hyperhive/docs/getting-started/setup.md
atlas b0edb5b2cc docs/setup: contract "cannot" in the KV-mount troubleshooting block
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# First-run setup (fresh-deploy bootstrap)
How to bring a fresh hyperhive hive online: provision accounts, open
the gateway, bootstrap swarm SSO, make matrix reachable, and spawn the
first sub-agents.
Aimed at `ruth` (the root/manager agent) on a fresh deploy, but it's a
plain reference doc — read it whenever you need the bootstrap command
sequence. All `hivectl` commands below run as **root on the host** (not
inside an agent container); the `request_*` steps run from ruth's own
turn via the MCP tools.
**Bringing up a hive that doesn't host its own swarm services?** Read
[`swarm/secrets.md`](../swarm/secrets.md) first. Everything below assumes
each credential is generated where it's read, which is true on an
all-local deploy and not otherwise — that page says which files an
operator has to place, and where.
## Step-by-step
### 1 · Forge
```bash
# Provision (or refresh) ruth's own forge account — do this first. Ruth's
# bootstrap bypasses the normal spawn-approval flow (see step 6), so unlike
# every other agent it does not get its forge account auto-provisioned —
# this manual step is still load-bearing.
hivectl forge create-user ruth
# Sub-agents spawned later (via the approval flow in step 6) get their
# forge accounts auto-provisioned — nothing to run here for them.
```
Swarm SSO creates the human operator's own forge account instead of
a manual `hivectl` step — see step 3 (`swarmctl user add`).
### 2 · Gateway (HTTP Basic auth)
```bash
# Add an operator login to the gateway (reads password from stdin)
echo "hunter2" | hivectl gateway create-user mara --password-stdin
# List existing users
hivectl gateway list-users
```
### 3 · Secret store (only when `deploy.bao`)
⚠️ **A sealed store still answers.** OpenBao starts uninitialised and
sealed, so the container is up and the port responds while every read
times out — the failure looks like a hang, not like a store that was
never initialised. Do this before you point anything at it.
Run this **on the host**. The `bao` there is a wrapper carrying this store's
address, its CA, and the host's client certificate already, so nothing needs
exporting:
```bash
sudo bao operator init # keep the keys it prints and the root token OFF this host
```
`sudo` because the client certificate and key sit under
`/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki`, which is mode `0700`.
Inside the store's container (`nixos-container root-login swarm-bao`) the same
command needs two extra pieces, because the certificate carries no IP SAN and
its DNS name resolves to the bridge from in there: export
`BAO_ADDR=https://127.0.0.1:8200` alongside `BAO_TLS_SERVER_NAME=bao.<swarm
domain>` to verify the name while connecting on loopback. The host is the
shorter path.
While you still hold that root token, mint the one credential the swarm needs
to grant itself anything. Cert auth answers a _role_, so nothing can
authenticate until some role exists — this token is what breaks that cycle,
and it's the only step that needs the root token.
```bash
# Exactly the six grants the bootstrap unit needs, and nothing else. Each was
# derived with `bao <cmd> -output-policy`, which prints what a command requires
# without running it.
bao policy write swarm-bootstrap - <<'EOF'
path "sys/policies/acl/swarm-controller" {
capabilities = ["create", "update"]
}
# Cert auth is a mount, and nothing has created it yet: reading `sys/auth` is
# how the unit checks, and `sudo` is what enabling one costs.
path "sys/auth" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "sys/auth/cert" {
capabilities = ["create", "update", "sudo"]
}
path "auth/cert/certs/swarm-controller" {
capabilities = ["create", "update"]
}
# The KV engine the controller writes agent credentials through — also absent
# on a fresh store, and checked the same way. No `sudo` here, unlike the auth
# mount above: enabling a secrets engine does not ask for it.
path "sys/mounts" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "sys/mounts/secret" {
capabilities = ["create", "update"]
}
EOF
# A token holding it. `-orphan` so it outlives the session that made it.
bao token create -policy=swarm-bootstrap -ttl=24h -orphan -display-name=swarm-bootstrap
```
Put the token's value at `services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile`
(all-local names that path for you), then rebuild. A one-shot unit **on the
host** reads it, writes the `swarm-controller` policy, enables the cert auth
method, mounts the KV engine the controller stores credentials in, and creates
the `swarm-controller` role that attaches policy to certificate. It runs there
because every API listener demands a client certificate, and the host is the
side that has one.
