swarm-bao-matrix-oidc still reads the secret from bao under matrix-ctl's leaf, but now writes it to /run/hive-matrix-oidc on the host (tmpfs), which the container bind-mounts read-only for tuwunel's LoadCredential. Before, it wrote it to /var/lib/nixos-containers/hive-matrix/var/lib/tuwunel-oidc/<id>.secret on persistent disk, where a superseded secret stayed after rotation and went into backups of the container root. Host tmpfiles now removes that old file. clientSecretFile must now lie under /run/hive-matrix-oidc/, the one directory the container shares; any other value fails at evaluation. Rotation is unchanged: the ten-minute timer rewrites the file when the value differs and refresh_consumer restarts tuwunel. After a reboot the secret is fetched again; until the store answers, tuwunel does not start. Part of #4998 (slice 4: tuwunel).
467 lines
23 KiB
Markdown
467 lines
23 KiB
Markdown
# Swarm Matrix homeserver
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Private Matrix homeserver (matrix-tuwunel — the conduwuit
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successor) wrapped in a nixos-container (`hive-matrix`), plus optional fluffychat-web
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client at `chat.<swarm-domain>/` (the `gatewayHost` vhost). A swarm runs one
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homeserver, on one host. Two namespaces configure it:
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- `services.hyperhive.swarm.matrix.*` — what the homeserver **is**, as
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every hive sees it: `serverName`, `gatewayHost`, `apiUrl`, `allowEncryption`.
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- `services.hyperhive.deploy.matrix.*` — what the host running it decides:
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`enable`, `gui.package`, `trustedServers`,
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`maxRequestSize`, `sso.clientSecretFile`.
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Vhost routing lives in [`gateway.md`](../networking/gateway.md).
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## Container shape
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Same shape as [`gateway.md::hive-forge container shape`](../networking/gateway.md):
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- Container name `hive-matrix` (not `h-*`) so c0re's lifecycle
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scanner ignores it; operator manages via the standard
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`nixos-container` CLI.
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- Keeps hive-matrix from fighting any `services.matrix-*` the
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operator already runs on the host — separate systemd namespace,
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separate state dir.
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- Container runs in a network namespace of its own
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(`privateNetwork = true`) on the hive bridge, and binds no TCP port. Agents
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reach the homeserver at `chat.<swarm-domain>` via the gateway, which
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dials its unix socket (see [Reach](#reach)).
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- Persistent state at
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`/var/lib/nixos-containers/hive-matrix/var/lib/matrix-tuwunel/`
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survives container restart / host reboot. To wipe, destroy the
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container.
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## Identity vs API listener: `serverName` vs `gatewayHost`
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Two distinct hostnames:
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- **`serverName`** — matrix-spec `server_name`, embedded
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*irrevocably* in every `@user:<server_name>` and `!room:<server_name>`
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identifier minted on this homeserver. You can't change it later
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without abandoning every account and chat history. Defaults to the
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bare `services.hyperhive.swarm.domain`.
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- **`gatewayHost`** — the API listener hostname, where the gateway's
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matrix vhost proxies `/_matrix/*` to tuwunel. Defaults to
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`chat.<services.hyperhive.swarm.domain>`. Set to `null` to skip the
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gateway vhost, which leaves nothing able to reach the homeserver.
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Both default under the **swarm** domain, because a swarm runs one
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homeserver: tying its identity to a single hive's domain would make
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relocating the container between hives look like a different
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homeserver.
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⚠️ **they're still not interchangeable, and the difference is the
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cost of changing one.** `gatewayHost` is a routing detail clients
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rediscover through `.well-known`, so it's safe to move on a running
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deployment. The matrix id format bakes `serverName` into every user and
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room id, so adopting a new one does **not** rename the existing users and rooms —
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it strands them, because their ids still name a homeserver that no
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longer answers.
