'Expire-Date: 0' \
|
|
| gpg --batch --gen-key
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Point git (hence Forgejo's SIGNING_KEY="default") at the key.
|
|
KEYID=$(gpg --list-secret-keys --keyid-format long --with-colons \
|
|
| awk -F: '/^sec:/ { print $5; exit }')
|
|
if [ -n "$KEYID" ]; then
|
|
git config --global user.signingkey "$KEYID"
|
|
git config --global commit.gpgsign true
|
|
git config --global tag.gpgsign true
|
|
fi
|
|
'';
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
# Register authelia as an OIDC login source.
|
|
#
|
|
# ⚠️ Ordered AFTER forgejo, unlike forgejo-gpg-init above, and
|
|
# the difference is not stylistic: a login source is a row in
|
|
# forgejo's database, and on a fresh hive that database does
|
|
# not exist until forgejo has started and run its migrations.
|
|
# Running first would either fail or let the CLI initialise a
|
|
# schema behind the server's back.
|
|
#
|
|
# Idempotency is by QUERY, not by a stamp file — same reason
|
|
# spelled out for the GPG key above: a stamp survives a state
|
|
# wipe that took the thing it claims exists, and then suppresses
|
|
# the repair.
|
|
systemd.services.forgejo-sso-source = {
|
|
description = "register authelia as Forgejo's OIDC login source";
|
|
after = [ "forgejo.service" ];
|
|
requires = [ "forgejo.service" ];
|
|
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
|
|
serviceConfig = {
|
|
Type = "oneshot";
|
|
RemainAfterExit = true;
|
|
User = "forgejo";
|
|
Group = "forgejo";
|
|
SyslogIdentifier = "forgejo-sso-source";
|
|
};
|
|
# `FORGEJO_CUSTOM` (the forgejo-prefixed name, not `GITEA_CUSTOM`)
|
|
# is how the CLI finds the app.ini upstream's module wrote.
|
|
#
|
|
# This unit is also a trust-bundle consumer (declared in the
|
|
# container's `imports` above, which is where `SSL_CERT_FILE`
|
|
# comes from): registering the login source makes an **outbound
|
|
# HTTPS call** to `<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration`,
|
|
# served under the store's `pki` root, which the default store has
|
|
# never heard of.
|
|
# It once shipped without the trust `forgejo.service` had, and
|
|
# failed every single time with `x509: certificate signed by
|
|
# unknown authority`. The trust belongs to every process that
|
|
# makes the call, not to the obvious consumer.
|
|
environment = {
|
|
FORGEJO_CUSTOM = "/var/lib/forgejo/custom";
|
|
};
|
|
path = [
|
|
deployCfg.forgejo.package
|
|
pkgs.coreutils
|
|
pkgs.gnugrep
|
|
];
|
|
script = ''
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
secret=$(cat ${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.forgejo.sso.clientSecretFile})
|
|
if [ -z "$secret" ]; then
|
|
echo "empty OIDC client secret at ${deployCfg.forgejo.sso.clientSecretFile}" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# `--secret` is the only input forgejo offers: there is no
