hyperhive/nix/module-eval/name-guards.nix
atlas f1445b4c8b swarm-bao: give each hive-cert consumer its own bao identity
Four units read one path each out of the store, and all four logged in
holding `deploy.bao.clientCertFile` — the hive's own leaf. Bao identifies
a principal by the subject of the certificate it presents, so four
readers behind one certificate were ONE principal, and the only grant
expressible was the union of what the four need: read on
`swarm/agents/*`, `swarm/hives/<hive>/*` and `swarm/services/*`. The unit
fetching Grafana's OIDC client secret could fetch every agent credential
in the swarm; the one fetching this hive's matrix token could fetch
Grafana's. Least privilege was not misconfigured here, it was
unrepresentable.

Each now holds a leaf, a cert-auth role and a policy of its own, and each
policy is the single `secret/data/…` path that unit's own script names —
spelled to the leaf, not to a prefix, the way matrix-ctl's already is.
Following the four exemplars in-tree rather than building a mechanism:
`signLeaf` mints the leaves, `swarm-bao.nix` writes the roles from the
bootstrap token, the consumers name their own pair.

Two of the four are written PER HIVE and two are not, which is the shape
of the paths rather than a preference. A matrix appservice token and a
queue credential live under `swarm/hives/<name>/` and every hive runs a
reader for its own, so one role for all of them would have to be granted
`hives/*` — letting one hive read another's, a reach no hive has today.
An OIDC client secret lives under `swarm/services/<client-id>/` and a
swarm registers each exactly once, so one role each is enough. The
per-hive subjects are `<prefix>-<hive>` and swarm.nix reserves every
composed spelling as a hive name, so a hive cannot be named into another
hive's role.

The shared leaf stays: hive-c0re still passes it into its container, the
`bao` CLI wrapper still defaults to it, and the three
`glue-*-bao-identity.nix` files derive the PKI directory from it.

module-eval-bao-grants gains a negative arm per principal — each pins the
three stanzas the hive's leaf carried and the two wildcards a later
widening would reach for, so a policy that grows fails here rather than
in a store. Plus the consuming side: repointing a unit back at the hive's
leaf would evaluate, deploy and log in, and silently restore the union.

A hive that reads a store on another machine now places one leaf per
principal instead of one shared by four. That cost is the point, and
docs/swarm/secrets.md lists the pairs.
2026-09-23 10:11:42 +02:00