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<details><summary>Pinning <code>serverName</code> on a homeserver with existing ids</summary>
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`serverName` defaults to the bare `services.hyperhive.swarm.domain`. A
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homeserver that changes `serverName` after minting ids strands its
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existing users and rooms — keep the value it minted them under:
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```nix
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services.hyperhive.swarm.matrix = {
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# whichever this deployment already uses
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serverName = config.services.hyperhive.domain;
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gatewayHost = "matrix.${config.services.hyperhive.domain}";
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};
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```
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A rebuild on a host that already has a homeserver prints a
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`hive-matrix: WARNING — … serverName is unset` line when this is missing,
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naming the value it's about to default to. It never fails the rebuild, so
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pin the value before the homeserver mints any ids under the default.
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</details>
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## Reach
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tuwunel binds no TCP port. It listens on the unix socket
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`/run/hive-matrix/tuwunel.sock`, in a host directory (`root:nginx`,
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`0770`) bind-mounted into the container, and the gateway's
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`/_matrix/` location proxies to that socket. Clients, agents, hive-c0re
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and federation peers all reach the homeserver at `chat.<swarm-domain>`
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through the gateway; from outside the host that takes
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`gateway.openFirewall`.
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hive-c0re provisions matrix (its own sender login, the hive Space and
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chat room, invites) through `swarm.matrix.apiUrl`, which defaults to
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`https://<swarm.matrix.gatewayHost>` on every hive. That login carries
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the hive's matrix access token, and on a hive that doesn't run the
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homeserver it crosses the network, so the default is TLS; hive-c0re
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verifies the gateway's certificate against the hive trust bundle.
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Federation peers find the homeserver through `.well-known/matrix/server`
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on the hive domain, which names `<gatewayHost>:<httpsPort>`
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([`gateway.md::Discovery flow`](../networking/gateway.md#discovery-flow-matrix)).
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Port 8448 isn't used.
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Outbound, the container sits on the hive bridge like the CI runner: it
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leases an address from the gateway's DHCP, resolves through its dnsmasq,
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and leaves through the bridge's NAT. It reaches the secret store,
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authelia and federation peers by name.
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## Provisioning flow (appservice)
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO -->
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Registration is closed. **The swarm's appservice** creates accounts: agents
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never see an appservice token, and an agent only ever receives its own
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`access_token`.
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES -->
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The appservice has no URL (`url: null` in its registration), so the
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homeserver never calls out to it and there is no service to run. What the
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registration buys is an identity the homeserver recognises — which is why
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no secret has to be equal on both sides of the wire, and why account
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creation doesn't depend on registration being open to anyone who learns
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a token.
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1. **`swarm-matrix-ctl appservice render`**, inside the `hive-matrix`
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container and before tuwunel starts, mints the registration's
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`as_token` and its spec-required `hs_token` when they're missing, and
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renders the registration to
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`/var/lib/swarm-matrix-appservice/swarm.yaml` (mode `0600 root:root`).
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2. **systemd `LoadCredential=`** copies the registration into
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`/run/credentials/tuwunel.service/swarm-appservice.yaml`, owned by
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tuwunel's dynamic user with mode `0400`, at service start. The source
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file stays `root:root 0600` — no `chown :tuwunel` / `chmod 0640` /
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GID-pin gymnastics required. Keeps `DynamicUser = true` +
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`PrivateUsers = true` intact.
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3. tuwunel's `appservice_dir` points at the credentials directory. It
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reads only `.yaml`/`.yml` entries from there, so the sibling
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credentials are invisible to it. The `.yaml` suffix on the credential
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id is what makes this work.
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4. **hive-c0re** holds no appservice token and creates no account. Its
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`@hive-<hive>:` token comes from the swarm store (below).
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5. **`swarm-controller` creates every account**: each agent's, with its
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token stored at `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/main` for the agent's
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`hive-matrix-daemon` to read as the agent itself, and each hive's
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sender account (below).
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A homeserver whose `swarm-matrix-ctl` has no store identity
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(`services.hyperhive.deploy.matrix.ctlBaoClientCertFile`) loads no
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registration, and nothing creates accounts on it.
