hyperhive/hive-c0re/src/matrix.rs

//! Optional matrix-tuwunel wiring: the hive's appservice identity (host) +
//! per-agent account creation → `<agent-state>/matrix-token`. No-op
//! when the `hive-matrix` container isn't running, so operators who
//! haven't flipped `services.hyperhive.deploy.matrix.enable = true` pay
//! nothing.
//!
//! Accounts are created **as the hive's appservice**, not by presenting a
//! shared registration token in a UIAA flow. The difference that matters
//! here is not the round-trip count: an appservice token is an *identity*
//! the homeserver knows, so the secret never has to be the same on both
//! sides of the wire, and account creation does not depend on registration
//! being open to anyone who learns a token.
//!
//! See `docs/integrations/matrix.md::Provisioning flow (appservice)` for the
//! registration file's shape, how its token reaches both halves, and the
//! host/container bind-mount layout.

use std::path::PathBuf;

use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use reqwest::StatusCode;

use crate::coordinator::Coordinator;

/// Client-server API base this daemon provisions against, from
/// `HIVE_MATRIX_API_URL` (set by the hyperhive NixOS module from
/// `services.hyperhive.swarm.matrix.apiUrl`).
///
/// `None` means **this hive has no homeserver to provision against** and
/// every matrix path no-ops — see [`is_present`]. There is deliberately no
/// fallback: `localhost:8008` is right only when the homeserver happens to
/// share this daemon's netns, and an address baked into the binary is one
/// that builds fine and then talks to the wrong machine. The nix module
/// supplies the loopback address when it is itself the thing running
/// tuwunel, where it is not a guess but a fact about what it just started.
///
/// Also not an agent-facing address either way. An agent has its own netns;
/// agents are handed the gateway vhost via `HIVE_MATRIX_URL`, and get
/// nothing at all when the hive has no vhost to offer.
fn matrix_http() -> Option<&'static str> {
    static BASE: std::sync::OnceLock<Option<String>> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
    BASE.get_or_init(|| std::env::var("HIVE_MATRIX_API_URL").ok())
        .as_deref()
}

/// [`matrix_http`] for the call sites that propagate with `?`.
///
/// # Errors
/// When no homeserver is configured. Reaching one of these paths at all
/// means an [`is_present`] gate was skipped, so the message names that
/// rather than the missing variable.
fn matrix_base() -> Result<&'static str> {
    matrix_http().context(
        "matrix: no homeserver configured \
         (services.hyperhive.swarm.matrix.apiUrl / HIVE_MATRIX_API_URL) — \
         this path should have been gated on matrix::is_present()",
    )
}
/// HTTP timeout for registration round-trips. Account creation is one
/// POST; even the slow path should finish well inside this budget.
const HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 10;
/// Length (bytes) of the throwaway per-agent matrix password. Random
/// 32-byte hex — agents never log in with the password (they
/// authenticate by `access_token`), so it's protocol overhead. We
/// store it nowhere.
const PASSWORD_BYTES: usize = 32;

/// Matrix localpart for the hive system admin account. Not an agent; has
/// no state dir.
///
/// Also the `sender_localpart` of the hive's appservice registration,
/// which is what creates this account on a homeserver that has never had
/// one: the homeserver creates a registration's sender user itself, at
/// startup, before it accepts a request. See
/// `nix/host-modules/hive-matrix.nix`, where this same literal appears as
/// `hiveLocalpart`. **The two must match**; nothing wires an override
/// across.
///
/// An ordinary account, with no homeserver-admin standing: what it
/// provisions — the Space, the chat room, the invites — it provisions as
/// the creator of those rooms.
pub const HIVE_LOCALPART: &str = "hive";

/// Display name of the hive Space. Plain text, no special characters, so
/// the Space stays rediscoverable by name (no room alias needed) even when
/// the persisted room-id file is lost — preventing duplicate spaces from
/// being created on the next sweep.
pub const HIVE_SPACE_NAME: &str = "hive";

/// Display name of the default "hive chat" room — the `m.space.child` of
/// the hive Space that every agent + the operator can join. Plain text so
/// it stays rediscoverable by name (mirrors [`HIVE_SPACE_NAME`]) when the
/// persisted room-id file is lost, preventing duplicate chat rooms.
pub const HIVE_CHAT_ROOM_NAME: &str = "hive-chat";

/// Topic for the default hive chat room.
const HIVE_CHAT_ROOM_TOPIC: &str =
    "Hive-wide chat for all agents and the operator. Auto-provisioned by hive-c0re.";

/// Host path for the `@hive:` account's matrix access token. Outside every
/// purgeable path — not deleted by `destroy --purge` on any agent.
#[must_use]
pub fn hive_token_path() -> PathBuf {
    crate::paths::matrix_hive_token()
}

/// Token file inside the agent's bind-mounted state dir (visible as
/// `/state/matrix-token` from inside the container).
fn token_path(name: &hive_types::Ident) -> PathBuf {
    Coordinator::agent_notes_dir(name).join("matrix-token")
}

/// Password file for the agent's matrix account. Stored OUTSIDE the
/// purgeable `agent_state_root` tree so it survives `destroy --purge`
/// and allows re-login recovery when the same agent name is re-spawned.
///
/// Path: `/var/lib/hyperhive/matrix/creds/<name>-password`
///
/// The token file lives inside the agent's bind-mounted state dir (under
/// `agent_notes_dir`) so the agent container can read it; the password
/// file is host-side only (agents never log in by password — they use
/// the access token exclusively) and belongs with other hive-c0re
/// credential state, not inside the purgeable per-agent tree.
fn password_path(name: &str) -> PathBuf {
    crate::paths::matrix_creds_dir().join(format!("{name}-password"))
}

/// Legacy password path (inside the old purgeable `agent_notes_dir`).
/// Used only during the one-time migration in [`ensure_user_for`] to
/// move credentials from old deployments to the new location. Safe to
/// call after `destroy --purge` — the path will simply not exist and
/// the migration is a no-op.
fn legacy_password_path(name: &hive_types::Ident) -> PathBuf {
    Coordinator::agent_notes_dir(name).join("matrix-password")
}

/// Host path where the hive Matrix Space room ID is persisted.
/// Outside every purgeable path — not deleted by `destroy --purge`.
#[must_use]
pub fn hive_space_room_id_path() -> PathBuf {
    crate::paths::matrix_space_room_id()
}

/// Host path where the default hive chat room ID is persisted. Outside
/// every purgeable path — not deleted by `destroy --purge`.
#[must_use]
pub fn hive_chat_room_id_path() -> PathBuf {
    crate::paths::matrix_chat_room_id()
}

/// Whether this hive has a homeserver to provision against.
///
/// **A configured API URL, not a local container.** It used to scan
/// `nixos-container list` for `hive-matrix`, which answers a different
/// question — "is the homeserver a container on this host" — and so made a
/// remote homeserver silently no-op no matter how it was addressed. The
/// nix module still supplies the loopback URL whenever it runs tuwunel
/// itself, so a co-located hive behaves exactly as before.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_present() -> bool {
    matrix_http().is_some()
}

/// Read `n` cryptographic-quality bytes from `/dev/urandom` and return
/// them hex-encoded. Avoids pulling a workspace `rand` dep just for
/// 32 bytes of randomness; the kernel's CSPRNG is more than enough for
/// a long-lived shared secret on the same host.
fn random_hex(n: usize) -> Result<String> {
    use std::io::Read;
    let mut buf = vec![0_u8; n];
    let mut f = std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom").context("open /dev/urandom")?;
    f.read_exact(&mut buf).context("read /dev/urandom")?;
    let mut hex = String::with_capacity(n * 2);
    for b in &buf {
        use std::fmt::Write as _;
        write!(hex, "{b:02x}").ok();
    }
    Ok(hex)
}

/// Read the hive's appservice token — the `as_token` of the registration
/// the homeserver loaded at boot. Every account this module creates is
/// authorised by it.
///
/// **Reads, never mints**, unlike the registration token it replaced.
/// That token was the whole agreement, so whichever side wrote it first
/// was right; this one has a second half — the registration file naming
/// it, which only the nix side writes. A token minted here would be a
/// token the homeserver has never heard of, and the failure would surface
/// as every request being refused rather than as a missing file.
///
/// # Errors
/// When the file is absent or empty. That means the host activation
/// script has not run on this generation yet; callers log it and leave
/// existing accounts alone rather than trying to proceed.
pub fn read_appservice_token() -> Result<String> {
    let path = crate::paths::matrix_appservice_token();
    std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
        .ok()
        .map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
        .with_context(|| {
            format!(
                "matrix appservice token not found at {} — it is minted by the \
                 hive-matrix activation script, which also renders the registration \
                 file naming it; deploy the hive-matrix module (or re-run \
                 `nixos-rebuild switch`) before provisioning matrix users",
                path.display()
            )
        })
}

/// Build the localpart of a matrix user id for `agent`. Matrix
/// usernames are 1-255 chars from the `[a-z0-9._=-/]` alphabet; agent
/// names already conform (hyperhive enforces a strict subset), so no
/// escaping is needed at the boundary.
fn user_localpart(agent: &str) -> &str {
    agent
}

