hyperhive/docs/swarm/credentials-reference.md

| this hive's cache pull facts | swarm-controller, into the secret store at swarm/hives/<hive>/attic/{pull-token,url,cache,public-key}, copied every five minutes from swarm/services/attic/ | hive-c0re reads them under the hive's own store identity and writes /run/hyperhive/attic/netrc (the pull token), substituter and public-key (tmpfs, each 0600 hive-core). Only the probe reads them; hive-priv doesn't. |

Credentials: the per-secret reference

Every credential in the swarm's secret store, in one table: who mints it, who reads it, and whether it renews on its own. The overview and the rules a credential follows are in credentials.md; this page is the detail, so it changes whenever someone adds a credential or moves its minting. The second half, where each secret lives on disk, maps the files that exist today.

In the table, automatic re-mint is something replacing the stored value without an operator. Automatic re-pull is the reader picking up a replaced value without a restart. ✅ means it happens today, ❌ means it doesn't, and the rest of the cell says how.

store path	minter	reader	automatic re-mint	automatic re-pull
swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/main	swarm-controller, at agent creation and every 5 minutes	the agent	✅ when missing or rejected by the homeserver	✅ the daemon restarts within 5 minutes of a rejection
swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/<account>	swarm-controller, from a credential you hand it	the agent	must be stated	✅ retried within 2 to 16 minutes after a rejection
swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix-recovery/<account>	swarm-controller, a random passphrase per account	the agent	❌ never replaced: the account's key backup opens only with this passphrase	❌ read when the account comes up
swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token	swarm-matrix-ctl appservice sync in hive-matrix, from the registration's as_token	swarm-controller	❌ follows the registration below	✅ read every 5 minutes
swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-registration	swarm-matrix-ctl appservice render in hive-matrix, when the store answers and holds none; before that, the tokens an earlier version kept in the container, stored unchanged	swarm-matrix-ctl in hive-matrix; the controller has no grant to it	❌ minted once; an operator who replaces it makes sync render the new pair and restart the homeserver	✅ sync re-reads it every 10 minutes
swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client	authelia, first boot	swarm-controller	❌ minted once, straight into the store; minted again only when the store holds none	✅ re-read when authelia refuses it
swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token	the forge, once	swarm-controller	❌ minted once; delete /var/lib/forgejo/swarm-controller-token-name in the forge container to mint a new one	✅ re-read on a 401
swarm/controller/swarm-controller/grafana/token	swarm-bao-grafana-controller-token on Grafana's host	swarm-controller	✅ every 10 minutes, when Grafana refuses it or none is stored	✅ re-read on a 401
swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/webhook-secret	swarm-controller, at start, from its old webhook-secret file; a new one only when there is no file	swarm-controller	❌ minted once; a rotated secret fails every delivery until the forge hooks are re-registered	❌ read at start
swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls	the store's agent PKI mount (deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath), at agent creation, and by the renewal pass when none is stored or its cert-auth role is missing	hive-c0re, then the agent	✅ re-issued every 5 minutes once past half its 7-day validity; minted when none is stored or its cert-auth role is missing, for agents not Destroyed	✅ the agent re-reads every 10 minutes; it renews only while its current leaf is valid
swarm/agents/<agent>/queue	swarm-controller, at agent creation	the agent; the queue, log and metrics auth services	✅ re-minted at 45 days; skipped for Destroyed agents, whose path is deleted	✅ read on every reconnect; an open connection keeps the old secret for up to an hour; the log and metrics stores honour a replaced secret for up to deploy.victorialogs.authVerdictTtl and deploy.victoriametrics.agentAuthVerdictTtl (60 s by default)
swarm/agents/<agent>/forge-token	swarm-controller, at agent creation and every 5 minutes	the agent	✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge	✅ every 10 minutes
swarm/agents/<agent>/forge/<label>	swarm-controller, when you link an external forge account in the swarm UI	the agent	❌ your token; delete it and link the label again	✅ every 2 minutes
swarm/agents/<agent>/github-token	swarm-controller, when you link a GitHub account in the swarm UI	the agent	❌ your token; delete it and link again	✅ every 2 minutes
swarm/agents/<agent>/backend-env	hive-agent-backend-env, in the agent's container, from the agent's backendEnvironmentFile when the leaf holds nothing (field env, the file's exact text); or swarm-controller, when you set the API-key environment in the swarm UI	the agent	❌ nothing replaces it without you; a save in the swarm UI overwrites it, including text an agent wrote into an empty leaf; the agent's file stays as it was	❌ the file in /run refreshes every 2 minutes, and the harness and the subagent daemon load it at their next start
swarm/agents/<agent>/claude-credentials	swarm-claude-login, when you log the agent in from its card; one version per login	the agent, while it waits for a login	❌ log in again	✅ every 30 seconds while waiting
swarm/hives/<hive>/matrix/sender-token	swarm-controller, every 5 minutes	swarm-controller and the hive	✅ when missing or rejected by the homeserver	✅ the hive re-reads on every sweep
swarm/hives/<hive>/forge/token	swarm-controller, every 5 minutes	swarm-controller and the hive	✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge	✅ read on every forge call
