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hyperhive/swarm-secret-client/src/forge.rs
atlas 121c4678aa swarm-controller reads its forge token from the store, not a host file
The controller's forge token never entered bao: the forge minted it in its
container, hive-forge-swarm-controller-token copied it to a host file, and the
controller LoadCredential'ed that file. forgeTokenFile defaulted to that path
only where the forge ran, so a controller on any other host had no forge
access unless an operator copied the file by hand.

Now the forge's host publishes it and the controller reads it:

- swarm-bao-forge-publisher (replaces hive-forge-swarm-controller-token)
  waits for the in-container token, logs in with its own forge-publisher leaf
  and writes it to swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token. It runs on
  every forge container start, the old unit's trigger.
- New principal swarm-forge-publisher: leaf minted by glue-bao-tls.nix,
  policy create/update on that one path, written by
  swarm-bao-forge-publisher-policy, CN reserved as a hive name.
- The controller policy gains read on that path. swarm-controller reads it
  at start under its own certificate with the OIDC secret's retry, and runs
  without forge access if it still cannot.
- forgeTokenFile, its LoadCredential and the forgeEnv gate are gone;
  SWARM_CONTROLLER_FORGE_URL is always set. hostSwarmControllerTokenFile is
  removed, and a tmpfiles rule deletes the old host copy on the forge host.

The in-container file stays: the mint unit's only-once guard reads it, and
it is the publisher's source.

