Ten service modules (forge, matrix chat, authelia, grafana, otel, nats,
swarm-ui, victorialogs, victoriametrics, bao UI) wrote
services.nginx.virtualHosts themselves, each applying the gateway's
listen set, per-name TLS attrs and security headers by hand. They now
declare services.hyperhive.gateway.vhosts.<name> with only their own
locations and options; ./declared-vhosts.nix renders it into the nginx
vhost with listen, TLS and headers added.
An eval assertion refuses a declared vhost that sets listen, addSSL,
onlySSL, enableACME, useACMEHost, sslCertificate or sslCertificateKey,
and one declared while the gateway is off. nats' own leaf is the new
`certificate` field. The rendered nginx vhosts are unchanged.
Each container now runs the journal forwarder the queue's and the builder's
containers run, pushing to a receiver of its own on the swarm collector. Each
authenticates as a new machine OIDC client of its own
(swarm.<service>.otel.clientId), registered by a glue file wherever authelia
runs, minted by authelia and published to the store by the secret publisher.
Grafana's browser login client is unchanged.
The fetch unit inside each container reads the client secret with the store
identity the host already holds for that service (the runner's, Grafana's,
and the log store responder's), now also handed into the container as an
nspawn system credential. Each of those three policies gains one read stanza
on its forwarder's client path. The host units that use those identities are
unchanged.
The three containers drop --link-journal=host, and the host collector stops
reading them.
Each container now runs the journal forwarder the queue's container runs,
pushing to a receiver of its own on the swarm collector as the service's
existing OIDC client, with the client's secret read inside the container
by the fetch unit. Their store identities are system credentials, so the
fetch unit loads them too. The three containers drop --link-journal=host,
which hid their journals from the forwarder, and the host collector stops
reading them.
The swarm-nats container now runs its own otel collector, which reads the
container's journal and pushes it to the swarm collector at
https://<swarm.otel.domain>/swarm-nats, authenticated as the queue's
existing OIDC client (swarm.nats.clientId). Records carry
service.name=nats and no hive label.
The collector lives in a reusable container module,
nix/container-modules/swarm-journal-forwarder.nix, which follows
swarm-bao's forwarder: a journald receiver over /var/log/journal with
merge and a file_storage cursor, an otlphttp exporter with an
oauth2client authenticator that requests its own client id as audience,
self-metrics on a loopback telemetry port, and the client secret handed
in through LoadCredential. Unlike swarm-bao, the secret is fetched inside
the container by swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc.service, under the
container's own store identity (the swarm-nats-auth leaf, which already
holds a read grant on secret/swarm/services/swarm-nats/oidc/client).
The fetch retries until the store answers, and the collector restarts
until the file exists. A 10-minute timer re-reads the secret and restarts
the collector when it changed.
The swarm collector's authenticated producer route was hard-wired to
swarm-bao. It is now rendered from swarm.otel.serviceProducers
(internal), one receiver, oidc authenticator, gateway location and
pipeline entry per service: swarm-bao (port 4391, unchanged names) and
swarm-nats (port 4392). The reserved-fragment and port-collision
assertions cover every entry.
The queue's OIDC client registration gains its own id as audience and
RS256-signed access tokens, which the receiver verifies offline.
swarm-nats drops --link-journal=host, so its journal stays in the guest
where the forwarder reads it, as swarm-bao did in 44009dc51. The new
swarm.nats.otel.telemetryPort (8891) keeps the forwarder off the
collectors' 8888-8890 in the shared host netns, with an assertion.
module-eval-nats-authelia gains four cases: the container's forwarder
and fetch unit on the store host and on a queue-only host, the
responder role's read grant, the swarm collector's swarm-nats receiver
on a host without the queue, and the client registration.
Part of #4499
Part of #5342
swarm-bao-otel-oidc still reads the secret from bao under the collector's
own leaf, but now writes it to /run/swarm-otel-oidc on the host (tmpfs),
which the container bind-mounts read-only for the collector's
LoadCredential. Before, it wrote it to
/var/lib/nixos-containers/swarm-otel/var/lib/swarm-otel-oidc/<id>.secret on
persistent disk, where a superseded secret stayed after rotation and went
into backups of the container root. Host tmpfiles now removes that old file.
Rotation is unchanged: the ten-minute timer rewrites the file when the value
differs and refresh_consumer restarts the collector. After a reboot the
secret is fetched again; until the store answers the collector starts on an
empty file and the stores refuse its pushes and scrapes.
Part of #4998 (slice 2a).
The metrics store's container gets privateNetwork = true with no
interface but loopback. VictoriaMetrics listens on
unix:/run/swarm-victoriametrics/victoriametrics.sock, a host directory
(root:nginx 0770) bind-mounted into the container, and every vhost
location that forwarded to 127.0.0.1:8428 now forwards to that socket.
The store runs as a static user whose primary group is nginx's gid,
with UMask 0007, so the socket it creates is 0770 group nginx. This
relies on VictoriaMetrics >= 1.153.0 honouring the umask (the locked
nixpkgs ships 1.153.0). nixpkgs' readiness loop curls a TCP URL, so
postStart is replaced with the same loop over --unix-socket.
swarm.victoriametrics.port is removed (nothing binds it any more), with
a mkRemovedOptionModule entry, and dropped from swarm-otel's host
port-collision assertion. The container's resolver unit is dropped:
there is no interface to reach the bridge resolver through, and the
store resolves no names.
The collector scrape, the collector push and Grafana's datasource
already reach the store by its published domain, so they are unchanged.
