e9cec0da21
Every unit that writes a bao policy or cert-auth role ran only while the operator-placed bootstrap token existed, and skipped silently otherwise. The token lives 24h, so on any real swarm a PR adding or changing a grant deployed with its unit skipped, and each one needed a manual token refresh (plus a root `bao policy write` when it added a path). A `bao-granter` principal now writes them. Its leaf is minted by swarm-bao-pki on the store host (0600 root, never copied off it), and its policy covers `swarm-*` policies, `swarm-*` cert-auth roles and `pki/roles/swarm-*` by glob, plus the mount and services-root paths the controller's unit already used. All ten granting units (controller, secret-publisher, matrix-ctl, matrix-token, queue-agent, grafana-oidc, otel-oidc, forwarder-oidc, services-issuer, nats-tls) log in with it instead of reading the token. They keep the 2880 x 30s retry, now require swarm-bao-pki, and when the store refuses the granter they fail and print the one-time step instead of skipping. swarm-bao-granter-role is the one unit left on the token. It enables the auth mounts (moved out of the controller's unit) and writes the granter's own policy and role. The bootstrap policy is renamed `bao-bootstrap` and shrinks to those five stanzas; it is shipped at /etc/hyperhive/bao-bootstrap-policy.hcl. The old name `swarm-bootstrap` matched the granter's own `swarm-*` glob. The granter's CN joins certAuthCns, so no hive can be named into its role. An assertion keeps both pki role names under `swarm-`. With no client CA the granting units no longer render, and a warning says so. module-eval pins the granter's policy stanza by stanza, what it cannot reach, that every call a granting unit makes is granted, and that only swarm-bao-granter-role reads the token. Refs #4704
1139 lines
49 KiB
Nix
1139 lines
49 KiB
Nix
# `checks.module-eval-bao-grants` — see ./lib.nix for the shared
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# rationale (why this suite exists, naming convention, "evaluates
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# not executes").
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{
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pkgs,
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lib,
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self,
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nixosSystem,
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}:
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let
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inherit
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(import ./lib.nix {
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inherit
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pkgs
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lib
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self
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nixosSystem
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;
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})
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hive
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runGroup
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;
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# The store, plus a placed bootstrap token: the only shape in which the
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# granter's own role can be written at all.
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baoGrantHere = hive {
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deploy.bao.enable = true;
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deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile = "/run/secrets/bao-bootstrap.token";
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};
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# The credential without the store. Writing the first grant is a store-side
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# operation, so a host holding only the token has nothing to do — and this
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# is the arm that separates "an operator placed a token" from "this box can
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# act on it".
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baoGrantNoStore = hive {
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deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile = "/run/secrets/bao-bootstrap.token";
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};
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# The store with no bootstrap token: the steady state once the granter is set
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# up, and the state of a store host that has never named one.
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baoGranterNoToken = hive {
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deploy.bao.enable = true;
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};
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# The store with the granter's pair taken away: the deployment that writes
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# its grants some other way.
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baoGranterOptOut = hive {
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deploy.bao.enable = true;
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deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile = "/run/secrets/bao-bootstrap.token";
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deploy.bao.granterClientCertFile = lib.mkForce null;
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deploy.bao.granterClientKeyFile = lib.mkForce null;
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};
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# A pki role the granter's `roles/swarm-*` does not reach.
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baoGranterOddPkiRole = hive {
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deploy.bao.enable = true;
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deploy.bao.natsPkiRoleName = "queue";
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};
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# The store and the token, with no CA to trust. `mkForce` because the PKI
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# glue supplies one by default here — this is the deployment that brings its
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# own certificates and has not named the authority yet, in which nothing can
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# log in as the granter.
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baoGrantNoClientCa = hive {
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deploy.bao.enable = true;
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deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile = "/run/secrets/bao-bootstrap.token";
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deploy.bao.clientCaFile = lib.mkForce null;
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};
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# The store plus every one of the four readers that used to log in as the
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# hive. One fixture rather than four: the claim they are four *separate*
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# principals is only testable where all four render at once — that is the
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# deployment in which two of them sharing a leaf would be invisible.
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baoGrantWithConsumers = hive {
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deploy.bao.enable = true;
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deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile = "/run/secrets/bao-bootstrap.token";
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deploy.matrix.enable = true;
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deploy.grafana.enable = true;
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deploy.swarm-otel.enable = true;
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};
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# The store with none of the four readers beside it. Grafana, the collector and
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# the homeserver are simply off; the queue reader renders on any host holding
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# its leaf, which ./glue-bao-tls.nix mints here, so that leaf is taken away.
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baoGrantNoReaders = hive {
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deploy.bao.enable = true;
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deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile = "/run/secrets/bao-bootstrap.token";
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deploy.bao.queueAgentClientCertFile = lib.mkForce null;
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deploy.bao.queueAgentClientKeyFile = lib.mkForce null;
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};
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# The store with the forwarder's own pair taken away. The forwarder renders
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# wherever the store does, so this is the deployment the assertion refuses.
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baoNoForwarderIdentity = hive {
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deploy.bao.enable = true;
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deploy.bao.forwarderOidcClientCertFile = lib.mkForce null;
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deploy.bao.forwarderOidcClientKeyFile = lib.mkForce null;
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};
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# All four readers against a store they do not run, each with a leaf placed
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# by hand. The deployment in which there is no local policy unit to wait for.
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baoRemoteReaders = hive {
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deploy.matrix.enable = true;
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deploy.grafana.enable = true;
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deploy.swarm-otel.enable = true;
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deploy.bao.clientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client.pem";
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deploy.bao.clientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client-key.pem";
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deploy.bao.matrixTokenClientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-matrix-token.pem";
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deploy.bao.matrixTokenClientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-matrix-token-key.pem";
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deploy.bao.queueAgentClientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-queue-agent.pem";
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deploy.bao.queueAgentClientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-queue-agent-key.pem";
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deploy.bao.grafanaOidcClientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-grafana-oidc.pem";
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deploy.bao.grafanaOidcClientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-grafana-oidc-key.pem";
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deploy.bao.otelOidcClientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-otel-oidc.pem";
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deploy.bao.otelOidcClientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-otel-oidc-key.pem";
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};
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# The four readers ./glue-bao-readers-policy-order.nix orders after their
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# policy units.
