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hyperhive/hive-c0re/src/socket_server/mod.rs
atlas b88a5b2430 remove the list_containers and request_update_meta_inputs MCP tools
Both agent-facing tools go away end to end, with no replacement. This is
an intentional capability removal: agents can no longer enumerate their
own subtree, and can no longer queue a meta-flake input bump.

The system prompt and docs/tools/lifecycle.md land in this same commit
on purpose. A tool named in the prompt but absent from the server makes
agents confidently call something that doesn't exist, and the failure
then surfaces far from its cause.

Removed:

- MCP registrations and bodies (hive-agent-mcp), plus the now-unused
  UpdateMetaInputsArgs.
- Wire variants Request::ListDescendants,
  Request::RequestUpdateMetaInputs and Response::Containers, plus
  ContainerInfo, whose only consumer was that response.
- hive-c0re's handle_list_descendants (its whole module) and
  handle_request_update_meta_inputs, the two dispatch arms, and the
  require_group(agent, "approvals", ...) gate on the meta-inputs verb.
- The stream_enrich emoji entry and argument formatter.
- docs/tools/lifecycle.md (both tools it documented are gone), its two
  referrers, the tool-group tables and the agent-hierarchy prose.

Tool groups are kept, deliberately. ToolGroup::Lifecycle listed exactly
one tool and now lists none — it is vestigial, but the variant stays so
existing meta/capabilities.json grants still parse; retiring it is a
separate decision. ToolGroup::Approvals also listed exactly one tool,
but the group is NOT dead: check_can_cancel_approval still gates
cancel_loose_end's approval-cancel arm on it server-side.

ApprovalKind::UpdateMetaInputs stays too. Nothing in production code
produces it any more, but pre-existing approval rows may still carry it,
and the operator's own path to a meta update is unaffected — the
dashboard's POST /api/meta-update inserts the meta_update job directly,
bypassing approvals entirely.

The two format_ack tests in hive-agent-mcp that named
request_update_meta_inputs were only using it as a label string while
exercising the generic OkWarn/Ok renderer, so they are retargeted to a
surviving tool rather than deleted.

Note hive-c0re's priv_client::list_containers is a different thing (the
host-side privileged container listing behind hive-priv) and is
untouched.