Refs #4815
Refs #3560
Each store reader (forge's OIDC fetch and token publisher, matrix's OIDC
fetch, the hive collector's fetch, Grafana's OIDC fetch and admin password,
the queue's callout-xkey unit, the CI runner's token fetch, the swarm
collector's OIDC fetch) used to read `deploy.bao.enable` in its own module
to add `after`/`wants` on `container@<store machine>` and
`after`/`requires` on `swarm-bao-pki.service`. Per the #3742 ruling, that
cross-service read moves into glue-bao-readers-store-order.nix, which sets
the same edges when the store and the reader are both on this host and
restates each reader's own gate so no stub unit is rendered.
Rendered `after`/`wants`/`requires` are identical as sets to main on 16
fixtures, store here and elsewhere. New module-eval cases in existing
fixtures pin both arms.
Part of #3742.
Seven host oneshots fetch a secret from the swarm secret store into a file
their consumer loads at start: swarm-bao-grafana-oidc, swarm-bao-otel-oidc,
swarm-bao-matrix-oidc, swarm-bao-ci-runner, swarm-bao-forge-oidc,
swarm-bao-hive-otel-oidc and swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc. Each was
RemainAfterExit with no timer, so it ran at boot or deploy and never again:
a secret re-minted in the store reached its consumer only through an
operator restarting the fetch.
lib/store-refresh-timer.nix gives each one a timer (OnUnitInactiveSec 10min,
RandomizedDelaySec 1min, the agent's own store re-read interval), and each
drops RemainAfterExit so a timer start is not a no-op. Each script already
writes the file only when secret_differs, and refresh_consumer/refresh_unit
restart the consumer only when the file is newer than its last start, so a
run reading an unchanged value restarts nothing.
Two docs said these units do not run on a timer; credentials.md's
ci-runner row said the runner token is not re-pulled.
Part of #5017 (slice T).
Six more comments and option descriptions across five modules said the hive's leaf or grant reads every secret in the store. It reads swarm/agents/* and swarm/hives/<hive>/* and nothing else, so they now say that, in the wording the clientCertFile option already used. Also the matrix-ctl check's label no longer calls the hive's leaf store-wide.
The hive's bao policy grants read on swarm/agents/* and swarm/hives/<hive>/* only. Five comments across four modules still listed swarm/services/* among its reads, or said a shared leaf would let a unit fetch another service's OIDC client secret, or that the hive's leaf reads every secret in the store. Comment and option-description text only.
The docs, option descriptions and comments that named the swarm root, the
swarm CA or the hive CA as an existing trust anchor now name the secret
store's pki root or the trust bundle that holds it:
- docs/swarm/README.md, secrets.md, bao.md
- deploy.bao.clientCaFile's and gateway.verifiedProxyTo's descriptions
- comments in hive-c0re/src/meta.rs, hive-agent/src/swarm_queue.rs,
swarm-logs/src/auth.rs, swarm-controller/src/vcs_metrics.rs,
hive-forge, swarm-authelia, swarm-ci-runner, glue-bao-tls, swarm-bao,
swarm-grafana, swarm-otel, otel, hive-c0re, lib/hive-ca-trust.nix,
hive-forge/Cargo.toml and the flake-update workflow
Nothing behaves differently: every edit is a nix, Rust or TOML comment, an
option description, or a test assertion message. The Rust edits change the
workspace source, which this PR already rebuilds for hivectl.
Refs #4588
Rewrite the remaining narration in files the previous commit touched:
"moved"/"sat"/"was REMOVED"/"old default" comments in swarm-bao,
swarm-otel, glue-bao-tls, nats-authelia, swarm-controller, swarm-ui,
swarm-otel-service, swarm-authelia-service, the deploy.nix rename table,
hive-ci, hive-forge/service, hive-tls, hyperhive, swarm-nats, swarm.nix
and a few module-eval fixtures, so each says where a thing is or why it
is so now.
Revert the comment edits inside shell script strings in hive-tls,
swarm-nats and the forge token mint to their previous text, so those
generated units are unchanged. The only unit still changing is
swarm-bao-pki (two comment lines in its script). Refs #3902
Rewrite comments and option descriptions under nix/ that narrate how the
code got here ("used to", "new name", "sat at the TOP", "no longer",
renamed/moved narration, attributions) to say what the code does now and
why. Comments and description strings only; no logic changes.
Files in open PR #4970's diff are left alone. Refs #3902
The three client registrations move into glue-{controller,nats,matrix}-oidc-client.nix,
gated only on deploy.authelia.enable and reading their ids from swarm.* options,
so the host running authelia registers every one of them whichever host runs
the service. The matrix callback is a new read-only swarm.matrix.sso.redirectUri,
read by both the homeserver's config and its client entry.
swarm-secret-publish now also publishes the queue's and the homeserver's minted
secrets to swarm/services/<id>/oidc/client. The queue host reads its responder's
secret there with swarm-bao-nats-auth-oidc under the responder's own leaf
(swarm-nats-auth role gains that one read path), and the homeserver's host with
swarm-bao-matrix-oidc under matrix-ctl's leaf (swarm-matrix-ctl role gains its
one read path). The host-file copies are gone: swarm-nats-auth-secrets now
delivers only the callout seeds and the store identity, and
hive-matrix-oidc-secret is removed. A fetch unit whose leaf is unset still
renders and fails naming the option pair.
Closes#4943
Every hive's homeserver loaded a per-hive `hyperhive` appservice
registration, and the swarm minted and delivered an as_token for it
through bao. No client presented that token: swarm-controller creates
every `@hive-<hive>` sender and every agent account with the swarm
appservice token (hive_sender.rs, agent_token.rs), and no Rust code read
the per-hive one.
Removed, with everything that existed only to serve it:
- hive-matrix.nix: the `hyperhive` registration, its activation-time
render, the host bind mount of /var/lib/hyperhive/matrix-appservice,
its LoadCredential entry, and the internal options
`deploy.matrix.appserviceTokenFile` / `appserviceRegistrationScript`.
tuwunel now loads only the swarm registration.