⏱️ **Expect the first attempt to fail if you rebuilt into this.** A rebuild
restarts the store, and the unit races it — the store answers `local node not
active` until it finishes coming up. It retries every 30s and the second
attempt is the one that usually lands. Nothing to do.
**Confirm with `systemctl status swarm-bao-controller-policy`**, which wants no
token — a successful run logs `Uploaded policy`, `Enabled cert auth method` and
`Data written to: auth/cert/certs/swarm-controller`. ⚠️ Do _not_ reach for `bao
read auth/cert/…` to check: the host's `bao` wrapper carries an address, a CA
and a client certificate but deliberately **no token**, so that read answers
`403` whether or not the role exists.
**Delete the token file only once that unit has succeeded.** It skips when the
token is absent, so a host that has finished bootstrapping stops carrying the
credential — but deleting it before the role
exists leaves the unit skipping forever with nothing to show for it, and looks
exactly like a store that was never bootstrapped. The TTL above means a
forgotten one expires rather than lingering.
<details><summary>Already bootstrapped before the KV mount existed?</summary>
A store bootstrapped by an earlier version has the policy, the auth method and
the role, but no `secret/` engine — the controller's first credential write
answers `no handler for route "secret/data/…"`. The bootstrap token can't fix it
either: the policy it was minted from names nothing under `sys/mounts`. Mount it
once with the root token from `init`:
```bash
sudo bash -c 'BAO_TOKEN="<root token>" bao secrets enable -path=secret kv-v2'
```
No rebuild needed — the unit's own check finds the mount on its next run and
leaves it alone.
</details>
Whether anything more is needed depends on
`services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.seal`:
- **`pkcs11`** (the default) — the key is bound to the host's TPM and the
store unseals itself on every restart. `init` is the only manual step.
- **`shamir`** — no TPM, so `bao operator unseal` is needed again after
every restart, with the keys `init` printed.
The store serves TLS, and on a hive that deploys it you need do nothing: a
first-boot unit mints a CA of the store's own plus the two leaves it signs —
the store's server certificate and this host's client certificate — and points
`deploy.bao.serverCertFile`, `.serverKeyFile` and `.clientCaFile` at the store's
half, `.clientCertFile`, `.clientKeyFile` and `.serverCaFile` at the reader's.
Those are `mkDefault`s, so naming your own paths wins. Do that when your
certificates come from a real internal CA; the store has no opinion about
which. A hive that does **not** deploy the store names the reader's three
itself: that leaf is issued out of band, and it's the one credential the store
can't hand you, being what opens it. ⚠️ Not the gateway's HTTPS certificates and not the hive CA — this is
**mTLS between services and the store**, a separate trust domain, because a
store that took its identity from an authority it will itself distribute could
never come up before that authority.
Making even the `init` unnecessary is tracked as a follow-up.
### 4 · Swarm SSO (only when `deploy.authelia`)
⚠️ **Required to finish the install, not optional.** Authelia treats an
empty user store as a fatal startup error, so until this runs the
container crash-loops and `auth.<swarm.domain>` answers `502 Bad
Gateway` — a working vhost in front of an upstream that refuses to
start. Skipping this step looks like a broken proxy.
```bash
# Runs as root on the host that RUNS authelia (not necessarily the
# controller host). Prints a generated password once — record it.
swarmctl user add mara --display-name Mara --email mara@example.com --group admins
```
⚠️ **Keep `--group admins`.** it's not decoration: operator-only
surfaces (the swarm UI below) are gated on that group, and an account
without it authenticates successfully and is then refused — which reads
like a broken login rather than a missing group.