swarm/agents/<agent>/proxy-credential	swarm-controller: 32 random bytes, at start and every 5 minutes for every agent that holds a store identity	the hive (hive-c0re) and the agent, which fetches it	❌ never replaced: written only while the path holds nothing	✅ hive-c0re re-reads it every 30 seconds
swarm/hives/<hive>/squid-selfcheck	swarm-controller, in the same pass as the agents' credentials	the hive: hive-c0re and squid-selfcheck-credential (root)	❌ never replaced: written only while the path holds nothing	✅ hive-c0re every 30 seconds, the root unit every 10 minutes
swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client	authelia, first boot, straight into the store	the hive	❌ minted once, straight into the store; minted again only when the store holds none	✅ re-read when authelia refuses it
swarm/services/<clientId>/oidc/client	authelia	that service	must be stated	must be stated
swarm/services/ci-runner/registration-token	swarm-controller, from the forge, at start and every 5 minutes	swarm-bao-ci-runner on the runner's host	❌ the forge keeps one token until an admin resets it; the controller then writes the new one within 5 minutes	✅ every 10 minutes; restarts the runner on a change
swarm/services/<grafana client id>/metrics/bearer	swarm-bao-grafana-metrics-bearer on Grafana's host, when none is stored	swarm-metrics-auth and swarm-logs-grafana-auth	❌ delete it and restart swarm-bao-grafana-metrics-bearer	✅ the auth services re-read within a minute; ❌ Grafana restarts when its copy changes
swarm/services/<grafana client id>/secret-key	swarm-bao-grafana-secret-key on Grafana's host, from the key an earlier release generated; a new one only when there is none	Grafana	❌ minted once; a different key leaves Grafana unable to read its stored datasource secrets	❌ Grafana reads it at start; the unit restarts Grafana when the file changes
swarm/services/swarm-authelia/keys/<name>, for jwt, session, storage-encryption, oidc-hmac and oidc-issuer	authelia's authelia-swarm-secrets unit in its container, under the secret publisher's identity, from the key file an earlier release generated; a new one only when there is none	authelia	❌ minted once; a different storage-encryption key leaves authelia's database unreadable and a different issuer key invalidates every issued token	❌ read when the unit runs; the unit restarts authelia when the file changes
swarm/services/review-classifier/anthropic-api-key	you, in the store's UI, field api_key	swarm-review-classifier	❌ write a new key	✅ read on every run
swarm/services/review-classifier/acp-provider	you, in the store's UI, field api_key	swarm-review-classifier	❌ write a new key	✅ read on every run
swarm/services/review-classifier/forge/token	swarm-controller, at start and every 5 minutes	swarm-controller	✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge	✅ read on every review
swarm/services/builder/forge/token	swarm-controller, at start and every 5 minutes	swarm-builder, swarm-controller	✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge	✅ read on every build
swarm/services/attic/push-token	swarm-bao-attic-tokens on the cache's host, when none is stored; with an external cache, you, in the store's UI (field value), or bao kv put with value=- and the token on stdin	swarm-builder	❌ write a new token; a token the cache refuses fails the push, and the build stays green with cached false	✅ read on every push; with both swarm.attic options null, nothing reads it
swarm/services/attic/pull-token	swarm-bao-attic-tokens on the cache's host, when none is stored; read-only, ten years; with an external cache, you, in the store's UI (field value), or bao kv put with value=- and the value on stdin	swarm-controller, to copy it and to check narinfos	❌ write a new token	✅ copied to the hives every 5 minutes
swarm/services/attic/url	swarm-bao-attic-tokens on the cache's host, when none is stored (https://<swarm.attic.domain>); with an external cache, you, in the store's UI (field value), or bao kv put with value=- and the value on stdin (scheme included, no trailing slash)	swarm-controller, which copies it to each hive	❌ delete it and restart swarm-bao-attic-tokens, or write the new value	✅ copied to the hives every 5 minutes
swarm/services/attic/cache	swarm-bao-attic-tokens on the cache's host, when none is stored (swarm.attic.cache); with an external cache, you, in the store's UI (field value), or bao kv put with value=- and the value on stdin	swarm-controller, which copies it to each hive	❌ as the URL	✅ copied to the hives every 5 minutes
swarm/services/attic/public-key	swarm-bao-attic-tokens on the cache's host, when none is stored (the key attic cache info prints); with an external cache, you, in the store's UI (field value), or bao kv put with value=- and the value on stdin (<name>:<base64>)	swarm-controller, which copies it to each hive	❌ as the URL. A cache recreated with a new key leaves the stored one stale: every hive then reports bad-signature	✅ copied to the hives every 5 minutes
swarm/hives/<hive>/attic/{pull-token,url,cache,public-key}	swarm-controller, from the four swarm/services/attic/ leaves, every 5 minutes; it skips a leaf whose source holds nothing, and a copy whose source is gone stays	the hive (hive-c0re)	✅ a changed source is written over the copy in the next pass	✅ read every 5 minutes
swarm/services/attic/jwt-secret	swarm-bao-attic-secret on the cache's host, when none is stored	swarm-bao-attic-secret, swarm-bao-attic-tokens	❌ a new key invalidates both tokens	❌ atticd restarts when the file changes
swarm/services/ci-metrics/forge/token	swarm-controller, at start and every 5 minutes	swarm-ci-metrics, swarm-controller	✅ when missing or no longer matching the forge	✅ read on every pass
(not in the store) a hive's mTLS leaf	the store's PKI, or you by hand	the hive itself, from disk	must be stated	must be stated