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On the store's host `ctlBaoClientCertFile` / `ctlBaoClientKeyFile` default
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to the leaf `glue-bao-tls.nix` mints there. A homeserver host without the
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store gets no default, even when it holds the hive's own reader
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`deploy.bao.clientCertFile`: issue a leaf whose subject is
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`deploy.bao.matrixCtlCommonName`, place it, and name it in both options.
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Until you do, `swarm-bao-matrix-oidc` fails naming both.
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### The swarm's appservice, and its admin sender
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The registration's id is `swarm`, its sender `@swarm`, and its user
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namespace non-exclusive. It's the swarm's identity on the homeserver:
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`swarm-controller` creates every agent's account and every hive's sender
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account with it.
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`swarm-matrix-ctl appservice render` mints its tokens inside the
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`hive-matrix` container, before tuwunel starts, and renders the
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registration tuwunel loads as a credential. `appservice publish`
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then writes its `as_token` to
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`swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token`. No hive's
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policy reaches that path: only matrix-ctl (which writes it) and
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`swarm-controller` (which reads it) hold a grant to it.
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`@swarm` is the **one** account the homeserver promotes to admin at boot
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(`admin_execute`). Only those two principals read its token, which is
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the difference from the hive sender below: every hive reads its own
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sender's token. `swarm` is a reserved name, so nothing can create an agent
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as this account.
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`swarm-controller` mints each agent's account with the device id
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`hyperhive-<agent>`, and a login on that device replaces its token. The controller therefore reads
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the stored token back with `whoami` every five minutes and re-mints only
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when it's missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's. An
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agent's daemon picks a re-minted token up on its next start, and a timer
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restarts it while it's down.
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### Operators are homeserver admins
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Every member of authelia's `admins` group who has a matrix account is a
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homeserver admin. `swarm-controller` reads the group through
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`swarm-authelia-bridge` at start and every five minutes after, and for
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each member not yet in `#admins:<server_name>` it sends
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`!admin users make-user-admin @<name>:<server_name>` there as `@swarm`.
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`<name>` is the authelia username lowercased, the account an SSO login
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lands on.
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- **Leaving `admins` revokes what the sync granted.** The controller
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records each account it sends a grant for in
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`/var/lib/swarm-controller/operator-matrix-admins.json`. When one of
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them is no longer in `admins` but still in `#admins`, it sends
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`!admin users force-leave-room @<name>:<server_name> <admin room id>`
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there as `@swarm`; leaving that room is what ends homeserver admin.
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- **Admins the sync didn't make keep admin.** An admin missing from that
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file, `@swarm`, the server user `@conduit:<server_name>`, every agent's
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account, and every user id in
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`services.hyperhive.swarm.matrix.adminSync.ignoreUsers` are never
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revoked.
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- **The last admin stays.** A revoke that would leave no admin in
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`#admins` besides `@swarm` and the server user isn't sent; the
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controller logs a warning on each pass instead.
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- **No account, no grant.** A member who has never logged in to matrix
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has no account to promote. The first pass after their first SSO login
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promotes them.
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- **One command per account per controller run.** A member still missing
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from `#admins` after the controller sends its grant gets a
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`make-user-admin … failed to take` warning in the controller log on
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each later pass, and no second command until the controller restarts;
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a revoke that leaves its account in `#admins` gets
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`force-leave-room … failed to take` the same way.
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- Runs only on a controller with both
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`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.authBridgeUrl` and
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`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.matrixHomeserverUrl` set.
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### A hive's sender account, and why it isn't an admin
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`@hive-<hive>:<server_name>` is the account a hive acts as.
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`swarm-controller` creates it with the swarm's appservice token, for every
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hive in its directory. It's an **ordinary account**: nothing promotes it;
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the homeserver's `admin_execute` promotes only `@swarm`.
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**One account per hive.** The localpart carries the hive's name, so a swarm
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whose hives share a homeserver gives each of them its own identity: the
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homeserver attributes an action to the hive that took it, and revoking one
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hive's standing leaves the others alone.
