104 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
104 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
# SSH access to a machine
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Let an agent SSH into a machine you name, such as a test VM, without copying a
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key onto it. The agent holds no standing SSH key. It asks the swarm's secret
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store for a certificate that lasts an hour, and the machine trusts the swarm's
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SSH certificate authority (CA) instead of a list of keys.
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Agent-side, nothing changes until you do both of these:
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1. Switch SSH on for the agent and name the machines it may reach.
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2. Make each machine trust the CA and list the agents allowed in.
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The permission to get a certificate is in the policy every agent shares, so
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every agent with a store identity can already get a certificate for its own
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name, whether or not you switch SSH on for it. That's harmless: no machine
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trusts a name it doesn't list. Switching SSH on only sets up the key, the
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renewal and the client config.
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## 1. Switch it on for an agent
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In the agent's config:
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```nix
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services.hyperhive.agent.ssh = {
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enable = true;
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hosts.testvm = {
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hostName = "10.0.0.7";
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user = "test";
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port = 22; # the default
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hostKey = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA…";
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};
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};
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```
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`hostKey` is the machine's own host public key, the one line in
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`/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub` on it. The agent pins it: it refuses a
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machine that presents any other key, and never trusts a key on first sight.
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The agent then runs `ssh testvm` with no other flag. The agent's SSH client
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offers its certificate and nothing else. The option needs the agent to have a
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store identity, the same as for its other store credentials.
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This doesn't open the network. If you set the hive's `egress.forward` to
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`reject`, the hive refuses the agent's direct connection to the machine's port
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until a separate allowance exists; the default `log` lets it through. See
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[the network page](../../4-implementation/networking/network.md).
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## 2. Make a machine trust the CA
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On the swarm's store host, read the CA's public key:
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```bash
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bao read -field=public_key ssh-agents/config/ca
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```
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The store also serves the same key without a token at
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`<store address>/v1/ssh-agents/public_key`. The key is public and you set it
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once. Then import the module on the machine, which can be any NixOS machine,
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and not only a hive host:
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```nix
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{
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imports = [ hyperhive.nixosModules.agent-ssh-target ];
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services.hyperhive.agentSshTarget = {
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enable = true;
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caPublicKey = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA…";
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principals.test = [ "atlas" "maia" ];
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};
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}
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```
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`principals.<user>` lists the agents that may log in as that local account. The
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account has to exist. An account with no entry accepts no certificate. The
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module writes no `authorized_keys`.
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## What an agent can and can't do
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- It can only get a certificate for **its own name**. The store signs for the
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name its identity carries, so atlas can't obtain one that says maia.
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- The certificate lasts an hour, and the agent signs a new one every 20
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minutes. The key lives in the agent's `/run` (memory) and never reaches disk.
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A new container start makes a new key.
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- It signs ed25519 user keys only, and the certificate allows a terminal
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(`permit-pty`) and nothing else.
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## Revoking access
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- **One agent from one machine:** remove its name from that user's
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`principals` and deploy the machine. The next login attempt fails.
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- **One agent from every machine:** remove its name from every machine's
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`principals`. That's the revocation. No swarm-wide switch
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stops signing for an agent that a hive still declares: if you delete
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its cert-auth role `hive-agent-<name>` in the store, `swarm-controller`
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writes it back within five minutes. Signing stops only once no hive declares
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the agent any more (you destroyed it); the controller then stops renewing
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its store identity, and the identity lapses with its 7-day certificate.
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- **A certificate already issued** stays valid until it expires, at most three
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hours, whatever you remove. Removing a principal blocks new logins at once.
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- **The CA itself:** if the CA key changes, every machine needs the
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new public key. Nothing replaces the CA by itself.
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For the bao paths, field names and units, see
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[the SSH CA implementation page](../../4-implementation/swarm/ssh-ca.md).
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