| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
de09628c7c
`Coordinator::set_paused` wrote the marker directly with `std::fs::write`
from hive-c0re, which runs as the unprivileged `hive-core` user. The
agent's harness dir is chowned to the agent user on every container boot
(`user.nix`'s activation chown), mode 0755 — so hive-core can stat the
marker but gets EACCES creating or unlinking it. Pause therefore only
ever worked on an agent that had never booted; the read side works
because a stat needs traverse, not write, which is why the paused pill
and `is_paused` looked healthy.
Route both directions through hive-priv, the root helper that already
owns the other writes into agent-owned directories:
- `PrivRequest::SetAgentPaused { agent_name, paused }`, with the marker
filename constant moved to hive-priv-sock. That is the narrowest crate
all three sides share (hive-priv deliberately does not depend on
hive-sh4re, which re-exports it for the in-container resolver). A
private copy on any one side would break pause silently, since every
reader just sees "no marker".
- `write_agent_state_file` generalised to `write_agent_dir_file`, taking
the target directory: `state/` and `harness/` are both agent-owned,
which is the same reason both need root.
- resume unlinks via `remove_file`, which acts on the leaf and never
follows a symlink — an agent could otherwise plant a link at the
marker path and have root delete an arbitrary file.
`Coordinator::set_paused` becomes an async round-trip; its three call
sites were already async. Both directions stay idempotent because the
dashboard toggle and `hivectl pause|resume` fire without reading the
current state first.
|
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| .. | ||
| src | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
hive-priv
The minimal root privileged-helper for hive-c0re. It runs as root and
exposes a narrow unix socket at /run/hive/priv.sock that accepts PrivRequest
JSON lines and performs only the handful of operations that genuinely require
root — bind-mount edits, nsenter into a container, btrfs subvolume ops. All
coordination logic (broker, HTTP, scheduling) stays in the unprivileged
hive-c0re process, which delegates here.
Why it exists
Privsep. hive-c0re runs as the unprivileged hive-core user so a bug or a
prompt-injection in the large daemon can't directly wield root. The few root
operations it needs are funnelled through this small, auditable helper instead.
See docs/boundary.md and docs/security.md for the privilege boundary.
Security model
- Strict allowlist. Every request is validated against a container-name
allowlist before any filesystem or process operation — only names matching the
hive convention (
h-*, the manager container, known sibling service containers) are accepted. - No pass-through. Every
PrivRequestvariant maps to a single known operation; there is no arbitrary-command escape hatch. - Socket-activated, always. systemd binds
/run/hive/priv.sock(SocketGroup=hive-core,0660) and passes the listener as fd 3 (LISTEN_FDS); the helper requires this and has no self-bind fallback, so dev and prod take the identical path and the group grant always holds.
The wire contract (PrivRequest / response types) lives in the separate
hive-priv-sock crate so this root binary depends on just the protocol shapes,
not the whole daemon-shared crate.