Operating notes

The name main belongs to the swarm's own homeserver account, which the controller mints, so the controller rejects any account you link under it.

swarm-controller checks every forge token itself: it looks at every agent that has a store identity at start and every five minutes. For any whose stored token is missing or stale it creates the forge user if there isn't one, then mints the token. To check one agent now:

swarmctl agent mint-forge-token <agent>

An agent without a store identity gets no swarm token and keeps using the forge-token file in its state dir, if it has one; re-create it with swarmctl agent create to give it one. The swarm leaves an agent it already declares as it is. For an agent with no declaration, such as one only its hive knows about, agent create declares it paused; set it up from its card in the swarm UI.

⚠️ Re-create existing agents before deploying a hive-side change that makes a container require a credential it may not have. A container whose store identity is absent doesn't start, so create the identities first, setting any newly paused agent up as above.

Revoking an agent's queue credential. Declaring an agent destroyed — PUT /api/hives/{hive}/agents/{agent}/state — deletes swarm/agents/<agent>/queue and every version it held. An open queue connection closes within an hour. An agent recreated under the same name gets a fresh secret. It leaves the agent's mTLS leaf alone. If the store refuses the delete, swarm-controller logs an error naming the agent and the teardown continues; declare the agent destroyed again to re-run the revocation.

A failed store login retries every 30 seconds for a day. When a later attempt lands a changed value, the service that loaded it restarts. If the fetch unit can't compare file times it logs cannot compare the mtime of <path> … — leaving <unit> as it is at err, and the service keeps the old value until the next timer tick.

Where each secret lives on disk

One row per secret, by the place that owns it: who generates it, where the file or store path is, and what an operator of a hive elsewhere places. How the pieces fit, and the reasoning behind them, is in credentials.md.