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Its access token is the **sender token**, and it's the credential
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hive-c0re presents for every homeserver call it makes on the hive's
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behalf. It's per hive for the same reason the account is:
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`swarm-controller`, its only minter, mints it for every hive with the swarm's
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appservice token and publishes it to `swarm/hives/<hive>/matrix/sender-token`, and the hive
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reads it from there under its own certificate. That path sits inside the
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hive's own read grant (`swarm/hives/<hive>/*`), so a hive fetches its own
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token and gets a refusal on any other hive's. The name says what it
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authenticates as — an account the swarm's appservice creates — rather
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than any privilege level, because it carries none.
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It needs no promotion for what the hive does with it. Creating the hive
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Space and the chat room, writing their hierarchy and join rules, and
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inviting agents into them are all ordinary client calls that ride on
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being the rooms' own creator at power level 100 — there is no homeserver
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admin in any of it, and no Synapse admin API to reach for either, since
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tuwunel has none.
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Promoting a user to homeserver admin and resetting a password both need an
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admin **sender**: `!admin …` messages into `#admins:<server_name>`, and
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tuwunel only treats a message as a command when its sender is already an
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admin. Of the swarm's own accounts only `@swarm` is a homeserver admin
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(operators are too, see
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[Operators are homeserver admins](#operators-are-homeserver-admins)), so
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both are swarm-level operations.
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<details><summary>Store precedence for a hive's sender account</summary>
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`ensure_hive_user` reads the per-hive path
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`swarm/hives/<hive>/matrix/sender-token` **first, on every sweep**, not
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just when that file is missing (`sender_source`'s decision).
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`swarm-controller` mints a per-hive token within five minutes of a hive
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appearing; the sweep then overwrites the per-hive file, no boot
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required.
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</details>
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<details><summary>Appservice identity</summary>
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`swarm-matrix-ctl appservice render` mints the appservice tokens and
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renders the registration before tuwunel starts, so every boot has both
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halves.
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO -->
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- **Access tokens live on the device that minted them.**
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`login_with_password` stays on, so the password fallback works
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too.
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- **The homeserver's `admin_execute` promotes only `@swarm` at boot**
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(above); a hive's sender account is never promoted.
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- **The value that matters lives at
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`swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token`.**
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`appservice publish` writes the container's copy there whenever the
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store's differs, and `swarm-controller` reads it from there.
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES -->
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</details>
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Initial rollout settings:
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- `allow_federation = true` at the protocol level so swarms can be
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wired up later by extending `trustedServers` without a homeserver
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restart. `trusted_servers = []` keeps it effectively closed
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until you list peers.
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- `allow_registration = false`. tuwunel checks this flag only for
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requests that arrive **without** an appservice token, so the swarm's
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appservice still creates accounts and tuwunel refuses everyone else. With no
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registration token configured, `allow_registration = true` makes
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tuwunel refuse to start unless
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`yes_i_am_very_very_sure_…_open_registration_…` is also set.
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- `allow_encryption` — server-side E2EE switch, sourced from
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`services.hyperhive.swarm.matrix.allowEncryption` (**default `false`**, opt-in).
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Off by default because on the swarm's own homeserver the operator
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already controls the transport; turn it on for encrypted rooms on
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external / federated homeservers or to keep contents opaque to the
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homeserver admin. **The agent matrix client always supports decryption
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regardless of this flag** — it uses the `e2e-encryption` feature of
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`matrix-sdk` so it can read encrypted rooms it's invited to even when
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this homeserver doesn't permit room encryption. matrix-sdk stores
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crypto keys in the per-agent sqlite store under the state dir; they persist across
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restarts. `read_room` decrypts via
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`room.messages()` — UTD events surface as `event_type =
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"m.room.encrypted"` with `body = "[unable to decrypt]"`.
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The daemon bootstraps cross-signing on the bearer token alone, which
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works where the homeserver skips re-auth for a first key upload
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(MSC3967, as tuwunel does).
