78021ce982
Apply contraction fixes across ~40 doc files (setup, integrations, lifecycle, networking, scheduler, swarm, tools, trust-boundary, UI, etc.). Skipped 14 hits: - 10 where words appear in ALL CAPS for deliberate emphasis (is NOT, do NOT, etc.) - 4 where text could not be safely located due to markdown formatting or column position Applied via systematic scan with checks for fenced code blocks, inline code spans, and intentional caps. Preserves sentence-initial capitalization throughout.
197 lines
9.2 KiB
Markdown
197 lines
9.2 KiB
Markdown
# Swarm CA
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A hive's internal TLS chains to a **swarm root CA**: the root signs each
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hive's own CA, and that hive CA signs the gateway leaf. A peer that
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trusts the root once validates every hive in the swarm, present and
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future, instead of being pinned to each one by hand.
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that's the whole point of the hierarchy — it turns per-peer trust from
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O(n²) hand-pinning into one anchor per swarm.
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## Two provisioning modes, one structure
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What differs is who puts the artifacts on disk:
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| | swarm root | this hive's CA |
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| ---------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- |
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| default | operator-provided | operator-provided, else self-signed as before |
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| `autoConfigure = true` (all on one host) | generated by `swarm-ca.service` on first boot | issued by `hive-tls-ca.service` under the root |
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`services.hyperhive.swarm.ca.autoConfigure` selects between them, and is
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**off by default**: a swarm's services and its hives can live on
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different hosts, and a host can't tell whether it's the one holding
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the root, so setting the swarm CA up is an operator action rather than
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something a host assumes. Turn it on for an all-on-one-host deployment
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and the hierarchy costs no configuration.
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It defaults from `services.hyperhive.deploy.singleHostSwarm`, the single
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switch that says "this box is the whole deployment".
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**A hive given neither artifact keeps the self-signed CA it has always
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had.** It serves TLS exactly as before and isn't part of a
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swarm's trust hierarchy — the right outcome for a hive nobody has
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federated yet. Only `autoConfigure` issues a hive sub-CA, because only
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that case can: signing one needs the root's private key.
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Moving the swarm CA onto its own host is then a matter of moving
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`services.hyperhive.swarm.ca.stateDir` and leaving `autoConfigure` off —
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there is no second code path to switch to.
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### The warning about uncovered service names
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The swarm's service names (`swarm.forge.domain`,
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`swarm.matrix.gatewayHost`, `swarm.authelia.domain`) default to
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siblings of the hive domain — `forge.<swarm.domain>`, not
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`forge.<hive domain>`. The hive CA's leaf is a **single-label** wildcard
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over the hive's own domain, so it can't cover them; only the
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swarm-services leaf can, and this host signs that one only under
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`autoConfigure`. A hive with neither serves the hive leaf on those names
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and every client sees a name mismatch.
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So `hive-tls` emits an eval-time **warning** naming the uncovered names.
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it's deliberately not an assertion: this module can see what _it_ is
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able to issue, but not an operator-installed sub-CA in
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`swarm.ca.stateDir`, an external ACME setup, or a certificate delivered
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by any other means. If you have arranged one, the warning is expected
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and can be ignored. Otherwise either install the sub-CA, or pin the
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names back under the hive domain — a supported migration, since the
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sub-CA is constrained to the _configured_ names and the swarm root
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carries no name constraints at all.
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## Constraints on the material
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The root's private key never reaches the nix store: the store is
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world-readable and content-addressed, so a key committed to a flake is a
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key published to everyone who builds it. Only certificates are
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distributed.
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Each hive CA is **name-constrained** (X.509 `nameConstraints`) to that
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hive's own domain, so a hive CA that leaks can only mint names inside
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its own subdomain — enforced by every verifier rather than by
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convention. The constraint excludes both IP families as well, since a
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permitted-DNS-only constraint says nothing about IP SANs.
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The root is issued with `pathlen:1`: it may sign hive CAs, and those may
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sign leaves, and the chain stops there.
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## What to hand a peer
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`hivectl peer-config` prints the `services.hyperhive.swarm.hives."<name>"`
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block a peer operator pastes into their own config. When this hive's
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gateway serves a self-signed leaf under the hierarchy (detected by the
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presence of `<deploy.hive-controller.tls.stateDir>/trust-bundle.pem`), it
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also prints a one-time
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`scp` line installing the **swarm root** —
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`<swarm.ca.stateDir>/root.pem`, not this hive's own CA — on the peer's
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host:
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```
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scp /var/lib/swarm-ca/root.pem <peer-host>:/var/lib/swarm-ca/root.pem
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```
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that's the point of the hierarchy: the root is installed **once per
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swarm host**, not once per peer, so a hive joining later needs no edit on
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the hives already running. A hive whose cert already chains to a public
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CA has nothing to install — `peer-config` says so instead.
