30b9955ad3
Refs #4374 - otelNoIdentity: name journaldUnits so the fixture trips the store- identity path it's testing instead of swarm-otel's unrelated journald-safety assertion (an empty list with log collection on is refused as "collect everything", not "collect nothing"). - otelNoStores: give it a bao client identity. The secret gate moved from deployCfg.authelia.enable to a real client cert/key pair, so a fixture meaning "no telemetry stores" now needs its own secret identity to keep exercising the exporter/authenticator wiring it was written for. - docs/swarm/secrets.md: two vale fixes — a contraction, and drop a condescending "simply".
302 lines
30 KiB
Markdown
302 lines
30 KiB
Markdown
# Swarm secrets: what exists, and where each one lives
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A swarm's credentials are generated in three different places and read in a
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fourth, so "where does this file go" has a different answer per deployment.
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This page is that answer, one row per secret.
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Two rules run through all of it.
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**Private key material and access tokens are paths, never values.** Every option
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carrying one takes a file path (`*File`), because a literal written into a nix
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expression ends up in the nix store — world-readable and permanent. No
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option in this tree accepts one inline, and adding one would be a leak rather
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than a convenience.
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The rule is about what must stay secret, not about credentials generally.
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**Public material is a value**: a certificate, or a public nkey like
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`deploy.nats.calloutUserPublicKey`, is published to every client that connects,
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so the store is a perfectly good place for it.
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**The generator and the reader typically live in different containers.** They share
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the host's network namespace, which makes them feel co-located, but their
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filesystem roots are separate. That's why delivery is a **host-side copy rather
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than a bind mount**: `nixos-container` refuses to start when a bind source is
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missing, and a secret minted on another container's first boot doesn't exist
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yet. Binding it would make one container wait on a file that waits on a
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container that starts after it.
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## Topologies, by who places secrets
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Read every row below against one of these. This is a different cut
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from the [deployment shapes](services.md#deployment-shapes) --- those
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say _where services run_, these say _who is responsible for a secret
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file being there_ --- the two lists don't line up one-to-one, and
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neither is a renaming of the other.
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| topology | what it means | who places secrets |
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| ------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **all-local** | one host runs the swarm's shared services and its own hive | nobody — each secret is generated where it's read, or copied by a host unit |
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| **swarm-managed** | the swarm's services run on a host with `swarmctl` | `swarmctl` writes what it owns; the rest is still generated in place |
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| **hive elsewhere** | a hive that federates with a swarm it doesn't host | the operator provides the file and names it in config |
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## Swarm-level — one of each per swarm
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| secret | generated by | lives at | hive elsewhere |
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| --------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| swarm root CA cert | `swarm-ca.nix` first-boot unit, when `autoConfigure` is set | `/var/lib/swarm-ca/root.pem` | operator copies the **cert** in; it's public |
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| swarm root CA key | same unit | `/var/lib/swarm-ca/root-key.pem`, `0600` | stays on whichever host holds it — see the constraint below |
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| swarm-services sub-CA (cert + key) | `swarm-ca.nix`, signed by the root | `/var/lib/swarm-ca/services-ca{,-key}.pem` | issued where the root lives |
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| authelia session, JWT and storage-encryption keys | authelia's first-boot unit, in-container | `/var/lib/authelia-swarm/{session,jwt,storage-encryption}.key` | generated in place; nothing outside that container reads them |
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| authelia OIDC HMAC key | same unit | `/var/lib/authelia-swarm/oidc-hmac.key` | same |