Refs #4998
2026-10-08 13:25:47 +02:00

395 lines
15 KiB
Rust

//! The forge agreement: where agents' and hives' forge tokens live in the store,
//! and what the objects at those paths hold.
//!
//! Four kinds. The agent's own token on the swarm's forge
//! ([`agent_token_path`]): `swarm-controller` mints it with the forge's admin
//! API, and `nix/agent-modules/forge-token.nix` reads it back under the agent's
//! own certificate. And the agent's accounts on external forges
//! ([`account_path`]): an operator hands the controller a URL and a token, the
//! controller stores them there, and `nix/agent-modules/forge-accounts.nix`
//! lists [`accounts_dir`] and reads each account. A hive's read-only token
//! ([`hive_token_path`]) is the third: `swarm-controller` mints it for the
//! hive's own forge account, and hive-c0re reads it under the hive's
//! certificate. Neither end is senior, so both halves are stated once, here,
//! beside [`crate::matrix`].
//!
//! `swarm-controller`'s own forge token ([`controller_token_path`]) is the
//! fourth: the forge mints it, `swarm-bao-forge-publisher` on the forge's host
//! writes it here, and the controller reads it as it starts.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::{
Error,
path::{Kind, checked_segment, principal_prefix},
};
/// The path holding `agent`'s own forge access token.
///
/// A flat leaf under the agent's prefix, like its controller-minted siblings
/// [`crate::queue::agent_queue_path`] and [`crate::mtls::identity_path`], so
/// the agent's own read stanza ([`crate::policy::render_agent`])
/// already covers it.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `agent` contains anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`,
/// which is what keeps one agent's name from addressing another agent's secret.
pub fn agent_token_path(agent: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
let prefix = principal_prefix(Kind::Agent, agent)?;
Ok(format!("{prefix}/forge-token"))
}
/// The forge account `hive` reads the forge as: `swarm-controller` creates it
/// and mints [`hive_token_path`]'s token for it, and hive-c0re names it in the
/// basic-auth header that token travels in.
///
/// The `hive-` prefix keeps the account reading as a hive's rather than an
/// agent's, as [`crate::matrix::hive_localpart`] does on the homeserver.
/// `swarm-controller` refuses a new agent named with this prefix, and tells an
/// older one apart from the hive's account by the account's email.
#[must_use]
pub fn hive_login(hive: &str) -> String {
format!("hive-{hive}")
}
/// The path holding `hive`'s read-only token for the swarm's forge.
///
/// Under [`Kind::Hive`], so the grant that reaches it is the hive's own
/// `swarm/hives/<this hive>/*` stanza: hive `alpha` reads its own token and
/// gets a 403 on `beta`'s.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `hive` contains anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`,
/// which is what keeps one hive's name from addressing another hive's secret.
pub fn hive_token_path(hive: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
let prefix = principal_prefix(Kind::Hive, hive)?;
Ok(format!("{prefix}/forge/token"))
}
/// The path holding `swarm-controller`'s own forge token: the admin account it
/// provisions every agent's and hive's forge objects with.
///
/// Under [`Kind::Controller`], which no hive's policy reads. The nix half is
/// `swarm-bao.nix`'s `controllerForgeTokenLeaf`, which the publisher's write
/// grant and the controller's read grant both name.
///
/// # Errors
/// Never in practice: the name segment is a constant. The `Result` is
/// [`principal_prefix`]'s.
pub fn controller_token_path() -> Result<String, Error> {
let prefix = principal_prefix(Kind::Controller, crate::matrix::CONTROLLER)?;
Ok(format!("{prefix}/forge/token"))
}
/// What [`controller_token_path`] holds. No token name beside the value, unlike
/// [`Credential`]: the publisher copies a file that holds the token alone.
///
/// No `Debug` derive: `value` is the forge admin credential.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ControllerToken {
/// The token itself. `swarm-bao-forge-publisher` writes it with
/// `bao kv put … value=@<file>`, so this name is load-bearing for a writer
/// this crate does not control.
pub value: String,
}
/// What an agent's forge-token path, and a hive's [`hive_token_path`], holds.
///
/// No `Debug` derive: `value` is a live forge credential, and a derived
/// `Debug` is one `{:?}` away from a log line.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Credential {
/// The token itself. `forge-token.nix` reads the store with
/// `bao kv get -field=value`, so this name is load-bearing for a reader
/// this crate does not control, the same as [`crate::matrix::Credential`]'s.
pub value: String,
/// The forge's name for the token — not secret. Stored beside the value
/// so whoever rotates it can name the token it replaces.
pub name: String,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for Credential {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("Credential")
.field("value", &"<redacted>")
.field("name", &self.name)
.finish()
}
}
/// The path holding `agent`'s account on the external forge it calls `label`.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when either name contains anything but
/// `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`, which is what keeps one agent's name from addressing
/// another agent's secret.
pub fn account_path(agent: &str, label: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
checked_segment("label", label)?;
Ok(format!("{}/{label}", accounts_dir(agent)?))
}
/// The directory every one of `agent`'s [`account_path`]s is under, in the
/// form [`crate::SecretStore::list`] takes. Named apart from
/// [`agent_token_path`]'s `forge-token` key, so no key is also a directory.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `agent` contains anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`.
pub fn accounts_dir(agent: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
let prefix = principal_prefix(Kind::Agent, agent)?;
Ok(format!("{prefix}/forge"))
}
/// What an [`account_path`] holds.
///
/// No `Debug` derive, for [`Credential`]'s reason.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Account {
/// The token. `forge-accounts.nix` reads this field by name.
pub value: String,
/// The forge's base URL, without a trailing slash. Not secret.
/// `forge-accounts.nix` reads this field by name too.
pub url: String,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for Account {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("Account")
.field("value", &"<redacted>")
.field("url", &self.url)
.finish()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn an_account_and_its_directory_land_under_the_agent_prefix() {
// Spelled out: `forge-accounts.nix` spells the same strings.
assert_eq!(
account_path("atlas", "myforge").expect("both segments are legal"),
