hyperhive/nix/host-modules/glue-bao-tls.nix
müde 5704c0c583 nix: unbreak the swarm-services leaf the gateway waits on
Three defects in the store-issued path, each of which alone kept nginx
from starting at all. The gateway's cert import `Requires=` this leaf, so
a leaf that is never issued is not a name mismatch — it is an empty
listener, and the swarm's own forge stopped answering on :443.

`swarm-services-cert` declared `Before=hive-tls-ca` for the trust
bundle's sake while also being `After=` the store's container, which is
itself `After=hive-tls-ca`. systemd resolved the cycle the only way it
can, by deleting the job, so the leaf went unissued on every activation.
The edge is gone; the bundle converges the other way round, through the
restart this unit already performed when the root it wrote was new.

The `pki` mount was enabled without `-max-lease-ttl`, so bao clamped the
30-year root to the 768h default and then refused every issue call,
because a leaf of the mount's own default length would outlive the CA
signing it. The mount is tuned on every run, the role pins a 720h leaf,
and a root that can no longer cover one is replaced rather than left to
refuse forever. A hive tests its own copy of that certificate against the
same threshold, so both ends reach a fresh leaf without signalling.

`swarm-bao-pki` mints the services-issuer leaf that opens the mount, but
only `swarm-bao-certs` required it. `RemainAfterExit` plus an
already-active unit means an activation that ADDS a leaf mints nothing —
which is how a host whose config named `services-issuer.pem` came to have
no such file. A target wants it now, like every sibling granting unit.
2026-09-23 21:36:46 +02:00

239 lines
13 KiB
Nix
Raw Blame History

This file contains invisible Unicode characters

This file contains invisible Unicode characters that are indistinguishable to humans but may be processed differently by a computer. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