/// Send the registration POST as the appservice and parse the response.
/// Returns `Ok((status, body))` on any completed HTTP round-trip
/// (including the `M_USER_IN_USE` 400 the caller treats as "already
/// exists"); errors only on transport failure.
async fn register_post(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    as_token: &str,
    body: &serde_json::Value,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, serde_json::Value)> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    let url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/register");
    let resp = client
        .post(&url)
        .bearer_auth(as_token)
        .json(body)
        .send()
        .await
        .context("matrix: POST /register")?;
    let status = resp.status();
    let json = resp
        .json::<serde_json::Value>()
        .await
        .context("matrix: parse /register response")?;
    Ok((status, json))
}

/// Generate a throwaway random password for matrix UIAA registration.
/// `PASSWORD_BYTES` raw bytes ⇒ 64-char hex string. Agents authenticate
/// by `access_token` so the password is protocol overhead we never
/// persist; the operator path in `hivectl` lets the caller supply a
/// real password instead so they can log into a matrix web client
/// (`m.login.password`).
pub fn random_password() -> Result<String> {
    random_hex(PASSWORD_BYTES)
}

/// Create the matrix account for `agent` as the hive's appservice and
/// return an access token for it. One round-trip: an appservice-typed
/// registration needs no UIAA stage at all, so there is no session to
/// carry and no shared secret to present.
///
/// The account is created **by** the appservice but is an ordinary user
/// afterwards — it gets its own device and its own access token, and the
/// agent authenticates with that rather than with anything the hive
/// holds. The `as_token` never leaves the host.
///
/// Caller picks the password: agents use [`random_password`] (throwaway
/// — they auth by `access_token`), operators on the `hivectl` path
/// supply their own so they can log into matrix web clients.
///
/// # Errors
/// Propagates the homeserver's own body, which is what the
/// `M_USER_IN_USE` callers match on. A `M_EXCLUSIVE` body means the
/// localpart falls outside the appservice's namespace — the registration
/// file's `namespaces.users` regex is the place to look, not this call.
async fn register_user(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    agent: &str,
    as_token: &str,
    password: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
    let localpart = user_localpart(agent);
    let body = serde_json::json!({
        // What makes this an appservice registration rather than an
        // ordinary one. Without it the homeserver treats the request as a
        // normal client's and asks for a UIAA flow — even holding the
        // as_token.
        "type": "m.login.application_service",
        "username": localpart,
        "password": password,
        // device_id stays stable across re-runs of ensure_user_for so
        // a re-mint doesn't strand orphan devices in tuwunel.
        "device_id": format!("hyperhive-{agent}"),
        "initial_device_display_name": format!("hyperhive ({agent})"),
        "inhibit_login": false,
    });
    let (status, body) = register_post(client, as_token, &body).await?;
    if !status.is_success() {
        anyhow::bail!("matrix: /register as appservice HTTP {status}, body: {body}");
    }
    extract_access_token(&body)
}

/// Log in as an **existing** account using the hive's appservice token,
/// and return a fresh access token for it. No password involved: the
/// appservice is authorised for every localpart in its namespace, so it
/// can mint a session for one without knowing anything about the account.
///
/// This is the recovery path that used to need a stored password or an
/// admin-room password reset — an account whose token file was lost is
/// re-tokened from the hive's own identity instead. The device id matches
/// [`register_user`]'s, so a re-login replaces that device's token rather
/// than accumulating devices.
async fn appservice_login(client: &reqwest::Client, as_token: &str, agent: &str) -> Result<String> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    let url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/login");
    let body = serde_json::json!({
        "type": "m.login.application_service",
        "identifier": {
            "type": "m.id.user",
            "user": user_localpart(agent),
        },
        "device_id": format!("hyperhive-{agent}"),
        "initial_device_display_name": format!("hyperhive ({agent})"),
    });
    let resp = client
        .post(&url)
        .bearer_auth(as_token)
        .json(&body)
        .send()
        .await
        .context("matrix: POST /login as appservice")?;
    let status = resp.status();
    let json = resp
        .json::<serde_json::Value>()
        .await
        .context("matrix: parse appservice /login response")?;
    if !status.is_success() {
        anyhow::bail!("matrix: appservice /login HTTP {status} for {agent}, body: {json}");
    }
    extract_access_token(&json)
}

/// Pull `access_token` out of a successful /register response.
fn extract_access_token(body: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<String> {
    body["access_token"]
        .as_str()
        .map(str::to_owned)
        .with_context(|| format!("matrix: missing access_token in response: {body}"))
}

/// Login with `m.login.password` and return the access token. Fallback
/// for when registration fails with `M_USER_IN_USE` — the account
/// already exists in the homeserver but the token file was lost. Fails
/// if the stored password no longer matches (e.g. homeserver wiped),
/// in which case manual recovery via `hivectl matrix create-user` is
/// required.
async fn login_user(client: &reqwest::Client, agent: &str, password: &str) -> Result<String> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    let url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/login");
    let body = serde_json::json!({
        "type": "m.login.password",
        "identifier": {
            "type": "m.id.user",
            "user": user_localpart(agent),
        },
        "password": password,
        "device_id": format!("hyperhive-{agent}"),
        "initial_device_display_name": format!("hyperhive ({agent})"),
    });
    let resp = client
        .post(&url)
        .json(&body)
        .send()
        .await
        .context("matrix: POST /login")?;
    let status = resp.status();
    let json = resp
        .json::<serde_json::Value>()
        .await
        .context("matrix: parse /login response")?;
    if !status.is_success() {
        anyhow::bail!("matrix: /login HTTP {status} for agent {agent}, body: {json}");
    }
    extract_access_token(&json)
}

/// Auto-recovery helper: reset a user's matrix password through the admin
/// room when the locally stored password is missing. Returns the new
/// password (already persisted to [`password_path`]) on success.
///
/// ⚠️ Needs an **admin sender**, which `@hive:` is not — the reset is a
/// `!admin` command and tuwunel only treats a message as a command when
/// its sender is an admin in that room. So this recovery path fails until
/// the two admin operations are rehomed at swarm level; the ordinary
/// route (the stored password, or an appservice login) is unaffected.
///
/// Called by [`ensure_user_for`] when registration returns `M_USER_IN_USE`
/// but the password file is absent — covers the case where agent state dirs
/// were wiped but the homeserver still has the accounts.
async fn auto_reset_password(client: &reqwest::Client, name: &str) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
    let hive_token = read_hive_token()
        .context("matrix: the @hive: access token is unavailable for auto-recovery")?;
    let server_name = discover_server_name(client)
        .await
        .context("matrix: discover_server_name for auto-recovery")?;
    let effective_password = reset_user_password(client, &hive_token, name, &server_name)
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("matrix: admin-room password reset for {name} (auto-recovery)"))?;
    tracing::info!(%name, "matrix: auto-recovered password via admin-room reset");
    Ok(effective_password)
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Admin-room fallback for password reset
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Percent-encode a matrix room ID for use in a URL path segment.
/// Only `:` needs encoding; `!` and alphanumerics are path-safe.
fn encode_room_id_for_url(room_id: &str) -> String {
    room_id.replace(':', "%3A")
}

/// Look up the room ID for the `#admins:<server>` alias.
async fn discover_admin_room_id(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    server_name: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    // #admins:server → %23admins%3A<server>
    let encoded_alias = format!("%23admins%3A{server_name}");
    let url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/directory/room/{encoded_alias}");
    let resp = client
        .get(&url)
        .bearer_auth(hive_token)
        .send()
        .await
        .context("matrix: GET admin room alias")?;
    let status = resp.status();
    let json = resp
        .json::<serde_json::Value>()
        .await
        .context("matrix: parse admin room alias response")?;
    if !status.is_success() {
        anyhow::bail!("matrix: admin room alias lookup failed: HTTP {status}, body: {json}");
    }
    json["room_id"]
        .as_str()
        .map(ToString::to_string)
        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("matrix: admin room alias response missing room_id: {json}"))
}

/// Extract the new password from a conduit/tuwunel admin-room reset reply.
///
/// The admin bot always renders the new password as a backtick code span.
/// The live reply observed in the `#admins` room is:
///   "Successfully reset the password for user @x:server: `<password>`"
/// The surrounding prose varies between builds (the delimiter is `: ` after
/// the user id, not `" to:"`), so we anchor on the code span rather than
/// parsing the prose. Returns the content of the first backtick pair when the
/// message is a password-reset success.
///
/// Guard: an error reply can also code-span the *user id* ("@x:server"); a
/// real password has no whitespace and isn't a `@localpart:server` id, so we
/// reject that shape and return `None`. On `None` the caller surfaces the
/// timeout and `admin_room_send_and_poll` logs the unparsed body — so a
/// future format change is visible rather than silently mis-parsed.
fn extract_new_password(bot_message: &str) -> Option<String> {
    // Only consider password-reset success replies.
    if !bot_message.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("password") {
        return None;
    }
    // Content of the first backtick code span.
    let open = bot_message.find('`')?;
    let after = &bot_message[open + 1..];
    let close = after.find('`')?;
    let pw = &after[..close];
    // Reject a code-spanned matrix user id from an error reply, and any
    // multi-token span — generated passwords are a single whitespace-free run.
    if pw.is_empty()
        || pw.contains(char::is_whitespace)
        || (pw.starts_with('@') && pw.contains(':'))
    {
        return None;
    }
    Some(pw.to_owned())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod extract_new_password_tests {
    use super::extract_new_password;

