The handbook's sections were agent-lifecycle, integrations, swarm, tools, trust-boundary and web-ui, which do not follow how the system is built, so a reader could not tell which layer a page is about. Its pages now sit in swarm/, hives/ and agents/, with the accounts an agent can hold outside the system in external-accounts/. - swarm/: forge, matrix and the knowledge repo join the swarm pages, and so does the swarmctl reference. - hives/: the dashboard, hivectl and its reference, and the operator/agent boundary, with a README that takes over the old web-ui and tools pages. - agents/: the roster, persistence, config changes, the agent's own web page (was web-ui/agent) and the security model, with a README. - external-accounts/: GitHub and GitLab. Pages are moved whole; none is split yet. Every reference follows: relative links in the docs, `docs/2-handbook/...` paths in code comments, the nix checks that regenerate the CLI references and the ignore list, and docs/README.md, whose handbook section is now by layer.
69 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# hive-priv
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The minimal **root privileged-helper** for hive-c0re. It runs as root and
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exposes a narrow unix socket at `/run/hive/priv.sock` that accepts `PrivRequest`
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JSON lines and performs only the handful of operations that genuinely require
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root — bind-mount edits, `nsenter` into a container, btrfs subvolume ops. All
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coordination logic (broker, HTTP, scheduling) stays in the _unprivileged_
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`hive-c0re` process, which delegates here.
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## Why it exists
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Privsep. `hive-c0re` runs as the unprivileged `hive-core` user so a bug or a
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prompt-injection in the large daemon can't directly wield root. The few root
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operations it needs are funnelled through this small, auditable helper instead.
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See `docs/2-handbook/hives/boundary.md` and `docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/hive-c0re-privilege.md` for the privilege boundary.
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## Security model
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- **Strict allowlist.** hive-priv checks every request against a container-name
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allowlist before any filesystem or process operation, and accepts only names
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matching the hive convention (`h-*`, the manager container included).
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- **No pass-through.** Every `PrivRequest` variant maps to a single known
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operation; there is no arbitrary-command escape hatch.
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- **Socket-activated, always.** systemd binds `/run/hive/priv.sock`
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(`SocketGroup=hive-core`, `0660`) and passes the listener as fd 3
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(`LISTEN_FDS`); the helper requires this and has no self-bind fallback, so dev
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and prod take the identical path and the group grant always holds.
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The wire contract (`PrivRequest` / response types) lives in the separate
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`hive-priv-sock` crate so this root binary depends on just the protocol shapes,
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not the whole daemon-shared crate.
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## Layout
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`src/main.rs` holds the socket loop and the dispatch table, one arm per
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`PrivRequest` variant. Each op family, with its validation, has its own module:
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`container` (lifecycle), `container_config` (nspawn flags, systemd drop-ins),
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`storage` (btrfs subvolumes, quotas, snapshots, disk measurement), `files`
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(pause marker, socket dir, legacy tmpfiles) and `infra` (gateway nginx, forge
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admin, infra containers). Helpers more than one family calls live in `shared`.
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Each module's `//!` header lists its ops.
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## Implementation notes
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### Container toplevels (create/update)
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`container_toplevel_action` (in `src/container.rs`) applies a closure that is
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already in the store; hive-priv builds nothing. hive-c0re names the closure
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(`toplevel` on `CreateContainer` / `UpdateContainer`), downloaded beforehand
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with `RealiseClosure`. hive-priv remembers, per agent, the path its last
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successful `RealiseClosure` returned (in memory), and applies only that path to
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that agent. It refuses a path never realised for the agent, another agent's
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and the host's own, and logs an error naming the agent and both paths. A
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restart between the download and the apply empties the record, so the apply
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fails and the job retries. hive-priv does not re-check the signature at apply
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time: `RealiseClosure` enforces it, and the binding limits an apply to what that
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call stored.
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`create` passes the path to `nixos-container create --system-path`, so
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`nixos-container`'s own `buildFlake()` never runs. Without the flag, it builds
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to a hardcoded relative `.tmp` out-link: `$systemPath` stays `undef` and
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`"$systemPath.tmp"` interpolates to the bare string `.tmp` in the caller's cwd.
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With `services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.buildSlots > 1`, two concurrent
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calls could share that one `.tmp`, and one agent's container got another
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agent's closure.
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`update` points the container's profile at the path with `nix-env --set` and
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reloads the unit if it runs, because `nixos-container update` dies on its
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version probe before it honors `--system-path`.
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