| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
837e658d4a
`swarm-controller` mints an agent's mTLS leaf at creation and publishes it at `swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls`. Nothing read it back. This adds the hop that carries it the rest of the way, and the in-container consumer that proves the hop works. Host side, `lifecycle::agent_identity` reads the row under *this hive's* own certificate — the hive is a principal the store already knows — and stages the leaf and its key `0600` under a new `agent-identity/<name>` state dir, deliberately outside every bind-mounted tree. Both files go in as systemd credentials rather than binds, the same answer and the same mode reason as the queue secret beside it: the staged key is unreadable to the unprivileged agent user, and the container manager reads a `--load-credential` source as root before re-exposing it under the consuming unit's own `User=`. The agent is never asked to authenticate in order to obtain the thing it authenticates with. Container side, `hive-agent-bao-identity.service` logs in with that certificate and reads the agent's own path back, failing the unit when either step does not succeed. It fails loudly where the hive-side readers degrade quietly, because a refused certificate means an agent that believes it reaches the store and never does — a cause only the login itself can name. The address is the whole switch, no separate `enable`, matching how `queue.nix` and `logs.nix` already gate themselves. A hive with a store forwards `HIVE_AGENT_BAO_ADDR` and every agent on it gets the check; a hive without one forwards nothing and no agent does. That is what keeps the delivery from landing in a container with nothing to read it. The hive can now reach an agent's identity, so hive privilege covers agent privilege. Accepted, not mitigated: the alternative is an agent fetching its own credential with a credential it does not yet have. Refs #4137 |
||
| .. | ||
| src | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
hive-c0re
The unprivileged host daemon (runs as hive-core). Owns the sqlite
broker, the approval/reminder/schedule queues, the generic job-DAG
queue, container lifecycle, gateway/forge/matrix provisioning,
per-container stats, and the axum operator dashboard. Largest crate in
the workspace — bin-only, no separate lib.
When to use it
Host-level, cross-container orchestration: spawning/rebuilding/
destroying agent containers, the approval flow, dashboard-visible
state, provisioning per-agent forge/matrix/gateway accounts. Agent-side
behavior (turn loop, MCP tools) lives in hive-agent/hive-agent-mcp
instead — this daemon only talks to agents over the socket wire types
in hive-sh4re.
Shape
Cohesive clusters live in directory submodules, each re-exported at
the crate root (crate::broker::… keeps resolving regardless of which
subdirectory a module actually lives in). One line each — read the
module's own //! doc-comment for real detail, don't expect this file
to track it:
dashboard/— the operator dashboard (containers, approvals, schedules, logs, topology).job_queue/— the job-DAG queue + desired-state reconciliation (docs/scheduler/coordinator.md).lifecycle/—nixos-containerlifecycle + per-agent config flake generation.stores/— sqlite-backed stores (broker, queues, audit, power).workers/— background sweeps (crash watch, scheduled prompts, auto-update, knowledge sync).agent_config/— per-agent registries (tool groups, capabilities, resource limits, topology).stats/— dashboard metrics aggregation + OTEL export.socket_server/— the unix-socket request server shared by per-agent + manager sockets.forge/— optional Forgejo wiring (docs/integrations/forge.md).coordinator.rs— top-level wiring forserve.meta.rs,migrate.rs— the meta flake + schema/state migrations.matrix.rs,gateway_nginx.rs,webhook_secret.rs,priv_client.rs— matrix provisioning, gateway vhosts, webhook secrets, and thehive-privclient respectively.
See the top-level CLAUDE.md/docs/ index for the full reading-path
map.