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| authelia OIDC issuer key (RSA) | same unit | `/var/lib/authelia-swarm/oidc-issuer.key` | same — relying parties verify against the **public** half at `/jwks.json` |
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| OIDC client secret, plaintext half | `authelia crypto hash generate --random` | `/var/lib/authelia-swarm/oidc-clients/<id>.secret` | operator provides the file and names it in whichever option reads it — `sso.clientSecretFile` for a service, `otel.clientSecretFile` for the hive's telemetry collector |
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| OIDC client secret, digest half | the same mint | `oidc-clients/<id>.digest` | authelia's own half; merged at runtime via `settingsFiles` |
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| the swarm collector's copy of its OIDC secret | `swarm-bao-otel-oidc.service` reads it out of the swarm secret store, **on every host that runs the collector and holds a store identity** | `/var/lib/swarm-otel-oidc/<id>.secret` inside the `swarm-otel` container | same unit, same path — one route, co-located or not. A collector with no store identity is left with `clientSecretFile == null`, its already-supported unauthenticated-push degrade — see below |
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| Grafana's copy of its OIDC secret | `swarm-bao-grafana-oidc.service` reads it out of the swarm secret store, **on every host that runs Grafana** | `/var/lib/grafana-oidc/<id>.secret` inside the `swarm-grafana` container | same unit, same path — one route, co-located or not. Nothing for an operator to place beyond this host's store leaf, see below |
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| authelia subject store | `swarmctl` and `swarm-authelia-bridge` | `users.yml` — one file, read and written by both | `swarmctl`, on the host that runs authelia |
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| wireguard private key | **the operator** — `wg genkey` | whatever `deploy.wireguard.privateKeyFile` names | always operator-provided; nothing generates this for you |
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| queue auth-callout nkeys (user seed + account seed) | `swarm-nats-callout-keys` first-boot unit, when `deploy.nats.autoGenerateCallout` is set | `/var/lib/swarm-nats-callout/{callout-user,issuer}.seed`, `0600` | operator mints both with `nk` and names them in `deploy.nats.calloutUserSeedFile` / `deploy.nats.calloutIssuerSeedFile` |
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| the secret store's own contents | openbao, on first `bao operator init` — **an operator action, not a unit** | inside the `swarm-bao` container, at its own `/var/lib/openbao`, kept across rebuilds by `ephemeral = false`. ⚠️ **Not a host path**: `nixos-container destroy swarm-bao` takes the raft data with it, so back up the container's tree, not `/var/lib/`. Only the store's TLS material (`/var/lib/swarm-bao-tls`) and its PKCS11 token (`/var/lib/swarm-bao-token`) are host-level | n/a — there is one store; a hive elsewhere is a _client_ of it and holds none of this |
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| the secret store's unseal material | the HSM/TPM under `deploy.bao.seal = "pkcs11"`; openbao itself under `"shamir"` | in the token; or held by whoever ran `bao operator init`, which is what `"shamir"` means and why it's stated rather than inferred | n/a — only the host running the store seals anything |
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Authelia mints the three keys for itself, in-container, precisely
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because nothing outside that container ever reads them. **That's the test worth
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applying to any secret added here** — and the client secret's plaintext half is
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the one row that fails it, which is the entire reason a delivery step exists.
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Two telemetry collectors exist, and they land on opposite sides of that test.
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The **hive's** collector needs no delivery step. It authenticates to the swarm's
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collector as its own hive, and it's a host unit rather than a container, so on
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an all-local swarm it reads authelia's file where it lies and no second copy is
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made. On any other topology it's an ordinary "operator provides the file"
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case — see `services.hyperhive.otel.clientSecretFile`.
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The **swarm's** collector does need one, and its delivery route is the fourth
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store reader — the same shape as Grafana's, described in full below. In short:
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`swarm-bao-otel-oidc.service` reads `swarm/services/<client-id>/oidc/client`
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out of the store on every host that runs the collector and holds a store
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identity, whether authelia is a network away or in the container next door.
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The client it reads for is registered unconditionally, the same call
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`glue-grafana-oidc-client.nix` makes for Grafana's: authelia refuses a
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bearer-authz client with no audience, and the push audiences supply one even
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for a collector with nothing published to scrape.
