mara's call on the PR: "dont make the enum open, we will just add
entries later". The catch-all variant is gone, and with it the per-agent
inert path.
What changes is where version skew lands, not whether it is handled. An
unrecognised value used to be one agent this hive left alone; it is now a
decode failure for the whole declaration, so a hive running older code
converges *nothing* rather than obeying the agents it happened to
understand. That fails closed instead of dangerous, and it is the right
trade when both ends ship together — which is what "add entries later"
assumes.
The test moved with the property rather than being rewritten in place:
`an_unknown_state_fails_the_whole_declaration` lives in
swarm-queue-client, where the decode is, with a valid entry beside it as
the control. `hive-c0re` keeps a coverage check that every state this
build knows produces an action somewhere — asserting inertness there
would be asserting something the type system no longer lets me build.
The deploy event is a nudge with no second path: core NATS is
at-most-once, so a hive that was down when the controller published
simply never learns that an agent is meant to exist here. This adds the
repair path — one boot-time DAG node that reads this hive's own key in
the `hive-wanted` bucket and converges the agents it names.
Two semantics settled on the issue thread, and both are places where a
plausible implementation is the wrong one:
- **Absence is not a deletion order.** No bucket, no key, or an agent
the value does not name all mean the controller has said nothing.
Swarm-side lifecycle does not yet cover agents that predate it, so
"converge to exactly this set" would tear down every agent the swarm
has not adopted. `plan` only ever inspects the agents a declaration
names.
- **An unrecognised state is inert.** `AgentState` is an open enum: a
value this build cannot read deserialises into `Unrecognised` and is
left alone. A closed enum would force "not `Up`" onto a state like
`paused`, so a controller that learned a new value would take agents
down on every hive not yet updated.
Divergence is measured against the hive's **stored power intent**, not
the container's observed running state — an agent that is down while its
intent says `Up` is already the boot reconcile's work, and a loop reading
`is_running` would insert a start DAG behind that reconcile's back on
every boot. A hive that already agrees with its declaration queues
nothing at all.
`queue_first_deploy` is extracted from the deploy-event path rather than
open-coded here, for the power-intent seed: without it `first_deploy`'s
tail `Reconcile` seeds `Wanted` from a container that exists but has not
started yet, which locks the agent to `Offline` on its first reconcile.
The read is authorised as-is: `store.get` takes async-nats' direct-get
arm (the KV bucket is created with `allow_direct`), which is exactly the
`$JS.API.DIRECT.GET.KV_hive-wanted.$KV.hive-wanted.<hive>` subject
`swarm-nats-auth` grants a hive. The fallback subject is not granted, and
a refused NATS request surfaces as a timeout rather than an error.
Nothing writes the bucket yet — the controller-side writer is the other
half of #3124, so this does not close it.
This PR makes a swarm collector on a host with neither store — and no
authelia — an expressible deployment; `module-eval`'s `otelRemoteAuthelia`
case is exactly that. `secrets.md` still asserted the opposite in two
places, and one of them was the "hive elsewhere" column reading `n/a`.
The delivery unit is the convenience for the co-located case, not the
definition of it: whether the collector authenticates follows the
credential, never another service's placement.
The collector's store exporters were gated on deploy.victoriametrics.enable /
deploy.victorialogs.enable — options that say "this host RUNS the store", not
"the swarm has one". A collector that did not share a host with the stores
rendered no exporter at all and dropped everything it received, from every
hive, silently: an absent exporter is not an error.
mara ruled the premise rather than the mechanism ("the swarm always has a
store"), so there is no gate and no new option for that. Both exporters are
unconditional and address the stores by domain, per the cross-host rule from
the OIDC client and secret-delivery unit #3517 already built. The logs exporter
had the identical bug and is fixed here too.