Swarm-level — one of each per swarm

secret	generated by	lives at	hive elsewhere
swarm-services root CA (cert + key)	swarm-bao.nix's granting unit, inside the store's pki mount	the key never leaves the mount; the cert lands at /var/lib/swarm-bao-services-pki/services-root.pem (0644) and at /var/lib/hive-tls/swarm-services-root.pem on every hive	nothing to copy — every hive receives the cert with the leaf it asks the store for, or from pki/ca/pem where it fronts no swarm name and needs a store identity
authelia session, JWT, storage-encryption and OIDC HMAC keys	authelia-swarm-secrets in authelia's container. It stores each in the swarm secret store at swarm/services/swarm-authelia/keys/<name> when the store holds none: the value of the key an earlier release generated, or a new one when there is no such file. The files stay on disk. While the store's policy doesn't grant the leaf yet, or the store is down, the unit runs on the files. A container with no secret publisher identity generates the files, as before	/var/lib/authelia-swarm/{session,jwt,storage-encryption,oidc-hmac}.key	nothing to place: the publisher's store leaf is the one in the row below. A store that stays unreachable on a start with no key file keeps authelia from starting
authelia OIDC issuer key (RSA)	same unit, same store path (oidc-issuer)	/var/lib/authelia-swarm/oidc-issuer.key	same — relying parties verify against the public half at /jwks.json
swarm appservice registration (as_token, hs_token)	swarm-matrix-ctl appservice render in hive-matrix. The store's pair wins; a store holding none takes the tokens an earlier version kept in the container, so the value doesn't change by moving. Only a store that answers, holds none, and a container with no such files gets a new pair	/run/swarm-matrix-appservice/swarm.yaml in hive-matrix (tmpfs), which tuwunel loads through LoadCredential. The earlier /var/lib/swarm-matrix-appservice/{as-token,hs-token,swarm.yaml} stay, unused, and bao wins if they differ; the store path is swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-registration	nothing to place: matrix-ctl's store leaf is the one the container binds. A store that's down keeps the homeserver down and mints nothing, and render retries every 30 seconds for 24 hours
OIDC client secret, plaintext half	authelia crypto hash generate --random	the swarm secret store, at the path its reader fetches: swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client, swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client or swarm/services/<client id>/oidc/client. The bridge reads its own into /run/swarm-authelia-bridge/client-secret before each start. A container with no secret publisher identity keeps it in /var/lib/authelia-swarm/oidc-clients/<id>.secret; a file an earlier release left seeds the store once when it holds no value, and stays unused	nothing to place: readers fetch it from the store (how)
OIDC client secret, digest half	the same mint	oidc-clients/<id>.digest	authelia's own half; merged at runtime via settingsFiles
the swarm collector's copy of its OIDC secret	swarm-bao-otel-oidc.service reads it out of the swarm secret store, on every host that runs the collector and holds a store identity	/run/swarm-otel-oidc/<id>.secret on the host's tmpfs, bind-mounted read-only into the swarm-otel container — never on persistent disk, so a reboot fetches it again	same unit, same path — one route, co-located or not. A collector with no store identity has clientSecretFile == null, its already-supported unauthenticated-push degrade — see swarm-level secrets
Grafana's copy of its OIDC secret	swarm-bao-grafana-oidc.service reads it out of the swarm secret store, on every host that runs Grafana	/run/swarm-grafana-secrets/<id>.secret on the host's tmpfs, bind-mounted read-only into the swarm-grafana container — never on persistent disk, so a reboot fetches it again	same unit, same path — one route, co-located or not. Nothing for an operator to place beyond this host's store leaf, see hive-level secrets
Grafana's admin password	swarm-bao-grafana-admin.service creates it in the swarm secret store at swarm/services/<grafana client id>/admin/password when the store holds none, then copies it out, on every host that runs Grafana. Grafana's leaf may create that leaf but not update it, so the store keeps the first value, and the secret publisher can't write it. To rotate, run bao kv metadata delete secret/swarm/services/<grafana client id>/admin/password with a token that may, such as the root token (Grafana's, the publisher's and the controller's can't), then systemctl restart swarm-bao-grafana-admin; a plain bao kv delete isn't enough, see the callout xkey's section	/run/swarm-grafana-secrets/admin-password on the host's tmpfs, bind-mounted read-only into the swarm-grafana container, never on persistent disk: security.admin_password for a new database, and grafana cli admin reset-admin-password in grafana.service's preStart for an existing one, on every start	same unit, same path. After a reboot the unit fetches the file again, and Grafana doesn't start until it exists, so it stays down rather than falling back to the upstream default admin
Grafana's metrics bearer	swarm-bao-grafana-metrics-bearer.service creates it in the swarm secret store at swarm/services/<grafana client id>/metrics/bearer when the store holds none, then copies it out, on every host that runs Grafana. Same grant as the admin password, create without update. To rotate, run bao kv metadata delete secret/swarm/services/<grafana client id>/metrics/bearer with a token that may, then systemctl restart swarm-bao-grafana-metrics-bearer	/run/swarm-grafana-secrets/metrics-bearer on the host's tmpfs, bind-mounted read-only into the swarm-grafana container, holding Bearer <value>: the metrics datasource's Authorization header. The logs datasource sends the same header. swarm-metrics-auth on the metrics store's host, and a second instance on the log store's host (swarm-logs-grafana-auth), read the stored value themselves, each under its own leaf	same unit, same path. The unit restarts Grafana when the file changes