Closes #4591
2026-09-20 22:47:46 +02:00

976 lines
39 KiB
Rust

//! Unix-socket request server, shared by the per-agent sockets and the
//! (pure-transport) manager socket. The socket file's existence on disk
//! authenticates the caller: connecting to `<.../agents/foo/mcp.sock>` means
//! you are `foo`; the manager socket simply serves as `ruth`. There is no
//! privilege flag — both transports run the same [`serve`] / [`dispatch`]
//! code, and authority derives uniformly from the caller's identity:
//! topology (`is_descendant_of`) for subtree-relational verbs, capabilities
//! for hive-wide queries, and tool-group membership for the orchestration
//! verbs. `ruth` reaches every agent only as a consequence of being the
//! topology root, not via any hardcoded name match.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use hive_core_agent_sock::{Request, Response};
use hive_sh4re::inbox::Message;
use hive_sh4re::manager::MANAGER_AGENT;
use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
use tokio::net::{UnixListener, UnixStream};
use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use crate::coordinator::Coordinator;
mod config_approvals;
mod schedules;
pub(crate) use config_approvals::submit_merge_config_pr;
pub(crate) use schedules::filter_ghost_schedule_targets;
pub use schedules::schedule_to_wire_public;
use schedules::{
EditSchedulePatch, handle_cancel_schedule, handle_edit_schedule, handle_fire_schedule_now,
handle_list_schedules, handle_request_schedule_prompt,
};
pub struct AgentSocket {
pub path: PathBuf,
pub handle: JoinHandle<()>,
}
pub fn start(agent: &str, socket_path: &Path, coord: Arc<Coordinator>) -> Result<AgentSocket> {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
let agent = agent.to_owned();
if let Some(parent) = socket_path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)
.with_context(|| format!("create agent socket dir {}", parent.display()))?;
}
if socket_path.exists() {
std::fs::remove_file(socket_path).context("remove stale agent socket")?;
}
let listener = UnixListener::bind(socket_path)
.with_context(|| format!("bind agent socket {}", socket_path.display()))?;
// The socket is bind-mounted into exactly one container as
// `/run/hive/mcp.sock` (`lifecycle::set_nspawn_flags`); the
// in-container harness connects as the per-agent unix user,
// not root, so the default `tokio::net::UnixListener::bind`
// perms (0755) lock it out. 0666 lets the agent user connect;
// the bind source dir is per-agent on host so blast radius is
// unchanged.
std::fs::set_permissions(socket_path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o666))
.with_context(|| format!("chmod agent socket {}", socket_path.display()))?;
tracing::info!(%agent, socket = %socket_path.display(), "agent socket listening");
let path = socket_path.to_path_buf();
let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
match listener.accept().await {
Ok((stream, _)) => {
let agent = agent.clone();
let coord = coord.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Err(e) = serve(stream, agent, coord).await {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "agent connection failed");
}
});
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "agent listener accept failed; exiting");
return;
}
}
}
});
Ok(AgentSocket { path, handle })
}
/// Bind + serve the manager socket. This is now **pure transport**: it grants
/// no authority of its own — it just serves requests as `agent = MANAGER_AGENT`
/// ("ruth"), and ruth's reach comes entirely from being the topology root
/// (`is_descendant_of` covers every agent) plus the capabilities / tool-groups
/// it holds, identical to connecting on a per-agent socket — ruth uses the
/// standard per-agent runtime dir + socket, with no dedicated helpers.
pub fn start_manager(coord: Arc<Coordinator>) -> Result<()> {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
let dir = crate::paths::agent_runtime_dir(crate::lifecycle::MANAGER_NAME);
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir)
.with_context(|| format!("create manager dir {}", dir.display()))?;
let socket = Coordinator::socket_path(crate::lifecycle::MANAGER_NAME);
if socket.exists() {
std::fs::remove_file(&socket).context("remove stale manager socket")?;
}
let listener = UnixListener::bind(&socket)
.with_context(|| format!("bind manager socket {}", socket.display()))?;
// 0666 so the in-container root user (non-root) can connect; the bind
// source dir is manager-only on host (see the per-agent socket above).
std::fs::set_permissions(&socket, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o666))
.with_context(|| format!("chmod manager socket {}", socket.display()))?;
tracing::info!(socket = %socket.display(), "manager socket listening");
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
match listener.accept().await {
Ok((stream, _)) => {
let coord = coord.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
// Pure transport: serve as `ruth`, no privilege grant.
if let Err(e) = serve(stream, MANAGER_AGENT.to_owned(), coord).await {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "manager connection failed");
}
});
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "manager listener accept failed");
return;
}
}