|
|
# --secret-file and no env var, though its sibling
|
|
# `forgejo-cli actions register` has both. So the value is
|
|
# on this argv for the length of one exec, inside this
|
|
# container, where forgejo already stores it at rest in the
|
|
# login-source row — root and forgejo are the only
|
|
# principals here, and root can read the resting copy
|
|
# anyway. Accepted deliberately (see docs/swarm/), not
|
|
# overlooked; upstream gap filed.
|
|
# An ARRAY, not a string. A string of arguments has to be
|
|
# word-split at the call site to become argv, and splitting
|
|
# does not honour the quotes inside the value — the shell
|
|
# already finished quote removal by then, so
|
|
# `--scopes 'openid profile email groups'` arrives as four
|
|
# words with two stray apostrophes, and forgejo rejects the
|
|
# last three as unexpected arguments. An array carries the
|
|
# boundaries instead of re-deriving them from whitespace.
|
|
args=(
|
|
--provider openidConnect
|
|
--key ${lib.escapeShellArg cfg.sso.clientId}
|
|
--auto-discover-url ${lib.escapeShellArg autheliaDiscoveryUrl}
|
|
--scopes ${lib.escapeShellArg "openid profile email groups"}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if forgejo admin auth list | grep -q "[[:space:]]${ssoSourceName}[[:space:]]"; then
|
|
id=$(forgejo admin auth list \
|
|
| grep "[[:space:]]${ssoSourceName}[[:space:]]" \
|
|
| cut -f1)
|
|
forgejo admin auth update-oauth --id "$id" \
|
|
--name ${lib.escapeShellArg ssoSourceName} \
|
|
--secret "$secret" "''${args[@]}"
|
|
echo "updated OIDC login source ${ssoSourceName} (id $id)"
|
|
else
|
|
forgejo admin auth add-oauth \
|
|
--name ${lib.escapeShellArg ssoSourceName} \
|
|
--secret "$secret" "''${args[@]}"
|
|
echo "added OIDC login source ${ssoSourceName}"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Assert the EFFECT, not the command. The bug this replaced
|
|
# was a malformed argv: the unit ran the right verb, forgejo
|
|
# rejected it, and every check that read the rendered script
|
|
# still passed. A registration that does not appear in the
|
|
# source list did not happen, whatever the exit code said.
|
|
if ! forgejo admin auth list | grep -q "[[:space:]]${ssoSourceName}[[:space:]]"; then
|
|
echo "login source ${ssoSourceName} is absent after registration" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
'';
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
# Provision the swarm-controller's forge account + access token.
|
|
# Unconditional (not gated on any SSO/co-location option): forge
|
|
# is a swarm-wide singleton, so this account exists wherever
|
|
# forge does, regardless of which host (if any) actually runs
|
|
# swarm-controller — the design requirement was explicit that
|
|
# this must work even when forge and swarm-controller don't
|
|
# share a host.
|
|
systemd.services.forgejo-swarm-controller-account = {
|
|
description = "provision the swarm-controller's forge account + access token";
|
|
after = [ "forgejo.service" ];
|
|
requires = [ "forgejo.service" ];
|
|
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
|
|
serviceConfig = {
|
|
Type = "oneshot";
|
|
RemainAfterExit = true;
|
|
User = "forgejo";
|
|
Group = "forgejo";
|
|
SyslogIdentifier = "forgejo-swarm-controller-account";
|
|
};
|
|
# `FORGEJO_CUSTOM`, same reason as `forgejo-sso-source` above:
|
|
# every `forgejo admin` invocation needs it to find the app.ini
|
|
# the upstream module wrote, not just the auth-source verb.
|
|
environment = {
|
|
FORGEJO_CUSTOM = "/var/lib/forgejo/custom";
|
|
};
|
|
path = [
|
|
deployCfg.forgejo.package
|
|
pkgs.coreutils
|
|
pkgs.gnugrep
|
|
];
|
|
script = ''
