868c6cf96c
Every agent now connects to the queue and reads logs with its own secret from the store (#5181), so the per-hive `hive-<h>-agent` OIDC client has no reader left. Remove it end to end: - hive-c0re no longer forwards `hive-queue-agent-{secret,client-id}` into containers, and no longer forwards HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT; the agent module that loaded them (nix/agent-modules/queue.nix) is gone, its options refused with a removal message. - The host reader (glue-queue-agent-credential.nix, swarm-bao-queue-agent), its store role and policy unit (swarm-bao-queue-agent-policy), its PKI leaf and the deploy.bao.queueAgent* / queue.agentCredentialDir options are gone; the options are refused with a removal message. - authelia mints no `hive-<h>-agent` client, and swarm-secret-publish no longer writes swarm/hives/<h>/queue/agent. - swarm-secret-client drops queue::agent_client_path / queue::Credential. - HIVE_AGENT_NATS_URL is now gated on the agents' queue address alone. The log store's authelia check stays for operators. swarm-nats-auth still refuses a `-agent` client id; that refusal and `agentClientSuffix` are left for a follow-up. Refs #4459 Refs #4765
322 lines
14 KiB
Nix
322 lines
14 KiB
Nix
# This agent's own identity at the swarm secret store: the check that proves
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# it works, and the live copy every store reader in the container presents.
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#
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# `swarm-controller` mints the leaf at agent creation and publishes it; this
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# agent's hive collects it under the hive's own certificate and hands it in as
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# systemd credentials (`hive_c0re::lifecycle::agent_identity`). That copy is
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# fixed for the life of the container, and the controller re-issues the leaf
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# at half its validity, so this unit seeds a live copy from it and, on a timer,
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# reads the current leaf back from the store under the one it holds. Because
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# that login needs the held leaf to still be valid, a container whose leaf
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# expired while every pull failed recovers only at its next start.
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#
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# ⚠️ The identity arrives as credentials and NOT as a bind mount, and the mode
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# is why: the host file is `0600` to the hive daemon and this unit runs as the
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# unprivileged agent user. nspawn's `--load-credential` is read by the
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# container manager as root and re-exposed under this unit's own `User=`; a
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# bind would deliver a private key this user cannot open.
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#
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# This is the courier's other end: the hive-side collector has no purpose
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# without it, so the two ship together and neither is reachable alone.
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#
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# 🩸 This unit fails LOUDLY where the hive-side readers degrade quietly, and
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# that is the opposite default on purpose. A missing OIDC client secret means
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# a hive whose publisher has yet to run; a missing or refused certificate
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# means an agent that believes it can reach the store and cannot, which every
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# later pull would report as its own unrelated failure. The one place that
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# knows the real cause is the login itself, so this is where it is said.
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{
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pkgs,
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lib,
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config,
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...
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}:
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let
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cfg = config.services.hyperhive.agent.bao;
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# This container's agent name. The same string the hive published the
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# identity under, because the agent's unix user is named for the agent —
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# see ./user.nix.
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agentName = config.services.hyperhive.agent.user.name;
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# The three ids `hive_c0re::lifecycle::agent_identity` forwards under.
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# Neither side can discover the other's spelling, so a rename is a rename
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# there too.
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certCredential = "hive-agent-bao-cert";
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keyCredential = "hive-agent-bao-key";
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serverCaCredential = "hive-agent-bao-server-ca";
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unitName = "hive-agent-bao-identity";
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runtimeDir = unitName;
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# A symlink to the directory that holds the live pair. Each pair is written
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# into a fresh directory and goes live with one rename of this link, so the
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# link always names one whole pair, old or new.
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liveLink = "/run/${runtimeDir}/current";
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certFile = "${liveLink}/cert";
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keyFile = "${liveLink}/key";
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# The store's whole answer, key included, in the unit's own `0700` directory.
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rawFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/bao-mtls.json";
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errFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/bao.err";
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# Where the identity lives in the store, spelled from the same pieces the
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# publisher uses. `swarm_secret_client::mtls::identity_path` builds
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# `swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls` and `path::MOUNT` is `secret`; this
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# literal is the nix half of that one agreement.
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identityPath = "secret/swarm/agents/${agentName}/bao-mtls";
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# The address is the whole switch — no separate `enable`, the same shape
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# ./logs.nix gates itself with. A hive that has a store
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# forwards its address and every agent on it gets the check; a hive that has
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# none forwards nothing and no agent does. An `enable` beside it would be a
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# knob whose only correct setting is whatever the address already says, and
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# its default would decide whether the hive-side courier delivers into a
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# container that reads what it is given or into one that never looks.