Grafana's datasource encryption key	swarm-bao-grafana-secret-key.service stores it in the swarm secret store at swarm/services/<grafana client id>/secret-key when the store holds none, then copies it out, on every host that runs Grafana. It stores the key an earlier release generated at /var/lib/grafana-secret/secret_key in the container, so the key doesn't change, and mints a new one only on a host with no such file. Same grant as the admin password, create without update. The earlier file stays on disk, unused once the store holds the key. A store that's down or doesn't grant the leaf fails the unit, and Grafana doesn't start	/run/swarm-grafana-secrets/secret-key on the host's tmpfs, bind-mounted read-only into the swarm-grafana container: security.secret_key	same unit, same path. Grafana doesn't start until the file exists. Changing the key leaves Grafana unable to read the datasource secrets it stored, so never delete the store path to rotate it
the swarm controller's webhook secret	swarm-controller stores it in the swarm secret store at swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/webhook-secret when the store holds none: the value of webhook-secret in its state directory, or a new one when there is no such file. The state directory file stays on disk and is the fallback while the store is unreachable or its policy doesn't grant the path yet	the swarm secret store; the controller holds it in memory and registers the same value with the forge's hooks	nothing to place: the controller's store leaf already exists. A store that stays unreachable on a start with no state directory file leaves the webhook endpoint answering 503
the metrics store responder's own store leaf (cert + key)	signLeaf in glue-bao-tls.nix (swarm-bao-pki.service), on the host that runs the secret store, once, subject deploy.bao.metricsAuthCommonName. swarm-bao-metrics-auth-policy.service writes the swarm-metrics-auth role and its read grants on the bearer leaf and on the metrics store forwarder's client secret, nothing else	/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/metrics-auth.pem and metrics-auth-key.pem on the store's host, handed to swarm-metrics-auth through LoadCredential (paths in argv, never values) and read by path by swarm-victoriametrics-forwarder-oidc	the operator places a leaf with that subject on the metrics store's host and names it in deploy.victoriametrics.authBaoClientCertFile / authBaoClientKeyFile; evaluation fails naming both until then. If the store is on another host, deploy that host first: the role must exist before the responder's login succeeds, and until it does the gateway refuses every Grafana query (fail closed)
the secret publisher's store leaf (cert + key)	signLeaf in glue-bao-tls.nix (swarm-bao-pki.service), on the host that runs the secret store, once, subject deploy.bao.secretPublisherCommonName. swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy.service writes the swarm-secret-publisher role: create and update under swarm/hives/*, swarm/services/* and the controller's client, and read on the oidc/client leaves it mints, the controller's client and authelia's five keys alone	/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/secret-publisher.pem and secret-publisher-key.pem on the host, handed into authelia's container as nspawn system credentials, which authelia-swarm-secrets, swarm-authelia-bridge and the forwarder's swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc load with LoadCredential. nspawn won't start authelia's container while a named file is missing	the operator copies the leaf to authelia's host, beside the hive's own store leaf, where glue-secret-publisher-bao-identity.nix looks, or names it in deploy.swarm-secret-publisher.baoClientCertFile / baoClientKeyFile
the swarm controller's copy of its OIDC secret	swarm-controller reads it out of the swarm secret store at start, under its own leaf	the daemon's memory only; never on disk	same read, co-located or not. Nothing for an operator to place beyond the controller's store leaf (deploy.swarm-controller.baoClientCertFile)
a hive's copy of its own OIDC secret	hive-c0re reads it out of the swarm secret store when it first connects to the queue, under the hive's own leaf	the daemon's memory only; never on disk	same read, co-located or not. Nothing for an operator to place beyond the hive's store leaf (deploy.bao.clientCertFile)
the hive collector's copy of its hive's OIDC secret	swarm-bao-hive-otel-oidc.service reads it out of the swarm secret store under the hive's own leaf, on every hive that runs the collector and holds that leaf; the leaf is the source	/run/hive-otel-oidc/hive-<name>.secret on the hive's host tmpfs, 0400 root, loaded by LoadCredential — never on persistent disk, so a reboot fetches it again	same unit, same path, co-located or not. Nothing for an operator to place beyond the hive's store leaf (deploy.bao.clientCertFile). Naming a secret file with otel.clientSecretFile instead is legacy for a host without a leaf: the build warns, and the fix is to place the leaf from /var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/hives/<hive>/ and drop the setting
the swarm controller's forge token	the forge's forgejo-swarm-controller-account, in-container, once	the swarm secret store at swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token, written by the mint under the forge publisher's leaf, which the forge container loads as a credential; the controller holds it in memory only. /var/lib/forgejo/swarm-controller-token-name in the forge container holds its name, the minter's record that it has minted	nothing to place beyond the controller's store leaf. A forge host without the store needs the publisher's leaf placed (deploy.bao.forgePublisherClientCertFile)