Both stores gained a machine ingest route, required in the same change: the
exporter now targets https://logs.<domain>/insert/..., and that vhost is
browser-shaped, so shipping the collector half alone would have regressed logs
ingestion that works today. Neither ingest location carries
`error_page 401 =302` — a pusher handed a redirect follows it and POSTs at a
login page, which answers 200.
Whether the collector authenticates follows the CREDENTIAL, never another
service's placement: `clientSecretFile` is a nullable option, and the delivery
unit — the one thing here that may know where authelia runs, since it copies
out of its container — sets it by mkDefault. An earlier revision gated this on
deploy.authelia.enable directly, which put a different service's co-location in
the collector's own config.
Also removed rather than relaxed: the assertion that this collector has
"somewhere to send". It read the store's per-host enable, so it rejected at
eval exactly the deployment reaching the stores by domain exists for.
Deliberately not replaced with an authentication assertion — a collector on a
host of its own is a supported shape, and refusing to build it would make this
fix illegal where the bug bites hardest.
Knock-on worth review: collectLogs is now always satisfied, so journald
collection is unconditional.
Config shape validated against otelcol-contrib 0.151.0 `validate`, with a
bogus-key control confirming the validator checks the extension schema.
module-eval: 31 properties.
Nine panels against the metric names openbao actually emits — the prefix is
`vault_`, the fork kept upstream's names, and a board built on `openbao_`
would render perfectly and show nothing.
The top row works on a SEALED store, which is what a hive has until an
operator runs `operator init`: seal state, uptime, goroutines and a request
count that reads 0 rather than going blank. Everything below is empty until
then, and each panel's description says so rather than leaving an operator to
wonder which of the two it is looking at.
The seal panel reduces with `max()`. Once unsealed there are two
`vault_core_unsealed` series and the `cluster=""` one stays 0 forever, so a
bare selector reads SEALED on a healthy store — invisible while sealed, which
is why the metric names were sampled in both states.
The store's scrape target rendered as `host:port` alone, so the collector
requested `/metrics` — a path openbao does not serve on any listener. Every
scrape since the target landed has 404'd, which reads as a dead exporter
rather than a wrong address, and no bao sample has ever reached the store.
`scrapeTargets` values may now carry a path and query. Both are optional and
omitted when absent, so every existing target renders the config it rendered
before. The query cannot ride in `metrics_path`: prometheus percent-encodes
the `?`, so it has to become `params`.
Measured against openbao 2.6.2 and otelcol-contrib 0.151.0, the pinned
versions: `/metrics` 404s ("this listener only serves the metrics endpoint"),
`/v1/sys/metrics` answers JSON, and only `?format=prometheus` — or an Accept
header the collector happens to send today — returns exposition text. The
query param is the half that does not depend on content negotiation.
`bao operator init` fails at the seal with CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID. The
pkcs11 seal asks for AES-GCM by default and the TPM does not offer it: a
TPM 2.0's symmetric modes are CBC/CFB/CTR/OFB/ECB, and openbao accepts
only AEAD mechanisms — AES-GCM or RSA-OAEP — so RSA-OAEP is the single
mechanism both sides implement.
Measured on the deployed token (`pkcs11-tool --list-mechanisms`, #3860):
no AES-GCM, and `RSA-PKCS-OAEP, keySize={1024,2048}, hw, encrypt,
decrypt` present. CBC is not a fallback — openbao's
`MechanismFromString` rejects `CKM_AES_CBC_PAD` as deprecated and its
encrypt path implements exactly the two AEAD mechanisms.
The key gets a new label so a store provisioned by the earlier module
keeps its unusable AES key without the two resolving to one label, and
the addkey step is now keyed on the label rather than on the store not
existing — otherwise an existing deployment never gains the RSA key.
#3880 bound /dev/tpmrm0 into the store's container, which was necessary and
not sufficient: a bind mount preserves the host's ownership, openbao runs as a
DynamicUser with an empty CapabilityBoundingSet (so no CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE), and
the host applies no tpm udev rule at all — measured, 0 hits across all 41 host
closures against 62 rule files as a control. The node therefore keeps the
kernel default and the seal cannot open it.