}
});
Ok(())
}
async fn serve(stream: UnixStream, agent: String, coord: Arc<Coordinator>) -> Result<()> {
let (read, mut write) = stream.into_split();
let mut reader = BufReader::new(read);
let mut line = String::new();
loop {
line.clear();
let n = reader.read_line(&mut line).await?;
if n == 0 {
return Ok(());
}
let resp = match serde_json::from_str::<Request>(line.trim()) {
Ok(req) => dispatch(&req, &agent, &coord).await,
Err(e) => Response::Err {
message: format!("parse error: {e}"),
},
};
let mut payload = serde_json::to_string(&resp)?;
payload.push('\n');
write.write_all(payload.as_bytes()).await?;
write.flush().await?;
}
}
/// Max long-poll window the caller can ask for; values above the
/// cap are clamped. 180s keeps us under typical TCP/proxy idle
/// limits while still letting agents park their turn until a
/// message arrives. Omitting `wait_seconds` (or passing `0`) means
/// "peek, don't wait" — claude can call recv whenever it wants a
/// cheap "is there anything pending?" check without blocking the
/// turn for 30 seconds. To actually park, the caller passes a
/// positive `wait_seconds`.
pub(crate) const RECV_LONG_POLL_MAX: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_mins(3);
/// Server-side hard cap on `Recv.max` — canonical value lives in
/// `hive_sh4re::inbox::RECV_BATCH_MAX` so the harness's wake-prompt hint and
/// this enforcement site can't drift apart.
pub(crate) const RECV_BATCH_MAX: u32 = hive_sh4re::inbox::RECV_BATCH_MAX;
pub(crate) fn recv_timeout(wait_seconds: Option<u64>) -> std::time::Duration {
match wait_seconds {
Some(s) => std::time::Duration::from_secs(s).min(RECV_LONG_POLL_MAX),
None => std::time::Duration::ZERO,
}
}
/// Handle the subset of `Request` variants that are identical on both
/// the agent socket and the manager socket. Returns `Some(response)` for
/// every variant it handles; returns `None` for the remaining variants —
/// `GetLooseEnds` and the orchestration verbs (schedules), which need
/// per-verb tool-group gating — or for host-admin / unknown requests
/// invalid on either socket.
///
/// The unified `dispatch` calls this first; the remaining arms (which gate
/// on topology / capabilities / tool-groups) are handled there.
pub(crate) async fn dispatch_shared(
req: &hive_core_agent_sock::Request,
agent: &str,
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
) -> Option<hive_core_agent_sock::Response> {
Some(match req {
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Send {
to,
body,
in_reply_to,
} => handle_send(coord, agent, to, body, *in_reply_to),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Recv { wait_seconds, max } => {
handle_recv(coord, agent, *wait_seconds, *max).await
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Status => handle_status(coord, agent),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::OperatorMsg { body } => {
handle_operator_msg(coord, agent, body)
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Wake { from, body } => handle_wake(coord, agent, from, body),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Recent { limit } => handle_recent(coord, agent, *limit),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::SetStatus { text } => handle_set_status(coord, text),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::GetAgentMeta { name } => {
handle_get_agent_meta(coord, agent, name.as_ref()).await
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::CancelLooseEnd { kind, id } => {
handle_cancel_loose_end(coord, agent, *kind, *id).map_or_else(
|message| hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err { message },
|()| hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok,
)
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::CreateRepo { repo } => handle_create_repo(agent, repo).await,
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::AckTurn => handle_ack_turn(coord, agent),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::AckUntil { up_to } => handle_ack_until(coord, agent, *up_to),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::RequeueInflight => handle_requeue_inflight(coord, agent),
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::GracefulStopComplete => {
// Harness drained + is exiting: clear the fence so the
// `GracefulStop` orchestration (which polls this flag) proceeds
// to stop the container without waiting out its timeout.
coord.clear_graceful_stop(agent);
hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::PauseAcknowledged => {
// Harness saw its own pause marker flip between turns: clear
// the fence so the pause DAG's drain node (which polls this
// flag) resolves without waiting out its timeout.
coord.clear_pause_pending(agent);
hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Request::GetHostJournal {
unit,
container,
lines,
priority,
grep,
since,
until,
} => {
dispatch_host_journal(
agent,
HostJournalArgs {
unit,
container,
lines,
priority,
grep,
since,
until,
},
)
.await
}
// Not a shared variant.
_ => return None,
})
}
/// `Recv` — long-poll the broker for up to `max` messages (capped at
/// `RECV_BATCH_MAX`), mapping deliveries onto the wire response.
async fn handle_recv(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
agent: &str,