the swarm controller's Grafana token	swarm-bao-grafana-controller-token.service, on the host that runs Grafana, as Grafana's built-in admin over its socket: it creates the swarm-controller service account as a Viewer (and sets it back to Viewer on every run), mints a token for it and writes it to the swarm secret store at swarm/controller/swarm-controller/grafana/token under Grafana's leaf. Re-run every ten minutes: it keeps a stored token Grafana accepts, and replaces one Grafana refuses with 401 (or a missing one), deleting every other token of that account first	the swarm secret store only; the controller reads it for GET /api/alerts and holds it in memory, re-reading the store once when Grafana answers 401	nothing to place: Grafana's leaf is already required to run Grafana. Until the unit has run, /api/alerts answers 503 naming the empty path
an agent's API-key environment (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, an ACP provider key)	hive-agent-backend-env.service, in the agent's container, on an agent with a store that uses useApiKey or the acp runtime. When the store holds nothing at swarm/agents/<agent>/backend-env and backendEnvironmentFile is a non-empty file, it creates the leaf with the file's exact bytes and -cas=0, under the agent's own leaf, which may create that path and not update it. It never rotates a value and never rewrites or deletes the file. To set or replace a key, use set the API-key environment in the swarm UI (PUT /api/hives/{hive}/agents/{agent}/backend-env): swarm-controller overwrites the leaf with its own grant, and the store's value then wins over the file. Its remove (DELETE on the same path) deletes the leaf, and an agent whose file has content then creates it from that file again	the swarm secret store at that path; the unit writes it to /run/hive-agent-backend-env/env (tmpfs, 0600, root), and hive-agent and hive-subagent-daemon load that after backendEnvironmentFile as EnvironmentFile=	the same unit, same path. A variable in the store wins over the same one in the file. With the store down at a start, the file alone carries the agent, as it did before the store held a copy; with an older hive build the agent ignores the leaf and keeps reading the file
an agent's proxy settings (HTTPS_PROXY, HTTP_PROXY, NO_PROXY, the credential in the proxy URL)	hive-agent-proxy-credential.service, in the agent's container, as the agent user, at start and every 10 minutes: it reads swarm/agents/<agent>/proxy-credential under the agent's own leaf and builds the file from it. It writes nothing while the path holds nothing or the hive's facts name no squid	/run/hive-agent-proxy-credential/proxy.env (tmpfs, 0600, the agent user); the harness, its bash tool, the subagents, the MCP servers and the pollers load it as EnvironmentFile=- and read it when they start	With no credential, or on a hive that writes no HIVE_SQUID_PROXY and HIVE_EGRESS_NO_PROXY fact, nothing writes the file and a unit has no proxy variable and reaches the internet directly. A failed read keeps the file already in place. A unit started before the file appeared goes direct until its next start. The credential is also in the environment of every process those units start, so env in the agent's shell prints it
an agent's claude login (.credentials.json)	swarm-claude-login.service, in its container, when an operator completes claude auth login from the agent's card in the swarm UI; it stores the file as a new version at swarm/agents/<agent>/claude-credentials under its own leaf, which may create and update that path and read nothing under an agent	the swarm secret store at that path; the agent's hive-agent reads it under the agent's own leaf every 30 seconds while it waits for a login and writes it to ~/.claude/.credentials.json	the same read, co-located or not; nothing for an operator to place beyond the agent's store leaf. When the store's copy and the agent's differ the KV version decides: the agent installs only a version newer than the last it installed (claude-credentials-version under the harness dir), because claude rotates the refresh token in its own copy and the stored one goes stale. The agent ignores a stale or equal version, and a relogin writes a newer one — claude-login.md
the queue responder's copy of its OIDC secret	the responder reads it out of the swarm secret store itself as it starts, under its own leaf, and again when authelia refuses it	the daemon's memory only; never on disk	same read, wherever authelia runs. Nothing for an operator to place beyond the responder's store leaf (deploy.nats.authBaoClientCertFile)
the queue container's journal forwarder's copy of the queue's OIDC secret	swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc.service inside the swarm-nats container reads it out of the swarm secret store under the responder's store leaf, and again every 10 minutes	/run/swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc/client-secret on the container's tmpfs, root 0400, never on persistent disk; LoadCredential hands it to the collector	same unit, same path. After a reboot the collector restarts until the file exists, then resumes from its saved journal cursor. Nothing for an operator to place beyond the responder's store leaf (deploy.nats.authBaoClientCertFile)
