An agent's memory cap was rendered into its flake (`memoryMaxBytes` →
`services.hyperhive.agent.claudeMemoryMaxBytes`), so the closure depended
on it and a changed cap reached the JSC heap ceiling and the subagent
`MemoryHigh=` only after a rebuild.
hive-c0re now writes the effective `MemoryMax=` in bytes to the agent's
runtime dir (`/run/hive/memory-max-bytes` inside) in `write_dropins`,
from the same value the drop-in gets. The file is removed for
`infinity` or a RAM percentage, and left alone when the drop-in is kept.
Inside the container, `nix/agent-modules/memory-cap.nix` reads it at
boot: an environment generator sets `BUN_JSC_forceRAMSize` (75%) for
every unit and `machinectl shell`, `/etc/set-environment` exports it in
login shells, and a unit generator writes `MemoryHigh=` (2/3) as a
drop-in for `hive-subagent-daemon`.
The render drops `memoryMaxBytes`, the agent option is removed (both
spellings fail eval with a removal message), and
`effective_memory_bytes_from` goes with its only caller.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
Part of #5081. Follow-up to the review of #5131.
- Before this PR, claude read CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL_SESSION_NAME_PREFIX
from managed-settings.json in every context. The environment generator
reaches every unit of the container's manager, including `machinectl
shell` (hivectl choom): machined starts it as a transient
container-shell@ unit (systemd 260.5 src/machine/machine.c:980-1004),
and every unit's exec environment starts from the manager environment
the generators fill (src/core/unit.c:5557, src/core/manager.c:3990-4001).
Shells no unit starts do not get it: `nixos-container root-login` / `run`
enter with nsenter + `su -l`, and getty logins go through login(1). So
hive-facts.nix now also exports the generator's output from
/etc/set-environment (environment.extraInit).
- The generator's read loop kept a last line only when it ended in a
newline; it now keeps one without.
- checks.script-test-agent-hive-facts runs the rendered generator and the
shell snippet (under dash and bash's sh) against sample files: both
facts, a planted LD_PRELOAD/PATH line, a last line without a newline,
an empty file and no file.
- identity.rs: hive_name()'s doc names the facts file as the source.
The live pair was replaced with two renames, key then cert. A run
stopped between them (timeout, container stop, power loss) left a new
key beside the old cert, and every later run logged in with that pair,
so the agent could not re-pull until its container restarted.
Each pair now goes into a fresh directory under
/run/hive-agent-bao-identity, and `current`, a symlink to it, is
replaced by one rename. Wherever a run stops, `current` names one whole
pair; the next run removes whatever a stopped run left. Consumers read
`current/cert` and `current/key` through the same read-only options and
still re-read them on every login.
The script test covers a swap stopped at each of its link and rename
steps: the live pair is always one whole pair, and the next run puts
the new one live.
Refs #5017
swarm-controller re-issues an agent's store leaf at half its validity, but
the running container kept presenting the copy its hive delivered at
start, so a re-issued leaf reached the agent only on its next restart.
hive-agent-bao-identity now seeds a live copy of the pair in its own
runtime directory from the delivered credentials, and re-runs every 10
minutes: it logs in with the live leaf, reads its own
swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls (a read render_agent already grants), and
when the leaf changed, logs in with the new pair and swaps it in only if
the store accepts it.
Every unit in the container that logs in to the store presents the live
pair: hive-agent (queue-identity.nix), hive-matrix-daemon,
hive-subagent-daemon, hive-agent-forge-token, hive-agent-forge-accounts
and hive-agent-github-token. They keep loading the server CA as a
credential. The long-running daemons are ordered after the refresher so
the live pair exists when they start.
It renews only while the held leaf is still valid: the login that reads
the new leaf is made with the current one.
Refs #5017
`swarm-bao-nats-callout-xkey` runs `ensure-callout-keys`, importing
/var/lib/swarm-nats-callout/{issuer,callout-user}.seed when present so the
keys keep their public halves, then fetches all three public halves from
the store. The verb removes each seed file once a read of the store returns
a seed; when the store's seed differs, it is kept and a warning names the
file. No tmpfiles rule touches those files, since one could run before the
import with the store sealed and leave the next run to mint a new key.
The server renders the issuer and user public halves from the fetched files,
checked for shape as the xkey's is, and does not start without them. The
responder reads both seeds from the store, so the copies into the container
and their LoadCredential entries are gone, and a tmpfiles rule removes the
copies a container still holds. `swarm-nats-callout-keys` is removed.
On the store's host the fetch unit is also ordered after
`swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy`, so the publisher's denial of the seed
paths is written before the unit creates or keeps a seed there.
`deploy.nats.autoGenerateCallout`, `calloutUserPublicKey`,
`calloutIssuerPublicKey`, `calloutUserSeedFile` and `calloutIssuerSeedFile`
are removed with `mkRemovedOptionModule`, under `swarm.nats` too, each
message saying the keys live in the store.
`checks.script-test-nats-render-config` runs the queue server's
`ExecStartPre` render against a scratch runtime directory: a fetched key
lands in `auth_callout.xkey` and the wrapper includes the fragment, and
a missing or malformed key file fails the start and writes no config.
module-eval only sees the render as a store path, so dropping `xkey`
from the template, or its substitution, passed every check while the
server would have run unsealed.
The harness now reads swarm/agents/<agent>/queue from the store itself,
under the agent's own store certificate, and holds it in memory only.
It reads once before the first connect and again on every reconnect
attempt (async-nats `ConnectOptions::with_auth_callback`), so an agent
whose secret was re-minted reconnects with the new value instead of
being refused until the container restarts.
hive-agent-queue-credential.service, the /run file it wrote, and
HIVE_AGENT_QUEUE_AGENT_SECRET_FILE are gone; queue-identity.nix now
hands hive-agent.service the store address, its certificate paths and
the agent name.
A failed or empty read before the first connect still falls back to
the hive's shared client. Each read is bounded by a 10s timeout, and
retries wait out the existing reconnect backoff (500ms doubling, capped
at 60s).
Closes#4783
`script-test-agent-bao-fetch` executes the rendered `ExecStart` of
`hive-agent-forge-token` and `hive-agent-queue-credential` under
`umask 0377`, with a stub `bao` first on the unit's own PATH. It covers
every error branch, the happy path, forge rotation/unchanged, and 0400
files already in place: the redirect failure #4736 fixed, whose live
symptom was `bao.err: Permission denied` reported as a refused
certificate. The TLS-alert fixture is the `unknown certificate
authority` error h-atlas's identity check got from the store.
#4736 claimed this test but never committed it; the two module-eval
suites for these units only evaluate the config.
Closes#4748