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configured = cfg.addr != null;
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storeRetry = import ../host-modules/lib/store-retry.nix { };
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in
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{
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options.services.hyperhive.agent.bao = {
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addr = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
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default = null;
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example = "https://bao.example.com:8200";
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description = ''
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Where the swarm secret store listens, as this container reaches it.
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Set by the generated meta flake from the host's own `BAO_ADDR`, which
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is the address this hive already uses, and setting it is what generates
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`${unitName}.service`: at boot that unit logs in with the certificate
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its hive delivered and reads this agent's own path back, failing if
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either step does not succeed. `systemctl status ${unitName}` inside the
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container is then the answer to "can this agent reach the store as
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itself", which nothing else in the tree reports.
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`null` means the hive was given no store. No unit is generated then,
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because an agent whose swarm never minted an identity has nothing to
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log in with, and a failed unit at every boot would say that in the
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loudest possible way about a deployment that never asked for it.
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'';
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};
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clientCertFile = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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readOnly = true;
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default = certFile;
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description = ''
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This agent's current store certificate, kept by `${unitName}.service`.
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Read-only: it is where that unit writes, not a knob. Every unit that
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logs in to the store as this agent points `BAO_CLIENT_CERT` here.
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'';
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};
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clientKeyFile = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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readOnly = true;
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default = keyFile;
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description = ''
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The private key for `clientCertFile`, `0400` to the agent user.
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🩸 A PATH and never a value.
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'';
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};
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};
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config = lib.mkIf configured {
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systemd.services.${unitName} = {
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description = "keep this agent's swarm secret store identity current, and prove it works";
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after = [ "network.target" ];
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wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
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path = [
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pkgs.openbao
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pkgs.coreutils
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pkgs.diffutils
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pkgs.jq
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];
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# ../host-modules/lib/store-retry.nix. From an agent the store is reached
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# through the gateway's stream passthrough, so either being down fails
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# the login below.
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inherit (storeRetry) startLimitBurst startLimitIntervalSec;
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serviceConfig = storeRetry.serviceConfig // {
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Type = "oneshot";
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# Not `RemainAfterExit`, so the timer below can start it again.
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# `RuntimeDirectoryPreserve` keeps the live pair between runs.
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RemainAfterExit = false;
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TimeoutStartSec = 30;
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User = agentName;
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Group = agentName;
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RuntimeDirectory = runtimeDir;
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RuntimeDirectoryMode = "0700";
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RuntimeDirectoryPreserve = "yes";
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UMask = "0377";
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# Bare ids, no paths: the terse `LoadCredential=` form that inherits a
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# credential the service *manager* received, which is what the
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# container manager passed in.
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LoadCredential = [
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certCredential
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keyCredential
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serverCaCredential
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];
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};
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environment = {
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BAO_ADDR = cfg.addr;
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BAO_CLIENT_CERT = certFile;
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BAO_CLIENT_KEY = keyFile;
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};
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script = ''
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set -euo pipefail
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# Absent credentials are the first thing checked, because every later
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# message would blame the store for a delivery that never happened.
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# 🩸 The files are named and never read here: what went wrong is a
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# property of the path, and the bytes at it are a private key.
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missing=
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for id in ${lib.escapeShellArg certCredential} ${lib.escapeShellArg keyCredential}; do
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if [ ! -s "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/$id" ]; then
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missing="$missing $id"
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fi
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done
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if [ -n "$missing" ]; then
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echo "this agent has no store identity: the hive delivered no$missing." >&2
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echo "swarm-controller publishes it at ${identityPath} when the agent is created, and the hive collects it from there." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# Only when one was delivered. Absent means the container verifies the
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# store's listener against its own trust store, which is what a
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# deployment with a real CA wants; pointing BAO_CACERT at a file that
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# is not there would fail the handshake and name the wrong cause.
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if [ -s "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}" ]; then
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export BAO_CACERT="$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}"
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fi
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# `UMask=0377` makes every file this script creates `0400`, so each one
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# is removed before the command that creates it.
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err=${lib.escapeShellArg errFile}
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raw=${lib.escapeShellArg rawFile}
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trap 'rm -f "$err" "$raw"' EXIT
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live=${lib.escapeShellArg liveLink}
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dir=''${live%/*}
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# A fresh directory for one pair. `chmod`, because the umask cuts
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# mktemp's `0700` down to a `0400` no file can be created in.
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new_pair() {
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local d
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d=$(mktemp -d -p "$dir" pair.XXXXXX)
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chmod 0700 "$d"
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echo "$d"
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}
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# The only step that changes the live pair: one rename of the link. A
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# reader whose two opens straddle it gets one file of each pair for
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# that one login; the next login reads a whole pair.