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policyReaders = [
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"swarm-bao-matrix-token"
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"swarm-bao-queue-agent"
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"swarm-bao-grafana-oidc"
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"swarm-bao-otel-oidc"
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];
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# Two credentials write grants, and each is checked against what the units
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# holding it actually call. The bootstrap token's policy is read from the
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# file the operator writes it from (../../docs/getting-started/setup.md
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# points there); the granter's from the unit that writes it. Units are found
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# by the credential they read rather than by name, so a new one is checked
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# without anyone listing it here.
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bootstrapTokenFile = "/run/secrets/bao-bootstrap.token";
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# The READ, not the path: every granting unit prints the path in the
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# one-time step it shows when the granter is refused.
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bootstrapUnits = lib.filterAttrs (
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_: u: lib.hasInfix "cat ${lib.escapeShellArg bootstrapTokenFile}" u.script
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) baoGrantWithConsumers.systemd.services;
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# The pair ./glue-bao-tls.nix defaults on a store host.
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granterCertFile = "/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/granter.pem";
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granterKeyFile = "/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/granter-key.pem";
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granterUnits = lib.filterAttrs (
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_: u: (u.environment.BAO_CLIENT_CERT or null) == granterCertFile
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) baoGrantWithConsumers.systemd.services;
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# The ten units that write a `swarm-*` grant, by name, for the discovery
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# control below.
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grantingUnitNames = [
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"swarm-bao-controller-policy"
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"swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy"
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"swarm-bao-matrix-ctl-policy"
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"swarm-bao-matrix-token-policy"
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"swarm-bao-queue-agent-policy"
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"swarm-bao-grafana-oidc-policy"
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"swarm-bao-otel-oidc-policy"
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"swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc-policy"
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"swarm-bao-services-issuer-policy"
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"swarm-bao-nats-tls-policy"
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];
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# Comment lines dropped first: both the HCL and the scripts explain
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# themselves in prose that names paths and `bao` commands.
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codeLines =
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text: lib.filter (l: builtins.match "[[:space:]]*#.*" l == null) (lib.splitString "\n" text);
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bootstrapPolicyText = lib.concatStringsSep "\n" (
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codeLines (builtins.readFile ../host-modules/bao-bootstrap-policy.hcl)
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);
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# The granter's HCL is the only policy text in the unit that writes it.
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granterPolicyText = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-granter-role.script;
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matches = re: text: lib.filter lib.isList (builtins.split re text);
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grantsIn =
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text:
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map
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(m: {
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path = lib.elemAt m 0;
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caps = map lib.head (matches ''"([a-z]+)"'' (lib.elemAt m 1));
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})
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(
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matches ''path "([^"]+)"[[:space:]]*[{][[:space:]]*capabilities[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*[[]([a-z", ]*)'' text
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);
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bootstrapGrants = grantsIn bootstrapPolicyText;
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granterGrants = grantsIn granterPolicyText;
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# One `bao …` invocation → the path and capabilities it needs, as
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# `bao <cmd> -output-policy` reports them. Path-specific `sudo` (bao's
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# root-protected paths, e.g. `pki/root` for a delete) does not follow from
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# the verb, so only `auth enable` is checked for it. A verb not listed here
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# needs a path no grant has, so it fails the case until it is taught.
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baoCallNeeds =
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words:
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let
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flags = lib.filter (lib.hasPrefix "-") words;
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args = lib.filter (w: !(lib.hasPrefix "-" w) && w != "\\") words;
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a = i: if i < lib.length args then lib.elemAt args i else "";
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need = path: caps: {
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inherit path caps;
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call = lib.concatStringsSep " " words;
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};
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cu = [
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"create"
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"update"
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];
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in
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# A login and a seal-status check are unauthenticated: no policy grants them.
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if a 0 == "login" || a 0 == "status" then
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null
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else if a 0 == "policy" && a 1 == "write" then
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need "sys/policies/acl/${a 2}" cu
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else if a 0 == "secrets" && a 1 == "list" then
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need "sys/mounts" [ "read" ]
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else if a 0 == "secrets" && a 1 == "enable" then
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need "sys/mounts/${lib.removePrefix "-path=" (lib.findFirst (lib.hasPrefix "-path=") "-path=${a 2}" flags)}" cu
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else if a 0 == "secrets" && a 1 == "tune" then
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need "sys/mounts/${a 2}/tune" cu
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else if a 0 == "auth" && a 1 == "list" then
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need "sys/auth" [ "read" ]
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else if a 0 == "auth" && a 1 == "enable" then
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need "sys/auth/${a 2}" (cu ++ [ "sudo" ])
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else if a 0 == "write" then
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need (a 1) cu
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else if a 0 == "read" then
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need (a 1) [ "read" ]
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else if a 0 == "list" then
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need (a 1) [ "list" ]
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else if a 0 == "delete" then
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need (a 1) [ "delete" ]
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else
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need "unrecognised call" [ ];
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baoCalls =
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script:
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lib.filter (n: n != null) (
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map
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(
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inv:
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baoCallNeeds (lib.filter (w: w != "") (lib.splitString " " (lib.replaceStrings [ "'" ] [ "" ] inv)))
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)
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(
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lib.concatMap (l: map (m: lib.elemAt m 1) (matches "(^[[:space:]]*|[$][(]|[)] )bao ([^|;)]*)" l)) (
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codeLines script
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)
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)
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);
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# bao's own rule (vault/policy/acl.go): an exact path wins, otherwise the
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# longest glob prefix, and a trailing `*` is a plain string prefix.
