| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
ec476dfaae
container@.service sets Restart=on-failure and no start limit, so systemd's defaults applied: 5 starts per 10s with RestartSec 100ms. That made the bound a function of how fast a container dies -- one failing instantly tripped the limit in under a second, one taking longer than ~2s never tripped it and restarted forever. The per-container drop-in already carried both sections this needs, so the bound goes there rather than into a second file. StartLimit* are [Unit] settings; systemd silently ignores them under [Service], which the pinned body test now guards. The values are hive-wide constants rather than wire fields: the bound is policy, identical for every agent, and threading it through the socket as a per-agent parameter would be plumbing for a value nobody varies. Giving up is safe to make tight because it is not terminal -- reconcile retries later, and the reset-failed already done before each start clears the latch first. |
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| .. | ||
| src | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
hive-priv
The minimal root privileged-helper for hive-c0re. It runs as root and
exposes a narrow unix socket at /run/hive/priv.sock that accepts PrivRequest
JSON lines and performs only the handful of operations that genuinely require
root — bind-mount edits, nsenter into a container, btrfs subvolume ops. All
coordination logic (broker, HTTP, scheduling) stays in the unprivileged
hive-c0re process, which delegates here.
Why it exists
Privsep. hive-c0re runs as the unprivileged hive-core user so a bug or a
prompt-injection in the large daemon can't directly wield root. The few root
operations it needs are funnelled through this small, auditable helper instead.
See docs/boundary.md and docs/security.md for the privilege boundary.
Security model
- Strict allowlist. Every request is validated against a container-name
allowlist before any filesystem or process operation — only names matching the
hive convention (
h-*, the manager container, known sibling service containers) are accepted. - No pass-through. Every
PrivRequestvariant maps to a single known operation; there is no arbitrary-command escape hatch. - Socket-activated, always. systemd binds
/run/hive/priv.sock(SocketGroup=hive-core,0660) and passes the listener as fd 3 (LISTEN_FDS); the helper requires this and has no self-bind fallback, so dev and prod take the identical path and the group grant always holds.
The wire contract (PrivRequest / response types) lives in the separate
hive-priv-sock crate so this root binary depends on just the protocol shapes,
not the whole daemon-shared crate.