- glue-matrix-bao-token.nix and its `swarm-bao-matrix-token` unit.
- glue-bao-tls.nix: the matrix-token leaf and its defaults.
- swarm-bao.nix: the `swarm-matrix-token-<hive>` roles and policies
(`swarm-bao-matrix-token-policy`), and the options
`deploy.bao.matrixTokenClient{Cert,Key}File` and
`matrixTokenCommonNamePrefix`, now mkRemovedOptionModule.
- swarm-secret-publisher.nix: the per-hive token mint and its state dir.
- swarm.nix: the reserved `<matrixTokenCommonNamePrefix>-<hive>` CN.
- swarm-secret-client: `matrix::appservice_token_path`.
The swarm registration (swarm-matrix-ctl, swarm-controller) is untouched.
Comments and docs that pointed at the removed glue file now point at
glue-queue-agent-credential.nix, which has the same reader shape.
Refs #4428
The hive policy rendered by policy::render granted every hive cert read
on secret/data/swarm/services/*, which holds each swarm service's OIDC
client secret. No reader of that tree authenticates with a hive cert:
grafana, the otel collector and the store forwarder each read with
their own leaf, and the bao UI's secret is read by the store's granter.
render() now emits two stanzas: swarm/agents/* and the hive's own
swarm/hives/<hive>/*. Kind::Service had no other caller and is removed.
Docs and comments that described the grant as a decision are rewritten
to the current state.
Closes#4960
Four comments pointed at ./swarm-otel.nix for something the split moved
to ./swarm-otel-service.nix: `domain` (otel.nix), `domainBase`
(swarm-ui.nix), the `clientId`/`audience` options
(glue-swarm-otel-oidc-client.nix), and `producerName` (swarm-otel.nix's
own "Read-only option below"). Every other pointer to ./swarm-otel.nix
names its `config` block, units, exporters, authenticators or
assertions, which stayed.
Refs #3742
`swarm.otel` (what the swarm collector is to every hive: its domain,
receiver ports, producer names, client id and the audiences that client
may present) moves to nix/host-modules/swarm-otel-service.nix, together
with the `journaldUnits` removal module and the helpers its defaults
read. Everything else -- the `deploy.swarm-otel` options, the whole
`config` block including `containers.swarm-otel`, and the helpers only
they read -- stays in nix/host-modules/swarm-otel.nix, which default.nix
now imports after the new file.
The service file needs `domainBase` (for `domain`), `baoCfg` (for
`storeProducerName`) and `cfg` plus `pushAudiences` (for `audience`).
`swarmDomain` and `domainBase` move. `cfg`, `hyperhiveCfg`, `baoCfg`,
`vmCfg`, `vlCfg`, `metricsPushUrl`, `logsPushUrl` and `pushAudiences`
are read on both sides and none is an option, so each is bound in both
files; the comments on the push URLs say the two copies must agree.
`swarmCfg` was bound and never read, so neither file carries it.
A pure move: option paths, option definitions and config are unchanged.
Comments changed: the transition comment above `deploy.swarm-otel` now
names the file `swarm.otel` lives in, and the push-URL and
`pushAudiences` comments now describe the per-file readers and the
duplicate. Three otel fixtures evaluate to the same host and container
toplevel derivations, `swarm.otel.*` and `deploy.swarm-otel.*` values
before and after.
Refs #3742
The swarm collector's journald receiver read only the units listed in
`services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.journaldUnits`. A unit nobody listed
never reached the store, and a misspelt entry shipped nothing without
an error. The list existed to keep an operator's desktop session out of
a store every swarm operator can read, but the receiver can only match
positively, so the only way to express "not user sessions" was to name
every service instead.
The receiver now reads the whole host journal, and a new
`filter/exclude-user-sessions` processor in the `logs/<swarm>` pipeline
drops records whose `_SYSTEMD_SLICE` is `user-<uid>.slice` (session
scopes and `user@<uid>.service`). The per-hive `logs/<hive>` pipelines
carry agent-container journals only and get no filter.
`journaldUnits` is removed with `mkRemovedOptionModule`, together with
its non-empty assertion and the entry each host module added. The four
module-eval membership checks go with it, replaced by one structural
case in swarm-otel-core.
Closes#3646
The restart decision was a shell variable set by comparing the fetched
value with the file just before overwriting it. A run that wrote the
file and then failed before the restart (the matrix unit's registration
render, or `systemctl --machine` finding no bus yet) left a retry that
saw an unchanged file and never restarted the consumer.
The file is now written only when the value differs, so its mtime marks
the last real change, and `refresh_consumer <machine> <unit> <path>`
compares that mtime with the consumer's ActiveEnterTimestamp on every
run, the shape the openbao client-CA refresh in swarm-bao.nix already
uses. A consumer that started after the last change is left alone; a
running one is try-restarted, a failed one reset and started, all with
--no-block, and nothing happens while the container is down.
The helper's comment block also exceeded the 30-line limit
(`comment-block lint` failed on d871467d); its per-function notes now
sit beside the functions.
module-eval-bao-grants asserts the gated write, the path the refresh is
keyed on, and the mtime-vs-start comparison for each consumer.
Refs #4662
The previous commit's comments said a unit in auto-restart keeps its
start job, so anything ordered after it waits for the whole 24h retry
window. That is wrong under the default RestartMode=normal: each failed
attempt passes through `failed`, which ends that start job. `After=`
dependents proceed after one attempt, `Requires=` dependents fail with
`dependency`, and the retries continue as fresh start jobs. The
2026-09-24 journal shows it with the already-2880 swarm-services-cert:
nginx got "Dependency failed" 1ms after the first failure, and
switch-to-configuration exited before the first restart was scheduled.