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go_live() {
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rm -f "$live.new"
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ln -s "''${1##*/}" "$live.new"
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mv -Tf "$live.new" "$live"
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}
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# Every pair directory but the live one is left over: the pair the
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# last swap replaced, kept until now for a reader that resolved the
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# link before the swap, or a pair a stopped run staged.
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current=$(readlink "$live" || true)
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for d in "$dir"/pair.*; do
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if [ -d "$d" ] && [ "''${d##*/}" != "$current" ]; then
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chmod 0700 "$d"
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rm -rf "$d"
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fi
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done
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rm -f "$live.new"
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# The delivered pair is the start of every container's life: /run is
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# empty at boot and kept across this unit's runs.
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if [ ! -s "$BAO_CLIENT_CERT" ] || [ ! -s "$BAO_CLIENT_KEY" ]; then
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seed=$(new_pair)
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cp "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${keyCredential}" "$seed/key"
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cp "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${certCredential}" "$seed/cert"
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go_live "$seed"
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fi
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# Cert auth is a login, not a transport setting. The `BAO_CLIENT_*`
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# variables above only decide which certificate the TLS handshake
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# presents; without a token `bao` asks its token helper instead, and
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# that is a `sh` this unit's `path` does not carry. `-token-only`
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# answers on stdout and skips the helper on both sides.
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#
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# No `name=`: a cert role pins both its authority and the common name
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# it accepts, so this agent's leaf matches its own role and no other.
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# Naming the role here would be a third copy of a string
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# `swarm_secret_client::policy::agent_object_name` already owns.
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rm -f "$err"
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if ! BAO_TOKEN="$(bao login -method=cert -token-only 2>"$err")"; then
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echo "this agent's certificate was refused by the swarm secret store at $BAO_ADDR." >&2
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if [ -s "$err" ]; then
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cat "$err" >&2
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else
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echo "bao failed without writing a diagnostic." >&2
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fi
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exit 1
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fi
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export BAO_TOKEN
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# A token is not yet an answer: the login proves the certificate, this
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# proves the policy attached to it, and the answer is the current
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# leaf. One read, so the certificate and key come from one version.
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#
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# ⚠️ Written by redirect, never printed: the object holds a private
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# key.
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rm -f "$err" "$raw"
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if ! bao kv get -format=json ${lib.escapeShellArg identityPath} >"$raw" 2>"$err"; then
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echo "this agent logged in to the swarm secret store but cannot read ${identityPath}, so its policy does not cover its own path." >&2
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if [ -s "$err" ]; then
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cat "$err" >&2
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else
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echo "bao failed without writing a diagnostic." >&2
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fi
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exit 1
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fi
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# `-j`: the bytes as the store holds them, which is what the hive
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# delivered, so an unchanged leaf compares equal to the seeded copy.
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staged=$(new_pair)
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if ! jq -ej '.data.data.cert | strings' "$raw" >"$staged/cert" \
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|| ! jq -ej '.data.data.key | strings' "$raw" >"$staged/key"; then
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rm -rf "$staged"
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echo "${identityPath} holds no certificate and key; this agent keeps the one it has." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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if cmp -s "$staged/cert" "$BAO_CLIENT_CERT" && cmp -s "$staged/key" "$BAO_CLIENT_KEY"; then
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rm -rf "$staged"
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echo "authenticated to the swarm secret store at $BAO_ADDR as ${agentName}; its certificate at ${identityPath} is unchanged."
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else
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# This unit's next login uses whatever goes live, so a pair the
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# store refuses must never replace the one it accepts.
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rm -f "$err"
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if ! BAO_CLIENT_CERT="$staged/cert" BAO_CLIENT_KEY="$staged/key" \
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bao login -method=cert -token-only >/dev/null 2>"$err"; then
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rm -rf "$staged"
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echo "the swarm secret store refused the certificate at ${identityPath}; this agent keeps the one it has." >&2
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if [ -s "$err" ]; then cat "$err" >&2; fi
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exit 1
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fi
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go_live "$staged"
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echo "replaced this agent's store certificate with the one at ${identityPath}."
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fi
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'';
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};
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# The controller re-issues a leaf at half its validity, so ten minutes is
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# small against the time the old one stays valid.
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systemd.timers.${unitName} = {
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description = "re-read this agent's store certificate from the secret store";
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wantedBy = [ "timers.target" ];
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timerConfig = {
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OnUnitInactiveSec = "10min";
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RandomizedDelaySec = "1min";
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};
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};
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};
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}
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