Agents have authelia *users*; they had no machine identity at all, so an
agent could not authenticate to the swarm queue as anything. This mints
one `agent-<hive>` OIDC client per hive beside the existing
`hive-<hive>` one, teaches the auth-callout responder an agent arm, and
opens the queue's client port on the bridge so a container can reach it.
One client per HIVE, not per agent: agents are created at runtime, and a
per-agent client would make creating one a config change plus an
authelia reload. The cost is that agents on a hive are indistinguishable
to the broker, which is deliberate and tracked separately.
The agent grant is deny-by-default twice over. An agent id matches no
hive rule, so it gets a hive's status-key grant from neither; and with
no agent subject configured the responder returns no grant at all rather
than an empty publish list, which would be a denial wearing a grant's
shape. What an agent may publish is a deployment's decision, taken
through `--agent-publish-subject` the same way `--hive-publish-subject`
already works.
`Policy::new` now refuses two prefixes where one contains the other. The
arms are tried in order, so that overlap does not error at match time -
it silently hands one principal the other's grant.
Not shipped here, and neither is reachable without it: no subject is
configured for agents anywhere in nix, and nothing yet delivers
`agent-<hive>.secret` into an agent container. Both belong to the stream
that will be the first consumer.
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