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⚠️ **A collector with no store identity isn't refused.** Unlike Grafana,
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where an absent OIDC block is a container with no way in at all, a collector
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with nothing to authenticate with still receives every hive's telemetry —
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only its own pushes to the stores go out unauthenticated and get refused
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there. `swarm-bao-otel-oidc.service` therefore doesn't render at all without
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`deploy.bao.clientCertFile` / `clientKeyFile`, the same choice
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`glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` and `glue-queue-agent-credential.nix` make for
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their own optional readers, rather than the hard assertion `swarm-grafana.nix`
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uses for its non-optional one. The secret can still be delivered by hand, at
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`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-otel.clientSecretFile`, on a collector this
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unit never reaches.
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### Minting the queue's callout nkeys
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`deploy.nats.autoGenerateCallout` mints both keypairs on the host before the queue
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starts. It's on by default only under `singleHostSwarm` — the one
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topology where the queue, its responder and the operator are the same person. On
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every other topology, mint them yourself:
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```
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nk -gen user > callout-user.seed # the responder's own identity
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nk -gen account > issuer.seed # signs the user JWTs it hands out
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nk -inkey callout-user.seed -pubout # → calloutUserPublicKey
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nk -inkey issuer.seed -pubout # → calloutIssuerPublicKey
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```
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Keep both seeds at `0600` and name them in `deploy.nats.calloutUserSeedFile` /
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`deploy.nats.calloutIssuerSeedFile`. Possession of the **issuer** seed is the authority to
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admit anyone to the queue, so it belongs wherever the responder runs and nowhere
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else.
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A hive that sets neither the public keys nor `autoGenerateCallout` fails at
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eval, naming the option it wants. That's deliberate: a queue that started
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without them would accept `CONNECT {"user":"auth"}` from anyone sharing the
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host's network namespace, and nothing would look wrong until somebody connected.
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**All four or none** — the seed paths are required too, not just the public
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keys. They're two halves of the same pair: the server verifies with the public
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half, the responder signs with the private one. Supplying only the public keys
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used to pass eval and leave the queue with an auth-callout nobody answers, which
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refuses every client rather than degrading — and a refusal reaches the client as
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a timeout, so the symptom is every consumer hanging with nothing logged.
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One consequence of the generated path worth knowing before you debug it: with
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`autoGenerateCallout` set, the queue assembles its config at boot rather than at
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build time, so a malformed one surfaces when the container starts instead of
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when the system builds. The server names the offending file and refuses to run.
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## Hive-level — one of each per hive
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| secret | generated by | lives at |
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| ---------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| hive CA cert + key | `hive-tls.nix` first-boot unit | `<deploy.hive-controller.tls.stateDir>/ca.pem`, `ca-key.pem` (`0600`) |
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| hive leaf certs | `hive-tls.nix`, signed by the hive CA | `<deploy.hive-controller.tls.stateDir>/<name>.pem` |
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| matrix registration token | a host activation script, on first boot | `/var/lib/hyperhive/matrix-register-token` (`0600`) |
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| the forge's copy of its OIDC secret | `hive-forge-oidc-secret.service` copies it from authelia's tree | `/var/lib/forgejo-oidc/<id>.secret` inside the forge container |
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| the homeserver's copy of its OIDC secret | `hive-matrix-oidc-secret.service`, same shape | `/var/lib/tuwunel-oidc/<id>.secret`, handed to tuwunel through `LoadCredential` |
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| the agent containers' queue credential | authelia, published to the store by `swarm-secret-publish` | `<deploy.hive-controller.queue.agentCredentialDir>/secret` (`0600`) and `/client_id` (`0644`) |
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Both delivery units wait for authelia's first boot to mint the secret — a
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bounded wait, 120s — and then **fail loudly** rather than skipping. A silent skip
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produces a service whose login button always fails, which is a symptom many
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layers from its cause.
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The store's **first reader** is the matrix registration token, and it's worth
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saying why that one: it's an opaque 32-byte value with no second file and no
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format. Authelia's OIDC secret needs a `.secret` _and_ a matching `.digest`, so
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starting there would have meant debugging "can a reader authenticate and get
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bytes back" and "is authelia's file format right" at once, with an
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SSO outage as the failure mode.