    #[test]
    fn conduit_live_admin_room_format() {
        // The exact reply observed in the live #admins room: ": " after the
        // user id, password in a backtick code span.
        let msg = "Successfully reset the password for user @triage:pr1ma.darkest.space: `hVfa6TpvIKnADoEJNWn9saHoI`";
        assert_eq!(
            extract_new_password(msg).as_deref(),
            Some("hVfa6TpvIKnADoEJNWn9saHoI")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn backtick_span_anywhere_in_prose() {
        // Wording around the code span is irrelevant — we anchor on the span.
        let msg = "Done. New password is: `hunter2` (store it now)";
        assert_eq!(extract_new_password(msg).as_deref(), Some("hunter2"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn password_with_symbols_inside_span() {
        // '@' mid-token is fine — only a leading "@…:…" user-id shape is rejected.
        let msg =
            "Successfully reset the password for user @atlas:pr1ma.darkest.space: `N3wP@ss-w0rd!`";
        assert_eq!(extract_new_password(msg).as_deref(), Some("N3wP@ss-w0rd!"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn codespan_userid_in_error_not_mistaken_for_password() {
        // An error that code-spans the user id must not yield it as a password.
        let msg = "Failed to reset password for `@sock:pr1ma.darkest.space` — user not found";
        assert_eq!(extract_new_password(msg), None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn no_codespan_returns_none() {
        // No backtick span → unparseable here; the caller logs the raw body
        // so a genuinely new format surfaces instead of being mis-parsed.
        let msg = "Password reset complete. New password is: abc123XYZ";
        assert_eq!(extract_new_password(msg), None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn non_password_message_returns_none() {
        let msg = "Command not recognised. Please try again.";
        assert_eq!(extract_new_password(msg), None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_codespan_returns_none() {
        let msg = "Successfully reset the password for user @x:server: ``";
        assert_eq!(extract_new_password(msg), None);
    }
}

/// Send a command to the Matrix admin room and poll for a bot response.
///
/// Strategy: send the command, capture its `event_id`, then poll backwards
/// (`dir=b&limit=20`) on each tick. Events in a backward response are
/// newest-first; we walk the list until we find our own command `event_id`,
/// then stop — everything before that marker in the list is a response that
/// arrived *after* our command. We check `body` and `formatted_body` of
/// every non-self message in that window.
///
/// This avoids forward-pagination token direction issues that occur with
/// some tuwunel builds: backward fetches are always anchored at the live
/// timeline end and need no stored token.
///
/// Generic over `T` so both password-returning and `()` callers share the loop.
async fn admin_room_send_and_poll<T>(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    server_name: &str,
    room_url: &str,
    command: &str,
    check: impl Fn(&str) -> Option<T>,
) -> Result<T> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    // Send the command; record the event_id so we can use it as an anchor.
    let txn_id = random_hex(8)?;
    let send_url =
        format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{room_url}/send/m.room.message/{txn_id}");
    let send_resp = client
        .put(&send_url)
        .bearer_auth(hive_token)
        .json(&serde_json::json!({"msgtype": "m.text", "body": command}))
        .send()
        .await
        .context("matrix: PUT admin room message")?;
    if !send_resp.status().is_success() {
        let body = send_resp
            .json::<serde_json::Value>()
            .await
            .unwrap_or_default();
        anyhow::bail!("matrix: admin room send failed: {body}");
    }
    let send_json = send_resp
        .json::<serde_json::Value>()
        .await
        .unwrap_or_default();
    let our_event_id = send_json["event_id"].as_str().unwrap_or("").to_owned();

    // Poll for bot response: fetch the 20 most recent events (newest-first)
    // on each tick. Walk the list until we hit our own command event_id;
    // everything *before* that marker arrived after our command.
    let own_user_id = format!("@{HIVE_LOCALPART}:{server_name}");
    let poll_url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{room_url}/messages?dir=b&limit=20");
    for _ in 0..15_u8 {
        tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
        let poll_json = client
            .get(&poll_url)
            .bearer_auth(hive_token)
            .send()
            .await
            .context("matrix: admin room poll")?
            .json::<serde_json::Value>()
            .await
            .context("matrix: parse admin room poll response")?;

        if let Some(events) = poll_json["chunk"].as_array() {
            for event in events {
                // Stop as soon as we reach our own command — everything
                // older (further into the list) predates our request.
                // If our_event_id is empty (malformed PUT response), we skip
                // this guard and inspect all 20 events — slight risk of a
                // false match from an older response, but an acceptable fallback.
                if !our_event_id.is_empty()
                    && event["event_id"].as_str() == Some(our_event_id.as_str())
                {
                    break;
                }
                if event["type"].as_str() != Some("m.room.message") {
                    continue;
                }
                if event["sender"].as_str() == Some(own_user_id.as_str()) {
                    continue;
                }
                // Check both plain body and formatted_body (HTML) — some
                // admin bots put the password only in formatted_body.
                let body = event["content"]["body"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
                let formatted = event["content"]["formatted_body"]
                    .as_str()
                    .unwrap_or_default();
                for text in [body, formatted] {
                    if let Some(result) = check(text) {
                        return Ok(result);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    anyhow::bail!(
        "matrix: admin room command timed out after 15 seconds. \
         Command: '{command}'. No matching bot response received."
    )
}

/// Reset a user's password via the Matrix admin room (`#admins:<server>`).
/// Sends `!admin users reset-password @<localpart>:<server>` as @hive, polls for the bot's
/// response containing the new password.
///
/// Returns the new password; caller is responsible for persisting it.
async fn admin_room_reset_password(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    server_name: &str,
    localpart: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
    let room_id = discover_admin_room_id(client, hive_token, server_name).await?;
    let room_url = encode_room_id_for_url(&room_id);
    let command = format!("!admin users reset-password @{localpart}:{server_name}");
    admin_room_send_and_poll(
        client,
        hive_token,
        server_name,
        &room_url,
        &command,
        extract_new_password,
    )
    .await
    .with_context(|| {
        format!(
            "matrix: admin room reset-password for @{localpart}:{server_name}: \
                 no password response received within 15 seconds. \
                 Verify the admin room accepts '!admin users reset-password @user:server' commands."
        )
    })
}

/// Ensure `name` has a matrix user + token file on the local
/// homeserver. Skips provisioning entirely if the token file already
/// exists (treating a present token as proof the account is good).
/// To force re-provisioning, delete the token file.
///
/// When registration fails with `M_USER_IN_USE` (account exists in the
/// homeserver but the token file was deleted) this falls back to
/// `m.login.password` using the persisted `matrix-password` file. If
/// that file is also missing, recovery requires manual intervention:
/// `hivectl matrix create-user <name> --password <pw>`.
///
/// `client` is shared across the sweep so we build one reqwest
/// connection pool for all agents rather than one per call.
pub async fn ensure_user_for(client: &reqwest::Client, name: &str, as_token: &str) -> Result<()> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    let agent = hive_types::Ident::parse(name)
        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid agent name {name:?}: {e}"))?;
    let path = token_path(&agent);
    if path.exists()
        && let Ok(existing) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
        && !existing.trim().is_empty()
    {
        tracing::debug!(%name, "matrix: token already present");
        return Ok(());
    }

    // One-time migration: move the password from the old location inside
    // agent_notes_dir (purgeable) to the new location outside it.
    let new_pw_path = password_path(name);
    let old_pw_path = legacy_password_path(&agent);
    if !new_pw_path.exists() && old_pw_path.exists() {
        if let Some(parent) = new_pw_path.parent() {
            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
        }
        if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&old_pw_path, &new_pw_path) {
            // Rename across filesystems or read-only src — copy + delete.
            if let Ok(content) = std::fs::read(&old_pw_path) {
                if std::fs::write(&new_pw_path, &content).is_ok() {
                    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&old_pw_path);
                    tracing::info!(%name, "matrix: migrated password file to non-purgeable location");
                }
            } else {
                tracing::warn!(%name, rename_error = ?e, "matrix: password migration failed — could not read old path (old path stays)");
            }
        } else {
            tracing::info!(%name, "matrix: migrated password file to non-purgeable location");
        }
    }