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- **Key backup.** `swarm-controller` mints a random recovery passphrase
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for every matrix account an agent has, at
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`swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix-recovery/<account>` in the swarm secret
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store, and never replaces it. When `hive-matrix-daemon` brings an
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account up it reads that passphrase: with no backup on the account's
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homeserver it turns on server-side key backup and secret storage
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(log line `matrix recovery enabled`), unless the account already has
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secret storage, which it never replaces (a `WARN` instead). With a
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backup there it recovers from it (`recovered from the server-side key backup`), which downloads the
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room keys and signs the new device with the account's existing
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cross-signing identity. A crypto store lost to `--purge` or to a
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primary-token reset therefore comes back with its history. With no passphrase
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stored yet the account comes up without backup and picks it up on the
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next daemon start. A failure is a `WARN` and never stops the daemon.
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## Hive Matrix Space
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On first boot hive-c0re creates a private **Matrix Space** named `"hive"` using its own hive
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account (`@hive-<hive>:<server_name>`) and invites every provisioned agent
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into it. This gives the operator a single Space in FluffyChat or any
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Matrix client that groups all agent-to-agent + operator rooms in one
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place.
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO -->
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The sweep also provisions a default **`hive-chat` room** as an
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`m.space.child` of the Space. Joining a Space doesn't autojoin
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child rooms — the explicit room entry ensures the operator and every
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agent can find a common chat room without manual setup. Room join is
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restricted (any Space member including the operator can join; agents
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are explicitly invited). Room version pinned to 10 for the restricted
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join floor.
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES -->
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**State**: hive-c0re persists both room IDs to `/var/lib/hyperhive/matrix/`
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(mode `0600`, owned by the hive-c0re service user):
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- `space-room-id` — the Space itself
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- `chat-room-id` — the `hive-chat` room
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These paths are **outside** every agent state dir and **aren't** deleted by
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`nixos-container destroy --purge` — both survive full agent purges, and
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hive-c0re reuses them on re-provision.
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**Idempotent**: if the files exist and are non-empty, hive-c0re considers the Space and
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room already created. Delete the files to force
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re-creation (for example after a homeserver wipe).
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## Configuration tuning
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```nix
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services.hyperhive.deploy.matrix = {
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trustedServers = [ "matrix.org" "example.com" ]; # default: []
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maxRequestSize = 20000000; # default: 20 MB
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};
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```
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**`trustedServers`** (default `[]`) — list of peer homeserver names
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whose signing keys tuwunel fetches and trusts. tuwunel enables
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federation at the protocol level from first boot (`allow_federation =
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true`) but trusts no remote homeserver until you list it here. For a closed
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single-hive deployment the default empty list is correct — add peer
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hive domains here when connecting hives into a swarm (see
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[`docs/swarm/`](../swarm/README.md)).
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**`maxRequestSize`** (default `20_000_000` bytes = 20 MB) — maximum
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size of a single matrix client request body. Matches the matrix-spec
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recommendation for media uploads and the upstream tuwunel default.
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Raise for deployments that need large file transfers; lower for
|
|
resource-constrained hosts where a 20 MB request is unexpectedly large.
|
|
|
|
## Assertion rationale
|
|
|
|
`config.assertions` in this module fail eval early rather than ship
|
|
surprising behaviour:
|
|
|
|
- **`services.hyperhive.swarm.matrix.gatewayHost != ""`** — same footgun as `forge.domain`:
|
|
empty string renders `.<hive>`-shaped garbage in both nginx
|
|
`server_name` (treated as wildcard catch-all, surprising) and
|
|
`/etc/hosts` (invalid entry). `null` is the right opt-out shape;
|
|
a config assertion rejects empty string explicitly.