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`glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` fetches it and writes the file `hive-matrix.nix`
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already reads, so the homeserver never learns the store exists. Every failure
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path — no such key, sealed store, unreachable store, empty value — leaves the
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locally minted token in place, so a hive with no store behaves exactly as it
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did before.
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The **second reader** is the agent containers' queue credential:
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`glue-queue-agent-credential.nix` lands it as two files, the client secret and
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the client id it authenticates, because that's how a queue client reads them —
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the secret by path, the id by value. No local fallback exists, and none is
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possible, so absent files mean this hive's agents don't connect, which is what
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a swarm looks like before the publisher on the authelia host has run. The
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reader runs before `hive-c0re.service` and is wanted (not required) by it, so
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an agent container never renders ahead of the credential; an unreachable store
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delays the daemon's start rather than failing it.
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That credential still has one hop left, because the reader of it lives inside
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an agent container. **It crosses as a systemd credential, not as a bind
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mount**, and the mode decides that: the secret is `root:0600` and a harness
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runs as its own unprivileged agent user, so a bind would deliver a file that
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user can't open. `hive-c0re` stats the two files — the directory is `0755`, so
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it needs no read access to either — and hands them to
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`systemd-nspawn --load-credential` through `hive-priv`, which runs as root.
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Inside, `hive-agent.service` names the same two ids in `LoadCredential=` and
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reads them out of its own `$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY`, owned by the agent user
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and by nobody else. `hive-c0re` never reads the bytes at any point: it runs as
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`hive-core`, which is the reason a copy wasn't an option either. When the
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files aren't there the daemon forwards nothing and says so in its journal, and
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the harness logs that it has no queue coordinates — the same absent-and-legal state, twice,
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rather than a container that refuses to start.
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The **third reader** is Grafana's OIDC client secret, and it's the first one
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that's a _swarm service's_ own credential rather than a hive's. It has exactly
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one delivery route: `swarm-bao-grafana-oidc.service` reads
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`swarm/services/<client-id>/oidc/client` out of the store, on **every** host
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that runs Grafana. Where authelia is doesn't enter into it — the publisher on
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authelia's host writes that path whether the reader is a network away or in the
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container next door.
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That's a deliberate refusal of the shortcut. Copying the plaintext
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straight out of authelia's tree when the two happen to share a host is one
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round trip cheaper and costs a second delivery unit, a second way for the file
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to be wrong, and a gate deciding between them — and the gate is the expensive
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part, because whatever it's wrong about is an outage nobody can read. The store
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exists so a host holds **one** out-of-band secret, its client certificate, and
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reads everything else with it.
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Two things follow, and `swarm-grafana.nix` asserts both rather than degrading:
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running Grafana requires `swarm.authelia.url` (its local login form is disabled
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unconditionally, so SSO isn't a feature of some topologies — it's the only way
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in), and it requires this host's `deploy.bao.clientCertFile` /
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`clientKeyFile`. Each refusal names the option to set. Both used to be silent:
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a null URL dropped the OIDC block, a missing leaf produced a warning, and
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either one left a Grafana with no SSO and no password box — nothing failed, so
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nothing said anything. Registration is separate and stays where authelia is
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(`glue-grafana-oidc-client.nix`): a client is a row in authelia's own config,
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so it's declared on the host running authelia, which isn't necessarily the host
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running Grafana.
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The **fourth reader** is the swarm collector's own OIDC client secret, the
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same shape one level down: `swarm-bao-otel-oidc.service` reads
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`swarm/services/<client-id>/oidc/client` out of the store on every host that
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runs the collector, and registration lives separately in
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`glue-swarm-otel-oidc-client.nix` for the same reason Grafana's does. Where it
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differs is what an absent credential means: the collector still receives
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telemetry with none, so `swarm-otel.nix` doesn't assert
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`deploy.bao.clientCertFile` / `clientKeyFile` the way Grafana does — it
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doesn't render the reading unit without them, the shape
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`glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` and `glue-queue-agent-credential.nix` use for
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their own optional reads.
