forge-token.nix fetches swarm/agents/<agent>/forge-token under the agent's own store identity into /run/hive-agent-forge-token/token, and re-fetches on a timer so a rotation lands. hive-forge, the git credential helper, hive-forge-notify, forge-avatar-sync and the web UI read that file first and fall back to <state>/forge-token. tea-login is deleted: it copied the token into ~/.config/tea, which docs/swarm/credentials.md forbids for a store secret. hive-forge covers the same verbs. swarmctl gains agent mint-forge-token. Refs #3782
182 lines
7 KiB
Nix
182 lines
7 KiB
Nix
# This agent's own forge access token, fetched from the swarm secret store by
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# the agent itself.
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#
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# `swarm-controller` mints the token with the forge's admin API and writes it
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# to `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge-token`
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# (`swarm_secret_client::forge::agent_token_path`); no hive is in that chain.
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# This unit logs in to the store with the certificate ./bao.nix already proves
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# it can log in with, and reads its own path. The shape is ./queue-identity.nix's,
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# for the same reason: a hive handing the token over would be the hive reading
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# a secret on the agent's behalf.
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#
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# Unlike the queue credential this one rotates: the controller replaces the
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# token when the forge's copy stops matching the stored one. So the unit is
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# re-run by a timer, and it swaps the file in by rename, only when the value
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# changed, so a reader never sees half a token and a watcher on the file
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# (forge-avatar-sync.path) fires only on a real change.
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#
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# Consumers read `services.hyperhive.agent.forge.tokenFile` first and fall back
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# to `<state>/forge-token`, the file the hive wrote before this existed.
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{
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pkgs,
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lib,
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config,
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...
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}:
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let
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cfg = config.services.hyperhive.agent.bao;
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# The name `swarm-controller` minted the token under — see ./queue-identity.nix.
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agentName = config.services.hyperhive.agent.user.name;
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# The same three ids ./bao.nix and ./queue-identity.nix load.
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certCredential = "hive-agent-bao-cert";
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keyCredential = "hive-agent-bao-key";
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serverCaCredential = "hive-agent-bao-server-ca";
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unitName = "hive-agent-forge-token";
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# The nix half of `swarm_secret_client::forge::agent_token_path` plus
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# `path::MOUNT`.
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tokenPath = "secret/swarm/agents/${agentName}/forge-token";
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runtimeDir = unitName;
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tokenFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/token";
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# Beside the token, so the rename that replaces it stays in one directory.
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stagingFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/token.new";
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# The store's address is the whole switch, as in ./bao.nix and
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# ./queue-identity.nix.
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configured = cfg.addr != null;
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in
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{
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options.services.hyperhive.agent.forge.tokenFile = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.str;
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readOnly = true;
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default = tokenFile;
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description = ''
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Path this agent's own forge token is fetched to. Read-only: it is a
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fact about where `${unitName}.service` writes, not a knob.
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🩸 A PATH and never a value. The file is `0400` to the agent user.
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The file exists only once the swarm has minted a token for this agent
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and the agent has a store identity to fetch it with. Until then every
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consumer falls back to `$HYPERHIVE_STATE_DIR/forge-token`.
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'';
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};
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config = lib.mkIf configured {
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# Every unit and the bash-task runner (where `hive-forge` and `git` run)
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# resolve the token through this, the same way they find
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# `$HYPERHIVE_STATE_DIR`. A path, never the value.
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systemd.globalEnvironment.HIVE_FORGE_TOKEN_FILE = tokenFile;
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environment.variables.HIVE_FORGE_TOKEN_FILE = tokenFile;
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systemd.services.${unitName} = {
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description = "fetch this agent's own forge token from the secret store";
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after = [
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"network.target"
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# Ordering only, for the reason ./queue-identity.nix gives.
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"hive-agent-bao-identity.service"
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];
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before = [ "hive-forge-notify.service" ];
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wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
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path = [
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pkgs.openbao
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pkgs.coreutils
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pkgs.diffutils
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];
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startLimitBurst = 4;
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startLimitIntervalSec = 300;
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serviceConfig = {
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Type = "oneshot";
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# Not `RemainAfterExit`, unlike the queue fetch: the timer below has to
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# be able to start this unit again, and an active unit cannot be
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# started. `RuntimeDirectoryPreserve` is what keeps the directory, and
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# the token in it, alive between runs instead.
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RemainAfterExit = false;
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TimeoutStartSec = 30;
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Restart = "on-failure";
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RestartSec = 15;
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User = agentName;
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Group = agentName;
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RuntimeDirectory = runtimeDir;
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RuntimeDirectoryMode = "0700";
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RuntimeDirectoryPreserve = "yes";
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UMask = "0377";
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LoadCredential = [
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certCredential
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keyCredential
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serverCaCredential
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];
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};
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environment = {
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BAO_ADDR = cfg.addr;
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BAO_CLIENT_CERT = "%d/${certCredential}";
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BAO_CLIENT_KEY = "%d/${keyCredential}";
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};
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script = ''
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set -euo pipefail
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# No identity delivered: ./bao.nix's check reports that; saying it
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# twice adds nothing.
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for id in ${lib.escapeShellArg certCredential} ${lib.escapeShellArg keyCredential}; do
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if [ ! -s "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/$id" ]; then
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echo "this agent has no store identity, so it cannot fetch its own forge token." >&2
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exit 0
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fi
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done
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if [ -s "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}" ]; then
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export BAO_CACERT="$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}"
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fi
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err="$(mktemp)"
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trap 'rm -f "$err" ${lib.escapeShellArg stagingFile}' EXIT
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if ! BAO_TOKEN="$(bao login -method=cert -token-only 2>"$err")"; then
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echo "this agent's certificate was refused by the swarm secret store at $BAO_ADDR." >&2
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if [ -s "$err" ]; then cat "$err" >&2; fi
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exit 1
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fi
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export BAO_TOKEN
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# 🩸 Degrades rather than fails, for the reason ./queue-identity.nix
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# gives: the policy stanza that let the login read `bao-mtls` covers
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# this path too, so a refusal here is a token not minted yet. The
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# file already in place, if any, is kept: a store that is briefly
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# unreachable must not take a working token away.
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#
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# ⚠️ Written by redirect, never echoed: the field is the secret. The
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# staging file is removed first so the redirect creates it — a file
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# `UMask=0377` left behind is `0400` and could not be reopened for
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# writing.
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rm -f ${lib.escapeShellArg stagingFile}
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if ! bao kv get -field=value ${lib.escapeShellArg tokenPath} > ${lib.escapeShellArg stagingFile} 2>"$err"; then
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echo "no forge token at ${tokenPath} yet; consumers keep using the state-dir token if there is one." >&2
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if [ -s "$err" ]; then cat "$err" >&2; fi
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exit 0
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fi
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if cmp -s ${lib.escapeShellArg stagingFile} ${lib.escapeShellArg tokenFile}; then
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echo "this agent's forge token at ${tokenPath} is unchanged."
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exit 0
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fi
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mv -f ${lib.escapeShellArg stagingFile} ${lib.escapeShellArg tokenFile}
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echo "fetched this agent's forge token from ${tokenPath}."
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'';
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};
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# The controller re-checks every agent's token every five minutes; this
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# picks up a rotation within about ten more.
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systemd.timers.${unitName} = {
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description = "re-fetch this agent's forge token from the secret store";
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wantedBy = [ "timers.target" ];
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timerConfig = {
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OnUnitInactiveSec = "10min";
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RandomizedDelaySec = "1min";
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};
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};
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};
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}
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