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grantFor =
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grants: path:
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let
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exact = lib.filter (g: g.path == path) grants;
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globs = lib.filter (
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g: lib.hasSuffix "*" g.path && lib.hasPrefix (lib.removeSuffix "*" g.path) path
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) grants;
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in
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if exact != [ ] then
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lib.head exact
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else
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lib.foldl' (
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best: g: if best == null || lib.stringLength g.path > lib.stringLength best.path then g else best
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) null globs;
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ungranted =
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grants: units:
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lib.concatLists (
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lib.mapAttrsToList (
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unit: u:
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map (n: "${unit}: `bao ${n.call}` needs ${n.path} [${toString n.caps}]") (
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lib.filter (
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n:
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let
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g = grantFor grants n.path;
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in
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g == null || !(lib.all (c: lib.elem c g.caps) n.caps)
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) (baoCalls u.script)
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)
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) units
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);
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bootstrapUngranted = ungranted bootstrapGrants bootstrapUnits;
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granterUngranted = ungranted granterGrants granterUnits;
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cases = [
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{
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|
# Reads the rendered unit on the HOST, which is where the write happens:
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# every API listener demands a client certificate, and the host is the
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# side that has one.
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name = "a store host renders the granting unit on the host, logging in as the granter";
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ok =
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let
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u = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy;
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in
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u.environment.BAO_CLIENT_CERT == granterCertFile
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&& u.environment.BAO_CLIENT_KEY == granterKeyFile
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&& lib.hasInfix "bao login -method=cert -token-only" u.script
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&& !(u.unitConfig ? ConditionPathExists);
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|
}
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{
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|
# The move is the fix, so pin the side it landed on: in the container it
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# had no identity to open a connection with, and no address that resolved
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# to the store from its own netns.
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name = "the granting unit is not rendered inside the store's container";
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ok = !(baoGrantHere.containers.swarm-bao.config.systemd.services ? swarm-bao-controller-policy);
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}
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{
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# `StartLimit*` are `[Unit]` settings that systemd ignores under
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# `[Service]`, so a bound written into `serviceConfig` renders, deploys
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# and does nothing. Asserted where nixpkgs puts it rather than where it
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# was written. The values are pinned because they are the bound: under
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# `shamir` a human unseals by hand, and anything shorter than a day gives
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# up first — `start-limit-hit` does not self-heal.
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name = "the granting unit's start limit lands in [Unit], not [Service]";
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ok =
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let
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u = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy;
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in
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toString u.unitConfig.StartLimitBurst == "2880"
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&& toString u.unitConfig.StartLimitIntervalSec == "90000"
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&& !(u.serviceConfig ? StartLimitBurst);
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}
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{
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# The grants themselves, and the `hive-` prefix is the whole point:
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# without it the controller can rewrite the policy that constrains it,
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# which is a privilege escalation that renders, deploys and looks fine.
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# Readable here only because the HCL is piped as an argument rather than
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# written to a store path.
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name = "the controller's bao grants cannot reach the policy that constrains it";
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ok =
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let
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s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy.script;
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in
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lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl/hive-*" s && !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl/*" s);
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|
}
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|
{
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|
# Same host-side reasoning as the controller's granting unit above: the
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# write needs a client certificate and the host is the side that has one.
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name = "a store host renders the publisher's granting unit too, logging in as the granter";
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ok =
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let
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u = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy;
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in
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u.environment.BAO_CLIENT_CERT == granterCertFile && lib.hasInfix "swarm-secret-publisher" u.script;
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|
}
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{
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|
# The control for the case above, and the same one the controller's unit
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|
# has: rendered on the host means NOT rendered in the container, where it
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# would have neither an identity nor a route to the store.
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name = "the publisher's granting unit is not rendered inside the store's container";
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|
ok =
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|
!(baoGrantHere.containers.swarm-bao.config.systemd.services ? swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy);
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|
}
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|
{
|
|
# The whole point of a second principal. The two prefixes it publishes to
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|
# and not `swarm/`, so it cannot touch an agent's credentials; and no
|
|
# `read`, so a unit whose job is copying a file cannot recover what is
|
|
# already there. Pinned as the full capability list per prefix, because an
|
|
# added capability is exactly what a presence check misses.
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|
name = "the publisher's grant is write-only and reaches the hive and service prefixes alone";
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|
ok =
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|
let
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|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy.script;
|
|
in
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|
lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/hives/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"update\"]" s
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|
&& lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/services/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"update\"]" s
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|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents" s)
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|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/*" s)
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|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl" s);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The ordering is load-bearing and invisible at runtime: the controller's
|
|
# unit creates the KV and cert-auth mounts this one writes into, so
|
|
# without it a cold boot races and fails with "route entry not found",
|
|
# which names neither unit.
|
|
name = "the publisher's granting unit is ordered after the one that creates the mounts";
|
|
ok = lib.elem "swarm-bao-controller-policy.service" (
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|
baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy.after
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|
);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The third principal's grant, and the narrowest of the three: ONE path,