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
${atomicWriteSecret}
|
|
|
|
# Idempotent by query, same reasoning as the SSO unit: assert
|
|
# the effect, not the command's exit code. `--admin`: the
|
|
# controller creates repos in the agents org on the swarm's
|
|
# behalf, which needs org-admin standing to do at all. Only
|
|
# applies to a fresh account — `forgejo admin` has no
|
|
# in-place "promote to admin" verb (checked: `admin user`
|
|
# offers create/list/change-password/delete/
|
|
# generate-access-token/must-change-password/reset-mfa and
|
|
# nothing else), and mara's call was not to delete+recreate
|
|
# an already-provisioned non-admin account to work around
|
|
# that (every hive from before this fix has one) — she
|
|
# promotes those by hand instead.
|
|
if ! forgejo admin user list | grep -qE "[[:space:]]${swarmControllerForgeUser}[[:space:]]"; then
|
|
forgejo admin user create \
|
|
--username ${lib.escapeShellArg swarmControllerForgeUser} \
|
|
--email ${lib.escapeShellArg "${swarmControllerForgeUser}@hyperhive.local"} \
|
|
--admin --random-password --must-change-password=false
|
|
echo "created forge account ${swarmControllerForgeUser}"
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! forgejo admin user list | grep -qE "[[:space:]]${swarmControllerForgeUser}[[:space:]]"; then
|
|
echo "forge account ${swarmControllerForgeUser} absent after creation" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
token_path=${lib.escapeShellArg swarmControllerTokenPath}
|
|
|
|
# Token minting is idempotent by the token FILE's existence,
|
|
# not a separate stamp: the file is both the record of "already
|
|
# done" and the thing that has to survive, so a state wipe that
|
|
# deletes it correctly triggers a re-mint instead of being
|
|
# silently masked by a stamp that outlived what it claims exists.
|
|
if [ ! -s "$token_path" ]; then
|
|
# `write:admin` added for `swarm-controller::forge::Client::
|
|
# ensure_agent_user` (the `CreateForgeUser` jobq node) —
|
|
# Forgejo's `admin_create_user` HTTP endpoint refused every
|
|
# call with "token does not have at least one of required
|
|
# scope(s): [write:admin]" without it, an already-deployed
|
|
# swarm hitting this the moment that node shipped. A host
|
|
# whose token was minted before this scope was added won't
|
|
# pick it up automatically — the `[ ! -s "$token_path" ]`
|
|
# guard above only mints when the file is absent, by design
|
|
# (see its own comment) — so an existing deployment needs
|
|
# its token file deleted to force a re-mint with the new
|
|
# scope.
|
|
#
|
|
# Token name carries a timestamp suffix rather than the
|
|
# fixed `swarm-controller-boot` this used to be — a real
|
|
# incident, not a hypothetical: deleting the token *file*
|
|
# (the remediation above) doesn't delete the token Forgejo
|
|
# already has under that name, so re-running this unit hit
|
|
# "Command error: access token name has been used already"
|
|
# and failed outright. Same fix `hive-c0re::forge::users::
|
|
# mint_token` already uses for its own agent tokens, for
|
|
# the identical reason — a monotonic suffix means a re-mint
|
|
# can never collide with whatever this account already has.
|
|
out=$(forgejo admin user generate-access-token \
|
|
--username ${lib.escapeShellArg swarmControllerForgeUser} \
|
|
--token-name "swarm-controller-boot-$(date +%s)" \
|
|
--scopes "write:repository,write:organization,write:issue,read:user,write:admin")
|
|
token=$(printf '%s' "$out" | grep -oE '[0-9a-f]{32,}' | head -n1)
|
|
if [ -z "$token" ]; then
|
|
echo "no token-shaped word in forgejo's generate-access-token output" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
atomic_write_secret 0600 "" "$token_path" "$token"
|
|
echo "minted forge access token for ${swarmControllerForgeUser}"
|
|
fi
|
|
'';
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
# The client this login source authenticates as is registered by
|
|
# ../glue-forge-oidc-client.nix, wherever authelia runs.
|
|
services.hyperhive.deploy.forgejo.sso.clientSecretFile = lib.mkDefault forgeSecretPath;