the CI runner, Grafana, log store, cache, forge and homeserver containers' journal forwarders' OIDC secrets	swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc.service inside each container reads its forwarder client's secret (swarm.<service>.otel.clientId) out of the swarm secret store under the store leaf the host already holds for that service, handed in as a system credential (bound in read-only, for the homeserver's), and again every 10 minutes	/run/swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc/client-secret on the container's tmpfs, root 0400, never on persistent disk; LoadCredential hands it to the collector	same unit, same path. Nothing for an operator to place beyond those leaves (deploy.bao.ciRunnerClientCertFile, deploy.bao.grafanaOidcClientCertFile, deploy.victorialogs.authBaoClientCertFile, deploy.bao.forgePublisherClientCertFile, deploy.bao.atticClientCertFile, deploy.matrix.ctlBaoClientCertFile)
the metrics store container's journal forwarder's OIDC secret	swarm-victoriametrics-forwarder-oidc.service on the store's host reads its forwarder client's secret (swarm.victoriametrics.otel.clientId) out of the swarm secret store under the metrics store responder's leaf, and again every 10 minutes: the container has no network to reach the store	/run/swarm-victoriametrics-forwarder-oidc/<id>.secret on the host (tmpfs), root 0400, never on persistent disk; bound into the container read-only, where LoadCredential hands it to the collector	same unit, same path. Nothing for an operator to place beyond that leaf (deploy.victoriametrics.authBaoClientCertFile)
the CI run poller's forge token	swarm-controller, with the forge's admin API, for its ci-metrics account, at start and in a five-minute pass	the swarm secret store at swarm/services/ci-metrics/forge/token; swarm-ci-metrics reads it once per pass under its own leaf and holds it in memory for that pass. When the store's token no longer matches the forge's, the controller's next pass mints a new one; until then the poller's forge calls answer 401, the unit fails and no cursor moves	nothing to place beyond the poller's leaf (deploy.bao.ciMetricsClientCertFile), on a host without the store
the CI run poller's copy of its OIDC secret	authelia's mint, which creates it in the swarm secret store	swarm-ci-metrics reads swarm/services/<swarm.ci-metrics.clientId>/oidc/client once per pass under its own leaf, and again when authelia refuses it; memory only. While it differs from authelia's, the token request fails, nothing gets pushed and no cursor moves	same leaf, nothing else
authelia's container's journal forwarder's OIDC secret	authelia's mint, in its container, like every client's secret (swarm.authelia.otel.clientId). It creates it at swarm/services/<id>/oidc/client, and swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc.service in the same container reads it back under the secret publisher's leaf, at start and every 10 minutes	/run/swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc/client-secret on the container's tmpfs, root 0400; LoadCredential hands it to the collector.	none: the forwarder runs only in authelia's container, and is off there without the publisher's leaf
authelia subject store	swarmctl and swarm-authelia-bridge	users.yml — one file, read and written by both	swarmctl, on the host that runs authelia
wireguard private key	the operator — wg genkey	whatever deploy.wireguard.privateKeyFile names	always operator-provided; nothing generates this for you
queue auth-callout nkeys (user seed + account seed)	swarm-nats-auth ensure-callout-keys, run by swarm-bao-nats-callout-xkey on the queue's host when the store holds no seed; the verb stores a seed it finds at /var/lib/swarm-nats-callout/{callout-user,issuer}.seed as is, then removes the file	the swarm secret store: the seeds at swarm/services/swarm-nats/callout/{user,issuer}-seed, read by the swarm-nats-auth role alone; the public halves at swarm/public/swarm-nats/callout-{user,issuer}	nothing to place beyond the responder's store leaf (deploy.nats.authBaoClientCertFile)
queue auth-callout xkey (curve seed)	swarm-nats-auth ensure-callout-keys, run by swarm-bao-nats-callout-xkey on the queue's host when the store holds no seed	the swarm secret store: the seed at swarm/services/swarm-nats/callout/xkey-seed, read by the swarm-nats-auth role alone; the public half at swarm/public/swarm-nats/callout-xkey	nothing to place beyond the responder's store leaf (deploy.nats.authBaoClientCertFile)
the queue's TLS key, copied for the gateway's /metrics vhost	swarm-nats-gateway-cert.service on the queue's host, where the gateway uses self-signed TLS: a copy of the queue's bao-PKI TLS leaf (/var/lib/swarm-nats-tls/) once swarm-bao-nats-tls has issued it, else a throwaway 30-day self-signed pair for the queue's name until then	/var/lib/swarm-nats-gateway-tls/{cert,key}.pem; the key is 0640 group nginx, read by nginx for the queue's /metrics vhost. The queue's own key stays 0600 root	the copy is redone on each leaf renewal (swarm-bao-nats-tls starts the unit, which queues a non-blocking nginx reload when nginx is running); a restart before any leaf exists keeps the pair already there. Until swarm-bao-nats-tls issues the leaf the vhost serves the throwaway cert, so the collector's scrape fails TLS. Nothing for an operator to place
the secret store's own contents	openbao, on first bao operator init — an operator action, not a unit	inside the swarm-bao container, at its own /var/lib/openbao, kept across rebuilds by ephemeral = false. ⚠️ Not a host path: nixos-container destroy swarm-bao takes the raft data with it, so back up the container's tree, not /var/lib/. Only the store's TLS material (/var/lib/swarm-bao-tls) and its PKCS11 token (/var/lib/swarm-bao-token) are host-level	n/a — there is one store; a hive elsewhere is a client of it and holds none of this
the secret store's unseal material	the HSM/TPM under deploy.bao.seal = "pkcs11"; openbao itself under "shamir"	in the token; or held by whoever ran bao operator init, which is what "shamir" means and why it's stated rather than inferred	n/a — only the host running the store seals anything