# Glue: give the secret store a PKI of its own, and point it at it.
#
# ONE PAIRING PER FILE — `glue-<consumer>-<what>.nix`. A single module holding
# every co-location default becomes the file nobody dares change, because a
# reader cannot tell which of its rules their deployment is subject to. Each
# of these should be deletable on its own, and deleting this one leaves a
# store that takes operator-provided certificates and nothing else.
#
# ⚠️ Why the PKI lives HERE and not in ./swarm-bao.nix: the store must have no
# opinion about where its identity comes from. Minting is an opinion — the
# most consequential one available — so it belongs to the glue that decides
# this deployment self-signs, not to the service that merely serves what it is
# handed. A deployment with a real internal CA drops this file and names its
# own paths; nothing in the store changes.
#
# ⚠️ Not the hive CA and not the swarm CA. The store will eventually
# distribute both, and an authority you must already hold a certificate from
# cannot be one the store hands out — reach the store to get the CA material,
# need a cert from that CA to reach the store. This CA signs a fixed, short
# list of leaves and distributes nothing, so it cannot enter that cycle.
#
# ⚠️ Files like this are the only place a `deploy.<foo>` value may derive from
# a `deploy.<bar>.enable`. Everywhere else that is forbidden. The exception
# earns itself: the derivation happens either way, and the alternative is
# having it spread through the service modules where it is invisible.
#
# Everything is `mkDefault`. An operator naming their own paths wins.
{
pkgs,
lib,
config,
...
}:
let
hyperhiveCfg = config.services.hyperhive;
deployCfg = hyperhiveCfg.deploy;
cfg = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.bao;
# Host-side, outside the container's tree, for the same reason the raft data
# is: `nixos-container destroy` must not take it. Losing the CA key means
# re-issuing every client certificate in the swarm.
pkiDir = "/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki";
# What a reader calls itself to the store. The hive's name, because a bao
# cert-auth role matches on the CN — this is an interface, not a label.
# No fallback: `hiveName` is asserted set for every hyperhive host, which is
# the same condition this file's `config` is gated on. A fallback here reads
# as a second supported spelling and there is no such thing.
clientCn = hyperhiveCfg.hiveName;
# $1 dir $2 basename $3 CN $4 SAN or "" $5 EKU
signLeaf = pkgs.writeShellScript "swarm-bao-sign-leaf" ''
set -euo pipefail
d="$1"; base="$2"; cn="$3"; sans="$4"; eku="$5"
csr="$(mktemp "$d/$base.csr.XXXXXX")"
ext="$(mktemp "$d/$base.ext.XXXXXX")"
trap 'rm -f "$csr" "$ext"' EXIT
openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -sha256 \
-keyout "$d/$base-key.pem" -out "$csr" -subj "/CN=$cn"
{
[ -n "$sans" ] && printf 'subjectAltName=%s\n' "$sans"
printf 'basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE\n'
printf 'keyUsage=critical,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment\n'
printf 'extendedKeyUsage=%s\n' "$eku"
} > "$ext"
openssl x509 -req -in "$csr" -CA "$d/ca.pem" -CAkey "$d/ca-key.pem" \
-CAcreateserial -days 3650 -sha256 -extfile "$ext" -out "$d/$base.pem"
chmod 0600 "$d/$base-key.pem"
chmod 0644 "$d/$base.pem"
'';
in
{
config = lib.mkIf (hyperhiveCfg.enable && deployCfg.bao.enable) {
services.hyperhive.deploy.bao = {
serverCertFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/server.pem";
serverKeyFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/server-key.pem";
clientCaFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/ca.pem";
# A reader on this host, which happens to be the host that mints. Only
# these three are what a reader elsewhere needs placed by hand; that they
# collapse to the same CA file here is a property of self-signing, not of
# the pairing.
clientCertFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/client.pem";
clientKeyFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/client-key.pem";
serverCaFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/ca.pem";
# 🩸 Four readers that used to present `client.pem` above, each now
# pointed at a leaf of its own. The leaf is what bao sees, so this pairing
# is the whole of what turns "one principal with the union of four grants"
# into four principals with one grant each — see ./swarm-bao.nix's
# `perHiveReaders` block for the grants themselves.
#
# Defaulted here rather than in four `glue-<consumer>-bao-identity.nix`
# files: those exist where the consumer is a CONTAINER with a
# `deploy.<service>.*` namespace of its own to point at. These four are
# host units reading the store, which is the pairing this file already is.
matrixTokenClientCertFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/matrix-token.pem";
matrixTokenClientKeyFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/matrix-token-key.pem";
queueAgentClientCertFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/queue-agent.pem";
queueAgentClientKeyFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/queue-agent-key.pem";
grafanaOidcClientCertFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/grafana-oidc.pem";
grafanaOidcClientKeyFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/grafana-oidc-key.pem";
otelOidcClientCertFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/otel-oidc.pem";
otelOidcClientKeyFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/otel-oidc-key.pem";
};
# Idempotent on ABSENCE, never on content. Re-issuing the CA invalidates
# every client certificate already trusting it, so a rebuild that
# "refreshed" it would lock every reader in the swarm out at once — the
# same rule the store's TPM PIN unit follows, for a sharper reason.
# Declared beside the unit it names, not in the store's module: an entry
# exists only where the unit does, and this one is minted by glue that not
# every hive runs.
services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.journaldUnits = [ "swarm-bao-pki" ];
systemd.services.swarm-bao-pki = {
description = "mint the swarm secret store's own CA and leaves";
before = [ "swarm-bao-certs.service" ];
requiredBy = [ "swarm-bao-certs.service" ];