The comments in lib/store-retry.nix, glue-matrix-bao-token.nix,
glue-queue-agent-credential.nix, swarm-otel.nix and swarm-grafana.nix
now say that, and so does docs/swarm/credentials.md.
Because dependents start after one attempt, a consumer that loads its
credential at start never sees a value a later attempt lands, or a
rotated one. nix/host-modules/lib/refresh-consumer.nix adds
`secret_differs` and `refresh_consumer`, and the four fetch units whose
consumers take a start-time copy call them after the write, only when
the value changed:
- swarm-bao-matrix-token -> tuwunel.service in hive-matrix
- swarm-bao-otel-oidc -> opentelemetry-collector.service in swarm-otel
- swarm-bao-grafana-oidc -> grafana.service in the grafana container
- swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc -> opentelemetry-collector.service in swarm-bao
A running consumer is try-restarted, a failed one is reset and started,
all with --no-block. Inline in the fetch script rather than a
PathChanged path unit because the fetch script is the only writer and
already knows whether the value changed, and it is the same shape as
this PR's nginx hook and swarm-bao-nats-tls's restart of nats.
module-eval-bao-grants gains one case per consumer.
Refs #4662
Six credential-fetch units retried 4 times at 15s, so an apply during
which the store or gateway was down for more than about a minute left
them in start-limit-hit, and nothing started them again once the store
came back. The swarm-services leaf could also land after nginx had
already given up on it, and the hook that propagates a new leaf only
reloaded a running nginx, so a stopped one stayed down until a second
apply.
- nix/host-modules/lib/store-retry.nix: the 2880 x 30s / 25h window
shape swarm-services-cert already had, as one attrset.
- swarm-services-cert, swarm-bao-otel-oidc, swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc,
swarm-bao-matrix-token, swarm-bao-queue-agent, swarm-bao-grafana-oidc,
hive-agent-bao-identity and hive-agent-forge-token use it.
queue-identity.nix no longer has a fetch unit (ccb5bd3b), and
forge-token.nix is a fetch unit with the same short budget that was
added after the census in #4662.
- The swarm-services-cert propagation hook now reset-fails and starts
(--no-block) a loaded nginx that is not active; an active nginx keeps
the re-import + reload.
- module-eval-bao-grants: one case pinning the shape on every host-side
fetch unit, swarm-services-cert included.
Refs #4662
hive-ci, hive-forge, hive-matrix, swarm-authelia, swarm-bao, swarm-grafana,
swarm-nats, swarm-otel and swarm-victorialogs now import
./swarm-container.nix and drop their own copies of the stateVersion,
firewall and resolvconf lines. Each binds privateNetwork once in its
top-level let and passes it to both the host attr and the in-container
option, as swarm-victoriametrics already does.
hive-forge (25.11) and swarm-otel (the host's value) keep their own
stateVersion over the module's mkDefault. hive-ci sets privateNetwork =
true and writesOwnResolvConf = false, which leaves its firewall and
resolvconf on, as before. hive-matrix keeps its useHostResolvConf
override and static resolv.conf; its resolvconf mkForce now comes from
the module default.
Every container's system.build.toplevel drvPath and host-side attrs
evaluate identical to the parent commit.
module-eval-swarm-services-switch gains a fixture with all ten service
containers and checks that each one's in-container privateNetwork equals
its host-side value, that the nine on the host netns run no firewall or
resolvconf, that hive-ci keeps both, and that hive-forge keeps its pinned
stateVersion.
Refs #3773
The collector's oidc/* authenticators call out to authelia at startup, so a
restart that races authelia's own (a redeploy that touches both, a store
outage) can fail immediately. nixpkgs' upstream opentelemetry-collector
module sets Restart=always with no RestartSec, so systemd's defaults
(100ms RestartSec, 5-in-10s start limit) burn the whole allowance in well
under a second and leave the unit in start-limit-hit, dead until someone
resets it by hand.
Sets RestartSec=5 plus an explicit startLimitBurst/startLimitIntervalSec
window (12/120s) sized so the burst can never trip while authelia comes
back — same values host-modules/otel.nix already uses for the sibling
host-tier collector, which depends on authelia the same way. Pins the
[Unit]-vs-[Service] placement and the window relation in
module-eval-swarm-otel-core, mirroring module-eval-hive-otel's existing
case for the host tier.
The pipe contract had a gap: if a producer piped into
atomic_write_secret exited non-zero after writing partial output,
cat still saw a clean EOF and wrote that partial content through to
the live target via mv — pipefail only reported the failure
afterward, once the bad write was already committed. The helper now
takes the value as its 4th argument and writes it itself with printf
(a shell builtin, so the value never touches an external process's
own argv/environ, same as a function argument never does), so there
is no pipe left to fail silently.
Callers that compute the value with a command now capture it into a
variable first (`value=$(cmd)`), which fails under `set -e` before
atomic_write_secret is ever called — swarm-bao.nix's pin.env site is
the one that needed this (`pin_env_value="BAO_HSM_PIN=$(cat ...)"`).
All seven call sites converted; output is byte-identical (same
printf '%s\n' framing, now applied inside the helper instead of by
each caller).
Refs #4723
Four host glue units fetched a secret from swarm-bao and rendered it
with `> path; chmod`: a reader racing the write could see a truncated
file, and briefly one at the wrong mode before the chmod landed.
glue-matrix-bao-token.nix, glue-queue-agent-credential.nix (both
files), swarm-grafana.nix and swarm-otel.nix now write to a same-
directory temp file, set its final mode/owner, then `mv -f` it over
the target — a shared `atomic_write_secret` helper
(nix/host-modules/lib/atomic-write-secret.nix) so the five call sites
share one implementation.