|
|
# spelled to the leaf. The negative arms are the property — a homeserver
|
|
# is not entitled to overwrite Grafana's OIDC client, so widening this to
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|
# the `services/` prefix the publisher holds would be a real loss even
|
|
# though it would read as tidier.
|
|
#
|
|
# ⚠️ `hives` is PLURAL, because the path segment comes from
|
|
# `Kind::Hive`'s strum serialisation and not from `Kind::label`, which
|
|
# renders the singular for error text. The singular spelling evaluates,
|
|
# deploys, and 403s every read with "permission denied" and nothing else.
|
|
#
|
|
# 🩸 The hive NAME in the middle is the per-hive half of this credential:
|
|
# the token used to be one swarm-wide value under `services/matrix/`,
|
|
# which every hive's own policy granted read on. The negative arms below
|
|
# are what keep it from drifting back — neither the `services/*` tree nor
|
|
# a `hives/*` wildcard may appear, since either one hands matrix-ctl (or
|
|
# a hive) reach beyond the single leaf it owns.
|
|
#
|
|
# The one other leaf is the swarm appservice token, which matrix-ctl
|
|
# mints and publishes for the controller. Counted, so a third stanza
|
|
# fails rather than riding along beside two correct ones.
|
|
name = "matrix-ctl's grant is one hive's sender token and the swarm appservice token, nothing else";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-matrix-ctl-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/hives/h1/matrix/sender-token\" {" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"update\", \"read\"]\n}" s
|
|
&& lib.length (lib.splitString "path \"" s) == 3
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/services" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives/*" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl" s);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# 🩸 `read` is load-bearing here, and the publisher — the one sibling
|
|
# that still has no `read` — shows what its absence costs. matrix-ctl's
|
|
# first act is to read this path back and stop if something is there —
|
|
# that read IS "and only once", so without the capability every container
|
|
# restart would mint a second access token and invalidate the hive's.
|
|
# (The controller holds `read` for the same idempotency reason, on the
|
|
# agent prefix.)
|
|
name = "matrix-ctl may read back the one path it writes";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-matrix-ctl-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "capabilities = [\"create\", \"update\", \"read\"]" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "auth/cert/certs/swarm-matrix-ctl" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "allowed_common_names=swarm-matrix-ctl" s;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Same two controls its siblings carry: ordered after the unit that makes
|
|
# the mounts it writes into, and rendered on the HOST rather than inside
|
|
# the store's container, where it would have neither an identity nor a
|
|
# route to the store.
|
|
name = "matrix-ctl's granting unit is ordered after the mounts and rendered on the host";
|
|
ok =
|
|
lib.elem "swarm-bao-controller-policy.service" (
|
|
baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-matrix-ctl-policy.after
|
|
)
|
|
&& !(baoGrantHere.containers.swarm-bao.config.systemd.services ? swarm-bao-matrix-ctl-policy);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ── the four readers that used to share the hive's own leaf ──────────────
|
|
#
|
|
# 🩸 Until this split all four presented `deploy.bao.clientCertFile`, whose
|
|
# policy grants read on `swarm/agents/*`, `swarm/hives/<hive>/*` AND
|
|
# `swarm/services/*`. Four principals behind one certificate are one
|
|
# principal to bao, so the only expressible grant was the union: the unit
|
|
# fetching Grafana's OIDC secret could fetch every agent credential in the
|
|
# swarm.
|
|
#
|
|
# Every one of these cases carries the same three negative arms, and they
|
|
# are the deliverable rather than decoration — a positive arm alone passes
|
|
# just as well when the other two stanzas are still there beside it. The
|
|
# arms pin what each principal must NOT reach, so a later widening fails
|
|
# here instead of being noticed in a store.
|
|
{
|
|
name = "the matrix-token reader's grant is one hive's appservice token and nothing else";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-matrix-token-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/hives/h1/matrix/appservice-token\" {" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "capabilities = [\"read\"]" s
|
|
# The three stanzas the hive's own leaf carried, none of which this
|
|
# principal needs: every agent's credential, every service's OIDC
|
|
# client, and the rest of its own hive's tree — including the queue
|
|
# credential its sibling reader fetches.
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/services" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives/h1/*" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives/h1/queue" s)
|
|
# A `hives/*` wildcard would serve every hive from one role and let any
|
|
# hive read any other's token — the reach this split exists to remove,
|
|
# not to create.
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives/*" s)
|
|
# Nothing may rewrite the policy constraining it, for the reason the
|
|
# controller's own `hive-*` narrowing above gives.
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl" s);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
name = "the queue-credential reader's grant is one hive's queue credential and nothing else";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-queue-agent-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/hives/h1/queue/agent\" {" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "capabilities = [\"read\"]" s
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/services" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives/h1/*" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives/h1/matrix" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives/*" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl" s);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# ⚠️ The client id is the path segment, so the negative arm that matters
|
|
# for this one is the OTHER service's: `services/*` would have granted
|
|
# both, and the two are separate principals precisely because a
|
|
# dashboard is not entitled to a collector's credential.
|
|
name = "the Grafana OIDC reader's grant is Grafana's own client secret and nothing else";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-grafana-oidc-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/services/swarm-grafana/oidc/client\" {" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "capabilities = [\"read\"]" s
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/services/*" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "swarm-collector" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl" s);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The mirror of the case above, and the arm naming `swarm-grafana` is why
|
|
# these are two principals rather than one `services/*` grant shared.
|
|
name = "the collector OIDC reader's grant is the collector's own client secret and nothing else";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-otel-oidc-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/services/swarm-collector/oidc/client\" {" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "capabilities = [\"read\"]" s
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/services/*" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "swarm-grafana" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl" s);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The fifth, and the one that stayed on the hive's leaf longest: the
|
|
# store's own forwarder. Its client id is `swarm-bao-collector`, so the
|
|
# arm naming `swarm-collector/` is the swarm collector's secret, which
|
|
# this principal is not entitled to.
|
|
name = "the store forwarder's OIDC reader's grant is its own client secret and nothing else";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/services/swarm-bao-collector/oidc/client\" {" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "capabilities = [\"read\"]" s
|
|
&& lib.length (lib.filter lib.isList (builtins.split "path \"" s)) == 1
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/services/*" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "services/swarm-collector/" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "swarm-grafana" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl" s);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# 🩸 The half that makes the policies above bind: a policy grants only
|
|
# through a token that carries it, and a token is minted by a cert-auth
|
|
# role matching a CN. Four distinct subjects is the whole mechanism — one
|
|
# subject for four readers is one principal however the policies read.
|
|
#
|
|
# The per-hive subjects carry the hive name because their paths do; the
|
|
# two service subjects do not, because an OIDC client is registered once
|
|
# per swarm. Pinned so neither shape is tidied into the other.
|
|
name = "each of the five readers logs in under a subject of its own";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
subjectOf =
|
|
unit: role: cn:
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.${unit}.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "auth/cert/certs/${role}" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "allowed_common_names=${cn}" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "token_policies=${role}" s