|
|
|
|
# The forge's OIDC client secret, out of the swarm secret store under the
|
|
# forge publisher's leaf — the one route, wherever authelia runs. Same
|
|
# shape as ../hive-matrix.nix's `swarm-bao-matrix-oidc`: the login and the
|
|
# read both fail loudly, and `storeRetry` retries until the publisher on
|
|
# authelia's host has written the secret.
|
|
#
|
|
# On the host, where that leaf is: the container holds no store identity.
|
|
# A host with no publisher leaf fails here, naming the options, rather than
|
|
# rendering no unit.
|
|
systemd.services.swarm-bao-forge-oidc = {
|
|
description = "fetch the forge's OIDC client secret from the swarm secret store";
|
|
# Ordered after the store where it runs here
|
|
# (../glue-bao-readers-store-order.nix); elsewhere the timeout below
|
|
# bounds the attempt.
|
|
before = [ "container@hive-forge.service" ];
|
|
wantedBy = [
|
|
"multi-user.target"
|
|
"container@hive-forge.service"
|
|
];
|
|
path = [
|
|
deployCfg.bao.package
|
|
pkgs.coreutils
|
|
pkgs.systemd
|
|
];
|
|
# ../lib/store-retry.nix. The container waits for one attempt; a secret a
|
|
# later attempt lands re-runs `forgejo-sso-source` (below).
|
|
inherit (storeRetry) startLimitBurst startLimitIntervalSec;
|
|
serviceConfig = storeRetry.serviceConfig // {
|
|
# No `RemainAfterExit`: the timer below starts this again, and
|
|
# starting an active unit is a no-op.
|
|
Type = "oneshot";
|
|
SyslogIdentifier = "swarm-bao-forge-oidc";
|
|
TimeoutStartSec = 30;
|
|
};
|
|
environment = {
|
|
BAO_ADDR = "https://${baoCfg.domain}:${toString baoCfg.port}";
|
|
}
|
|
// lib.optionalAttrs havePublisherIdentity {
|
|
BAO_CLIENT_CERT = deployCfg.bao.forgePublisherClientCertFile;
|
|
BAO_CLIENT_KEY = deployCfg.bao.forgePublisherClientKeyFile;
|
|
}
|
|
// lib.optionalAttrs (deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile != null) {
|
|
BAO_CACERT = deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile;
|
|
};
|
|
script =
|
|
if !havePublisherIdentity then
|
|
''
|
|
echo "the forge's host has no forge-publisher store identity, so it cannot read the forge's OIDC client secret: set services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.forgePublisherClientCertFile and forgePublisherClientKeyFile (they default to the leaf the store mints only where services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.enable is set on this host)" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
''
|
|
else
|
|
''
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
${atomicWriteSecret}
|
|
${refreshConsumer}
|
|
|
|
err="$(mktemp)"
|
|
trap 'rm -f "$err"' EXIT
|
|
|
|
# `-token-only` answers on stdout and skips the token helper, a
|
|
# `sh` this unit's `path` does not carry.
|
|
if ! BAO_TOKEN="$(bao login -method=cert -token-only 2>"$err")"; then
|
|
echo "could not log in to swarm-bao with the forge publisher's certificate; leaving the forge's OIDC client secret as it is." >&2
|
|
if [ -s "$err" ]; then
|
|
cat "$err" >&2
|
|
else
|
|
echo "bao failed without writing a diagnostic." >&2
|
|
fi
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
export BAO_TOKEN
|
|
|
|
if ! secret="$(bao kv get -field=value ${lib.escapeShellArg oidcStorePath} 2>"$err")"; then
|
|
echo "swarm-bao did not return ${oidcStorePath}; the forge has no OIDC client secret yet." >&2
|
|
if [ -s "$err" ]; then
|
|
cat "$err" >&2
|
|
else
|
|
echo "bao failed without writing a diagnostic." >&2
|
|
fi
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -z "$secret" ]; then
|
|
echo "swarm-bao returned an empty ${oidcStorePath}; the forge has no OIDC client secret yet." >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# `forgejo-sso-source` reads the file as forgejo. The owning uid is