The first-boot `/root/.claude` migration in nix/agent-modules/user.nix
wrote its done-marker unconditionally, so a failed `cp` (disk full,
permission error) left the marker behind and no boot ever retried the
copy. The marker is now written only when there was nothing to
migrate or the copy succeeded; `cp -an`'s no-clobber semantics already
make a retry after a partial copy safe.
Refs #4723
argus review on #4713: the comment said every container block sets
--link-journal=host, and warned that dropping it silently blinds this
receiver. #4713 does exactly that for swarm-bao (its journal stays
inside the container for its own collector instead), so read on its
own the comment told a debugger to revert the fix. State the
exception.
The queue listened in plaintext on 4222, reached by bridge IP or loopback,
and nothing in-tree opened it to another hive. It now has a name, serves a
certificate for that name alone, and refuses clients that do not speak TLS.
- `swarm.nats.domain`, default `nats.<swarm.domain>`, a sibling name like
`swarm.bao.domain`. The queue host answers it via `gateway.localNames`;
every other hive resolves it through the operator's DNS, as for bao.
- `pki/roles/swarm-nats` allows that one name (bare domain, no subdomains,
IPs or localhost, server flag). A `swarm-nats` cert-auth role and policy
may only `update` `pki/issue/swarm-nats`, written by
`swarm-bao-nats-tls-policy`. The login leaf is minted by glue-bao-tls and
paired by glue-nats-bao-identity. `deploy.bao.natsCommonName` is reserved
as a hive name.
- `swarm-bao-nats-tls` issues the leaf into a directory bound read-only into
the container, restarts nats when it rotates, and re-runs daily.
It joins glue-bao-readers-policy-order, so it is ordered after its policy
unit (`after` and `wants`, never `requires`) where the store is on the
same host. The policy unit joins the store's journald list.
- nats gets `tls {}`, with the key via `LoadCredential`, and no
`allow_non_tls`. `validateConfig` is now off in every mode, because the
build-time check loads a leaf that only exists at runtime.
- 4222 is also open on `wg-hive` when the host is on the mesh, never
host-wide.
- `statusPublish.natsUrl`, `queue.agentNatsUrl`, the controller's URL under
`singleHostSwarm`, and the auth responder all dial
`tls://<swarm.nats.domain>:<port>`. swarm-queue-client hands its CA file
to the NATS connection too, so hive-c0re and the controller trust the
leaf's root.
- docs/swarm/README.md: the queue URL and the one DNS record a multi-host
swarm needs.
module-eval-nats-tls pins the role, the policy, the served leaf, the
firewall, the ordering, and a scan of every `*_NATS_URL` and the
responder's URL across the host and its containers.
Closes#4626
The four readers' ordering after their policy units only applies where
the store and that reader share a host, so it is colocation glue and
does not belong in the reader modules (two of which are main modules).
glue-bao-readers-policy-order.nix now sets the after+wants edges, gated
on deploy.bao.enable AND the reader's own gate, so a store host without
a reader gains no stub unit.
The four readers (matrix-token, queue-agent, grafana-oidc, otel-oidc) log
in against a cert-auth role that their own swarm-bao-*-policy unit writes.
They were ordered after swarm-bao-pki and the store's container but not
after that unit, so on an apply a reader could log in before its role
existed and be refused by `allowed_common_names` until a retry landed
after the role did.
After= plus Wants= on the policy unit, never Requires=: the policy unit
skips by ConditionPathExists once the bootstrap token is gone, and a
skipped unit counts as done for ordering.
The units on the path a deploy takes to TLS, the store's grants and the
swarm collector itself were not on the host collector's journald
allowlist, so an ingest outage one of them caused showed in the store
only as every source going quiet at once.
Each module names its own units, per the option's rule:
- hive-tls.nix: hive-tls-ca, swarm-services-cert
- hive-gateway: hive-gateway-self-signed-cert (self-signed mode only)
- swarm-bao.nix: the seven grant units beside
swarm-bao-services-issuer-policy
- swarm-otel.nix: container@<machine>, and
nixos-rebuild-switch-to-configuration, the transient unit nixos-rebuild
runs the activation in and whose syslog lines carry its status
The module-eval arm pins each unit as both listed and defined, since a
listed name that matches nothing is silent.
The swarm-tier collector's journald receiver had no storage extension, so
it started each run with no cursor: journalctl --follow --lines=0 ships
only what arrives after the receiver starts. Every collector restart
therefore dropped whatever was written to the journal while it was down,
silently — no error and no replay.
Wire the receiver to a file_storage extension, matching the agent-tier
collector in nix/agent-modules/otel.nix, so a restart resumes from the
persisted cursor instead.
Refs #4527.
The four-way client-cert split gives each store reader its own leaf, and
three of the four readers render only where their own leaf exists. On a
host that mints its own PKI glue-bao-tls.nix defaults all eight, so there
is nothing to do; on a hand-configured remote-store hive, omitting one
pair used to mean that unit silently did not render — a privilege-
narrowing unit absent from a green build, with the missing unit as the
only evidence.
Each of the three now asserts its own pair, shaped after
swarm-grafana.nix's haveClientIdentity assertion and named to the pair it
needs. What differs from Grafana's is the gate: these fire only where the
host demonstrably reads the store (it holds deploy.bao.clientCertFile and
clientKeyFile) and the consumer is on. A host with no store identity is
the supported no-store deployment and still evaluates; the collector's
no-secret degrade is untouched, because that host holds no clientCertFile
either.
Also rewords three passive-voice sentences in docs/swarm/secrets.md that
vale flagged, and documents what the refusal costs and where it stays
silent.
