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4007fc965d
A hive holds an mTLS pair and a policy naming what it may read, and still cannot log in: nothing creates the role that maps its certificate to that policy. The one pre-shared credential in the system therefore buys no access. Minting happens here rather than in nix, which was the first plan. Nix mints from the store's own container, and that path is gated on the bootstrap token -- so onboarding a hive later would mean placing the one genuinely pre-shared secret again. Doing it from the controller costs a public certificate authority as an input and makes the bootstrap token one-time. A startup pass, not a hook: the hive list is loaded once and a config change means a redeploy, so the roles are as static as the list. Only the policy is derived from something that moves. The subject is the hive's name because glue-bao-tls.nix mints a hive's client leaf with its name as the CN, and cert auth matches on that. Per-hive failures are logged and skipped, matching the queue, bridge and forge connects above it: a controller whose store is unreachable still serves everything else, and the next start retries. Not covered by a test: ensure_hive_roles is IO from end to end, and the seam that would make it assertable is the one the read-grant sink already has. Said here rather than implied by a green suite. |
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| src | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
swarm-controller
The swarm-level daemon. Where hive-c0re owns the agents on one host, this
owns what is true across hives — so a swarm runs one of them and most hives
leave it off.
Opt-in per host via services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.enable, which is
deliberately not derived from services.hyperhive.enable: turning it on is
a statement about swarm topology, not about whether hyperhive is installed.
What it does today
Serves one /health endpoint and holds no state.
That is the whole intent of the first slice. The point is to make the unit
real — service user, runtime and state directories, socket, nginx
reachability — so the swarm-level surfaces that follow have somewhere to land.
Inventing those surfaces before they are agreed would bake in a shape nobody
chose. See the hyperhive.swarm consolidation epic.
Why a unix socket, not a port
The hive-gateway's nginx is the only intended client and reaches the socket through a bind-mount. A listener that is never bound to an address cannot be reached from off-host by mistake.
The socket path is services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.socketPath, default
/run/swarm-controller/controller.sock, exported to the process as
SWARM_CONTROLLER_SOCKET.
⚠️ The socket's directory is its access control
The socket is 0666. It has to be: nginx runs as a different user and
connect(2) needs write. This matches how hive-c0re publishes the per-agent
sockets, and rests on the same argument — "the bind source dir is per-agent on
host so blast radius is unchanged."
What keeps that safe is that the directory holds one socket. So:
Never point
socketPathat a directory that carries anything else./run/hyperhiveabove all — it holdshost.sock, the host admin socket. Pointing nginx at that directory to reach this socket would put the admin socket within its reach too.
nginx is a host service, so nothing narrows what it can reach except the directory itself — that is the whole of the access control. A unit test pins the default path so a tidying edit fails instead of reviewing cleanly.
RuntimeDirectoryPreserve=yes and the daemon's stale-socket unlink on start are
a pair: preserving the directory without the unlink means bind fails with
EADDRINUSE after a restart.
Packaging
Built by the workspace derivation and extracted as its own package
(nix build .#swarm-controller). Deliberately not in nix/packages'
daemonBins — that list is the core stack and drives the bundle
services.hyperhive.c0re.package points at, so folding this in would put a
swarm-scoped service into every hive's closure.