|
|
SSO is unconditional, so the three below are requirements of running a
|
|
homeserver at all rather than of a setting:
|
|
|
|
- **Keep `deploy.matrix.sso.clientSecretFile` set** — it defaults to
|
|
`/run/hive-matrix-oidc/<client id>.secret` wherever the homeserver runs,
|
|
and `swarm-bao-matrix-oidc` writes the secret there from the swarm secret
|
|
store under matrix-ctl's leaf. The path is on the host's tmpfs, so every
|
|
reboot fetches the secret again and it never reaches persistent disk. A path
|
|
outside `/run/hive-matrix-oidc/`, or a null, fails at eval, not at boot:
|
|
tuwunel reads its identity providers from the config file, so a half-configured
|
|
one can stop the homeserver from starting outright rather than merely
|
|
hiding a login button.
|
|
- **Set `swarm.authelia.url`** — without a provider URL there
|
|
is nothing to discover against.
|
|
- **Set `swarm.matrix.gatewayHost != null`** — the SSO callback URL is
|
|
format-locked to `<homeserver>/_matrix/client/unstable/login/sso/callback/<client_id>`,
|
|
and the identity provider needs a public name to redirect the
|
|
browser to.
|
|
|
|
`server_name`'s own bogus-value guard lives in `hive-network.nix`
|
|
(`services.hyperhive.domain != null`), not here — see
|
|
[`docs/networking/network.md`](../networking/network.md).
|
|
|
|
## fluffychat-web build fixes
|
|
|
|
`pkgs.fluffychat-web` ships from `flutter341.buildFlutterApplication`,
|
|
which has two upstream gaps for fluffychat's web target:
|
|
|
|
- The dart web-worker entry point (`web/native_executor.dart`) isn't
|
|
compiled — `buildFlutterApplication` only runs `flutter build web`
|
|
on the main entry.
|
|
- `native_imaging`'s C source isn't built — emscripten isn't a
|
|
flutter-builder native build input.
|
|
|
|
Both fixed in `nix/host-modules/hive-matrix.nix` via two derivations:
|
|
|
|
- **`fluffychat-web-imaging`** builds `Imaging.{js,wasm}` from the
|
|
`native_imaging` C source via `pkgs.emscripten`. Source comes
|
|
from `pkgs.fluffychat-web.passthru.pubspecLock.dependencySources.native_imaging`
|
|
— already in the build closure of the flutter app, so no parallel
|
|
hash pin and version autosyncs with nixpkgs bumps. Build closure
|
|
is ~3.6 GiB (emscripten LLVM); runtime closure is just the two
|
|
output files. `dontConfigure = true` because cmake runs inside
|
|
`js/Makefile` via `emcmake cmake`, not at the package root. The
|
|
build script needs `HOME` + `EM_CACHE` writable for emscripten's
|
|
on-demand sysroot build (libc, libc++ → wasm).
|
|
- **`fluffychat-web-fixed`** is `pkgs.fluffychat-web` plus a
|
|
`postInstall` patch that (a) compiles `web/native_executor.dart`
|
|
via `dart compile js` (dart from the flutter341 closure, no
|
|
incremental cost) and (b) installs `fluffychat-web-imaging`'s
|
|
outputs into `$out`.
|
|
|
|
Two subtle details worth knowing before touching either derivation:
|
|
|
|
- **`make -C js`** instead of `cd js; make` — keeps the build-phase
|
|
pwd at the source root so `installPhase` doesn't have to know
|
|
about the cd. Robust against future reorders / `dontBuild`.
|
|
- **`web/native_executor.dart`** as a build-CWD-relative path,
|
|
*not* `$src/web/...` — `dart`'s `package_config.json` walk-up
|
|
needs to hit `buildFlutterApplication`'s pub-get output
|
|
(`.dart_tool/` in the build CWD). Walking up from a read-only
|
|
`$src/` store path finds no `.dart_tool/` and errors with
|
|
"Couldn't resolve the package 'matrix'."
|
|
|
|
Drop both derivations when nixpkgs's flutter builder grows worker
|
|
+ emcc support upstream.
|
|
|
|
Mount point is `chat.<swarm-domain>/` (the `gatewayHost` vhost);
|
|
upstream `--base-href "/"` is correct at sub-domain root, no override.
|