Four units read one path each out of the store, and all four logged in
holding `deploy.bao.clientCertFile` — the hive's own leaf. Bao identifies
a principal by the subject of the certificate it presents, so four
readers behind one certificate were ONE principal, and the only grant
expressible was the union of what the four need: read on
`swarm/agents/*`, `swarm/hives/<hive>/*` and `swarm/services/*`. The unit
fetching Grafana's OIDC client secret could fetch every agent credential
in the swarm; the one fetching this hive's matrix token could fetch
Grafana's. Least privilege was not misconfigured here, it was
unrepresentable.
Each now holds a leaf, a cert-auth role and a policy of its own, and each
policy is the single `secret/data/…` path that unit's own script names —
spelled to the leaf, not to a prefix, the way matrix-ctl's already is.
Following the four exemplars in-tree rather than building a mechanism:
`signLeaf` mints the leaves, `swarm-bao.nix` writes the roles from the
bootstrap token, the consumers name their own pair.
Two of the four are written PER HIVE and two are not, which is the shape
of the paths rather than a preference. A matrix appservice token and a
queue credential live under `swarm/hives/<name>/` and every hive runs a
reader for its own, so one role for all of them would have to be granted
`hives/*` — letting one hive read another's, a reach no hive has today.
An OIDC client secret lives under `swarm/services/<client-id>/` and a
swarm registers each exactly once, so one role each is enough. The
per-hive subjects are `<prefix>-<hive>` and swarm.nix reserves every
composed spelling as a hive name, so a hive cannot be named into another
hive's role.
The shared leaf stays: hive-c0re still passes it into its container, the
`bao` CLI wrapper still defaults to it, and the three
`glue-*-bao-identity.nix` files derive the PKI directory from it.
module-eval-bao-grants gains a negative arm per principal — each pins the
three stanzas the hive's leaf carried and the two wildcards a later
widening would reach for, so a policy that grows fails here rather than
in a store. Plus the consuming side: repointing a unit back at the hive's
leaf would evaluate, deploy and log in, and silently restore the union.
A hive that reads a store on another machine now places one leaf per
principal instead of one shared by four. That cost is the point, and
docs/swarm/secrets.md lists the pairs.
Review response on #4620: not having SSO is not a supported
deployment, so the type should not permit it, and the docs paragraph
explaining why SSO is always present is redundant once the type says
so.
- swarm.authelia.url drops types.nullOr.
- Every consumer's null-arm is gone: two option defaults
(swarm-controller's and swarm's own statusPublish.tokenEndpoint)
that produced an empty/null placeholder when the URL was null now
unconditionally compute the real derived URL. Five now-dead
"assertion = ... != null" guards (swarm-authelia's bridge,
swarm-grafana, swarm-otel, swarm-nats, hive-forge, hive-matrix) are
removed as unreachable — in every case the same URL was already
interpolated unconditionally a few lines below the guard.
- grafanaNoSso, the module-eval fixture whose sole purpose was
exercising the now-unsupported no-IdP refusal, is removed along
with its dedicated test case; swarm.authelia.url = null is a type
error now, not a value that reaches that assertion.
- docs/swarm/services.md: cut the clause about setting the option to
null and the sentence explaining why the URL is co-location-
independent — both redundant now that the type enforces it.
bao's metrics were scraped by the SWARM collector over loopback, via a
`swarm.otel.scrapeTargets.bao` entry gated on `deploy.swarm-otel.enable`
— "does the swarm's collector run on THIS host". It had to be: loopback
only reaches a reader that landed on the same host.
What that rendered everywhere else was nothing at all. Off that host the
metrics listener was not emitted, so the store's metrics reached the
store nowhere, and a host with no entry is indistinguishable from a host
nobody asked to scrape.
Moves the scrape into the collector this container already runs, per
mara on #4537: "move the existing scraper to the local collector". The
container shares the host netns (privateNetwork = false), so the scrape
still dials 127.0.0.1 — the listener keeps its address, its
`metrics_only` narrowing and its loopback-only bind, and the API
listener's `tls_require_and_verify_client_cert` is untouched.
The listener and its `prometheus_retention_time` lose their gate: the
reader ships with the store now, so there is no host where the endpoint
has none. The metrics pipeline reuses the logs pipeline's `resource`
processor and `otlphttp` exporter, so both signals carry the same
`service.name` and leave by the one hop.
Logs are unaffected: `journaldUnits` and --link-journal=host stay until
every sibling swarm container has a collector of its own.
The module-eval absence arm "a store with no collector beside it serves
no metrics" is inverted rather than dropped — the condition it asserted
is the bug. Three cases join it: the job is in swarm-bao AND gone from
swarm-otel (a move, not a copy), the scrape target and listener are both
pinned to loopback, and the metrics pipeline shares its exporter with
the logs one.
Records reached VictoriaLogs carrying the journal's raw PRIORITY and
severity_text "Unspecified" — every line in the store, at every tier, with
no level a query or a dashboard could read. VictoriaLogs has no ingest
parameter naming a level field; it auto-detects one by field name, so the
mapping has to happen in the collector.
A stanza severity_parser on each journald receiver, from one shared file
rather than a copy per tier: the two receivers are unrelated config (a
fixed stanza in the agent container, a parameterised block inside the
swarm-otel container) and a drifted copy fails silently — every line still
arrives, labelled as the wrong thing.
Two details that are easy to get wrong and quiet when wrong. PRIORITY
counts down in urgency where the OTEL severity counts up, so the table is
written as a table. And overwrite_text is required: without it the parser
sets the severity number and leaves the text as the raw digit, so
severity_text arrives as the literal "6" — populated, and not a level
anything renders.
Two swarm-wide facts were being read off this machine's deploy set, so the
answer differed between two hosts of one swarm:
- `swarm.authelia.oidc.hiveIdentities` defaulted to `deploy.nats.enable`,
so whether a hive gets an identity at all depended on whether the IdP
host happened to also run the queue. It is on by default now: a swarm's
hives have identities, and the clients are inert until used.
