diff --git a/docs/observability.md b/docs/observability.md
index 67224a0e..cb2f2b21 100644
--- a/docs/observability.md
+++ b/docs/observability.md
@@ -62,29 +62,6 @@ boundary (`docs/security.md`: capability = accepted risk), so an agent being
 able to *send* is an accepted extension of that boundary — but it is not
 closed by this design, and nothing here should be read as closing it.
 
-**The `agent` label is self-reported, and no planned authentication changes
-that.** Treat it as a convenience for grouping dashboards, never as evidence of
-which container produced a sample: any agent that can reach this hive's
-collector can label its data as any other agent.
-
-Worth spelling out, because two different hops are in play and only one of them
-is getting a credential:
-
-- **agent→collector** (this section's hop) stays open on the bridge. Nothing
-  downstream can tell one agent's export from another's.
-- **hive→swarm** is where the planned ingest auth goes. The swarm tier stamps
-  `hive=` from the connection it authenticated, so *that* label becomes
-  unforgeable.
-
-So a verified `hive` is reachable and a verified `agent` is not — and that falls
-out of the topology rather than being a gap someone forgot to close. The swarm
-runs one collector, and the mechanism gives it no finer grain: a bearer-token
-check never reveals *which* token matched, and a receiver reads request metadata
-rather than the claims it authenticated with.
-
-If you need per-agent numbers you can act on, take them from the agent's own
-turn-stats rather than from a metric label.
-
 ## Options reference
 
 Every `services.hyperhive.otel.*` option's full type/default/description/