|
|
# Outside the `hive-*` namespace the controller may rewrite, for
|
|
# the reason the three service principals above state.
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "auth/cert/certs/hive-" s);
|
|
in
|
|
subjectOf "swarm-bao-matrix-token-policy" "swarm-matrix-token-h1" "swarm-bao-matrix-token-h1"
|
|
&& subjectOf "swarm-bao-queue-agent-policy" "swarm-queue-agent-h1" "swarm-bao-queue-agent-h1"
|
|
&& subjectOf "swarm-bao-grafana-oidc-policy" "swarm-grafana-oidc" "swarm-bao-grafana-oidc"
|
|
&& subjectOf "swarm-bao-otel-oidc-policy" "swarm-otel-oidc" "swarm-bao-otel-oidc"
|
|
&& subjectOf "swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc-policy" "swarm-forwarder-oidc" "swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc";
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# 🩸 The consuming side, and the arm that would catch the regression that
|
|
# costs the most: a unit repointed back at `deploy.bao.clientCertFile`
|
|
# evaluates, deploys and logs in — and silently restores the union grant,
|
|
# because bao would again see one principal. Nothing about the policies
|
|
# above would look wrong.
|
|
#
|
|
# Each pair is asserted whole: a certificate with no key authenticates
|
|
# nothing, so a half-set pair is a reader that does not render.
|
|
name = "each of the five readers presents its own leaf, never the hive's";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
b = baoGrantWithConsumers.services.hyperhive.deploy.bao;
|
|
hiveLeaf = [
|
|
b.clientCertFile
|
|
b.clientKeyFile
|
|
];
|
|
own = [
|
|
b.matrixTokenClientCertFile
|
|
b.matrixTokenClientKeyFile
|
|
b.queueAgentClientCertFile
|
|
b.queueAgentClientKeyFile
|
|
b.grafanaOidcClientCertFile
|
|
b.grafanaOidcClientKeyFile
|
|
b.otelOidcClientCertFile
|
|
b.otelOidcClientKeyFile
|
|
b.forwarderOidcClientCertFile
|
|
b.forwarderOidcClientKeyFile
|
|
];
|
|
envOf = unit: baoGrantWithConsumers.systemd.services.${unit}.environment;
|
|
presents =
|
|
unit: cert: key:
|
|
(envOf unit).BAO_CLIENT_CERT == cert && (envOf unit).BAO_CLIENT_KEY == key;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.all (p: p != null) own
|
|
&& !(lib.any (p: lib.elem p hiveLeaf) own)
|
|
&& lib.length (lib.unique own) == lib.length own
|
|
&& presents "swarm-bao-matrix-token" b.matrixTokenClientCertFile b.matrixTokenClientKeyFile
|
|
&& presents "swarm-bao-queue-agent" b.queueAgentClientCertFile b.queueAgentClientKeyFile
|
|
&& presents "swarm-bao-grafana-oidc" b.grafanaOidcClientCertFile b.grafanaOidcClientKeyFile
|
|
&& presents "swarm-bao-otel-oidc" b.otelOidcClientCertFile b.otelOidcClientKeyFile
|
|
&& presents "swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc" b.forwarderOidcClientCertFile b.forwarderOidcClientKeyFile;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The minting side of the same claim. A role matching a subject nothing
|
|
# signs is a reader that cannot log in, so the leaves and the roles have
|
|
# to be asserted against each other — and the two per-hive leaves carry
|
|
# THIS host's hive name, which is what makes one hive's leaf useless
|
|
# against another hive's role.
|
|
name = "the PKI unit signs a leaf per reader, each under that reader's own subject";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-pki.script;
|
|
in
|
|
# The basename and the subject are matched separately: `signLeaf` takes
|
|
# them as consecutive arguments across a `\` continuation, so one
|
|
# literal spanning both would pin this file's line wrapping rather than
|
|
# the pairing it means to.
|
|
lib.all (lib.flip lib.hasInfix s) [
|
|
"/matrix-token.pem ]"
|
|
"swarm-bao-matrix-token-h1 \"\" clientAuth"
|
|
"/queue-agent.pem ]"
|
|
"swarm-bao-queue-agent-h1 \"\" clientAuth"
|
|
"/grafana-oidc.pem ]"
|
|
"swarm-bao-grafana-oidc \"\" clientAuth"
|
|
"/otel-oidc.pem ]"
|
|
"swarm-bao-otel-oidc \"\" clientAuth"
|
|
"/forwarder-oidc.pem ]"
|
|
"swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc \"\" clientAuth"
|
|
];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The absence arm: with no client CA there is no trust anchor, so no
|
|
# role can be written and nothing can log in as the granter. The units
|
|
# are gone, so the deployment has to say so itself.
|
|
name = "with no client CA no granting unit renders, and the deployment warns";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantNoClientCa.systemd.services;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.all (unit: !(s ? ${unit})) (grantingUnitNames ++ [ "swarm-bao-granter-role" ])
|
|
&& lib.any (lib.hasInfix "services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.clientCaFile is null") baoGrantNoClientCa.warnings
|
|
# The control: a store with a CA does not warn.
|
|
&& !(lib.any (lib.hasInfix "clientCaFile is null") baoGrantHere.warnings);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Same control the three service principals carry: the write needs a
