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@ -62,29 +62,6 @@ boundary (`docs/security.md`: capability = accepted risk), so an agent being
able to *send* is an accepted extension of that boundary — but it is not
closed by this design, and nothing here should be read as closing it.
**The `agent` label is self-reported, and no planned authentication changes
that.** Treat it as a convenience for grouping dashboards, never as evidence of
which container produced a sample: any agent that can reach this hive's
collector can label its data as any other agent.
Worth spelling out, because two different hops are in play and only one of them
is getting a credential:
- **agent→collector** (this section's hop) stays open on the bridge. Nothing
downstream can tell one agent's export from another's.
- **hive→swarm** is where the planned ingest auth goes. The swarm tier stamps
`hive=` from the connection it authenticated, so *that* label becomes
unforgeable.
So a verified `hive` is reachable and a verified `agent` is not — and that falls
out of the topology rather than being a gap someone forgot to close. The swarm
runs one collector, and the mechanism gives it no finer grain: a bearer-token
check never reveals *which* token matched, and a receiver reads request metadata
rather than the claims it authenticated with.
If you need per-agent numbers you can act on, take them from the agent's own
turn-stats rather than from a metric label.
## Options reference
Every `services.hyperhive.otel.*` option's full type/default/description/