# 🩸 A target wants this, not only `swarm-bao-certs`, and the reason is
# what happens when the LIST of leaves grows. `requiredBy` alone is
# satisfied by a unit that already ran: this one is `RemainAfterExit`,
# so an activation that adds a leaf here finds it active, pulls nothing,
# and the new leaf is never minted — while every sibling granting unit,
# each of which carries this line, was re-run by the same activation.
# That is how `services-issuer.pem` came to be missing on a host whose
# config named it, leaving `swarm-services-cert` to fail on an absent
# file until someone restarted this by hand.
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
path = [
pkgs.openssl
pkgs.coreutils
];
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
RemainAfterExit = true;
};
script = ''
set -euo pipefail
install -d -m 0700 ${pkiDir}
if [ ! -s ${pkiDir}/ca.pem ]; then
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -sha256 -days 3650 \
-keyout ${pkiDir}/ca-key.pem -out ${pkiDir}/ca.pem \
-subj "/CN=swarm-bao-ca ${cfg.domain}" \
-addext "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:0" \
-addext "keyUsage=critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign"
chmod 0600 ${pkiDir}/ca-key.pem
chmod 0644 ${pkiDir}/ca.pem
fi
# The store's own identity, and the identity of a reader on this host.
# A reader elsewhere gets its leaf from this CA out of band that is
# what makes the store reachable from another machine at all, and why
# the CA is a file rather than a service.
[ -s ${pkiDir}/server.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} server \
${lib.escapeShellArg cfg.domain} ${lib.escapeShellArg "DNS:${cfg.domain}"} serverAuth
[ -s ${pkiDir}/client.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} client \
${lib.escapeShellArg clientCn} "" clientAuth
# Minted whether or not a controller runs here, because the case it
# serves is the one where it does not: a controller elsewhere needs a
# leaf from this CA and has no way to sign one. Issuing it here turns
# "obtain a certificate out of band" into "copy this file".
#
# Its own CN rather than the reader's above: the controller's policy
# lets it create roles for every hive, and the reader's leaf carries
# this hive's name.
[ -s ${pkiDir}/controller.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} controller \
${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.controllerCommonName} "" clientAuth
# The secret publisher's, minted here for the reason the controller's
# line above gives and it serves that case more often, not less: the
# publisher runs beside AUTHELIA, which is the one host guaranteed not
# to be this one whenever the store has a host of its own.
[ -s ${pkiDir}/secret-publisher.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} secret-publisher \
${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.secretPublisherCommonName} "" clientAuth
# The matrix container's `swarm-matrix-ctl`. Minted unconditionally like the two
# above, and for the third variant of the same reason: the homeserver
# is a swarm singleton, so on every hive but the one running it this
# leaf is the file an operator copies rather than a file anything
# local reads.
#
# Its own CN, not the reader's: the reader's leaf carries this hive's
# name and its policy reads the whole store, while this principal may
# only write one path which is the entire point of giving the
# container an identity instead of lending it the hive's.
[ -s ${pkiDir}/matrix-ctl.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} matrix-ctl \
${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.matrixCtlCommonName} "" clientAuth
# 🩸 The four readers that used to present `client.pem` above. Each
# carries its own subject, which is the entire mechanism: bao matches a
# cert-auth role on the CN, so four units sharing one leaf were one
# principal holding the union of four grants, and the union included
# every agent credential in the swarm.
#
# The first two carry THIS hive's name in the subject, unlike the
# three service leaves above. Their grants name one hive's path, because
# a matrix token and a queue credential live under `swarm/hives/<name>/`
# and every hive runs a reader for its own; ./swarm-bao.nix writes one
# role per hive in the swarm directory to match. The two OIDC readers
# need no such segment a client is registered once per swarm.
#
# Minted whether or not the consumer runs here, for the reason the three
# leaves above give: on a hive that does not run the store this is the
# file an operator copies, and a leaf that only appears where its
# consumer does is one nobody can copy from anywhere.
[ -s ${pkiDir}/matrix-token.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} matrix-token \
${lib.escapeShellArg "${deployCfg.bao.matrixTokenCommonNamePrefix}-${clientCn}"} "" clientAuth
[ -s ${pkiDir}/queue-agent.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} queue-agent \
${lib.escapeShellArg "${deployCfg.bao.queueAgentCommonNamePrefix}-${clientCn}"} "" clientAuth
[ -s ${pkiDir}/grafana-oidc.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} grafana-oidc \
${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.grafanaOidcCommonName} "" clientAuth
[ -s ${pkiDir}/otel-oidc.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} otel-oidc \
${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.otelOidcCommonName} "" clientAuth
# The identity a hive presents to ask the store's `pki` mount for the
# swarm-services certificate its gateway serves. Minted here like the
# three above, and the reason is the sharpest of the four: this leaf
# is what OPENS the mint, so it cannot come out of it. A certificate
# authority that issues the credential admitting you to it is the
# cycle this file's header exists to keep out which is exactly why
# the swarm-services root moved into the store and this one did not.
#
# Its own CN, not the reader's: the hive's own leaf reads every secret
# its policy names, while this principal may do one thing `update`
# on `pki/issue/swarm-services` and giving a renewal unit the wider
# credential would undo the separation the role was created for.
[ -s ${pkiDir}/services-issuer.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} services-issuer \
${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.servicesIssuerCommonName} "" clientAuth
'';
};
};
}