    let password = random_password()?;
    let access_token = match register_user(client, name, as_token, &password).await {
        Ok(token) => {
            // Successful registration — persist the password so we can
            // fall back to login if the token file is deleted later.
            let pw_path = password_path(name);
            if let Some(parent) = pw_path.parent() {
                std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
            }
            if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&pw_path, format!("{password}\n")) {
                tracing::warn!(%name, error = ?e, "matrix: failed to persist password (token still saved)");
            } else {
                let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&pw_path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
            }
            token
        }
        Err(reg_err) if reg_err.to_string().contains("M_USER_IN_USE") => {
            // Account already exists and its token file was lost. The
            // appservice can mint a session for any account in its
            // namespace, so this needs no password and no admin rights —
            // try it before the password paths below, which exist for
            // accounts created before the appservice did (or named
            // outside its namespace) and stay as the fallback.
            tracing::info!(%name, "matrix: user already exists, logging in as the appservice");
            match appservice_login(client, as_token, name).await {
                Ok(token) => return finish_user_provisioning(name, &token).await,
                Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
                    %name,
                    error = ?e,
                    "matrix: appservice login failed; falling back to the stored password"
                ),
            }
            let pw_path = password_path(name);
            let stored = if let Some(pw) = std::fs::read_to_string(&pw_path)
                .ok()
                .map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
                .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
            {
                pw
            } else {
                // Password file missing — attempt auto-recovery through the
                // admin room.
                // This covers the case where agent state dirs were wiped but the
                // homeserver still has the accounts. Requires the `@hive:`
                // token at /var/lib/hyperhive/matrix/access-token, and an admin
                // sender, which `@hive:` no longer is.
                tracing::info!(
                    %name,
                    "matrix: stored password missing, attempting admin-room auto-recovery"
                );
                match auto_reset_password(client, name).await {
                    Ok(new_pw) => new_pw,
                    Err(e) => {
                        anyhow::bail!(
                            "matrix: user {name} already exists but password is missing \
                                 and admin auto-recovery failed ({e:#}) — run:\n\
                                 hivectl matrix reset-password {name}\n\
                                 hivectl matrix create-user {name}"
                        )
                    }
                }
            };
            login_user(client, name, &stored).await.with_context(|| {
                format!(
                    "matrix: login fallback for {name} failed — if homeserver was wiped, delete \
                     the matrix-password file and retry"
                )
            })?
        }
        Err(other) => return Err(other),
    };

    finish_user_provisioning(name, &access_token).await
}

/// Persist a freshly-obtained agent access token and kick the agent's
/// matrix daemon. Shared by every way [`ensure_user_for`] can end up
/// holding a token — creation, appservice login, password login — so a
/// new recovery path cannot forget half of it.
async fn finish_user_provisioning(name: &str, access_token: &str) -> Result<()> {
    // Write the token via hive-priv (root helper): hive-c0re runs as the
    // unprivileged `hive-core` user and cannot write to agent-owned state
    // directories directly. hive-priv writes the file 0600 and chowns it
    // to the agent user so it is readable from inside the container.
    crate::priv_client::write_agent_matrix_token(name, access_token, None, None)
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("matrix: write matrix-token for {name} via hive-priv"))?;
    tracing::info!(%name, "matrix: provisioned access token");

    // Kick the daemon so it picks up the new token without waiting for a
    // full container restart — see docs/integrations/matrix.md::Provisioning flow.
    if let Err(e) = crate::priv_client::restart_matrix_daemon(name).await {
        tracing::warn!(%name, error = ?e, "matrix: could not restart hive-matrix-daemon (token written; daemon will reload on next container start)");
    } else {
        tracing::info!(%name, "matrix: restarted hive-matrix-daemon to pick up new token");
    }

    Ok(())
}

/// Register a matrix account for `name` with the supplied `password`
/// and return the freshly-minted access token. Unlike [`ensure_user_for`],
/// the token is **not** persisted to disk — the caller is responsible
/// for storing it. Used by `hivectl matrix create-user` for human
/// (non-agent) accounts so we don't create stray
/// `/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/<name>/` directories for users that
/// aren't agents. For operator accounts the caller passes a real
/// password so the operator can `m.login.password` into matrix web
/// clients afterwards; for headless agent re-provisioning the caller
/// can pass [`random_password`] to keep the existing throwaway
/// behaviour.
///
/// **Not idempotent** (unlike [`crate::forge::provision_user_token`]): the
/// matrix `/register` endpoint returns `M_USER_IN_USE` (HTTP 400) on a
/// second call for the same localpart, appservice-authorised or not.
/// Callers re-running this for a known-existing matrix user should expect
/// a hard error from this fn and route to a password-reset path instead.
pub async fn provision_user_token(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    name: &str,
    as_token: &str,
    password: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
    register_user(client, name, as_token, password).await
}

/// Per-agent matrix sync: ensure the agent has a matrix account + token.
/// All operations are idempotent; failures are logged as warnings but
/// don't abort the caller.
pub async fn sync_agent(client: &reqwest::Client, name: &str, as_token: &str) {
    if let Err(e) = ensure_user_for(client, name, as_token).await {
        tracing::warn!(%name, error = ?e, "matrix: ensure_user failed");
    }
}

/// Standalone per-agent sync that handles its own setup: checks if
/// hive-matrix is present, reads the appservice token, and builds
/// an HTTP client before delegating to [`sync_agent`]. Mirrors the
/// setup in [`ensure_all`] so the rebuild path and the startup sweep
/// stay equivalent. No-op when the matrix container is absent.
pub async fn sync_agent_standalone(name: &str) {
    if !is_present() {
        return;
    }
    let as_token = match read_appservice_token() {
        Ok(t) => t,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(%name, error = ?e, "matrix: read_appservice_token failed");
            return;
        }
    };
    let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECS))
        .build()
    {
        Ok(c) => c,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(%name, error = ?e, "matrix: build HTTP client failed");
            return;
        }
    };
    sync_agent(&client, name, &as_token).await;
}

/// Ensure the `@hive:` matrix user exists and that its access token is
/// persisted at [`hive_token_path()`].
///
/// **Nothing here depends on registration order, and nothing here is
/// privileged.** The account used to have to be the first ever
/// registered, to win tuwunel's automatic first-user grant — a rule that
/// cannot fire for an appservice-created account at all. It is now an
/// ordinary account: the homeserver creates it because it is the
/// appservice registration's `sender_localpart`, and everything the hive
/// provisions with it, it provisions as the creator of those rooms.
///
/// Idempotent — skips the account work when the token file already exists
/// and is non-empty.
///
/// The token is taken from the **swarm secret store** when it is there:
/// `swarm-matrix-minter`, the oneshot inside the matrix container, publishes
/// it under an identity of its own, and taking it from there is what lets a
/// hive that holds no `as_token` have an admin at all. The mint ladder below
/// stays as the fallback for a store that is empty, unconfigured or
/// unreachable — which is every swarm whose matrix container predates that
/// minter.
pub async fn ensure_hive_user(client: &reqwest::Client, as_token: &str) -> Result<()> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    let path = hive_token_path();
    if path.exists()
        && let Ok(existing) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
        && !existing.trim().is_empty()
    {
        tracing::debug!("matrix: the @hive: access token is already present");
        return Ok(());
    }
    if let Some(token) = stored_hive_token().await {
        return persist_hive_token(&path, &token);
    }
    let password = random_password()?;
    let access_token = match register_user(client, HIVE_LOCALPART, as_token, &password).await {
        Ok(token) => {
            let pw_path = password_path(HIVE_LOCALPART);
            if let Some(parent) = pw_path.parent() {
                std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
            }
            if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&pw_path, format!("{password}\n")) {
                tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: failed to persist the @hive: account password");
            } else {
                let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&pw_path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
            }
            token
        }
        Err(reg_err) if reg_err.to_string().contains("M_USER_IN_USE") => {
            // The expected path, not an edge case: this account is the
            // appservice's own `sender_localpart`, so the homeserver
            // creates it when it loads the registration — before
            // hive-c0re gets a chance to ask. An appservice login needs
            // no password, which is just as well since an account the
            // homeserver created has none.
            tracing::info!("matrix: the @hive: user already exists, logging in as the appservice");
            match appservice_login(client, as_token, HIVE_LOCALPART).await {
                Ok(token) => token,
                Err(e) => {
                    tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: appservice login for @hive: failed; falling back to the stored password");
                    let pw_path = password_path(HIVE_LOCALPART);
                    let stored = std::fs::read_to_string(&pw_path)
                        .ok()
                        .map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
                        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
                        .with_context(|| {
                            format!(
                                "matrix: the @hive: user exists, appservice login failed, and no \
                                 password is stored at {} — check that the registration file's \
                                 namespace covers @{HIVE_LOCALPART} and that the homeserver \
                                 loaded it",
                                pw_path.display()
                            )
                        })?;
                    login_user(client, HIVE_LOCALPART, &stored).await?
                }
            }
        }
        Err(other) => return Err(other),
    };
    persist_hive_token(&path, &access_token)
}

/// Write the `@hive:` account's access token to `path`, 0600, creating the
/// directory if it is not there.
///
/// Shared by both arms of [`ensure_hive_user`] rather than duplicated into
/// the store one: the file's mode is the only thing keeping an unprivileged
/// reader off the hive's matrix credential, and a second copy of that decision
/// is one that can be edited alone.
fn persist_hive_token(path: &std::path::Path, access_token: &str) -> Result<()> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;