A name cannot fix this. NixOS allocates system groups at activation, per
machine, so `tss` — or any group declared on both sides — gets two different
ids, and the device node carries the number. mara picked pinning a gid with an
overridable default (deploy.bao.tpmGid).
The default sits above the range NixOS auto-assigns system groups from
(400-999, measured in update-users-groups.pl) and above the normal-user range,
and below systemd's DynamicUser range (61184-65519), so it collides with
nothing any of those allocate.
The module-eval case compares the two sides rather than checking each against
a literal: the property is that they AGREE, not what they agree on. Its
absence arm is a shamir store, which never opens a TPM and must not claim a
device node's group — without it, pinning unconditionally would look identical.
mara (#3877): issue report too narrow — the 8-column table was
clipped by .shell-body's 60em readable-line-length cap, which is right
for the rest of the UI's cards/forms but too tight for a wide table.
damocles diagnosed the root cause and scoped the shape (route
allowlist + an additive .shell-body-wide modifier, no prop plumbing
through App.tsx) before asking for a nod; mara then routed the actual
build to me. Implemented that shape as scoped: /issues opts into a
90em cap via WIDE_BODY_ROUTES, every other route keeps 60em untouched.
Verified with real headless-chromium screenshots at 1280px: the issue
report's full 8-column row (through 'transitively blocks') now fits
with no horizontal scroll, and a second screenshot of /agents confirms
every other route is unaffected.
openbao runs as a DynamicUser, so the uid that has to open the token
store is allocated by the container's PID 1 and cannot be named by a
host unit — the store was created root-owned 0700 and the seal could
never read it. The provisioning unit moves inside the container and
hands the sqlite store over by group; the host keeps only the mkdir the
bind mount needs, create-only so a reboot does not re-impose 0700.
Two further layers blocked the same start, both measured while fixing
this one:
- DynamicUser implies ProtectSystem=strict (systemd.exec(5)), so the
bind mount was read-only to openbao however it was owned, and the
pkcs11 library opens its store read-write. ReadWritePaths= is
required and was absent.
- allowedDevices renders DeviceAllow= and nothing else, and nspawn
builds its own /dev as a fixed tmpfs and cannot create device nodes
— verified against a live container, whose /dev holds no host
devices at all. /dev/tpmrm0 was therefore absent inside swarm-bao,
not merely unpermitted. It is now bound in.
Whether openbao's dynamic uid may *open* that node is a third question:
the tss gid is dynamically allocated, so no name or number means the
same thing on both sides of the boundary. Filed separately rather than
guessed at here.
The two module-eval cases that asserted the unit on the host now assert
it in the container and absent from the host, and two new cases pin the
device bind and the write access — each was individually valid and
collectively required, which is the state no assertion catches. Both
new cases select with `or [ ]`: mutation-testing them showed that a bare
select aborts the run with a nix trace instead of failing the case by
name, which also hid the second failure behind the first.
The case counting that fixture's listeners is about the addresses
declared on it. A collector on the same host adds a metrics listener,
so the expected count depended on a flag the case never mentions —
found by mutating the gate it sits next to, which failed both.
The store declared no journald units and served no metrics: nothing in
`swarm-bao.nix` mentioned either, while every sibling swarm service
declares both.
Metrics get their own loopback listener rather than a flag on the API
one, and that follows from what a scraper can express rather than from
taste: `swarm.otel.scrapeTargets` is `host:port`, plaintext and with no
credential, while the API listener is TLS and demands a client
certificate once a client CA is set. `metrics_only` narrows the new
listener to the metrics path; `prometheus_retention_time` is what serves
the endpoint at all.
Measured against openbao 2.6.2 before writing any of it: the metrics
path answers 200 on such a listener *while the node is sealed and
uninitialised*, 503 on the API listener, and 404 for a non-metrics path
on the metrics listener.
