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The handbook's sections were agent-lifecycle, integrations, swarm, tools, trust-boundary and web-ui, which do not follow how the system is built, so a reader could not tell which layer a page is about. Its pages now sit in swarm/, hives/ and agents/, with the accounts an agent can hold outside the system in external-accounts/. - swarm/: forge, matrix and the knowledge repo join the swarm pages, and so does the swarmctl reference. - hives/: the dashboard, hivectl and its reference, and the operator/agent boundary, with a README that takes over the old web-ui and tools pages. - agents/: the roster, persistence, config changes, the agent's own web page (was web-ui/agent) and the security model, with a README. - external-accounts/: GitHub and GitLab. Pages are moved whole; none is split yet. Every reference follows: relative links in the docs, `docs/2-handbook/...` paths in code comments, the nix checks that regenerate the CLI references and the ignore list, and docs/README.md, whose handbook section is now by layer.
109 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
109 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
# The operator/agent boundary
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO -->
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Design rationale for hyperhive's two-principal trust model. The
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_implementation_ work — container network isolation, the unifying
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gateway, core-daemon privsep — is tracked as `area:ops` issues on
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the forge.
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES -->
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The operator/agent boundary is technically enforced, not just a
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convention: containers run in private netns (network isolation is
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always on), the gateway proxies all operator-facing traffic, and
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`hive-c0re` runs as the unprivileged `hive-core` user.
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## Two principals, two paths
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- **Operator** — reaches every UI (the dashboard + every
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per-agent page) through the gateway, on one origin.
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The core daemon serves operator-authority actions
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(answer-as-operator, lifecycle POSTs), reachable only via the
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gateway.
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- **Agent** — speaks only for itself, only over its per-agent
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unix socket. The socket's identity _is_ the agent (see
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`docs/5-project/process/conventions.md`, "identity = socket"). An agent must not
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be able to reach the core daemon's HTTP surface, another
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agent's socket, or another agent's web UI.
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## Design rule
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**Operator-authority actions never get a per-agent-socket entry
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point.** They live in hive-c0re.
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Worked example — destroying or rebuilding a container is a
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`POST /api/{destroy,rebuild}/{name}` on the core dashboard, _never_ a
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per-agent-socket `Request` variant. If it were a per-agent-socket
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request, a compromised agent could `curl` its own socket and destroy
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or rebuild itself (or, if the variant took an arbitrary target, another
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agent) without ever touching the core's own authenticated surface.
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## Why network isolation is the load-bearing step
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Without network isolation, containers share the host network namespace
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and can reach `localhost:<core-port>`, the dashboard, and every other
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agent's web port — the operator/agent split is on the honour system and
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every boundary claim above is aspirational. Network isolation is what
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makes the boundary _real_; the gateway and privsep are ergonomics and
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defence-in-depth layered on top.
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Network isolation is complete and always on: every agent container
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runs in a private netns behind the hive bridge, and there is no
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shared-netns mode. See `docs/4-implementation/networking/network.md`.
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Concretely, the core daemon's dashboard `/api` carries **no
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application-layer authentication** — the core daemon serves operator-authority
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routes unauthenticated at the HTTP layer. Their protection is entirely (a) the
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gateway, which fronts all operator traffic and is where operator auth lives,
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and (b) network isolation, which keeps agents — and the CI runner's untrusted
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PR builds — off host-loopback so nothing can reach `127.0.0.1:<dashboard_port>`
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directly. This is deliberate given the load-bearing role of network isolation
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above, but it's a standing invariant: the `/api` must never bind to a
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non-loopback address or get exposed outside the gateway, and every new
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operator-authority route inherits that assumption. hyperhive treats
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`swarm-ci-runner` like an agent for this purpose — it runs untrusted PR code and is
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netns-isolated for the same reason.
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The boundary rests on three layers:
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1. **Gateway** — fronts all surfaces (dashboard + every per-agent UI)
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on one origin. An nginx nixos-container proxies per-agent UIs under
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`/agent/<name>/`, which is what lets each agent page's inbox panel
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POST `mark-all-read` to the core dashboard's
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`/api/agent/{name}/mark-all-read` go same-origin instead of needing
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a cross-origin CORS shim. Pure ergonomics — no behavioural risk on
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its own.
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2. **Network isolation** — the load-bearing layer: every agent
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container runs in a private netns behind the hive bridge, always
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on and unconditional. This is what turns the operator/agent split
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from an honour-system convention into an enforced boundary.
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3. **Privsep** — defence in depth on the core process; `hive-c0re`
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runs as the unprivileged `hive-core` user and delegates root
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operations to `hive-priv`, a narrow socket-activated helper. See
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[`docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/hive-c0re-privilege.md`](../../4-implementation/trust-boundary/hive-c0re-privilege.md) for the privilege boundary table.
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### host admin socket access (`hivectl`)
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`hivectl` drives the whole hive — spawn / kill / destroy / rebuild /
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deploy — over the **host admin socket** `/run/hyperhive/host.sock`,
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socket-activated by the `hive-c0re.socket` unit. That socket _is_ the
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full-control surface, so who can connect to it's a real trust
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boundary.
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By default the socket is `0660` group-owned by **`hive-admin`**, an
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empty group — so it's effectively **root-only** until an operator is
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explicitly granted access. Grant sudoless `hivectl` by listing login
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users in `services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.adminUsers`; the option adds each to
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`hive-admin`, and members connect without `sudo`. The runtime dir
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`/run/hyperhive` is `0751` (traverse-only, no listing) so the group can
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reach the socket path; the socket's own `0660 hive-admin` mode gates
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the connection, and the per-agent subdirs under it keep their own
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restrictive perms. Keep `adminUsers` to trusted operators — membership
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is equivalent to root over the hive.
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## Implementation detail
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How `hive-priv` is socket-activated and how the per-agent socket directory
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gets its owner and mode:
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[socket mechanics](../../4-implementation/trust-boundary/boundary-mechanism.md).
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