- `swarm.statusPublish.tokenEndpoint` defaulted through `queueLocal`
(`deploy.nats.enable && deploy.authelia.enable`), so a hive that was not
the swarm host had no token endpoint even when the swarm's IdP was
reachable and named. It follows `swarm.authelia.url` now — the same
derivation `swarm-controller.nix`'s own `queue.tokenEndpoint` already
uses, which is correct for a remote provider.
`deploy.nix:1-30` is what makes this a rule rather than a preference:
`swarm.*` is "identical on every host, byte for byte" and `deploy.*` is
"necessarily different on every host". A swarm value derived from a deploy
value cannot satisfy both.
The all-or-nothing status-publish assertion follows: the token endpoint is
no longer one of the coordinates that says this hive publishes — every hive
in a swarm with an IdP has one — so the two per-host coordinates are what
must agree, and they now require the endpoint rather than being counted
beside it.
`queueLocal` itself stays for the three remaining host-local addresses
(`natsUrl`, `clientSecretFile`, `agentNatsUrl`): each of those is a
`deploy.*` value that genuinely differs per host.
Closes#4048
`services.hyperhive.gateway.enable`, `gateway.dns.enable` and
`network.enable` replace the `hyperhive.enable` gate on all three. Each
defaults to false; the modules that need one assert it with `mkDefault
true` from inside the guard their own deployment already carries, and
`swarm-required-services.nix` — the module that owns what the
swarm-services toggle implies — asserts all three explicitly.
hive-c0re asserts all three unconditionally, so an ordinary hive keeps
getting them with no opt-in: it is the host's only knowledge that agent
containers exist.
The resolver moves to its own `hive-gateway/dns.nix` so it can be gated
without reindenting the nginx half of the module.
Reinstates `network.enable`, dropping its `mkRemovedOptionModule` shim.
A config still carrying `network.enable = false` from before the removal
now switches the bridge off instead of failing eval.
Also deletes a duplicate `centralToggleOff` fixture in nix/module-eval.nix.
Two sibling slices added it independently (c5f60fd5, ce3b3d94); the merge
was textually clean and left `main` failing to evaluate at all, so this
file could not be gated without removing one.
The receiver was defined for `scrapeTargets != {} || publishedScrapeTargets
!= {}`, but the swarm-tier pipeline named it only for `scrapeTargets != {}`.
A collector with published targets and no loopback ones therefore rendered
scrape configs that belonged to no pipeline: requested, parsed, delivered
nowhere, and valid enough to deploy.
Latent, not live: the module seeds `scrapeTargets.collector` under its own
`enable`, so the loopback set is never empty in a real deploy and the
disagreeing arm is unreachable today. Nothing would have noticed if that
seeding became conditional, which is why the module-eval case pins the
pipeline rather than trusting the seed to keep masking it.
Refs #4511
`services.hyperhive.enable` is going away (Refs #4500). These four blocks
ANDed it with a second condition that was already the load-bearing one:
the bridge-firewall hole asks whether an operator named any
`network.exposeHostPorts`, and the three swarm-level services ask their
own `deploy.*.enable`, each of which defaults false (swarm-ui derives
from the controller's toggle, a sibling deployment decision) and none of
which is derived from the hive toggle. So dropping the conjunct turns
nothing on by itself — the remaining condition still decides.
The way that claim fails is by something becoming unconditional, so
module-eval gets absence arms for all four, each asserted on a host with
the hive ON and on one with it OFF, plus the two controls that make the
absences mean something.
The swarm-controller arm is probed by the credential oneshot and by the
daemon's `ExecStart` rather than by the unit name: hive-tls defines an
environment key on that name, which leaves an inert fragment behind on
any hive with a CA whether or not the controller runs there.
The swarm collector's OIDC client secret only existed where authelia
did: `swarm-otel-oidc-secret.service` copied the minted plaintext out
of authelia's container tree, reachable only because the two share a
host's network namespace. A swarm that placed authelia elsewhere
delivered nothing, and the option's own description said so —
"a deployment that places authelia elsewhere points this at a file it
delivers itself." Same gap as #3853 and #4234, and this is the
swarm-otel twin of #4234's fix for Grafana.
Mirrors PR #4361 (Grafana) almost exactly:
- `swarm-bao-otel-oidc.service` reads
`swarm/services/<client-id>/oidc/client` out of the store, in every
deployment, replacing the co-located copy unit outright — one
delivery route, not two, per the ruling that landed under #4234.
- Client registration moved out of `swarm-otel.nix`'s own `config`
block (gated on this host running the collector) into
`glue-swarm-otel-oidc-client.nix` (gated on this host running
authelia), the same split `glue-grafana-oidc-client.nix` made. It
was broken the same way: a split deployment registered the client
nowhere at all, so authelia never minted a secret for the publisher
to send on.
- The publisher's `services` prefix (write grant in `swarm-bao.nix`,
hive read grant in `policy::render`) already covers any service's
path — nothing to add there. `swarm-secret-publisher.nix` only grew
`serviceClientIds` by one entry.
One judgement call, stated rather than buried: the store-reading unit
renders only where this host holds a client identity
(`deploy.bao.clientCertFile`/`clientKeyFile`), rather than asserting
it the way `swarm-grafana.nix` does. Grafana's local login form is
disabled unconditionally, so a Grafana with no OIDC secret has no way
in at all — that earns a hard refusal. This collector without a
credential still receives every hive's telemetry; only its own pushes
to the stores go out unauthenticated and get refused there, an
already-supported degrade the module's own `haveCollectorSecret` flag
named before this change. So the reading unit follows the shape
`glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` and `glue-queue-agent-credential.nix` use
for their own optional readers: no unit when the identity is absent,
not a build refusal.