|
|
# client certificate and the host is the side that has one, so a unit
|
|
# rendered inside the store's container would have neither an identity
|
|
# nor a route. Plus the ordering that makes the mounts exist first.
|
|
name = "the five readers' granting units are ordered after the mounts and rendered on the host";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
units = [
|
|
"swarm-bao-matrix-token-policy"
|
|
"swarm-bao-queue-agent-policy"
|
|
"swarm-bao-grafana-oidc-policy"
|
|
"swarm-bao-otel-oidc-policy"
|
|
"swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc-policy"
|
|
];
|
|
in
|
|
lib.all (
|
|
unit:
|
|
lib.elem "swarm-bao-controller-policy.service" baoGrantHere.systemd.services.${unit}.after
|
|
&& !(baoGrantHere.containers.swarm-bao.config.systemd.services ? ${unit})
|
|
) units;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The other end of those units: each reader logs in against the role its
|
|
# own policy unit writes, so it has to wait for that unit. Ordering and
|
|
# never a requirement: a failed policy unit still counts as done, and the
|
|
# reader's own retries carry it past that.
|
|
#
|
|
# The forwarder is listed apart from `policyReaders`: it renders wherever
|
|
# the store does, so it is never absent on a store host and never present
|
|
# on a remote one, and the two cases below would fail on it for that.
|
|
name = "each of the five readers is ordered after the unit writing its role";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantWithConsumers.systemd.services;
|
|
waitsFor =
|
|
reader:
|
|
let
|
|
policy = "${reader}-policy.service";
|
|
in
|
|
lib.elem policy s.${reader}.after
|
|
&& lib.elem policy s.${reader}.wants
|
|
&& !(lib.elem policy s.${reader}.requires);
|
|
in
|
|
lib.all waitsFor (policyReaders ++ [ "swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc" ]);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The ordering is set apart from each reader's own definition, so it can
|
|
# define a reader by itself: `after` on a unit nothing else declares is a
|
|
# unit with no ExecStart. On the store's host without the readers, none
|
|
# of the four may exist.
|
|
name = "a store host without the readers gains no reader unit from their ordering";
|
|
ok = lib.all (reader: !(baoGrantNoReaders.systemd.services ? ${reader})) policyReaders;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Where the store is remote there is no policy unit here to wait for, so
|
|
# the readers render as they did before the ordering existed.
|
|
name = "a reader whose store is remote is not ordered after a policy unit";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoRemoteReaders.systemd.services;
|
|
unordered =
|
|
reader:
|
|
let
|
|
policy = "${reader}-policy.service";
|
|
in
|
|
s ? ${reader} && !(lib.elem policy s.${reader}.after) && !(lib.elem policy s.${reader}.wants);
|
|
in
|
|
lib.all unordered policyReaders;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# A store host without the granter's pair writes its grants some other
|
|
# way, so none of the ten units may exist. Without this arm
|
|
# `lib.mkIf haveGranter` could be dropped from any of them and every other
|
|
# case here would still pass.
|
|
name = "without the granter's pair none of the ten granting units render";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGranterOptOut.systemd.services;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.all (unit: !(s ? ${unit})) (grantingUnitNames ++ [ "swarm-bao-granter-role" ])
|
|
# The control: the same store with the pair renders all ten.
|
|
&& lib.all (unit: baoGrantHere.systemd.services ? ${unit}) grantingUnitNames;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# 🩸 What replaced the silent skip. With no bootstrap token the ten still
|
|
# render, and a refused granter fails them with the step that fixes it.
|
|
# A store host that never named a token is told to name one, since the
|
|
# unit that sets the granter up renders only where it has.
|
|
name = "a store host without a bootstrap token renders the ten, each failing loudly with the one-time step";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGranterNoToken.systemd.services;
|
|
loud =
|
|
unit:
|
|
s ? ${unit}
|
|
&&
|
|
lib.hasInfix "bao policy write bao-bootstrap /etc/hyperhive/bao-bootstrap-policy.hcl"
|
|
s.${unit}.script
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "set services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.bootstrapTokenFile" s.${unit}.script
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "exit 1" s.${unit}.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.all loud grantingUnitNames && !(s ? swarm-bao-granter-role);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Where the token is named, the step names the file to put it in and the
|
|
# unit to restart.
|
|
name = "with a bootstrap token named, the one-time step places it and restarts the granter's unit";
|
|
ok = lib.all (
|
|
unit:
|
|
let
|
|
sc = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.${unit}.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "install -D -m 0600 /dev/stdin /run/secrets/bao-bootstrap.token" sc
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "systemctl restart swarm-bao-granter-role" sc
|
|
) grantingUnitNames;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Every granting unit retries a sealed or late store for a day, in the
|
|
# `[Unit]` section systemd reads it from, and waits for the unit that
|
|
# mints the granter's leaf.
|
|
name = "each granting unit requires the PKI unit and retries 2880 times at 30s";
|
|
ok = lib.all (
|
|
unit:
|
|
let
|
|
u = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.${unit};
|
|
in
|
|
lib.elem "swarm-bao-pki.service" u.requires
|
|
&& lib.elem "swarm-bao-pki.service" u.after
|
|
&& lib.elem "swarm-bao-granter-role.service" u.after
|
|
&& !(lib.elem "swarm-bao-granter-role.service" (u.requires ++ u.wants))
|
|
&& toString u.unitConfig.StartLimitBurst == "2880"
|
|
&& toString u.unitConfig.StartLimitIntervalSec == "90000"
|
|
&& toString u.serviceConfig.RestartSec == "30"
|
|
&& u.serviceConfig.Restart == "on-failure"
|
|
) grantingUnitNames;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The only unit left acting with the token, so the only one that may
|
|
# skip on it.
|
|
name = "no unit but the granter's role reads the bootstrap token or skips on it";
|
|
ok =
|
|
lib.attrNames bootstrapUnits == [ "swarm-bao-granter-role" ]
|
|
&& lib.all (u: !(u.unitConfig ? ConditionPathExists)) (lib.attrValues granterUnits)
|
|
&&
|
|
baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-granter-role.unitConfig.ConditionPathExists
|
|
== bootstrapTokenFile;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The granter's grants, whole. Pinned as the full list, because an added