Hive-level — one of each per hive

secret	generated by	lives at
hive leaf certs	hive-tls.nix, issued by the secret store's pki mount	<deploy.hive-controller.tls.stateDir>/<name>.pem
the hive's own store identity	glue-bao-tls.nix on the store's host; placed by hand on every other host (ca.md)	deploy.hive-controller.tls.baoHiveIdentityCertFile / baoHiveIdentityKeyFile
the cache's public key and pull token, for hive-priv	swarm-controller copies them to swarm/hives/<hive>/attic/{public-key,pull-token} (see the cache-facts row above)	hive-priv-cache-facts (root) reads those two under the hive's own store identity every ten minutes and writes /run/hyperhive-priv/attic/public-key and netrc (tmpfs, root, each 0600, directory 0700); the cache's address comes from services.hyperhive.swarm.attic.domain and cache, not from the store. A store that holds no facts, or that doesn't answer, leaves the files as they stand, and a hive that never got them has hive-priv answer not available.
the forge's copy of its OIDC secret	swarm-bao-forge-oidc.service reads it out of the swarm secret store under the forge publisher's leaf, wherever authelia runs	/run/hive-forge-oidc/<id>.secret on the host (tmpfs), bound into the forge container, handed to forgejo-sso-source through LoadCredential
the homeserver's copy of its OIDC secret	swarm-bao-matrix-oidc.service reads it out of the swarm secret store under matrix-ctl's leaf, wherever authelia runs	/run/hive-matrix-oidc/<id>.secret on the host (tmpfs), bound into the homeserver container, handed to tuwunel through LoadCredential
this hive's forge read token	swarm-controller, into the secret store at swarm/hives/<hive>/forge/token, for the hive-<hive> account; a pass at start and every five minutes re-mints a missing or stale token	hive-c0re reads it under the hive's own store identity for each forge read, and hands it to the git commands it runs. It keeps no copy on disk
squid's users file	hive-c0re (workers::squid_users), every 30 seconds, from the proxy credentials of its agents and the self-check	services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.squid.usersFile (/var/lib/hive-squid/users, hive-core:squid, 0640): <user>:<hash> lines, SHA-512 crypt hashes only, renamed into place when it changed. unrestricted beside it lists the users whose agent holds the swarm's unrestricted_internet flag, names only; it lists every agent the hive never read as off systemd-tmpfiles creates it empty so squid's helper never sees a missing file. A hive whose agents have no credential yet (an older controller) has an empty file: every login fails and the self-check reports ok=false; an agent without one sends none, so it goes direct
the squid self-check's password	swarm-controller mints swarm/hives/<hive>/squid-selfcheck; squid-selfcheck-credential (root, every 10 minutes) reads it as the hive	/run/credstore/hive-squid.selfcheck (tmpfs, root, 0400), imported by squid-selfcheck.service as a systemd credential and handed to curl on its stdin. Both self-check users (selfcheck.squid and the always-unrestricted selfcheck-unrestricted.squid) use it, so whoever holds it has unrestricted egress through this squid Missing, or different from the users file: the self-check logs credential=absent or a 407 and fails, and nothing else breaks

Store identities, one per principal

Bao matches a cert-auth role on the certificate's subject, so a certificate is an identity and sharing one merges the identities. Each of these leaves has a role and a policy of its own, and reaches one path, except the review classifier's, the CI runner's, the builder's, the cache's, the CI run poller's, the claude login minter's, the forge host's and Grafana's, which reach more than one:

unit	option pair under deploy.bao.	reads, or writes
swarm-bao-grafana-oidc, swarm-bao-grafana-admin, swarm-bao-grafana-secret-key, and Grafana's journal forwarder in its container	grafanaOidcClientCertFile / grafanaOidcClientKeyFile	reads swarm/services/<grafana client id>/oidc/client and swarm/services/<grafana forwarder client id>/oidc/client; creates and reads swarm/services/<grafana client id>/admin/password and swarm/services/<grafana client id>/secret-key
swarm-bao-otel-oidc	otelOidcClientCertFile / otelOidcClientKeyFile	swarm/services/<collector client id>/oidc/client
swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc	forwarderOidcClientCertFile / forwarderOidcClientKeyFile	swarm/services/<store forwarder client id>/oidc/client
swarm-bao-ci-runner, and the runner's journal forwarder in its container	ciRunnerClientCertFile / ciRunnerClientKeyFile	swarm/services/ci-runner/registration-token and swarm/services/<runner forwarder client id>/oidc/client
swarm-review-classifier, in its container	reviewClassifierClientCertFile / reviewClassifierClientKeyFile	swarm/services/review-classifier/anthropic-api-key, swarm/services/review-classifier/acp-provider and swarm/services/<classifier client id>/oidc/client
swarm-claude-login, in its container	claudeLoginClientCertFile / claudeLoginClientKeyFile	creates and updates swarm/agents/+/claude-credentials; reads swarm/services/<minter client id>/oidc/client
swarm-notify-router, in its container	notifyRouterClientCertFile / notifyRouterClientKeyFile	swarm/services/<router client id>/oidc/client
swarm-builder, in its container	builderClientCertFile / builderClientKeyFile	swarm/services/builder/forge/token, swarm/services/attic/push-token and swarm/services/<builder client id>/oidc/client
swarm-bao-attic-secret and swarm-bao-attic-tokens	atticClientCertFile / atticClientKeyFile	creates and reads swarm/services/attic/jwt-secret, swarm/services/attic/push-token and swarm/services/attic/pull-token
swarm-ci-metrics	ciMetricsClientCertFile / ciMetricsClientKeyFile	swarm/services/ci-metrics/forge/token and swarm/services/<poller client id>/oidc/client
swarm-bao-forge-oidc and the forge's controller-token mint and its journal forwarder in its container	forgePublisherClientCertFile / forgePublisherClientKeyFile	writes swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token; reads swarm/services/<forge client id>/oidc/client and swarm/services/<forge forwarder client id>/oidc/client

The option names are deploy.bao.<pair>; the common names, what a missing leaf costs and how to place a leaf by hand are in per-principal identities.