The listener exists only where a collector does — it is unauthenticated
by design for now, and an endpoint with no reader would be exposure
bought for nothing.
The port cannot be the API port + 1: openbao derives every listener's
cluster address as its own port plus one, so that number is already
taken. An assertion says so, since the failure is otherwise a race with
no log line.
Journald units are declared by the module that defines each unit, not
gathered here, matching the option's own rule — a name nothing defines
is silently ignored, so a central list would read as coverage on hives
that have neither glue module.
Refs #3849
openbao has never started on a hive that deploys it. With raft storage
and no `cluster_addr`, `bao server` exits 1 before serving anything:
cluster address must be set when using raft storage
Reproduced against openbao 2.6.2 with the module's own config shape:
the same JSON minus `cluster_addr` exits 1 with that line, and with it
the server comes up and configures every listener.
Both addresses are built from `swarm.bao.domain` rather than a bind
address — that is the URL a reader already dials (`BAO_ADDR` in
glue-matrix-bao-token) and the name the server certificate carries.
Cluster traffic sits one port up, upstream's convention.
The `unknown or unsupported field loopback` warning in the same startup
log is unrelated and cosmetic: openbao's unknown-field check does not
know about named listener blocks, but the parser honours `type` and
configures each one (measured, two named listeners, both served).
Noted in the module so the next reader does not chase it; the JSON
array form that avoids the warning does not typecheck against nixpkgs'
`settings.listener` (`attrsOf`).
module-eval gains the regression gate plus a control that the settings
it reads vary per deployment.
Refs #3860
Nothing resolved `bao.<swarm.domain>`. It is absent from
`swarm.serviceDomains` and, unlike every other swarm service, contributed
no `gateway.localNames` entry — so the name a reader dials answered only
if an operator had published an external record, which nothing asks them
to do.
Cross-hive traffic goes via the domain either way; only what it resolves
to varies, and for a multi-host swarm that is the operator's upstream DNS.
This covers the deployment with no upstream record to configure.
DNS only, and that asymmetry is deliberate: bao stays out of
`serviceDomains` and gets no vhost. Its leaf comes from its own CA, so a
services-CA entry would mint one nothing uses, and nginx terminating TLS
would strip the client certificate the store authenticates every hive
with. `swarm-nats.nix` documents the same exclusion for itself.
module-eval gains the presence and absence arms: claiming a name this
host does not serve would point every local reader at the wrong machine.
Refs #3862
The bucket the previous commit adds had no grants, so the controller
could not create or write it and no hive could read its own key.
Measured against nats-server 2.14.4 rather than extended by analogy,
because the shapes are not symmetric:
- controller: `STREAM.INFO` + `STREAM.CREATE` on `KV_hive-wanted` and
`$KV.hive-wanted.>`. With only today's status grants, `get_key_value`
timed out and the server named the two missing stream subjects.
- hive: `STREAM.INFO` plus **one** direct-get subject carrying its own
key. A KV read is a publish — `store.get` is a request — and the
direct-get subject embeds the key, so the read scopes per hive. By
analogy with `reader_subjects` this would have been `.>`, handing
every hive every hive's wanted set.
Both refusals were verified to fire, not assumed: as `alpha`,
`get beta` was refused naming
`$JS.API.DIRECT.GET.KV_hive-wanted.$KV.hive-wanted.beta`, and
`put alpha` was refused naming `$KV.hive-wanted.alpha`.
`a_reader_may_list_and_fetch_but_not_write` asserted a reader holds no
`$KV.` subject at all, which held only while status was the sole
bucket. Narrowed to the status bucket — the invariant it defends is
that the controller cannot forge a hive's own report, and the wanted
bucket runs the other way.