"swarm/agents/atlas/forge/myforge"
);
assert_eq!(
accounts_dir("atlas").expect("legal"),
"swarm/agents/atlas/forge"
);
}
#[test]
fn the_controller_token_is_under_the_controller_prefix() {
// Spelled out: `swarm-bao.nix` grants exactly this string.
assert_eq!(
controller_token_path().expect("a constant segment is legal"),
"swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token"
);
}
#[test]
fn no_hive_policy_reaches_the_controller_token() {
let policy = crate::policy::render("alpha").expect("legal");
let covers = |path: &str| {
policy.lines().any(|line| {
line.strip_prefix("path \"")
.and_then(|rest| rest.split_once("\" {"))
.and_then(|(p, _)| p.strip_suffix('*'))
.is_some_and(|prefix| path.starts_with(prefix))
})
};
assert!(!covers(&format!(
"secret/data/{}",
controller_token_path().expect("legal")
)));
// The control: the same matcher finds the hive's own token.
assert!(covers(&format!(
"secret/data/{}",
hive_token_path("alpha").expect("legal")
)));
}
#[test]
fn no_forge_key_is_also_a_directory() {
// KV-v2 cannot hold a key whose name is also a prefix of another key.
let dir = accounts_dir("atlas").expect("legal");
let key = agent_token_path("atlas").expect("legal");
assert_ne!(key, dir);
assert!(!key.starts_with(&format!("{dir}/")), "{key}");
assert!(!dir.starts_with(&format!("{key}/")), "{dir}");
}
#[test]
fn a_label_that_could_escape_the_directory_is_refused() {
for bad in ["../argus", "a/b", "a.b", ""] {
assert!(account_path("atlas", bad).is_err(), "label {bad:?}");
assert!(account_path(bad, "myforge").is_err(), "agent {bad:?}");
}
// The control: the legal charset stays reachable.
assert!(account_path("a-b_C9", "d-e0").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn the_agents_own_grants_list_its_accounts_and_read_each() {
let policy = crate::policy::render_agent("atlas").expect("legal");
let covers = |path: &str| {
policy.lines().any(|line| {
line.strip_prefix("path \"")
.and_then(|rest| rest.split_once("\" {"))
.and_then(|(p, _)| p.strip_suffix('*'))
.is_some_and(|prefix| path.starts_with(prefix))
})
};
let dir = accounts_dir("atlas").expect("legal");
assert!(covers(&format!("secret/metadata/{dir}/")));
assert!(covers(&format!(
"secret/data/{}",
account_path("atlas", "myforge").expect("legal")
)));
// The control: another agent's accounts are outside both grants.
let other = accounts_dir("argus").expect("legal");
assert!(!covers(&format!("secret/metadata/{other}/")));
assert!(!covers(&format!(
"secret/data/{}",
account_path("argus", "myforge").expect("legal")
)));
}
#[test]
fn the_account_fields_match_what_the_nix_reader_asks_for() {
let json = serde_json::to_string(&Account {
value: "t".to_owned(),
url: "https://forge.example.org".to_owned(),
})
.expect("two Strings serialise");
assert_eq!(json, r#"{"value":"t","url":"https://forge.example.org"}"#);
}
#[test]
fn debug_never_prints_an_accounts_value() {
let a = Account {
value: "0123456789abcdef".to_owned(),
url: "https://forge.example.org".to_owned(),
};
let shown = format!("{a:?}");
assert!(!shown.contains("0123456789abcdef"), "{shown}");
assert!(shown.contains("forge.example.org"), "{shown}");
}
#[test]
fn the_token_lands_under_the_agent_prefix() {
// Spelled out rather than rebuilt from the pieces the code uses: the
// nix reader spells the same string, and a rename here that moved it
// would leave that reader fetching nothing.
assert_eq!(
agent_token_path("atlas").expect("a plain name is legal"),
"swarm/agents/atlas/forge-token"
);
}
#[test]
fn a_traversal_in_the_agent_name_is_refused() {
for bad in ["../argus", "a/b", "atlas/../argus", "a.b", ""] {
let e = agent_token_path(bad).expect_err("a traversal is not legal");
assert!(matches!(e, Error::PathSegment { kind: "agent", .. }), "{e}");
}
}
#[test]
fn the_legal_charset_is_actually_reachable() {
// The control for the test above: a guard that refused everything
// would pass it for the wrong reason.
assert!(agent_token_path("a-b_C9").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn the_agents_own_read_grant_covers_the_path() {
// The agent reads this path under `hive-agent-<agent>`, and that
// policy is rendered elsewhere. If the path ever moved out from under
// it, the agent's fetch would 403 at boot, naming neither.
let path = agent_token_path("atlas").expect("legal");
let policy = crate::policy::render_agent("atlas").expect("legal");
let covered = policy.lines().any(|line| {
line.strip_prefix("path \"")
.and_then(|rest| rest.split_once("\" {"))
.and_then(|(p, _)| p.strip_suffix('*'))
.is_some_and(|prefix| format!("secret/data/{path}").starts_with(prefix))
});
assert!(covered, "no stanza in\n{policy}\ncovers {path}");
}
#[test]
fn another_agents_read_grant_does_not_cover_the_path() {
// Control for the test above: the prefix match must actually be
// discriminating, or it proves nothing.
let path = agent_token_path("atlas").expect("legal");
let policy = crate::policy::render_agent("argus").expect("legal");
let covered = policy.lines().any(|line| {
line.strip_prefix("path \"")
.and_then(|rest| rest.split_once("\" {"))
.and_then(|(p, _)| p.strip_suffix('*'))
.is_some_and(|prefix| format!("secret/data/{path}").starts_with(prefix))
});
assert!(!covered, "argus's policy must not reach atlas's token");
}
#[test]
fn the_hive_token_lands_under_the_hive_prefix() {
// Spelled out: the controller's bao stanza names the same leaf.
assert_eq!(
hive_token_path("pr1ma").expect("a plain name is legal"),
"swarm/hives/pr1ma/forge/token"
);
assert_eq!(hive_login("pr1ma"), "hive-pr1ma");
}
#[test]
fn a_traversal_in_the_hive_name_is_refused() {
for bad in ["../beta", "a/b", "a.b", ""] {
let e = hive_token_path(bad).expect_err("a traversal is not legal");
assert!(matches!(e, Error::PathSegment { kind: "hive", .. }), "{e}");
}
// The control: the legal charset stays reachable.
assert!(hive_token_path("a-b_C9").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn a_hive_reaches_its_own_forge_token_and_no_other_hives() {
let covered_by = |hive: &str, path: &str| {
crate::policy::render(hive)
.expect("legal")
.lines()
.any(|line| {
line.strip_prefix("path \"")
.and_then(|rest| rest.split_once("\" {"))
.and_then(|(p, _)| p.strip_suffix('*'))
.is_some_and(|prefix| format!("secret/data/{path}").starts_with(prefix))
})
};
let alpha = hive_token_path("alpha").expect("legal");
assert!(covered_by("alpha", &alpha), "alpha cannot read {alpha}");
assert!(!covered_by("beta", &alpha), "beta reaches {alpha}");
}
#[test]
fn the_value_field_matches_what_the_nix_reader_asks_for() {
let json = serde_json::to_string(&Credential {
value: "t".to_owned(),
name: "swarm-agent".to_owned(),
})
.expect("two Strings serialise");
assert_eq!(json, r#"{"value":"t","name":"swarm-agent"}"#);
}
#[test]
fn debug_never_prints_the_value() {
let c = Credential {
value: "0123456789abcdef".to_owned(),
name: "swarm-agent".to_owned(),
};
let shown = format!("{c:?}");
assert!(!shown.contains("0123456789abcdef"), "{shown}");
assert!(shown.contains("swarm-agent"), "{shown}");
}
}