    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
    }
    std::fs::write(path, format!("{access_token}\n")).with_context(|| {
        format!(
            "matrix: write the @hive: access token to {}",
            path.display()
        )
    })?;
    let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
    tracing::info!(path = %path.display(), "matrix: provisioned the @hive: access token");
    Ok(())
}

/// Fetch the `@hive:` access token `swarm-matrix-minter` published, under
/// this hive's own store identity.
///
/// The cert role is the hive's name, straight out of `HYPERHIVE_HIVE_NAME` —
/// the same role string `workers::credential` logs in with, and already in
/// this process's environment, so the store read costs no plumbing through
/// [`ensure_all`]. No new grant either: a hive's policy already covers the
/// whole `swarm/services/*` tree the minter writes into.
///
/// `None`, never an error, for every way this can come up empty — no hive
/// name, no `BAO_*` identity, an unreachable store, nothing at the path. All
/// four mean the same thing to the caller ("mint it the old way"), and three
/// of them are the ordinary state of a swarm that has not deployed the minter
/// yet, so raising would turn a supported deployment into a warning every
/// sweep.
///
/// 🩸 Logs the store **path** and never the value.
async fn stored_hive_token() -> Option<String> {
    let hive = std::env::var("HYPERHIVE_HIVE_NAME")
        .ok()
        .filter(|h| !h.is_empty())?;
    let path = swarm_secret_client::matrix::hive_token_path();
    let store = match swarm_secret_client::SecretStore::from_env(&hive).await {
        Ok(store) => store,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::debug!(error = %e, "matrix: no swarm secret store to read the @hive: access token from");
            return None;
        }
    };
    match store
        .read::<swarm_secret_client::matrix::Credential>(&path)
        .await
    {
        Ok(credential) if !credential.value.trim().is_empty() => {
            tracing::info!(%path, "matrix: taking the @hive: access token from the swarm store");
            Some(credential.value)
        }
        Ok(_) => {
            tracing::warn!(%path, "matrix: the stored @hive: credential is empty; minting instead");
            None
        }
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::debug!(%path, error = %e, "matrix: no @hive: credential in the store; minting instead");
            None
        }
    }
}

/// Whether an admin-room reply says a `make-user-admin` succeeded.
///
/// Three spellings, because the reply is prose and prose changes between
/// builds. tuwunel v1.9.0's is `"<user id> has been granted admin
/// privileges."` — which the original two patterns here (`done…`,
/// `made…admin`) do not match at all, so a promotion that had already
/// worked was reported as a 15-second timeout. The older spellings are
/// kept: a homeserver is not necessarily the version this was written
/// against.
fn is_make_admin_success(body: &str) -> Option<()> {
    let lower = body.to_ascii_lowercase();
    let says_ok = lower.starts_with("done")
        || lower.contains("granted admin privileges")
        || (lower.contains("made") && lower.contains("admin"));
    says_ok.then_some(())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod is_make_admin_success_tests {
    use super::is_make_admin_success;

    /// The reply tuwunel v1.9.0 actually sends
    /// (`src/admin/user/make_user_admin.rs`). This is the case the
    /// pre-existing matcher missed.
    #[test]
    fn tuwunel_1_9_grant_reply() {
        let msg = "@hive:pr1ma.darkest.space has been granted admin privileges.";
        assert_eq!(is_make_admin_success(msg), Some(()));
    }

    #[test]
    fn older_spellings_still_match() {
        assert_eq!(
            is_make_admin_success("Done: user is now an admin"),
            Some(())
        );
        assert_eq!(is_make_admin_success("Made @x:y an admin"), Some(()));
    }

    /// The control: an unrelated or failing reply must not read as
    /// success, or a failed promotion returns Ok and the warning that
    /// would have named it never fires.
    #[test]
    fn failures_and_noise_do_not_match() {
        assert_eq!(is_make_admin_success("Command not recognised."), None);
        assert_eq!(is_make_admin_success("User @x:y does not exist"), None);
    }
}

/// Promote a user to homeserver admin via the Matrix admin room
/// (`#admins:<server>`). Sends `!admin users make-user-admin @<localpart>:<server>` as
/// @hive, polls for the bot's success reply.
///
/// ⚠️ Requires the **sender** to be an admin already — tuwunel only
/// treats a message as a command when its sender is in the admin room.
/// `@hive:` is an ordinary account (`hive-matrix.nix` grants it no
/// `admin_execute` promotion), so this call has no working sender from
/// the hive and fails with the admin room's refusal. Promotion is a
/// swarm-level operation and is being rehomed as such; this stays here,
/// failing loudly, rather than justifying an over-privileged token that
/// all 13 ordinary call sites would also carry.
///
/// Goes through the admin room rather than a direct HTTP call because
/// tuwunel implements parts of the Synapse admin API but not user
/// creation, and upstream does not intend to add it. This is the
/// intended long-term mechanism, not a stopgap awaiting an upstream fix.
pub async fn promote_user_to_admin(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    localpart: &str,
    server_name: &str,
) -> Result<()> {
    let room_id = discover_admin_room_id(client, hive_token, server_name).await?;
    let room_url = encode_room_id_for_url(&room_id);
    let command = format!("!admin users make-user-admin @{localpart}:{server_name}");
    admin_room_send_and_poll(
        client,
        hive_token,
        server_name,
        &room_url,
        &command,
        is_make_admin_success,
    )
    .await
    .with_context(|| {
        format!(
            "matrix: admin room make-user-admin for @{localpart}:{server_name}: \
             no success response within 15 seconds. \
             Verify the admin room accepts '!admin users make-user-admin @user:server' commands."
        )
    })
}

/// Reset a user's password via the Matrix admin room (`#admins:<server>`).
///
/// Sends `!admin users reset-password @<localpart>:<server>` to the admin room as @hive,
/// polls for the bot's response containing the new password, and persists
/// it to the non-purgeable creds path so [`ensure_user_for`] can re-login
/// on the next provisioning sweep.
///
/// ⚠️ Same admin-**sender** requirement as [`promote_user_to_admin`], and
/// the same consequence: `@hive:` is an ordinary account, so this fails
/// from the hive until the operation is rehomed at swarm level.
///
/// Returns the new password for use in subsequent `login_user` calls.
pub async fn reset_user_password(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    localpart: &str,
    server_name: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
    let pw = admin_room_reset_password(client, hive_token, server_name, localpart)
        .await
        .with_context(|| {
            format!("matrix: admin-room password reset for @{localpart}:{server_name}")
        })?;
    persist_password(localpart, &pw);
    Ok(pw)
}

/// Persist the matrix password for `localpart` to the non-purgeable creds path.
fn persist_password(localpart: &str, password: &str) {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    let pw_path = password_path(localpart);
    if let Some(parent) = pw_path.parent() {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
    }
    if let Err(e) = std::fs::write(&pw_path, format!("{password}\n")) {
        tracing::warn!(%localpart, error = ?e, "matrix: failed to persist reset password");
    } else {
        let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&pw_path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
    }
}

/// Discover the matrix `server_name` from the running homeserver via
/// `GET /_matrix/key/v2/server` (unauthenticated federation key endpoint).
/// The response JSON always includes `"server_name"` per the matrix spec.
pub async fn discover_server_name(client: &reqwest::Client) -> Result<String> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    let url = format!("{base}/_matrix/key/v2/server");
    let resp = client
        .get(&url)
        .send()
        .await
        .context("matrix: GET /_matrix/key/v2/server")?;
    let status = resp.status();
    let body = resp
        .json::<serde_json::Value>()
        .await
        .context("matrix: parse /_matrix/key/v2/server response")?;
    if !status.is_success() {
        anyhow::bail!("matrix: /_matrix/key/v2/server returned HTTP {status}, body: {body}");
    }
    body["server_name"]
        .as_str()
        .map(str::to_owned)
        .with_context(|| {
            format!("matrix: /_matrix/key/v2/server response missing server_name field: {body}")
        })
}

/// Read the `@hive:` access token from disk. Returns an error if it
/// is absent — callers should gate their homeserver calls on this.
pub fn read_hive_token() -> Result<String> {
    let path = hive_token_path();
    std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
        .ok()
        .map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
        .with_context(|| {
            format!(
                "the @hive: matrix access token was not found at {} — \
                 ensure hive-c0re has started at least once with matrix enabled \
                 (it provisions the @hive: account on boot)",
                path.display()
            )
        })
}

/// Persist the hive Space room id to [`hive_space_room_id_path()`] (0600).
fn persist_space_room_id(room_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    let path = hive_space_room_id_path();
    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
    }
    std::fs::write(&path, format!("{room_id}\n"))
        .with_context(|| format!("matrix: write space room_id to {}", path.display()))?;
    let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
    Ok(())
}