If an account already exists without it, `user add` will refuse rather
than amend — adding the group afterwards is `swarmctl user update mara
--add-group admins`.
Detail, including what the password is and why this stays manual:
[`swarm/sso.md`](../swarm/sso.md).
### 5 · Swarm UI (only when `deploy.swarm-ui`, on by default with the controller)
Nothing to run — it's served on the swarm apex
(`https://<swarm.domain>/`) as soon as the host rebuilds. Two things
decide whether you can actually open it:
- **You are in `admins`** (step 3). The gateway asks authelia whether
you have a session; the rule that makes it mean _operator_ wants the
group. Without it you log in and still get bounced.
- **The name resolves to this host.** it's published to the hive's own
resolver and to `/etc/hosts` when `gateway.localHostsEntry` is on; from
anywhere else it needs a real DNS record like any other public name.
Detail, including why reachability is deliberately not the access
control: [`swarm/ui.md`](../swarm/ui.md).
### 6 · Matrix
```bash
# 5a. Ensure the hive-internal admin account exists first
hivectl matrix sync-admin
# 5b. Provision ruth's own matrix account — same bootstrap-bypass reasoning
# as forge above, still a required manual step.
hivectl matrix create-user ruth
# 5c. Invite the operator to the hive Space (and optionally to rooms)
hivectl matrix invite mara
hivectl matrix invite @mara:yourserver --room '#hive-chat:yourserver'
# 5d. Promote the operator to homeserver admin if needed
hivectl matrix promote-user mara
```
Swarm SSO creates the human operator's own matrix account instead of
a manual `hivectl` step — see step 3 (`swarmctl user add`).
### 7 · Spawn sub-agents
Sub-agent creation goes through the approval queue — ruth proposes, the
operator approves, the container builds. From ruth's own turn (inside
the container, via MCP tools):
```
# Step 1: initialise a new agent's config repo
request_init_config(name: "iris")
# → operator approves → config_ready event lands in the inbox
# Step 2: edit /agents/iris/config/agent.nix and commit it. Then the
# operator spawns iris (dashboard ◆ R3QU3ST SP4WN / Spawn approval),
# which builds + starts the container from that config.
# Later config changes: open a PR on agent-configs/iris (hive-forge);
# the operator reviews + approves it — no MCP tool call.
```
See [`approvals.md`](../agent-lifecycle/approvals.md) for the full flow.
### 8 · Useful host commands
```bash
# Roster: all agents, status, rev, parent, pending reminders
hivectl list-agents
# Restart a stuck container (no rebuild)
hivectl agent <agent> restart
# Open a Claude session inside an agent's container
hivectl agent <agent> choom
# Open hive web surfaces in a browser (or just print the URLs)
hivectl open # operator dashboard
hivectl open forge # Forgejo
hivectl open matrix # Matrix GUI (fluffychat)
```
See [`tools/hivectl.md`](../tools/hivectl.md) for every `hivectl` verb.
## Security notes
- **No forge admin token is stored in any agent state dir.** Agents
hold a regular agent token in their `forge-token` file; sensitive
creds (the core token, the matrix admin token) live on the host.
- All config changes (forge PRs on `agent-configs/<name>`) go through
operator approval — agents can't unilaterally rebuild containers, by design.
See [`boundary.md`](../trust-boundary/boundary.md) and [`security.md`](../trust-boundary/security.md).
- **Telemetry ingest is authenticated per hive**, and the `hive` label comes
from which hive authenticated rather than from the payload — so no hive can
report metrics as another. A first-run all-local hive gets this with nothing
to configure; joining a swarm you don't host needs one secret copied across.
See [`observability.md`](../scheduler/observability.md#authenticated-ingest).
Once the hive is running, ruth records anything it needs to remember
across restarts in `/agents/ruth/state/notes.md`.