Fixtures mirror #4361's: `otelBaoWithAuthelia`/`otelBaoRemoteAuthelia`
are the positive pair (co-located and split, both reading through the
store), `otelNoIdentity` is the negative — no reading unit, no
assertion firing, `clientSecretFile` left null.
Refs #4258
autheliaCfg/forgeCfg/vmCfg/vlCfg were local re-exports of
hyperhiveCfg.swarm.<subpath> — a shape that hides the full option
path from grep, the same hazard #4356 fixed for the tls alias.
Removed the six let-bindings and spelled the full
hyperhiveCfg.swarm.<subpath>.<field> path at every use site instead.
None of the read fields (url, machine, hiveClientPrefix,
agentClientSuffix, domain, port) sit on the old side of a
mkRenamedOptionModule in deploy.nix, so inlining the alias's own
current path is correct as-is.
Refs #4363
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every agent container reports the hostname `nixos`, so every log line it
ships carries that as its `_HOSTNAME`. Measured: host `muede-lpt2`,
`hive-matrix` (declared as `containers.hive-matrix`) `hive-matrix`, and
`h-atlas` `nixos`.
nixpkgs sets the hostname in the merge function of the
`containers.<name>.config` option (nixos-containers.nix:524), so it reaches
a guest evaluated through that option and nothing else. Agent containers are
`nixos-container create --flake meta#<name>` — an independent `nixosSystem`
off the meta flake, which never evaluates that submodule.
nspawn also names a container's hostname after the machine by default; that
is ruled out as the source here, because `h-atlas`'s machine name is
`h-atlas` and it reports `nixos`.
The machine name rather than the logical one: `stats/otel_metrics.rs:345`
already labels metrics `container.name = "h-<name>"`, so the logical name
would make logs say `atlas` while metrics say `h-atlas` — a prefix transform
on every join between the two signals. Declarative containers and nspawn
both use the machine name too, so this is one rule with no exception for
agents.
The emission sits next to `hyperhive.user.name = name;`, which already
derives the container's unix user from the agent name; the hostname was the
one identity attr nobody wired.
Also drops the prose in swarm-otel.nix and module-eval.nix that explained
`_MACHINE_ID` by "every container is `nixos`" — that motivating example is
what this commit removes, and the argument for `_MACHINE_ID` never depended
on it.
Checked before editing: nothing in the tree assumes the hostname is
"nixos" (0 hits across *.rs and *.nix), and nothing reads the hostname at
runtime.
Gate: cargo fmt 0, clippy -D warnings 0, cargo test -p hive-c0re meta::
0 (23 run, 22 passed, 1 ignored), nix fmt 0 changed.
Refs #4304
The previous commit's comments explained `_HOSTNAME` being `nixos` with
"no container sets `networking.hostName`", read off a `git grep` of this
tree. That grep answers a question about our source; the default is
nixpkgs': `nixos/modules/virtualisation/nixos-containers.nix` sets
`networking.hostName = mkDefault name` for every `containers.<name>`
guest, which is how every swarm service container here is declared.
So the stated cause is wrong, and why the default does not reach these
guests is still open. What is measured is narrower: an agent container
reports `nixos`, and `_MACHINE_ID` is per-machine by construction. The
comments now claim only that, and say the rest is unresolved.
The code is unchanged — `_MACHINE_ID` in `_stream_fields` is correct
regardless of which explanation turns out to be true.
Refs #4304
`_stream_fields=_HOSTNAME,_SYSTEMD_UNIT` was chosen to give "one stream
per unit per machine", which is what the comment above it claims. It does
not: no container sets `networking.hostName`, so `_HOSTNAME` is the NixOS
default `nixos` in every one of them, and every container's stream for a
given unit name merges into a single series.
Measured from inside an agent container:
journalctl -n1 -o json -> "_MACHINE_ID":"5d1427ea…", "_HOSTNAME":"nixos"
cat /etc/machine-id -> 5d1427ea…
git grep -i hostname -- nix/ -> 20 hits, all public vhost names,
zero `networking.hostName =`
`_MACHINE_ID` is written by journald per machine and is already on every
entry, so adding it to the stream key makes the partition what its own
comment says it is. That merge is also why the host collector and the
containerised one were one series: both log to
`opentelemetry-collector.service`, and the field meant to separate them
was a constant.
The second comment touched here asserted a reader "can still tell the
origins apart" from `_HOSTNAME`/`_SYSTEMD_UNIT`/`_MACHINE_ID`. True only
of the last one; it now says so.
Not a full fix for attribution: `_MACHINE_ID` is opaque hex and nothing
maps it to a container name. Naming is the other half and is a separate
change.
Refs #4304
A collector's `refused` / `failed` / queue-depth counters are the only
signal that says telemetry is being dropped, and nothing read them at
any tier — so a collector losing records looked exactly like a quiet
system.
The hive tier could not be scraped without first naming its port. 8888
is the collector's built-in default and appeared in no config, which is
also why nothing comparing configured ports could see it clash with a
co-located collector — swarm-otel.nix sidesteps 8888 by hand for that
reason, and says so. Declaring the port and binding it explicitly makes
the value comparable; wiring the scrape is then one entry per tier.
Extending the port-collision assertion to cover it is deliberately left
out: that belongs with the other port work, and coupling a collision
fix to a scraping fix makes both harder to review.
Gate: 101 module properties hold, was 95. The six cases pin the rendered
scrape job rather than the option; the metrics pipeline naming the
prometheus receiver, a path never emitted on any hive before this since
the hive tier's scrapeTargets was empty everywhere; the `readers`
spelling, with a control so a missing telemetry block cannot pass the
port check vacuously; the swarm tier's own entry; the two tiers not
claiming the same port; and the absence arm, a hive with no collector
declaring no target.
scrapeTargets' description said "Empty by default, and that is the
shipped case". This makes that false, so the paragraph moves with it.