wait_seconds: Option<u64>,
max: Option<u32>,
) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
// Graceful-stop fence: while a graceful stop is pending for this agent,
// return `GracefulStop` instead of polling the broker. The harness runs
// one stop-checkpoint turn then exits; new sends keep queueing in the
// broker for the agent's next start. Checked before the (blocking) poll
// so a flag set between polls is seen on the next Recv — the orchestration
// also fires a transient wake to break an in-flight long-poll.
if coord.is_graceful_stop_pending(agent) {
return hive_core_agent_sock::Response::GracefulStop;
}
let cap = max.unwrap_or(1).min(RECV_BATCH_MAX) as usize;
match coord
.broker
.recv_blocking_batch(agent, recv_timeout(wait_seconds), cap)
.await
{
Ok(deliveries) => {
// `recv_batch` stamps `delivered_at` on every popped row, so a
// `count_pending` here excludes the just-popped batch and reports
// exactly how many still-pending messages remain to drain. A count
// error is non-fatal — fall back to 0 rather than fail the recv.
let remaining = coord.broker.count_pending(agent).unwrap_or(0);
hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Messages {
messages: deliveries
.into_iter()
.map(|d| hive_sh4re::inbox::DeliveredMessage {
from: d.message.from.to_string(),
body: d.message.body,
id: d.id,
redelivered: d.redelivered,
in_reply_to: d.message.in_reply_to,
})
.collect(),
remaining,
}
}
Err(e) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// `Wake` — inject a wake into `agent`'s own inbox. Persisted through
/// the sqlite broker like any other message so the agent can ack it
/// via `AckUntil` and it appears in message history for post-mortem.
fn handle_wake(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
agent: &str,
from: &str,
body: &str,
) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
match coord.broker.send(&Message {
from: hive_sh4re::manager::trusted_sender(from),
to: agent.to_owned(),
body: body.to_owned(),
in_reply_to: None,
}) {
Ok(()) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok,
Err(e) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// `SetStatus` — validate the status text, then trigger a dashboard
/// rescan. The harness has already written the status file to its own
/// `state/` dir (it runs as the agent user), so this only refreshes the
/// dashboard's view.
fn handle_set_status(coord: &Arc<Coordinator>, text: &str) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
if let Err(message) = crate::limits::check_status_text(text) {
return hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err { message };
}
let coord2 = Arc::clone(coord);
tokio::spawn(async move { coord2.rescan_containers_and_emit().await });
hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok
}
/// Validate an agent-supplied repo name: a single safe slug segment, no
/// path traversal. Forgejo validates server-side too, but rejecting early
/// gives a clear message and avoids building odd API paths.
fn valid_repo_name(name: &str) -> bool {
!name.is_empty()
&& name.len() <= 100
&& !name.starts_with(['-', '.'])
&& name
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '-' | '_' | '.'))
}
/// `CreateRepo` — create a repo for `agent` *through hive-c0re* in the
/// c0re-owned `agents` org with operator-team branch protection.
/// The sanctioned create path now that agents can't create repos directly.
async fn handle_create_repo(agent: &str, repo: &str) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
if !valid_repo_name(repo) {
return hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!(
"invalid repo name {repo:?} — single segment of letters, digits, '-', '_', '.' \
(no leading '-'/'.', max 100 chars)"
),
};
}
let Some(core_token) = crate::forge::core_token() else {
return hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: "forge unavailable (no core token) — cannot create repo".to_owned(),
};
};
match crate::forge::create_agent_repo(agent, repo, &core_token).await {
Ok(full_name) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::RepoCreated {
clone_url: format!("{}/{full_name}.git", crate::forge::forge_http_base()),
full_name,
},
Err(e) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("create repo {repo:?} failed: {e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// `GetAgentMeta` — identity + live status for `name` (defaults to the
/// caller). Reads the live container-view status and the hive/swarm
/// display names.
async fn handle_get_agent_meta(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
agent: &str,
name: Option<&hive_types::Ident>,
) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
// `name` arrives pre-validated by serde (wire field is `Ident`). The
// `None` default (target == caller) still needs a parse since `agent`
// is a plain `&str` here — but it's the caller's own authenticated
// name, already valid in practice.
let target_id = match name {
Some(id) => id.clone(),
None => match hive_types::Ident::parse(agent) {
Ok(id) => id,
Err(reason) => {
return hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("get_agent_meta: invalid agent name {agent:?}: {reason}"),
};
}
},
};
let (status_text, status_set_at, running) =
crate::container_view::read_agent_status_live(&target_id).await;
