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Nothing in the gate read doc-comments: clippy doesn't check intra-doc links, cargo test doesn't, and no check built docs. So a [`Foo`] pointing at a renamed, moved or deleted item rendered as plain text and had no discoverer but a human happening to read the comment. That matters here more than in most repos, because the convention is to put a thing's authoritative description in one doc-comment and point at it from everywhere else -- the design leans on the pointers being real, and a dangling link is worse than no link since it names something and sends the reader looking. Adds `docs-rustdoc` to nix/checks.nix: craneLib.cargoDoc over --workspace --no-deps --document-private-items, denying six rustdoc lints. Listed explicitly rather than -D warnings so a new lint appearing upstream cannot red the build on a class nobody has triaged. --document-private-items is load-bearing rather than thoroughness for its own sake: most of this workspace's doc-comments live on private items and //! module headers, so without it rustdoc checks a small fraction of the links and the gate sits green while the rot continues. Then fixes every error it reports, 40 to 0 across nine crates. The classes differ and so do the fixes: - public item, wrong scope -> qualify. Node and Node::parent are both public; the link failed only because scheduler.rs does not import Node. Six sites become [`crate::Node::parent`]. - private item -> downgrade to backticks. Nothing was made public to satisfy a lint; changing API surface to appease a doc check would be the tail wagging the dog. - genuinely dead -> [`JobBuilder::insert_into`] names a method that does not exist. Insertion is Scheduler::insert_job. - prose that looks like markup -> argv[0] parsed as a link, and <args>/<hex>/<name> parsed as HTML tags. Note for future fixes: pub(crate) resolves in an intra-doc link, a plain private fn in a binary crate does not (wait_for_nodes resolved, connect_hint did not, same crate, same shape). The check does not ride the clippy/test artifact cache. It takes cargoArtifacts, but rustdoc needs its own flavour of dependency metadata, which cargo build does not produce, so a --no-deps docs build still compiles dependencies it never documents. Measured at 6m47s cold; that reasoning is recorded in the check's own comment so the next reader does not re-derive it. Verified by running the check's exact command against the pre-cleanup tree first: 40 errors, build failed. A gate that cannot fail is not evidence, and building it before the cleanup makes that proof free. |
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| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
hive-sock-client
One JSON-line-over-unix-socket client, shared by every daemon that speaks to a hyperhive socket.
The wire protocol is the same everywhere: connect, write one line of JSON, read one line of JSON back. Before this crate existed, five daemons each carried their own copy of that — two of them byte-identical — and the retry, response-handling and error-context behaviour drifted between them.
The crate is generic over the request and response types, so it is protocol-agnostic: the host-served control socket and the harness's in-agent socket both use it, with their own wire-type crates.
Shapes
request/request_retried— write, then decode the response line.request_retriedadditionally reports how many retries it took, for callers (MCP tool handlers) that want to tell the model a socket flake happened so it doesn't retry at the LLM level.notify— write, half-close, drain the response line and discard it. For fire-and-forget ops where the reply carries nothing the caller acts on. The drain is not optional: without it the server's write-back lands on a closed socket.
Retry is a policy value, not a fork
Retry::RideOutRestart backs off 2/4/8/16/30s (60s total), sized to ride
out a service restart. It is for callers with no natural retry of their
own — a stall there costs a surfaced tool error and the tokens to handle
it.
Retry::None fails fast. It is for callers already inside a poll loop,
where the poll interval is the retry and a second backoff would only
stack sleeps and delay the rest of the batch.
Two named policies, not a configurable schedule: nobody needs a third yet, and naming them keeps the reason for the choice at the call site.
Error contract
Errors always name the socket path. That detail is load-bearing: a permission problem on a socket that reads as "is the daemon running?" sends the operator to fix the wrong thing.
A refused or missing socket additionally gets a "may be restarting" hint, and an exhausted retry schedule records how long it tried, so a surfaced error reads as the likely transient it usually is.
Serialisation and deserialisation failures are never retried — retrying identical bytes reproduces the same failure. They are raised outside the retry loop, so only connect/IO/short-read failures ever reach it.