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A service's secret is one value for the whole swarm rather than one per hive, so
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it lives under the `services` prefix, and a hive's read policy grants that prefix
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whole. That's because nothing in a swarm's configuration records which hive runs
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a given service — placement is a `deploy.*` fact, per-host by definition — so
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there is nothing to scope the grant to. Every hive can therefore read every swarm
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service's client secret; that's the cost of a shape where the service's host has
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no store identity of its own to present, and it's stated in
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`swarm-secret-client`'s `policy` module beside the grant itself. Absence behaves
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as it does for the other readers: a store that says "not here" leaves the
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file alone and says so, since there is no such thing as a locally valid OIDC
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client secret to stand in.
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⚠️ **Service↔store mTLS is its own trust domain.** A credential you must
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already hold to authenticate can't be fetched from the thing it authenticates
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you to, so the store's identity can't come from an authority the store
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distributes — which excludes the hive CA and the swarm CA both, and has nothing
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to do with the gateway's HTTPS certificates either way. `glue-bao-tls.nix`
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mints a CA that signs exactly two things, the store's server certificate and a
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reader's client certificate, and distributes nothing. A deployment with a real
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internal CA deletes that file and names its own paths in
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`deploy.bao.serverCertFile` / `clientCaFile`; the store itself has no opinion.
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A hive that reads from a store on **another** machine names the reader's half —
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`clientCertFile`, `clientKeyFile`, `serverCaFile` — and places that leaf by hand.
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It's the one credential that can't come out of the store, being what opens it;
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everything else a hive needs does.
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## How a reader reaches the store
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Every reader dials the same URL — `https://bao.<swarm domain>:<port>` — and on
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the host that runs the store that name resolves twice. `/etc/hosts` answers a
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host-side unit with loopback, where openbao binds; the hive's dnsmasq answers a
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container with the bridge IP, where nginx holds the same port. One `BAO_ADDR`,
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and the network namespace that asked decides which half of it answers.
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The container's half goes through nginx and **still doesn't terminate TLS**. It
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is an nginx `stream` server with `ssl_preread on`: it reads the SNI off the
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ClientHello and splices the rest of the connection through byte for byte, so
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openbao completes the handshake itself. A vhost would decrypt here instead, and
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the client certificate — the store's whole authentication — would stop at nginx,
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leaving openbao seeing one client for every hive in the swarm. That's why the
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store has no vhost and gets a passthrough: not an exception to the no-vhost
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rule, the one shape that keeps it.
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The stream listener binds the bridge IP rather than every address, because
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openbao already holds loopback on that port in the same network namespace and a
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wildcard bind would fail with `EADDRINUSE` — taking nginx, and with it every
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hive domain behind the gateway, down. `network.exposeHostPorts` opens the port
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on the bridge firewall and nowhere else.
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Reaching the port grants nothing by itself: openbao answers nothing without a
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client certificate signed by `deploy.bao.clientCaFile`. The passthrough carries
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whichever certificate the reader presents, unchanged.
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## The constraint that decides where the root lives
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A hive CA carries `nameConstraints=permitted;DNS:<hive domain>`, and **a swarm
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service name is a sibling of the hive domain rather than a child** — `forge.<swarm>`
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next to `<hive>.<swarm>`. A hive CA can't issue a certificate for a swarm
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service. Not by policy: by construction, and openssl enforces it.
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Whatever holds the swarm root is therefore what makes swarm-service certificates
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possible at all. Two things follow:
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- **The root's private key is a runtime file and must never enter the nix
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store**, so nothing build-time can name it — `security.pki.certificateFiles` is
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read when the system is built, and is the wrong tool here. Trust reaches
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containers through a bind-mounted bundle assembled at boot instead.
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- **On any topology other than all-local, placing that key is an operations
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decision**, not something this module tree makes for you. A hive that hosts no
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swarm services needs only the root's _cert_, to trust what others issue.
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## Adding a secret
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State three things, in the row you add above: **who mints it**, **which
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container reads it**, and **what happens when they differ**. If they differ, it
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needs a delivery unit, and the unit copies — it doesn't bind.
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