Refs #3124
The controller declares each hive's wanted agent set; the hive reads its own
key. Deliberately not a mirror of `status`, which the module documents as a
table: authored by the controller rather than the hive, DECLARED rather than
observed, and — the row that decides how it must be built — unrecoverable if
the store is lost, where status regenerates because every hive republishes
what it is.
Two open functions rather than one shared `open_or_create`. `status` shares its
constructor because either end may legitimately arrive first on a fresh swarm;
here the writer is single and known, so the hive gets a read-only open
returning `Option` and holds no grant to create the bucket. Its absence is the
ordinary pre-publication state, not an error a hive could fix.
Absence is also not a deletion order, which the module says at the place an
implementer will meet it: swarm-side lifecycle does not yet cover agents that
predate it, so a hive finding no key has learned nothing about what it runs —
converging to an empty set would tear those down.
No consumer yet. This is the half that is invariant under the scope semantics
and cadence still being decided.
`hive_subjects` granted `$JS.API.STREAM.INFO`/`CREATE` on `hive-notices`
but never the per-hive subject a publish actually targets, so every
`notices::publish` was refused with a permissions violation naming
`hive-notices.<hive>`.
The gap survived because `notices_subjects`'s own doc comment asserted
`extra_hive_subjects` covered it "since that one *is* per-hive". Nothing
in `nix/` has ever passed `--hive-publish-subject` (`git grep` → 0 hits;
control: `--reader-client` is passed at `nix/host-modules/swarm-nats.nix:711`),
so the publish had been refused for as long as the feature existed.
Subject comes from `swarm_queue_client::notices::subject`, the same
constant the publisher formats from, rather than a literal here.
Refs #3859
`echo 'FAILED: ${c.name}'` hand-quoted a string that is prose, so the
first case name containing an apostrophe to actually fail terminated the
builder script mid-report. The remaining failures never printed, and the
error read as a shell syntax error rather than as a broken property.
Only failing cases are ever echoed, so every green run agreed the
reporter was fine -- the defect was reachable exclusively at the moment
the report was the thing being relied on. Measured: with two cases
failing, the old form printed one line and an EOF error, the escaped
form prints both plus the count.
`swarm-bao.nix` declared the store's half of the mTLS pair as options —
`serverCertFile`, `serverKeyFile`, `clientCaFile` — and left the reader's
half as a literal inside `glue-bao-tls.nix`, which only runs where
`deploy.bao.enable` is set. A hive that did not host the store therefore
could not read from it and could not be pointed at a certificate even
when one had been placed by hand.
Adds `clientCertFile`, `clientKeyFile` and `serverCaFile` beside their
three server siblings, `mkDefault`ed by the glue to the leaf it already
mints, and moves `glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` onto them. Its gate becomes
"this host holds an identity" rather than "the store is a neighbour",
and the unit ordering that names store-local units is now conditional --
`Requires=` on an absent unit fails the job.
`serverCaFile` is separate from `clientCaFile` on purpose: one is the
store choosing which readers to trust, the other a reader choosing which
store to trust. Self-signing collapses them to one file, which is a
property of that deployment and not of the pairing.
Closes#3855.
mara asked on PR #3854 to remove the revive action alongside the
blank-name spawn form. Both posted to /api/request-spawn as the last
two frontend callers; with this the dashboard has no UI path left that
hits that endpoint (backend removal/decision stays damocles's call).
Drops the K3PT ST4T3 tombstone row's ⊕ R3V1V3 form, leaving PURG3 as
the only per-tombstone action. Updated the two doc/comment spots that
described the now-gone button.
Frontend half of removing hive-level agent spawning (swarm-level
creation now covers it, and its forge-works confirmation just landed
in hive/hive-chat). Removes call.js's blank-name spawn-request form
(R3QU3ST SP4WN) and its now-orphaned .spawnform CSS.
Deliberately keeps core.js's tombstone-list revive action (R3V1V3) --
a different feature (respawn an *existing* agent, reusing its kept
state), not agent creation, and not what this issue asked to remove.