|
|
# path or capability is exactly what a presence check misses.
|
|
name = "the granter's policy is exactly these eleven stanzas";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
cu = [
|
|
"create"
|
|
"update"
|
|
];
|
|
in
|
|
granterGrants == [
|
|
{
|
|
path = "sys/policies/acl/swarm-*";
|
|
caps = cu;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "auth/cert/certs/swarm-*";
|
|
caps = cu;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "pki/roles/swarm-*";
|
|
caps = cu;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "sys/mounts";
|
|
caps = [ "read" ];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "sys/mounts/secret";
|
|
caps = cu;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "sys/mounts/pki";
|
|
caps = cu;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "sys/mounts/pki/tune";
|
|
caps = cu;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "pki/issuers";
|
|
caps = [ "list" ];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "pki/cert/ca";
|
|
caps = [ "read" ];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "pki/root";
|
|
caps = [
|
|
"delete"
|
|
"sudo"
|
|
];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
path = "pki/root/generate/internal";
|
|
caps = cu;
|
|
}
|
|
];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Neither its own policy and role nor the bootstrap policy may be
|
|
# reachable, or the granter could rewrite what constrains it and what the
|
|
# next bootstrap token carries.
|
|
name = "the granter cannot reach the policy or role that constrains it, nor the bootstrap policy";
|
|
ok = lib.all (p: grantFor granterGrants p == null) [
|
|
"sys/policies/acl/bao-granter"
|
|
"auth/cert/certs/bao-granter"
|
|
"sys/policies/acl/bao-bootstrap"
|
|
];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Outside `swarm-*` and the store's own mounts it holds nothing: no
|
|
# hive's policy or role, no auth mount, no token, no secret.
|
|
name = "the granter grants nothing outside swarm-* and the store's own mounts";
|
|
ok =
|
|
lib.all (p: grantFor granterGrants p == null) [
|
|
"sys/policies/acl/hive-x"
|
|
"auth/cert/certs/hive-x"
|
|
"sys/auth"
|
|
"sys/auth/cert"
|
|
"sys/auth/x"
|
|
"auth/token/create"
|
|
"auth/token/create-orphan"
|
|
"secret/data/x"
|
|
"secret/data/swarm/agents/x/queue"
|
|
"sys/policies/acl/x"
|
|
"sys/policies/acl/root"
|
|
"pki/issue/swarm-services"
|
|
"pki/sign/swarm-services"
|
|
"*"
|
|
]
|
|
&& !(lib.any (
|
|
g:
|
|
lib.elem g.path [
|
|
"*"
|
|
"sys/policies/acl/*"
|
|
"auth/cert/certs/*"
|
|
"pki/roles/*"
|
|
]
|
|
) granterGrants);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Its names sit outside both globs that write grants — its own
|
|
# `swarm-*` and the controller's `hive-*`.
|
|
name = "the granter's own names are outside swarm-* and hive-*";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
sc = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-granter-role.script;
|
|
cn = baoGrantHere.services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.granterCommonName;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "bao policy write bao-granter -" sc
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "auth/cert/certs/bao-granter" sc
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "token_policies=bao-granter" sc
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "token_ttl=15m" sc
|
|
&& !(lib.hasPrefix "swarm-" cn)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasPrefix "hive-" cn);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The other principals are what they were: no unit but the granter's own
|
|
# hands its policy to a role, and none of them logs in as it.
|
|
name = "no other principal gains the granter's policy";
|
|
ok =
|
|
lib.all (u: !(lib.hasInfix "token_policies=bao-granter" u.script)) (
|
|
lib.attrValues (lib.removeAttrs baoGrantWithConsumers.systemd.services [ "swarm-bao-granter-role" ])
|
|
)
|
|
&& lib.all (u: (u.environment.BAO_CLIENT_CERT or null) != granterCertFile) (
|
|
lib.attrValues (lib.removeAttrs baoGrantWithConsumers.systemd.services grantingUnitNames)
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The minting side: a role matching a subject nothing signs is a
|
|
# granter that cannot log in.
|
|
name = "the PKI unit signs the granter's leaf under its own subject";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-pki.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "/granter.pem ]" s && lib.hasInfix "bao-granter \"\" clientAuth" s;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The granter writes pki roles through `roles/swarm-*` only, so a role
|
|
# named otherwise is refused at eval rather than 403'd at deploy.
|
|
name = "a pki role name outside swarm-* is refused, naming both options";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
names =
|
|
a:
|
|
lib.hasInfix "services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.servicesPkiRoleName" a.message
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.natsPkiRoleName" a.message;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.any (a: !a.assertion && names a) baoGranterOddPkiRole.assertions
|
|
&& !(lib.any (a: !a.assertion && names a) baoGrantHere.assertions);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# 🩸 The refusal half of the forwarder's own leaf. It renders wherever the
|
|
# store does and has no mode without a secret, so a null pair has one
|
|
# fallback left — the hive's leaf and its union grant. Refused at eval,
|
|
# with both options named.
|
|
name = "a store host without the forwarder's own pair is refused, naming both options";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
refused = lib.filter (a: !a.assertion) baoNoForwarderIdentity.assertions;
|
|
names =
|
|
a:
|
|
lib.hasInfix "services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.forwarderOidcClientCertFile" a.message
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.forwarderOidcClientKeyFile" a.message;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.any names refused
|
|
# The control: the same store with the pair in place trips no such
|
|
# assertion, so the arm above is not firing on every store host.
|
|
&& !(lib.any (a: !a.assertion && names a) baoGrantHere.assertions);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The policy authorising this route lives in another file, and nothing
|
|
# else relates the grants to the paths the code actually writes.
|
|
#
|
|
# `secret/data/` is KV v2's ACL prefix; `swarm` is
|
|
# `swarm_secret_client::path::ROOT` and `agents` is
|
|
# `Kind::Agent.as_str()`, both of which that crate pins in its own test.
|
|
#
|
|
# The grant is still the agent kind alone because nothing writes another
|
|
# one yet. It widens when a path outside `agents/` gains a writer, not
|
|
# when the kinds are declared.
|
|
name = "the controller may write agent credentials, and only under the agent prefix";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents/*" s
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/*" s)
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/*\"" s);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The exact list is the property, not an accident of how it was typed.
