An operator links an agent's GitHub personal access token in the swarm UI
(LinkGithubAccountForm, "link github account" on /agents). swarm-controller's
PUT /api/hives/{hive}/agents/{agent}/github-account stores it at
swarm/agents/<agent>/github-token (swarm_secret_client::github), a flat leaf
under the agent's prefix that the agent's existing read grant already covers:
no policy change, and no list grant, since there is one token per agent.
In the agent, hive-agent-github-token (oneshot + 2-minute timer, as the agent
user, under its own store certificate, ordered before hive-github-notify)
reads that path and writes <state>/github-token, 0600 and agent-owned, the
file the gh wrapper, git credential helper and hive-github-notify already
read. It replaces the file by rename only when the bytes changed and never
deletes it: a hive-written github-token stays until a token is linked in the
swarm UI. It is installed only with a store address and
services.hyperhive.agent.github.enable.
Removed: the dashboard's CR3D3NTIALS page (credentials.html/js/css, its
build entries and H0M3 tile; GITHUB was its only tab), hive-c0re's
dashboard/matrix_accounts.rs with GET/POST /api/github-account,
priv_client::write_agent_github_token, the host socket's
SetAgentGithubToken and `hivectl github set-token`, and hive-priv's
WriteAgentGithubToken with write_agent_state_file, its only caller gone.
Docs: integrations/github.md and swarm/ui.md describe the swarm path,
swarm/credentials.md gains the store-path row, and the hive UI docs,
hivectl docs and security.md's hive-priv table drop the removed pieces.
Closes #4347
150 lines
5.8 KiB
Rust
150 lines
5.8 KiB
Rust
//! Shared helpers used across hivectl's command handling: daemon
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//! request/response plumbing (`daemon_request`, `render`,
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//! `render_lifecycle`) and password input (`resolve_password`).
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use std::path::Path;
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use anyhow::{Context as _, Result, bail};
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/// Parse a CLI-supplied agent/account name into a validated
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/// [`hive_types::Ident`], mapping the parse error to an `anyhow` error that
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/// names the offending input. Used at hivectl's `HostRequest` construction
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/// sites so the wire `Ident` fields are built from validated names (the daemon
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/// re-validates on deserialize; parsing here gives the operator an immediate,
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/// local error instead of a round-trip rejection).
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pub(crate) fn parse_ident(name: &str) -> Result<hive_types::Ident> {
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hive_types::Ident::parse(name).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid agent name {name:?}: {e}"))
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}
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/// Send a provisioning request to the daemon and print its result lines.
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/// The daemon owns the provisioning logic; hivectl just relays the outcome,
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/// prefixing any error with `label` (e.g. `forge` / `gateway`).
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pub(crate) async fn daemon_request(
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socket: &Path,
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req: hive_host_sock::HostRequest,
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label: &str,
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) -> Result<()> {
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// No extra context on the request: `client::request` already names the
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// socket and classifies the failure, and wrapping it here would put a
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// vaguer line on top of the actionable one.
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let resp = crate::client::request(socket, req).await?;
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if !resp.ok {
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bail!(
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"{label}: {}",
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resp.error.as_deref().unwrap_or("unknown error")
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);
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}
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for line in &resp.messages {
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println!("{line}");
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Resolve the password the caller asked for, or return `None` to fall
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/// back to a random throwaway. `--password <PW>` wins outright;
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/// `--password-stdin` reads one line off stdin (trailing newline
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/// stripped). Empty stdin is treated as an error so the caller doesn't
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/// silently provision an empty-password account.
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pub(crate) fn resolve_password(
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password: Option<&str>,
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password_stdin: bool,
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) -> Result<Option<String>> {
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if let Some(p) = password {
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return Ok(Some(p.to_owned()));
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}
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if password_stdin {
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use std::io::BufRead as _;
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let stdin = std::io::stdin();
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let mut line = String::new();
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stdin
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.lock()
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.read_line(&mut line)
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.context("read password from stdin")?;
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let trimmed = line.trim_end_matches(['\r', '\n']).to_owned();
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if trimmed.is_empty() {
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bail!("--password-stdin: empty input");
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}
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return Ok(Some(trimmed));
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}
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Ok(None)
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}
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/// Pretty-print a `HostResponse` as JSON and bail on failure. Used by the
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/// agent-lifecycle + approval verbs that just relay a daemon result verbatim.
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pub(crate) fn render(resp: hive_host_sock::HostResponse) -> Result<()> {
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println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&resp)?);
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if !resp.ok {
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bail!(resp.error.unwrap_or_else(|| "request failed".to_owned()));
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Render a hive-wide stop/start/restart response: one `<verb>: <name>`
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/// line per touched container, then surface any aggregated per-target
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/// failure as a non-zero exit. `verb` is the past-tense word printed per
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/// item (`stopped` / `started`).
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pub(crate) fn render_lifecycle(resp: &hive_host_sock::HostResponse, verb: &str) -> Result<()> {
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let items = resp.agents.as_deref().unwrap_or(&[]);
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if items.is_empty() {
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println!("{verb}: nothing matched the requested scope");
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} else {
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for item in items {
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println!("{verb}: {item}");
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}
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}
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if !resp.ok {
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bail!(
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"{verb}: {}",
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resp.error.as_deref().unwrap_or("unknown error")
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);
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Query this hive's domain + browser-facing web URLs (`HostRequest::Urls`).
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///
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/// `Ok(None)` = the daemon answered and has nothing to report; `Err` = it was
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/// never reached, and the error carries the actionable connect hint (see
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/// [`crate::client::request`]). Keep the two apart: collapsing the error into
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/// `None` here is what made a permission problem on the socket read as "is
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/// hive-c0re running?", sending the operator to fix the wrong thing.
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pub(crate) async fn query_hive_urls(socket: &Path) -> Result<Option<hive_host_sock::HiveUrls>> {
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Ok(
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crate::client::request(socket, hive_host_sock::HostRequest::Urls)
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.await?
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.urls,
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)
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}
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/// True when `name` matches an existing hyperhive agent — i.e. it has a
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/// persistent state dir under the agents root. The state dir (not the
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/// live container list) is the test, so kept-state tombstones still
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/// resolve as agents: re-provisioning a destroyed-but-kept agent should
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/// drop its token into the existing state tree.
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///
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/// Asks the daemon rather than stat-ing the path. hivectl used to check
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/// locally, but the agents root is `0700` and owned by the daemon's
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/// user, so an operator without root got EACCES on traversal — which
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/// this function then had to report as "needs root", turning every
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/// caller's existence guard into a permission error. The daemon owns
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/// that directory and answers the same question over the socket, which
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/// operators can already reach via the `hive-admin` group, so the guard
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/// works sudoless and the remaining root requirements (if any) surface
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/// where they actually are.
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pub(crate) async fn agent_exists(socket: &Path, name: &str) -> Result<bool> {
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let resp = crate::client::request(
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socket,
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hive_host_sock::HostRequest::AgentExists {
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name: parse_ident(name)?,
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},
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)
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.await?;
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if !resp.ok {
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bail!(
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"check whether {name:?} is an agent: {}",
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resp.error.as_deref().unwrap_or("unknown error")
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);
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}
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resp.agent_exists
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.context("daemon answered the agent-exists check without a result")
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}
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