|
|
# read off the container's forgejo state dir rather than assumed,
|
|
# which exists only once the container has started.
|
|
state=/var/lib/nixos-containers/hive-forge/var/lib/forgejo
|
|
if [ ! -d "$state" ]; then
|
|
echo "the forge container has not created $state yet, so the forge's OIDC client secret has no owner to be written for." >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
uid="$(stat -c %u "$state")"
|
|
|
|
mkdir -p ${lib.escapeShellArg (builtins.dirOf hostSecretPath)}
|
|
if secret_differs ${lib.escapeShellArg hostSecretPath} "$secret"; then
|
|
atomic_write_secret 0400 "$uid:$uid" ${lib.escapeShellArg hostSecretPath} "$secret"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# The login source is a row `forgejo-sso-source` writes from the
|
|
# file each time it runs.
|
|
refresh_consumer hive-forge forgejo-sso-source.service ${lib.escapeShellArg hostSecretPath}
|
|
'';
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
systemd.timers.swarm-bao-forge-oidc = storeRefreshTimer "re-read the forge's OIDC client secret from the swarm secret store";
|
|
|
|
# The reverse direction of the unit above: publish the swarm-controller's
|
|
# freshly-minted forge token OUT of the container into the swarm secret
|
|
# store, where the controller reads it wherever it runs. On the host and
|
|
# under the forge's own store identity for the reason the unit above gives,
|
|
# so nothing here asks where the store or the controller is.
|
|
#
|
|
# It runs at boot and on a switch that adds or changes it
|
|
# (`multi-user.target`), each time the container starts, and each time the
|
|
# mint writes the file
|
|
# (`systemd.paths.swarm-bao-forge-publisher` below). The mint is a oneshot in
|
|
# the container's own systemd, invisible to this one by unit name, so a
|
|
# missing file is not an error: the path unit runs this again when the mint
|
|
# writes it, the shape of `swarm-secret-publish`.
|
|
#
|
|
# ⚠️ No `RemainAfterExit`. A oneshot that stays `active (exited)` turns
|
|
# every later start into a no-op, so neither trigger would run it again.
|
|
#
|
|
# Unconditional, like the in-container unit it publishes from: forge is a
|
|
# swarm-wide singleton, so the token always gets minted and published,
|
|
# regardless of whether swarm-controller runs on this host, another host,
|
|
# or nowhere in this swarm at all. A host with no publisher leaf fails
|
|
# here, naming the options, rather than rendering no unit.
|
|
systemd.services.swarm-bao-forge-publisher = {
|
|
description = "publish the swarm-controller's forge token to the swarm secret store";
|
|
# Also ordered after the store where it runs here:
|
|
# ../glue-bao-readers-store-order.nix.
|
|
after = [
|
|
"container@hive-forge.service"
|
|
];
|
|
wantedBy = [
|
|
"multi-user.target"
|
|
"container@hive-forge.service"
|
|
];
|
|
path = [
|
|
deployCfg.bao.package
|
|
pkgs.coreutils
|
|
];
|
|
# ../lib/store-retry.nix: a sealed or unreachable store is retried.
|
|
inherit (storeRetry) startLimitBurst startLimitIntervalSec;
|
|
serviceConfig = storeRetry.serviceConfig // {
|
|
Type = "oneshot";
|
|
SyslogIdentifier = "swarm-bao-forge-publisher";
|
|
# Bounded here so the number a switch waits on is in this file. A sealed
|
|
# store answers on the port and never answers the write.
|
|
TimeoutStartSec = 60;
|
|
};
|
|
environment = {
|
|
BAO_ADDR = "https://${baoCfg.domain}:${toString baoCfg.port}";
|
|
}
|
|
// lib.optionalAttrs havePublisherIdentity {
|
|
BAO_CLIENT_CERT = deployCfg.bao.forgePublisherClientCertFile;
|
|
BAO_CLIENT_KEY = deployCfg.bao.forgePublisherClientKeyFile;
|
|
}
|
|
// lib.optionalAttrs (deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile != null) {
|
|
BAO_CACERT = deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile;
|
|
};
|
|
script =
|
|
if !havePublisherIdentity then
|
|
''
|
|
echo "the forge's host has no forge-publisher store identity, so it cannot publish the swarm-controller's forge token: set services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.forgePublisherClientCertFile and forgePublisherClientKeyFile (they default to the leaf the store mints only where services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.enable is set on this host)" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
''
|
|
else
|
|
''
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
src=${lib.escapeShellArg swarmControllerTokenHostPath}
|
|
|
|
if [ ! -s "$src" ]; then
|
|
echo "the forge has not minted $src yet; the path unit publishes it when it does" >&2
|
|
exit 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
err="$(mktemp)"