It happens to post to the same /api/request-spawn action with the
tombstone's own name pre-filled rather than a blank input.
Backend endpoint + wiring is a separate slice (damocles).
claude's real OAuth URL is one long unbroken query-string token, no
whitespace for the browser to break on. Without overflow-wrap the
<a> just kept going past the login card's right edge instead of
wrapping at the card's bounded width (mara reported this with a
screenshot). overflow-wrap: anywhere lets it break mid-token as a
last resort, scoped to just the URL line (.login-url) rather than
the whole card.
argus's review on the original fix: refresh() did a parallel one-off
fetch instead of calling the mount effect's self-rescheduling poll(),
so it never re-armed timerRef after firing. Wiring refresh() to run on
every visibilitychange-to-visible meant the very first tab-switch back
into focus would kill periodic polling for the rest of the session --
reproducing the exact staleness bug this branch set out to fix, just
delayed by one tab switch instead of immediate.
Fix: hoist poll into a ref set by the mount effect so refresh() invokes
the same self-rescheduling function rather than a parallel fetch that
drops the loop. Also gave the visibilitychange effect an empty
dependency array per the review's second note -- it only closes over
stable refs/setters, and now that Root's 1s ticker re-renders the
calling component every second, a deps-less effect would tear down and
reattach the listener that often for no reason.
The status badge's elapsed-time text ('thinking Xm Ys') was computed
from Date.now() inside the render function, so it only ever advanced
when the component actually re-rendered. Two gaps let it go stale:
- useAgentState's poll loop is a chained setTimeout, which browsers
throttle (or suspend outright) once the tab is backgrounded, so
polling could stall for a long time with no way back to a live
reading short of a full page reload.
- even under healthy polling, the age text only advanced once every
~4s (the poll interval) instead of counting up smoothly.
Fix: resync immediately on visibilitychange (so returning to a
backgrounded tab doesn't leave a stale reading), and drive the age
text off its own 1s interval independent of the poll cadence.
Two non-blocking notes from review:
- the /api/repos effect now uses the same cancelled guard the
repo-filter effect already has, so an unmount mid-flight doesn't call
setRepos/setError on a gone component.
- Table's TableColumn gains an optional ariaSort field, consumed as the
<th>'s aria-sort attribute; the issue-report page's sortable columns
now report ascending/descending/none so a screen reader can announce
which column and direction is active, not just the sighted ▲/▼ glyph.
damocles caught it on the swarm-controller PR: forge's assignee field
is legacy single-value, assignees is the real multi-assignee list, and
this repo actually uses multiple. Widen the frontend's row type +
column to match -- rendered comma-joined the same way labels already
are.
New /issues route: a sortable, filterable table over open issues across
every repo that has one -- repo picker (default: no filter, every repo
combined), hide-blocked toggle, and a label multi-select, consuming
swarm-controller's GET /api/repos + GET /api/issue-report / GET
/api/repos/{org}/{repo}/issue-report (see hyperhive#3831 for the row
shape). blocked and depended_on_by_count arrive pre-resolved per row --
this page does no dependency-graph walking of its own, just sort/filter
over what it's given. Default sort is depended_on_by_count descending,
matching mara's framing of the report's headline ordering.
Widened Table's TableColumn.header from string to ComponentChildren so
a column can carry a real clickable sort-toggle button instead of
forking a second table primitive for this one page.
The UI and the swarm-controller it fronts are one service to a reader and to a
certificate, so a separate option only ever created two spellings of one
address — and the controller's own public URL was built from one of them while
an allow-list entry named the other.
Removed rather than aliased. A config still setting it was pinning a name the
controller never used; an alias would preserve exactly that mismatch, so
`mkRemovedOptionModule` says so and fails the build.