|
|
# `read` is in it because `mint_and_verify` reads a queue credential back
|
|
# before rewriting it; `list` is not, so the controller can fetch a
|
|
# credential only for an agent it was handed the name of, never enumerate
|
|
# the tree. Pinned as the whole capability list, because an added
|
|
# capability is exactly what a presence check misses.
|
|
name = "the controller's grant on agent credentials is create/read/update and nothing else";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\", \"update\"]" s;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The swarm appservice token is a homeserver-admin credential. The
|
|
# controller mints agents' accounts with it and has no business replacing
|
|
# it: matrix-ctl is its one writer. Pinned as the whole stanza, so an
|
|
# added capability fails.
|
|
name = "the controller reads the swarm appservice token and cannot write it";
|
|
ok = lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}" baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy.script;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Every role lives under a mount nothing else creates, and the granter
|
|
# holds no `sys/auth`, so the token-holding unit creates it — otherwise
|
|
# every certificate login fails against a path that is not there.
|
|
name = "the granter's role unit creates the cert auth mount, and the controller's unit writes its role";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy.script;
|
|
g = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-granter-role.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "bao auth enable cert" g
|
|
&& !(lib.hasInfix "bao auth enable" s)
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "auth/cert/certs/swarm-controller" s
|
|
&& lib.hasInfix "/var/lib/swarm-bao-tls/client-ca.pem" s;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# Same shape as the cert mount above, for the engine the controller
|
|
# writes credentials through: a fresh store has no `secret/`, so the
|
|
# grant would name a mount nobody created and the first write would 404.
|
|
#
|
|
# ⚠️ Matched on the COMMAND, for the reason the no-client-CA case below
|
|
# spells out: the policy text is embedded in this same script and grants
|
|
# `secret/data/...`, so any arm keyed on the *path* is satisfied either
|
|
# way and could never fail.
|
|
name = "the granting unit creates the KV mount the controller writes through";
|
|
ok =
|
|
let
|
|
s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy.script;
|
|
in
|
|
lib.hasInfix "bao secrets enable -path=secret kv-v2" s;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# What makes the granting-unit cases mean something, and the property
|
|
# the host-side half depends on: no store here, so no bind mount and no
|
|
# unit. Without it a hive that merely names a token would drag the
|
|
# store's container config into its evaluation.
|
|
name = "a bootstrap token on a host that runs no store grants nothing";
|
|
ok = !(baoGrantNoStore.systemd.services ? swarm-bao-bootstrap-dir);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The operator writes this policy by hand, so a call the token-holding
|
|
# unit makes and the file does not grant is a one-time step that fails.
|
|
# Failing names every ungranted call.
|
|
name =
|
|
"every bao call the bootstrap-token unit makes is granted by bao-bootstrap-policy.hcl"
|
|
+ lib.optionalString (bootstrapUngranted != [ ]) (
|
|
": " + lib.concatStringsSep "; " bootstrapUngranted
|
|
);
|
|
ok = bootstrapUngranted == [ ];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The same check for the granter: a grant a unit writes outside its
|
|
# globs is a 403 on deploy. Failing names every ungranted call.
|
|
name =
|
|
"every bao call a granting unit makes is granted by the granter's policy"
|
|
+ lib.optionalString (granterUngranted != [ ]) (": " + lib.concatStringsSep "; " granterUngranted);
|
|
ok = granterUngranted == [ ];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# What makes the case above mean something: discovery by the granter's
|
|
# certificate reaches all ten units, and each yields calls.
|
|
name = "the granter-policy check sees all ten granting units, and parses calls from each";
|
|
ok =
|
|
lib.sort lib.lessThan (lib.attrNames granterUnits) == lib.sort lib.lessThan grantingUnitNames
|
|
&& lib.all (u: baoCalls u.script != [ ]) (lib.attrValues granterUnits)
|
|
&& lib.all (u: baoCalls u.script != [ ]) (lib.attrValues bootstrapUnits);
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# And the grants side: a stanza the parser skipped would read as a
|
|
# grant that is not there.
|
|
name = "every path stanza in bao-bootstrap-policy.hcl and the granter's policy parses";
|
|
ok =
|
|
lib.all
|
|
(
|
|
t:
|
|
let
|
|
grants = grantsIn t;
|
|
in
|
|
grants != [ ]
|
|
&& lib.length grants == lib.length (matches ''path "'' t)
|
|
&& lib.all (g: g.caps != [ ]) grants
|
|
)
|
|
[
|
|
bootstrapPolicyText
|
|
granterPolicyText
|
|
];
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
# The bootstrap policy, whole: the auth mounts and the granter's own two
|
|
# objects, and nothing a `swarm-*` grant lives at.
|
|
name = "the bootstrap policy is exactly the auth mounts and the granter's policy and role";
|
|
ok =
|
|
lib.map (g: g.path) bootstrapGrants == [
|
|
"sys/auth"
|
|
"sys/auth/cert"
|
|
"sys/auth/approle"
|
|
"sys/policies/acl/bao-granter"
|
|
"auth/cert/certs/bao-granter"
|
|
]
|
|
&& grantFor bootstrapGrants "sys/policies/acl/swarm-controller" == null;
|
|
}
|
|
];
|
|
in
|
|
runGroup "bao-grants" cases
|