|
|
trap 'rm -f "$err"' EXIT
|
|
|
|
# `-token-only` answers on stdout and skips the token helper, a
|
|
# `sh` this unit's `path` does not carry.
|
|
if ! BAO_TOKEN="$(bao login -method=cert -token-only 2>"$err")"; then
|
|
echo "could not log in to swarm-bao with the forge publisher's certificate; the swarm-controller's forge token is not published." >&2
|
|
if [ -s "$err" ]; then
|
|
cat "$err" >&2
|
|
else
|
|
echo "bao failed without writing a diagnostic." >&2
|
|
fi
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
export BAO_TOKEN
|
|
|
|
# `value=@$src` hands bao the PATH: bao opens the file itself, so
|
|
# the token is never an argument of this process.
|
|
if ! bao kv put ${lib.escapeShellArg controllerTokenStorePath} value=@"$src" >/dev/null 2>"$err"; then
|
|
echo "swarm-bao refused the write to ${controllerTokenStorePath}." >&2
|
|
if [ -s "$err" ]; then
|
|
cat "$err" >&2
|
|
else
|
|
echo "bao failed without writing a diagnostic." >&2
|
|
fi
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
echo "published the swarm-controller's forge token to ${controllerTokenStorePath}"
|
|
'';
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
# Re-publish when the mint unit writes a token, which it can do without the
|
|
# container restarting. The file is the event: the mint runs in the
|
|
# container's own systemd, which this one cannot subscribe to.
|
|
systemd.paths.swarm-bao-forge-publisher = {
|
|
description = "watch the swarm-controller's forge token for a publish";
|
|
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
|
|
pathConfig = {
|
|
PathChanged = swarmControllerTokenHostPath;
|
|
Unit = "swarm-bao-forge-publisher.service";
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
# Unused: nothing writes or reads this host path, and it may hold a copy of
|
|
# the controller's forge token.
|
|
systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [ "r /var/lib/hyperhive-forge/swarm-controller.token" ];
|
|
|
|
networking.firewall = lib.mkIf deployCfg.forgejo.openFirewall {
|
|
allowedTCPPorts = [
|
|
cfg.httpPort
|
|
cfg.sshPort
|
|
];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
# Forward the declared pull-mirrors to the swarm-controller, which seeds
|
|
# them in its swarm-wide forge-objects pass
|
|
# (`swarm-controller/src/forge/objects.rs`), beside the orgs they live in.
|
|
# JSON-encoded list of { upstream, dest }; `[]` when nothing to seed.
|
|
#
|
|
# ⚠️ This host's `mirrors` reach a controller on THIS host only. A
|
|
# controller elsewhere reads its own host's list, so mirrors declared
|
|
# here would never be seeded; the warning below says so at eval rather
|
|
# than leaving it to be noticed as a missing repo.
|
|
systemd.services.swarm-controller.environment.SWARM_CONTROLLER_FORGE_MIRRORS =
|
|
lib.mkIf deployCfg.swarm-controller.enable (builtins.toJSON effectiveMirrors);
|
|
warnings = lib.optional (effectiveMirrors != [ ] && !deployCfg.swarm-controller.enable) ''
|
|
services.hyperhive.deploy.forgejo.mirrors (or the actions/* mirrors
|
|
deploy.forgejo.actionsFromSelf adds) is set on a host that does not run the
|
|
swarm-controller. The controller seeds mirrors from its own host's list,
|
|
so these are not seeded: declare them on the swarm-controller's host.
|
|
'';
|
|
};
|
|
}
|