⚠️ The option was TOTAL and `swarm.domain` is NULLABLE. That is not incidental:
`ui.domain` fell back to `swarm.invalid` so hive-network.nix's required-domain
assertion is what an operator sees, rather than a coercion error from a
consumer. Each site keeps that property its own way — swarm-ui binds a local
total (the idiom swarm-otel.nix already uses as `domainBase`), and the three
sites already gated on `deploy.swarm-ui.enable` gain `&& domain != null`, which
is stricter than a placeholder and puts no invented name into rendered config.
One behaviour change worth naming: `swarm.nix`'s certificate SAN list used to
receive the placeholder `swarm.invalid` on a null domain and now receives
nothing. `lib.optional` would otherwise have put a literal `null` in it.
Verified with `checks.module-eval` rather than `nix-instantiate --parse`: parse
proves syntax, and every failure this change could plausibly cause — a dead
binding, a renamed reference — is an evaluation error.
Her review: too much text, and an assertion helper instead of that much code
where the file should just say "this option cannot contain that".
`lib/name-guards.nix` gets `mustNotEqual` / `mustNotContain`; both call sites in
swarm-otel become four fields each — the option, the names, the list, and the
sentence explaining the failure. The message plumbing (find every offender,
quote them, name the list) is one shape shared by both.
Offenders are printed after their label rather than before it, because no
English verb agrees with both one name and five.
Converted the pre-existing equality assertion too. Leaving one hand-rolled
beside one helper-built is the worse of the two outcomes, and it is the same
guard.
Verified by evaluating both guards directly rather than only parsing: clean
rosters pass, `foo-agent`/`beehive` fail containment, `swarm` fails equality,
and `forgeworks`/`operator-hq` still pass — the control that keeps the two
lists from being merged.
Hive-scoped identifiers are built by joining a hive name with fixed words —
`hive-<name>`, `hive-<name>-agent` — so a hive called `foo-agent` produces
exactly the id hive `foo`'s agent containers produce. The queue's responder
resolves it as the agents, and that hive silently receives an agent grant
instead of its own; a NATS denial reaches a client as a timeout, so nothing
names the cause. Equality cannot see this: the two NAMES differ, only the
composed strings collide.
Deliberately a second file rather than three more entries in
`reserved-names.nix`. That list is matched by equality against a whole name and
every entry is a value some component emits; applying containment to it would
refuse `forgeworks` and `operator-hq` for failures that do not exist. The two
lists differ in subject (hive-only vs both), matcher (substring vs equality)
and admission rule, and each file's header says so.
No Rust change: `HIVE_RESERVED_NAMES` answers "may an AGENT be called this",
which stays an equality question — an agent name is never composed into these
identifiers.
Measured against the predicate rather than assumed:
pr1ma=ok alpha=ok forgeworks=ok operator-hq=ok
foo-agent=REFUSED beehive=REFUSED swarm=REFUSED myswarmx=REFUSED
The four `ok` cases are the control: `forgeworks` and `operator-hq` are exactly
what a merged list would have refused.
27 lines to 11. What went: the measured deny line (it is in the PR and the
commit that made the change), the "one value, two readers" argument for reading
the option the target URL is built from, and a note about `unique`.
What stayed is the part nobody can re-derive from the code: `external` must not
be dropped, both hyperhive hosts are private addresses the builtin denies, and
the entry is deliberately not gated on the per-host `deploy.swarm-ui.enable`
because a spread deployment has the forge and the swarm host on different
machines.
Her review: don't declare a `let` for a single use. The comment that justified
the binding moves to the use site and drops the claim it was carrying — that
`swarm.ui.domain` and `swarm.domain` can diverge — keeping only the part that
holds either way: this reads the same option swarm-controller builds its public
URL from, so the allow-list entry and the target it must match are one value
rather than two spellings.