/// Scan the admin account's joined rooms for the canonical hive Space: the
/// `m.space` whose name is [`HIVE_SPACE_NAME`]. Returns the first match
/// (deterministic per the homeserver's joined-rooms order) so a lost
/// room-id file recovers the existing space instead of spawning a
/// duplicate. `None` if the homeserver is unreachable or no match exists.
///
/// Name-based (not alias-based) rediscovery keeps the Space free of any
/// special-char room alias — the hardcoded plain name is the anchor.
async fn find_space_by_name(client: &reqwest::Client, hive_token: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let base = matrix_http()?;
    let joined_url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/joined_rooms");
    let joined: serde_json::Value = client
        .get(&joined_url)
        .bearer_auth(hive_token)
        .send()
        .await
        .ok()?
        .json()
        .await
        .ok()?;
    let rooms = joined["joined_rooms"].as_array()?;
    for room in rooms {
        let Some(room_id) = room.as_str() else {
            continue;
        };
        let encoded = encode_room_id_for_url(room_id);
        // Must be an m.space (m.room.create `type`).
        let create_url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{encoded}/state/m.room.create/");
        let is_space = match client.get(&create_url).bearer_auth(hive_token).send().await {
            Ok(r) if r.status().is_success() => r
                .json::<serde_json::Value>()
                .await
                .ok()
                .is_some_and(|c| c["type"].as_str() == Some("m.space")),
            _ => false,
        };
        if !is_space {
            continue;
        }
        // …and named HIVE_SPACE_NAME (m.room.name `name`).
        let name_url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{encoded}/state/m.room.name/");
        let name_matches = match client.get(&name_url).bearer_auth(hive_token).send().await {
            Ok(r) if r.status().is_success() => r
                .json::<serde_json::Value>()
                .await
                .ok()
                .is_some_and(|n| n["name"].as_str() == Some(HIVE_SPACE_NAME)),
            _ => false,
        };
        if name_matches {
            return Some(room_id.to_owned());
        }
    }
    None
}

/// Create (or recover) the hive Matrix Space and persist its room ID to
/// [`hive_space_room_id_path()`]. The Space is a private `m.space` owned by
/// `@hive`, identified by its hardcoded name [`HIVE_SPACE_NAME`] (no alias).
///
/// Dedup strategy (single canonical space):
///  1. If the room-id file exists, reuse it.
///  2. Otherwise, rediscover by scanning the admin's joined rooms for the
///     `m.space` named [`HIVE_SPACE_NAME`] and adopt it (re-persisting the
///     file). This recovers the existing space after a state wipe instead
///     of creating a duplicate.
///  3. Only if neither yields a room do we `createRoom`.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns an error if the homeserver is unreachable, `createRoom` fails,
/// or the room-ID file cannot be written.
pub async fn ensure_hive_space(client: &reqwest::Client, hive_token: &str) -> Result<String> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    // 1. Stored room id wins (fast path).
    if let Ok(existing) = std::fs::read_to_string(hive_space_room_id_path()) {
        let trimmed = existing.trim().to_owned();
        if !trimmed.is_empty() {
            tracing::debug!(room_id = %trimmed, "matrix: hive space already provisioned");
            return Ok(trimmed);
        }
    }

    // 2. No stored id — rediscover the existing space by its hardcoded name
    //    before creating a new one (prevents duplicate spaces after a wipe).
    if let Some(room_id) = find_space_by_name(client, hive_token).await {
        persist_space_room_id(&room_id)?;
        tracing::info!(%room_id, "matrix: recovered hive space by name");
        return Ok(room_id);
    }

    // 3. Create the space (plain hardcoded name, no alias).
    let url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/createRoom");
    let body = serde_json::json!({
        "name": HIVE_SPACE_NAME,
        "creation_content": { "type": "m.space" },
        "preset": "private_chat",
        "visibility": "private",
    });
    let resp = client
        .post(&url)
        .bearer_auth(hive_token)
        .json(&body)
        .send()
        .await
        .context("matrix: POST /createRoom (hive space)")?;
    let status = resp.status();
    let json = resp
        .json::<serde_json::Value>()
        .await
        .context("matrix: parse /createRoom response")?;
    if !status.is_success() {
        anyhow::bail!("matrix: createRoom HTTP {status}, body: {json}");
    }
    let room_id = json["room_id"]
        .as_str()
        .with_context(|| format!("matrix: createRoom missing room_id: {json}"))?
        .to_owned();
    persist_space_room_id(&room_id)?;
    tracing::info!(%room_id, "matrix: created hive space");
    Ok(room_id)
}

/// Persist the hive chat room id to [`hive_chat_room_id_path()`] (0600).
fn persist_chat_room_id(room_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    let path = hive_chat_room_id_path();
    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
    }
    std::fs::write(&path, format!("{room_id}\n"))
        .with_context(|| format!("matrix: write chat room_id to {}", path.display()))?;
    let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
    Ok(())
}

/// Scan the admin account's joined rooms for the canonical hive chat room:
/// a non-space room named [`HIVE_CHAT_ROOM_NAME`]. Mirrors
/// [`find_space_by_name`] so a lost room-id file recovers the existing chat
/// room instead of spawning a duplicate. `None` if the homeserver is
/// unreachable or no match exists.
async fn find_chat_room_by_name(client: &reqwest::Client, hive_token: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let base = matrix_http()?;
    let joined_url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/joined_rooms");
    let joined: serde_json::Value = client
        .get(&joined_url)
        .bearer_auth(hive_token)
        .send()
        .await
        .ok()?
        .json()
        .await
        .ok()?;
    let rooms = joined["joined_rooms"].as_array()?;
    for room in rooms {
        let Some(room_id) = room.as_str() else {
            continue;
        };
        let encoded = encode_room_id_for_url(room_id);
        // Skip the Space itself (and any other m.space).
        let create_url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{encoded}/state/m.room.create/");
        let is_space = match client.get(&create_url).bearer_auth(hive_token).send().await {
            Ok(r) if r.status().is_success() => r
                .json::<serde_json::Value>()
                .await
                .ok()
                .is_some_and(|c| c["type"].as_str() == Some("m.space")),
            _ => false,
        };
        if is_space {
            continue;
        }
        // …and named HIVE_CHAT_ROOM_NAME (m.room.name `name`).
        let name_url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{encoded}/state/m.room.name/");
        let name_matches = match client.get(&name_url).bearer_auth(hive_token).send().await {
            Ok(r) if r.status().is_success() => r
                .json::<serde_json::Value>()
                .await
                .ok()
                .is_some_and(|n| n["name"].as_str() == Some(HIVE_CHAT_ROOM_NAME)),
            _ => false,
        };
        if name_matches {
            return Some(room_id.to_owned());
        }
    }
    None
}

/// Whether the state event still has to be written.
///
/// `current` is the room's existing content for this `(type, state_key)`,
/// or `None` when it could not be read. **Unreadable means write**: the
/// re-apply exists so a missing link gets repaired, and one redundant
/// event is cheaper than a hierarchy that never reconverges.
///
/// Comparison is `serde_json::Value` equality, which compares objects as
/// maps — key order in the response does not matter.
fn state_needs_write(current: Option<&serde_json::Value>, desired: &serde_json::Value) -> bool {
    current != Some(desired)
}

/// Read the room's current content for one state event. `None` on any
/// failure — absent state, transport error, or an unparseable body are
/// all "we don't know", and [`state_needs_write`] turns that into a write.
///
/// One failure is louder than the rest, and it is the only one that hides:
/// **a non-404 HTTP failure means the read broke while the write still
/// works**, so the guard degrades to writing every time and the sweep
/// resumes waking the hive with nothing else to show for it. A transport
/// error needs no warning of its own — the PUT immediately after it fails
/// too, loudly — and a 404 is the expected first-setup case.
async fn current_room_state(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    url: &str,
) -> Option<serde_json::Value> {
    let resp = match client.get(url).bearer_auth(hive_token).send().await {
        Ok(resp) => resp,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::debug!(error = ?e, url, "matrix: state read unreachable; writing");
            return None;
        }
    };
    let status = resp.status();
    if !status.is_success() {
        if status != reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
            tracing::warn!(
                %status,
                url,
                "matrix: state read failed while writes still work — the \
                 skip-if-unchanged guard is off and every sweep will re-emit"
            );
        }
        return None;
    }
    match resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await {
        Ok(body) => Some(body),
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::debug!(error = ?e, url, "matrix: state read body unparseable; writing");
            None
        }
    }
}

/// PUT a state event into `room_id` using the `@hive:` token, **skipping the
/// write when the room already carries identical content**.
///
/// The read is not an optimisation. A PUT of identical content is a no-op
/// on the room's *state*, and the homeserver still appends an event to the
/// *timeline* — so "idempotent" was true one level too high. Downstream,
/// an event is unread activity, which is a todo, which is a turn: a caller
/// re-applying a link on a periodic sweep wakes every agent in the room on
/// that sweep's cadence, forever. Measured at ~30 minutes per wake per
/// agent before this guard existed.
///
/// The self-healing property the re-apply exists for is unaffected: a
/// missing or divergent link still gets written.
async fn set_room_state(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    room_id: &str,
    event_type: &str,
    state_key: &str,
    content: &serde_json::Value,
) -> Result<()> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    let encoded_room = encode_room_id_for_url(room_id);
    let encoded_key = encode_room_id_for_url(state_key);
    let url =
        format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{encoded_room}/state/{event_type}/{encoded_key}");
    let current = current_room_state(client, hive_token, &url).await;
    if !state_needs_write(current.as_ref(), content) {
        tracing::debug!(
            %room_id,
            event_type,
            "matrix: state already current, skipping PUT (no timeline event)"
        );
        return Ok(());
    }
    let resp = client
        .put(&url)
        .bearer_auth(hive_token)
        .json(content)
        .send()
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("matrix: PUT state {event_type} into {room_id}"))?;
    let status = resp.status();
    if status.is_success() {
        return Ok(());
    }
    let body = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await.unwrap_or_default();
    anyhow::bail!("matrix: set state {event_type} in {room_id}: HTTP {status}, body: {body}")
}