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Handing a peer this hive's own `ca.pem` would not work even as a
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one-off: once a hive CA is an intermediate under the swarm root, it's
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no longer something a verifier can build a chain _to_ — OpenSSL won't
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terminate a chain at a trusted non-self-signed certificate without
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`-partial_chain`. that's why the tool distributes the root, not a
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per-hive file.
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## Adopting the hierarchy on an existing hive
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A hive that predates the swarm root carries a self-signed `ca.pem`, and
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adopting the hierarchy means replacing it. That invalidates an anchor
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consumers already trust, and they refresh on their own schedule — agents
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only pick up new trust when their container restarts, peers only on
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their own rebuild. **Who is allowed to decide that's what splits the
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two cases.**
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### Where this host owns the root (`autoConfigure`)
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Adoption happens by itself, once. `hive-tls-ca.service` notices that
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`ca.pem` doesn't chain to the root, keeps the old certificate as
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`ca-previous.pem`, and re-issues under the root; the next leaf is signed
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by the new CA.
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it's safe to automate here precisely because this is the
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all-on-one-host shape: every consumer is on this box, so "when will they
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have refreshed" is knowable rather than guessed.
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The old CA stays in `trust-bundle.pem` afterwards, so adoption is
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**additive to the anchor set before it's subtractive** — a container
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that hasn't restarted yet still validates. Removing `ca-previous.pem`
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is a deliberate later step: how long is long enough is a property of the
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deployment, not something the unit can know.
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A marker file (`.swarm-ca-adopted`) records that this ran. Its _absence_
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is the trigger, so adoption fires once per hive rather than being
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re-decided on every activation.
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### Everywhere else
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No automatic adoption. `hive-tls-ca.service` fails, loudly, naming both
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certificates and giving the two-command recipe:
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```
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rm <deploy.hive-controller.tls.stateDir>/ca.pem <deploy.hive-controller.tls.stateDir>/ca-key.pem
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systemctl restart hive-tls-ca.service
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```
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Failing rather than warning is deliberate: a hive whose CA doesn't
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chain to the root it has been given is misconfigured, and a warning in a
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build log isn't something anyone reads twice.
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To keep the current CA on purpose — a hive that deliberately stays
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outside the hierarchy, or one mid-migration — `touch` the marker file
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named in the message. that's a decision, and it's recorded as one.
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A hive with **no** root configured at all isn't affected by any of
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this: it self-signs exactly as it always has.
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## Distributing the root
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The root **key** is a runtime file for the reason in
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[Constraints on the material](#constraints-on-the-material).
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The root **certificate** is a runtime file as a _consequence_ — it lives
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beside the key under `swarm.ca.stateDir` — and that has a cost worth
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naming, because it's subtle and it bites at a distance:
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> **Nothing whose trust store is assembled at build time can reference
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> the swarm root.** `security.pki.certificateFiles` is read inside the
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> derivation; the root doesn't exist there.
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Two consumers, and only one of them is fine:
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- **Agents are covered.** `hive-tls.nix` folds the root into this hive's
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`trust-bundle.pem`, hive-c0re receives that path as
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`HIVE_TLS_CA_PATH`, and the meta-flake renderer embeds that one file
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next to every agent's flake. The bundle is the runtime-to-build-time
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bridge.
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- **The Matrix container crosses the same bridge**, via the shared
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`lib/hive-ca-trust.nix` helper that `hive-ci` and `hive-forge` already
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use: the bundle is bind-mounted read-only into the container, and a
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oneshot concatenates it with the system CAs before tuwunel starts.
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The consumption differs per runtime and is the part worth knowing.
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tuwunel links no openssl, which makes `SSL_CERT_FILE` look inapplicable
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— it isn't: its rustls-based TLS stack still resolves trust through the
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platform certificate store on Linux, and that store honors
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`SSL_CERT_FILE`, so the env var takes effect the same way it would for
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an OpenSSL-linked binary.
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> ⚠️ **Concatenate; never point `SSL_CERT_FILE` at the anchor alone.**
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> `openssl-probe` uses it _instead of_ the default store, so naming
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> just the bundle would drop every public CA and break federation with
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> the wider matrix network — a much bigger outage than the one being
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> fixed. The same caveat applies to `hive-forge` (Go) for the same
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> reason.
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To put the root on another host, copy the certificate to the same path
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there (`scp <stateDir>/root.pem <host>:<stateDir>/root.pem`). One anchor
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per host, not one per peer: a hive joining later needs no edit on the
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hives already running, which is the whole point of the hierarchy.
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