`swarm.domain` is not the value swarm-controller addresses this hive with —
`swarm-controller.nix` builds `SWARM_CONTROLLER_PUBLIC_URL` from
`swarm.ui.domain`, which merely defaults to it and is documented as
overridable. Allowing the one and being delivered the other would work until
someone takes that option up, then fail as a refused delivery with nothing
naming the cause.
Also states why the entry is NOT gated on `deploy.swarm-ui.enable`, which is
what makes the controller register the hooks at all: in a spread deployment the
forge and the swarm UI are different hosts, so that per-host flag is false
exactly where the allow-list entry is needed.
The comment-block lint caught the prose at 35 lines; trimmed to the parts a
reader cannot re-derive.
`webhook.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` named `external` plus the HIVE domain. The
swarm-controller's webhooks target the SWARM domain, which is a different host
on the same private gateway IP — so `external` denied it and the hive entry did
not cover it. Every swarm-controller delivery has been failing there.
Found from the sender's log, which names the host and the rule it broke:
deny 'constellation.darkest.space(10.42.0.1:443)'
webhook can only call allowed HTTP servers (check your
webhook.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST setting)
This is the layer under the DNS fix: resolution now succeeds and reaches
10.42.0.1:443, and forgejo refuses to dial it. The two failures look identical
from the receiving end — no delivery, no log line — which is why reading the
sender was what separated them.
`optional` because a hive with no swarm has no such domain; `unique` because an
all-local deployment can legitimately set both to the same string.
This warned that `--label area:ops` "matches nothing and silently returns
unfiltered results". That stopped being true when hive-forge learned to suggest
the nearest name: it now exits non-zero with `unresolved label name(s): area:ops
(did you mean "area/ops"?)` and lists the available labels.
Measured, not assumed — the old text is what sent me looking for a silent
failure that no longer exists, which is the specific cost of a doc that
describes a fixed bug.
Registration ran once at startup and, on failure, deferred to the next
process start. Nothing schedules one, so a controller that lost the boot
race kept running with no hooks registered — and the failure is silent at
both ends, since the forge has nothing to report about a call that never
arrived.
That race is the common case rather than an edge: the controller and the
forge come up together on a rebuild. Measured on a deploy where both
consecutive starts got 502 from the gateway because forgejo was not yet
serving; the forge was healthy two minutes later.
Bounded backoff, not a poll loop — it exists to outlast a slow forge, not
to re-register periodically. Unit ordering would not fix this: the forge
is a remote host in a spread deployment, where no After= can reach it.
Closes#3828
mara (issue #3817): remove the home link + page, put the setting toggle into the Y3R C4LL tab. Deleted settings.html/.js/.css; the browser-notification toggle (the only content there) now renders as a ◆ PR3F3R3NC3S ◆ section under Y3R C4LL's approvals/inbox, wired the same way (NOTIF.bind()/NOTIF.show() in common.js — no behavior change, just a new mount point). Updated build.mjs's entry lists and every doc/comment that pointed at the old page.
mara: strip impl details from docs. Dropped the nix-module name, struct literal, and gating-condition restatement — docs/swarm/ui.md::Quick links already covers that; this section only needs to say where the link lives now.
mara (PR#3820): the operator doesn't type /matrix/ into the browser — it's a swarm-level link (hive-matrix.nix registers it into services.hyperhive.swarm.controller.links, rendered by swarm-ui's LinksMenu). Corrected the M4TR1X page doc, and fixed the hive-matrix.nix comment that still described the removed H0M3 tile in present tense while I was in there.
argus (PR#3820 review): the M4TR1X page section still said the operator opens /matrix/ from the H0M3 hub's Matrix tile — that tile no longer exists after this PR removed it. Fixed to say the page is opened directly.
mara (issue #3816): remove the swarm-service links (forge, matrix) from the hive home hub. Both surfaces are still reachable directly (forge's own public URL, /matrix/); they just no longer get a tile on H0M3. Dropped the now-dead reveal/href-fill logic in home.js and updated the two docs that described the old gating.