/// Create (or recover) the default hive chat room and wire it as a child of
/// the hive Space, persisting its room id to [`hive_chat_room_id_path()`].
///
/// The room is a normal room (not an `m.space`) named [`HIVE_CHAT_ROOM_NAME`]
/// with a `restricted` join rule allowing any member of the hive Space to
/// join — so the operator (who is in the Space) and every agent can chat
/// without needing an explicit invite. It's linked bidirectionally to the
/// Space: `m.space.child` on the Space points at the room, `m.space.parent`
/// on the room points back. Joining a Space does NOT auto-join its children
/// (Matrix semantics), so this gives clients a concrete room to surface +
/// join instead of an empty Space.
///
/// Dedup mirrors [`ensure_hive_space`]: persisted id wins, else rediscover
/// by name, else create. The space-child link is re-checked on every call
/// so a recovered room reconverges its hierarchy link — and written only
/// when it differs, see [`set_room_state`].
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns an error if the homeserver is unreachable, `createRoom` fails,
/// or the room-ID file cannot be written. A failure wiring the space-child
/// link is logged but not fatal (the room still exists + is joinable).
pub async fn ensure_hive_chat_room(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    space_room_id: &str,
    server_name: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    // 1. Stored room id wins (fast path). 2. Rediscover by name before
    //    creating (prevents duplicates after a state wipe). 3. Create.
    let room_id = if let Some(id) = std::fs::read_to_string(hive_chat_room_id_path())
        .ok()
        .map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
    {
        tracing::debug!(room_id = %id, "matrix: hive chat room already provisioned");
        id
    } else if let Some(id) = find_chat_room_by_name(client, hive_token).await {
        persist_chat_room_id(&id)?;
        tracing::info!(room_id = %id, "matrix: recovered hive chat room by name");
        id
    } else {
        // `initial_state` is applied after the preset-derived state, so the
        // restricted join rule overrides private_chat's invite-only default.
        let url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/createRoom");
        let body = serde_json::json!({
            "name": HIVE_CHAT_ROOM_NAME,
            "topic": HIVE_CHAT_ROOM_TOPIC,
            // Pin the room version explicitly: the `restricted` join rule
            // below needs room version >= 8. tuwunel's default is currently
            // higher, but pinning makes the dependency explicit so a future
            // homeserver-default change can't silently invalidate the
            // restricted rule (which would quietly fall back to invite-only
            // and break the "operator joins from the Space" path).
            "room_version": "10",
            "preset": "private_chat",
            "visibility": "private",
            "initial_state": [
                {
                    "type": "m.room.join_rules",
                    "state_key": "",
                    "content": {
                        "join_rule": "restricted",
                        "allow": [
                            { "type": "m.room_membership", "room_id": space_room_id }
                        ]
                    }
                },
                {
                    "type": "m.space.parent",
                    "state_key": space_room_id,
                    "content": { "via": [server_name], "canonical": true }
                }
            ]
        });
        let resp = client
            .post(&url)
            .bearer_auth(hive_token)
            .json(&body)
            .send()
            .await
            .context("matrix: POST /createRoom (hive chat room)")?;
        let status = resp.status();
        let json = resp
            .json::<serde_json::Value>()
            .await
            .context("matrix: parse /createRoom response (chat room)")?;
        if !status.is_success() {
            anyhow::bail!("matrix: createRoom (chat) HTTP {status}, body: {json}");
        }
        let id = json["room_id"]
            .as_str()
            .with_context(|| format!("matrix: createRoom (chat) missing room_id: {json}"))?
            .to_owned();
        persist_chat_room_id(&id)?;
        tracing::info!(room_id = %id, "matrix: created hive chat room");
        id
    };

    // Wire the Space → room child link. Without an `m.space.child` carrying
    // a `via`, the room won't surface in the Space hierarchy. `suggested`
    // hints clients to surface it prominently.
    let child_content = serde_json::json!({
        "via": [server_name],
        "suggested": true,
    });
    if let Err(e) = set_room_state(
        client,
        hive_token,
        space_room_id,
        "m.space.child",
        &room_id,
        &child_content,
    )
    .await
    {
        tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: set m.space.child on hive space failed");
    }

    Ok(room_id)
}

/// Invite `@{localpart}:{server_name}` to `room_id` using the admin
/// account. Idempotent — treats already-member responses as success.
async fn invite_to_room(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    room_id: &str,
    localpart: &str,
    server_name: &str,
) -> Result<()> {
    let user_id = format!("@{localpart}:{server_name}");
    invite_user_id(client, hive_token, room_id, &user_id).await
}

/// Fetch a user's current membership in a room via the `@hive:` token, or
/// `None` if there is no membership event (never invited) or the lookup
/// fails. Returns the raw membership string (`invite`, `join`, `leave`, …).
async fn room_membership(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    encoded_room_id: &str,
    user_id: &str,
) -> Option<String> {
    let base = matrix_http()?;
    // `:` must be percent-encoded in both the room-id and user-id path
    // segments; `@` and `!` are permitted path characters per RFC 3986.
    let encoded_user = user_id.replace(':', "%3A");
    let url = format!(
        "{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{encoded_room_id}/state/m.room.member/{encoded_user}"
    );
    let resp = client.get(&url).bearer_auth(hive_token).send().await.ok()?;
    if !resp.status().is_success() {
        // 404 = no membership event yet; anything else we treat as "unknown"
        // and let the caller fall through to the invite attempt.
        return None;
    }
    let body = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await.ok()?;
    body["membership"].as_str().map(ToOwned::to_owned)
}

/// Invite a fully-qualified Matrix user id (`@user:server`) to `room_id`
/// using the `@hive:` token. Idempotent: a user who is already a member or
/// already has a pending invite is left untouched (no fresh invite is sent,
/// so they are not re-notified), and a 403 `M_FORBIDDEN` / `M_BAD_STATE`
/// from a racing invite is still treated as success.
async fn invite_user_id(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    room_id: &str,
    user_id: &str,
) -> Result<()> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    // `:` must be percent-encoded in the room-id path segment; `!` is
    // permitted in URL path characters per RFC 3986.
    let encoded_room_id = room_id.replace(':', "%3A");

    // Skip the invite entirely when the user is already invited or joined.
    // Re-POSTing an invite to a pending member re-sends the invite event,
    // which re-notifies the agent on every provisioning sweep.
    if let Some(membership) = room_membership(client, hive_token, &encoded_room_id, user_id).await
        && matches!(membership.as_str(), "invite" | "join")
    {
        tracing::debug!(%user_id, %room_id, %membership, "matrix: invite skipped (already a member/invited)");
        return Ok(());
    }

    let url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{encoded_room_id}/invite");
    let resp = client
        .post(&url)
        .bearer_auth(hive_token)
        .json(&serde_json::json!({ "user_id": user_id }))
        .send()
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("matrix: POST /rooms/.../invite for {user_id}"))?;
    let status = resp.status();
    if status.is_success() {
        tracing::debug!(%user_id, %room_id, "matrix: invited to room");
        return Ok(());
    }
    // 403 with M_FORBIDDEN or M_BAD_STATE typically means the user is
    // already a member or has a pending invite — both are fine.
    if status == StatusCode::FORBIDDEN {
        let body = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await.unwrap_or_default();
        let errcode = body["errcode"].as_str().unwrap_or("");
        if errcode == "M_FORBIDDEN" || errcode == "M_BAD_STATE" {
            tracing::debug!(%user_id, %room_id, %errcode, "matrix: invite skipped (already member/invited)");
            return Ok(());
        }
        anyhow::bail!("matrix: invite {user_id} to {room_id}: HTTP {status}, body: {body}");
    }
    let body = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await.unwrap_or_default();
    anyhow::bail!("matrix: invite {user_id} to {room_id}: HTTP {status}, body: {body}")
}