197 lines
8.2 KiB
Nix

# `checks.module-eval-name-guards` — see ./lib.nix for the shared
# rationale (why this suite exists, naming convention, "evaluates
# not executes").
{
pkgs,
lib,
self,
nixosSystem,
}:
let
inherit
(import ./lib.nix {
inherit
pkgs
lib
self
nixosSystem
;
})
hive
runGroup
;
# The hive-name guards, with the collector explicitly OFF. That is the whole
# property: the guards live where `swarm.hives` is declared, so they run in a
# deployment that has a secret store and no collector — which used to skip
# them entirely, because they were assertions inside swarm-otel's own `mkIf`.
#
# ⚠️ `controllerCommonName` is overridden to a name containing NO reserved
# fragment. Its default (`swarm-controller`) contains `swarm` and is caught
# by the substring guard whatever the cert-auth arm does — so a fixture using
# the default could not tell the two apart, and the arm under test would pass
# on the neighbour's work.
hiveNamedAfterCertSubject = hive {
deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
deploy.bao.controllerCommonName = "ctl";
swarm.hives.ctl.domain = "ctl.t.local";
};
# The control for both arms below: same shape, a roster nothing objects to.
hiveNamesAllLegal = hive {
deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
deploy.bao.controllerCommonName = "ctl";
};
# The reserved subjects are a LIST, and a list with one consulted element and
# one dead one looks identical from the first element's case. This fixture
# collides with the SECOND, leaving the controller's at its default.
hiveNamedAfterPublisherSubject = hive {
deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
deploy.bao.secretPublisherCommonName = "pubctl";
swarm.hives.pubctl.domain = "p.t.local";
};
# The THIRD element of the same list, colliding on its own so neither of the
# two above can carry it. matrix-ctl's grant is one path rather than a whole
# prefix, which is exactly why a dead entry here would be easy to miss: a
# hive that inherited it would not obviously break anything, it would
# silently gain the ability to overwrite the swarm's matrix credential.
hiveNamedAfterMatrixCtlSubject = hive {
deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
deploy.bao.matrixCtlCommonName = "mintctl";
swarm.hives.mintctl.domain = "m.t.local";
};
# The two OIDC-secret readers' subjects, fixed strings like the three above.
hiveNamedAfterGrafanaOidcSubject = hive {
deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
deploy.bao.grafanaOidcCommonName = "gfctl";
swarm.hives.gfctl.domain = "g.t.local";
};
hiveNamedAfterOtelOidcSubject = hive {
deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
deploy.bao.otelOidcCommonName = "otctl";
swarm.hives.otctl.domain = "o.t.local";
};
# 🩸 A different shape from every fixture above: the matrix-token and
# queue-credential roles are written PER HIVE, so the subject a hive must not
# be is `<prefix>-<some hive's name>` rather than the prefix itself. Reserving
# only the prefix would leave the composed spelling free, and a hive taking it
# would present a leaf the other hive's role accepts — which is a hive reading
# another hive's queue credential, the exact widening the split exists to
# avoid.
#
# Two hives here, not one: the collision is with the OTHER hive's role.
hiveNamedAfterPerHiveReaderSubject = hive {
deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
deploy.bao.queueAgentCommonNamePrefix = "qr";
swarm.hives.other.domain = "o.t.local";
swarm.hives.qr-other.domain = "q.t.local";
};
hiveNameWithComposedWord = hive {
deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
swarm.hives."h1-agent".domain = "a.t.local";
};
# Markers from `lib/name-guards.nix`'s two `problem` strings. Matching the
# problem rather than the `why` prose keeps the messages rewordable.
equalityGuardFired =
h: lib.any (a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "has reserved name(s)" a.message) h.assertions;
fragmentGuardFired =
h:
lib.any (
a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "has name(s) containing a reserved word" a.message
) h.assertions;
cases = [
{
# `ctl` is in no deny list — it is reserved *because it is the subject a
# cert-auth role accepts*, which is a value an operator sets, so a
# literal deny entry could never have covered it.
name = "a hive named after a cert-auth subject is refused, with the collector off";
ok =
equalityGuardFired hiveNamedAfterCertSubject
&& lib.any (a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "'ctl'" a.message) hiveNamedAfterCertSubject.assertions;
}
{
# Every cert-auth subject is reserved, not just the first one in the
# list. Without this case the second element could be dead and the case
# above would still pass.
name = "a hive named after the secret publisher's subject is refused too";
ok =
equalityGuardFired hiveNamedAfterPublisherSubject
&& lib.any (
a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "'pubctl'" a.message
) hiveNamedAfterPublisherSubject.assertions;
}
{
# And the third, for the reason the second one's comment gives one list
# element earlier. `certAuthCns` is where a role added beside the others
# has to register itself, and nothing but a case per element notices when
# one forgets.
name = "a hive named after matrix-ctl's subject is refused too";
ok =
equalityGuardFired hiveNamedAfterMatrixCtlSubject
&& lib.any (
a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "'mintctl'" a.message
) hiveNamedAfterMatrixCtlSubject.assertions;
}
{
# The fourth and fifth, for the reason the case above gives: `certAuthCns`
# is where a role added beside the others registers itself, and nothing
# but a case per element notices when one forgets. These two are the
# subjects of the readers that fetch Grafana's and the collector's OIDC
# client secrets.
name = "a hive named after either OIDC-secret reader's subject is refused too";
ok =
equalityGuardFired hiveNamedAfterGrafanaOidcSubject
&& lib.any (
a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "'gfctl'" a.message
) hiveNamedAfterGrafanaOidcSubject.assertions
&& equalityGuardFired hiveNamedAfterOtelOidcSubject
&& lib.any (
a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "'otctl'" a.message
) hiveNamedAfterOtelOidcSubject.assertions;
}
{
# 🩸 The per-hive half, and the one a prefix-only reservation would miss:
# the role is `<prefix>-<hive>`, so the reserved string has to be composed
# against every declared hive. Here hive `qr-other` collides with the role
# written for hive `other` — a leaf that reads a credential belonging to a
# hive that is not it.
name = "a hive named after another hive's per-hive reader subject is refused";
ok =
equalityGuardFired hiveNamedAfterPerHiveReaderSubject
&& lib.any (
a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "'qr-other'" a.message
) hiveNamedAfterPerHiveReaderSubject.assertions;
}
{
# Without this the case above proves nothing: an arm that fires for every
# roster is not a guard, and `hives` is non-empty in both fixtures.
name = "a legal hive roster trips neither name guard";
ok = !(equalityGuardFired hiveNamesAllLegal) && !(fragmentGuardFired hiveNamesAllLegal);
}
{
# The substring guard came along in the move and has to still work.
# `h1-agent` mints exactly the client id hive `h1`'s agents present.
name = "a hive name containing a composed-identifier word is refused, with the collector off";
ok = fragmentGuardFired hiveNameWithComposedWord;
}
{
# ⚠️ The control that makes "with the collector off" mean anything. If a
# fixture silently had swarm-otel enabled, all three cases above would
# pass while testing the arrangement they exist to rule out.
name = "the guard fixtures really do have the collector disabled";
ok =
!hiveNamedAfterCertSubject.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-otel.enable
&& !hiveNamesAllLegal.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-otel.enable
&& !hiveNameWithComposedWord.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-otel.enable;
}
];
in
runGroup "name-guards" cases