The two hive-name guards lived in swarm-otel.nix, inside its
`config = lib.mkIf (… && deployCfg.swarm-otel.enable)`. A swarm running the
secret store and the controller but no collector therefore had no hive-name
check at all, while the names were still composed into OIDC client ids, bao
policies and cert-auth roles exactly the same way. They move to swarm.nix,
which declares `swarm.hives` and is unconditional. swarm-otel keeps the
assertion that its own entry is still in the shared list — that one is about
this module's stake in a file it no longer controls.
The equality guard also takes the store's cert-auth subjects now. Cert auth
trusts the CA, so `allowed_common_names` is the whole of what narrows a role
to one identity, and the same CA signs every hive's leaf with the hive's name
as its CN. A hive named after a role's subject presents a certificate that
role accepts, which for the controller is write access to every hive's
credentials and policies.
A list rather than the one string, because the next role added beside it
widens what a hive name must not collide with, and because the subject is an
option an operator sets — a literal deny entry covers the default and nothing
else.
Four module-eval cases, two of them controls. The fixture overrides the
subject to `ctl` on purpose: the default contains `swarm`, which the substring
guard catches whatever the new arm does, so a fixture using it could not tell
the two apart. The controls are that a legal roster trips neither guard, and
that all three fixtures really do have the collector disabled — without the
second, every case would pass while testing the arrangement they exist to
rule out.
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