/// Invite an arbitrary Matrix user to the hive Space (default) or an
/// explicit `room_id` / alias. `user` may be a fully-qualified id
/// (`@name:server`) or a bare localpart, which is qualified with the
/// homeserver's `server_name`. Returns the resolved room id the invite
/// targeted. Used by `hivectl matrix invite`.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns an error if the `@hive:` token or `server_name` can't be read,
/// the target room can't be resolved (no `--room` and no persisted hive
/// space), or the invite POST fails for a reason other than the user
/// already being a member / invited.
pub async fn invite_user(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    user: &str,
    room_override: Option<&str>,
    server_name: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
    // Qualify a bare localpart to a full user id on the hive homeserver.
    let user_id = if user.starts_with('@') {
        user.to_owned()
    } else {
        format!("@{user}:{server_name}")
    };
    // Resolve the room: explicit override (id or #alias) wins; otherwise
    // the persisted hive Space.
    let room_id = match room_override {
        Some(r) if r.starts_with('#') => resolve_room_alias(client, hive_token, r).await?,
        Some(r) if r.starts_with('!') => r.to_owned(),
        Some(r) => anyhow::bail!(
            "matrix: --room {r:?} is neither a room id nor an alias; \
             prefix with '!' for a room id (!abc:server) or '#' for an \
             alias (#name:server)"
        ),
        None => std::fs::read_to_string(hive_space_room_id_path())
            .map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
            .context(
                "matrix: no --room given and no persisted hive space \
                 (run the hive-c0re matrix sweep first)",
            )?,
    };
    invite_user_id(client, hive_token, &room_id, &user_id).await?;
    Ok(room_id)
}

/// Resolve a `#alias:server` to its room id via the directory API.
async fn resolve_room_alias(
    client: &reqwest::Client,
    hive_token: &str,
    alias: &str,
) -> Result<String> {
    let base = matrix_base()?;
    let encoded = alias.replace('#', "%23").replace(':', "%3A");
    let url = format!("{base}/_matrix/client/v3/directory/room/{encoded}");
    let resp = client
        .get(&url)
        .bearer_auth(hive_token)
        .send()
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("matrix: GET directory for {alias}"))?;
    let status = resp.status();
    let json = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await.unwrap_or_default();
    if !status.is_success() {
        anyhow::bail!("matrix: resolve alias {alias}: HTTP {status}, body: {json}");
    }
    json["room_id"]
        .as_str()
        .map(str::to_owned)
        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("matrix: alias {alias} response missing room_id: {json}"))
}

/// Sweep every existing container (manager + sub-agents) and ensure
/// each has a matrix user + token on the local homeserver. Called at
/// hive-c0re startup, alongside `forge::ensure_all`, and then
/// periodically (see the caller in `main.rs`). No-op when the
/// hive-matrix container isn't running. Per-step failures are logged
/// but don't abort the sweep.
///
/// Returns `true` when every step of the sweep succeeded, `false` when at
/// least one step failed — the caller feeds this into a
/// [`crate::stats::sweep_health::SweepHealth`] to raise a debounced
/// dashboard banner on persistent failure (this sweep re-runs every 30
/// minutes, so a one-off blip self-heals without ever bannering).
pub async fn ensure_all() -> bool {
    if !is_present() {
        tracing::debug!("matrix: hive-matrix container absent, skipping user sweep");
        return true;
    }
    let mut ok = true;
    // Loud and non-destructive: with no appservice token this sweep can
    // create nothing, so it does nothing. Agents that already hold a
    // token keep using it — their accounts and sessions are untouched by
    // anything in here.
    let as_token = match read_appservice_token() {
        Ok(t) => t,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: no appservice token; skipping the user sweep");
            return false;
        }
    };
    // One HTTP client for the whole sweep — connection pool is
    // reused across agents.
    let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECS))
        .build()
    {
        Ok(c) => c,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: build HTTP client failed; skipping sweep");
            return false;
        }
    };
    // The `@hive:` account first, because everything below provisions
    // THROUGH it (the Space, the chat room and every invite are sent with
    // its token) — as an ordinary user that created those rooms, not as a
    // homeserver admin.
    if let Err(e) = ensure_hive_user(&client, &as_token).await {
        tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: ensure_hive_user failed");
        ok = false;
    }
    let Ok(containers) = crate::lifecycle::list().await else {
        tracing::warn!("matrix: nixos-container list failed; skipping user sweep");
        return false;
    };
    let mut agent_names: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
    for c in &containers {
        let Some(name) = c.strip_prefix(crate::lifecycle::AGENT_PREFIX) else {
            continue;
        };
        sync_agent(&client, name, &as_token).await;
        agent_names.push(name.to_owned());
    }

    if !provision_space(&client, &agent_names).await {
        ok = false;
    }
    ok
}

/// Provision the hive Space + default chat room and invite every agent
/// (+ the admin account) to both. Split out of [`ensure_all`] purely to
/// keep that function under the `too_many_lines` threshold — this is the
/// tail half of the same sequential sweep and shares its aggregate-bool,
/// log-and-continue failure handling.
async fn provision_space(client: &reqwest::Client, agent_names: &[String]) -> bool {
    let mut ok = true;
    // server_name is needed to form full Matrix user IDs for invites.
    let hive_token = match read_hive_token() {
        Ok(t) => t,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: skipping hive space provisioning (no @hive: access token)");
            return false;
        }
    };
    // server_name first — the agent invites need it (fully-qualified user ids).
    let server_name = match discover_server_name(client).await {
        Ok(s) => s,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: discover_server_name failed; skipping space provisioning");
            return false;
        }
    };
    let room_id = match ensure_hive_space(client, &hive_token).await {
        Ok(id) => id,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: ensure_hive_space failed");
            return false;
        }
    };
    // Invite @hive first, then all agents.
    if let Err(e) =
        invite_to_room(client, &hive_token, &room_id, HIVE_LOCALPART, &server_name).await
    {
        tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: invite @hive to space failed");
        ok = false;
    }
    for name in agent_names {
        if let Err(e) = invite_to_room(client, &hive_token, &room_id, name, &server_name).await {
            tracing::warn!(%name, error = ?e, "matrix: invite agent to space failed");
            ok = false;
        }
    }

    // Provision the default hive chat room as an m.space.child of the Space
    // and invite @hive + every agent. Joining a Space alone surfaces no
    // rooms to chat in (Matrix semantics — children aren't auto-joined), so
    // without this the Space is empty. The restricted join rule additionally
    // lets the operator (a Space member) join from the Space hierarchy.
    match ensure_hive_chat_room(client, &hive_token, &room_id, &server_name).await {
        Ok(chat_room_id) => {
            if let Err(e) = invite_to_room(
                client,
                &hive_token,
                &chat_room_id,
                HIVE_LOCALPART,
                &server_name,
            )
            .await
            {
                tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: invite @hive to chat room failed");
                ok = false;
            }
            for name in agent_names {
                if let Err(e) =
                    invite_to_room(client, &hive_token, &chat_room_id, name, &server_name).await
                {
                    tracing::warn!(%name, error = ?e, "matrix: invite agent to chat room failed");
                    ok = false;
                }
            }
        }
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "matrix: ensure_hive_chat_room failed");
            ok = false;
        }
    }
    ok
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn random_hex_is_well_formed_and_correct_length() {
        let h = random_hex(16).expect("/dev/urandom readable");
        assert_eq!(h.len(), 32);
        assert!(h.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
    }

    /// The steady state. This is the whole point of the guard: the sweep
    /// runs forever, and every write it makes is a wake for every agent
    /// in the room.
    #[test]
    fn state_matching_the_room_is_not_rewritten() {
        let desired = serde_json::json!({ "via": ["example.org"], "suggested": true });
        let current = desired.clone();
        assert!(!state_needs_write(Some(&current), &desired));
    }

    /// Key order in the homeserver's response must not force a write —
    /// the guard leans on `serde_json::Value` comparing objects as maps,
    /// and a byte- or order-sensitive comparison would silently degrade
    /// to writing every time while still looking correct.
    #[test]
    fn state_matching_but_reordered_is_not_rewritten() {
        let desired = serde_json::json!({ "via": ["example.org"], "suggested": true });
        let current = serde_json::json!({ "suggested": true, "via": ["example.org"] });
        assert!(!state_needs_write(Some(&current), &desired));
    }

    #[test]
    fn diverged_state_is_rewritten() {
        let desired = serde_json::json!({ "via": ["example.org"], "suggested": true });
        let current = serde_json::json!({ "via": ["old.example.org"], "suggested": true });
        assert!(state_needs_write(Some(&current), &desired));
    }

    /// Fail-open, and deliberately so: an unreadable current state must
    /// write. The re-apply exists to repair a missing link, so "we don't
    /// know" has to behave like "it's missing", not like "it's fine".
    #[test]
    fn unknown_state_is_written() {
        let desired = serde_json::json!({ "via": ["example.org"], "suggested": true });
        assert!(state_needs_write(None, &desired));
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_hex_two_calls_differ() {
        // Sanity check — not a statistical claim, just guards
        // against ever accidentally returning a constant.
        let a = random_hex(16).expect("/dev/urandom readable");
        let b = random_hex(16).expect("/dev/urandom readable");
        assert_ne!(a, b);
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_access_token_pulls_from_success_body() {
        let body = serde_json::json!({
            "user_id": "@alice:matrix.example.org",
            "access_token": "syt_abc123",
            "device_id": "ABC",
        });
        assert_eq!(extract_access_token(&body).unwrap(), "syt_abc123");
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_access_token_errors_on_missing_field() {
        let body = serde_json::json!({"user_id": "@alice:matrix.example.org"});
        let err = extract_access_token(&body).unwrap_err();
        assert!(err.to_string().contains("missing access_token"));
    }
}