let (hive_name, swarm_name) = crate::container_view::hive_swarm_names();
// Matrix identities are public handles (`name` / `user_id`
// `@user:server` / `homeserver`) — the access token lives separately
// in the agent's `matrix-token` and is never part of this response.
// Peer visibility is intentional: it lets an agent verify/contact
// another on a public matrix instance. The `Ident::parse` gate
// above is what closes the real vector here (path traversal via `../`
// in an agent-supplied name).
let matrix_accounts = read_agent_matrix_identities(&target_id);
hive_core_agent_sock::Response::AgentMeta {
name: target_id.into_string(),
running,
hyperhive_rev: crate::auto_update::current_flake_rev(&coord.hyperhive_flake),
status_text,
status_set_at,
hive_name,
swarm_name,
matrix_accounts,
}
}
/// Read the target agent's matrix identities from the daemon's
/// `matrix-accounts.json` snapshot (under the agent's state dir).
/// Best-effort: an absent / unparseable snapshot (no matrix provisioning,
/// or the daemon not up yet) yields an empty list. The `MatrixIdentity`
/// serde shape matches the snapshot entries; the snapshot's `live` field is
/// ignored (only live accounts are written).
fn read_agent_matrix_identities(
agent: &hive_types::Ident,
) -> Vec<hive_sh4re::container::MatrixIdentity> {
let path = Coordinator::agent_notes_dir(agent).join("matrix-accounts.json");
std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
.ok()
.and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::<Vec<hive_sh4re::container::MatrixIdentity>>(&s).ok())
.unwrap_or_default()
}
/// `Status` — count of pending (unread) inbox messages for `agent`.
fn handle_status(coord: &Arc<Coordinator>, agent: &str) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
match coord.broker.count_pending(agent) {
Ok(unread) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Status { unread },
Err(e) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// `OperatorMsg` — deliver an operator-authored message into `agent`'s
/// inbox (from the `operator` recipient).
fn handle_operator_msg(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
agent: &str,
body: &str,
) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
match coord.broker.send(&Message {
from: hive_sh4re::manager::trusted_sender(hive_sh4re::manager::OPERATOR_RECIPIENT),
to: agent.to_owned(),
body: body.to_owned(),
in_reply_to: None,
}) {
Ok(()) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok,
Err(e) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// `Recent` — the last `limit` inbox rows for `agent` (read-only,
/// doesn't consume).
fn handle_recent(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
agent: &str,
limit: u64,
) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
match coord.broker.recent_for(agent, limit) {
Ok(rows) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Recent { rows },
Err(e) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// `AckTurn` — mark `agent`'s in-flight delivered messages acked so
/// they don't redeliver on the next turn.
fn handle_ack_turn(coord: &Arc<Coordinator>, agent: &str) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
match coord.broker.ack_turn(agent) {
Ok(_n) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok,
Err(e) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// `AckUntil` — bulk-ack every message addressed to `agent` with row
/// id `<= up_to` (the agent-side backlog-triage escape hatch).
fn handle_ack_until(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
agent: &str,
up_to: i64,
) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
match coord.broker.ack_until(agent, up_to) {
Ok(count) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Acked { count },
Err(e) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// `RequeueInflight` — resurface `agent`'s unacked in-flight messages
/// (crash recovery on harness boot).
fn handle_requeue_inflight(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
agent: &str,
) -> hive_core_agent_sock::Response {
match coord.broker.requeue_inflight(agent) {
Ok(n) => {
if n > 0 {
tracing::info!(%agent, requeued = %n, "requeued in-flight messages");
}
hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Ok
}
Err(e) => hive_core_agent_sock::Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// Unified dispatch for every socket connection — per-agent sockets and the
/// (now pure-transport) manager socket alike. There is no privilege bit;
/// authority derives uniformly from the caller's identity: hive-wide
/// orchestration verbs (schedules) require the matching tool-group (the
/// grantable capability).
async fn dispatch(req: &Request, agent: &str, coord: &Arc<Coordinator>) -> Response {
if let Some(resp) = dispatch_shared(req, agent, coord).await {
return resp;
}
match req {
Request::GetLooseEnds => handle_get_loose_ends(coord, agent),
// Orchestration verbs — gated per-verb on tool-group membership
// (see `dispatch_orchestration`).
_ => dispatch_orchestration(req, agent, coord).await,
}
}
/// Handle the hive-wide orchestration verbs (scheduling). No blanket socket
/// gate: each verb gates on the grantable capability that authorises it —
/// the matching tool-group (`scheduling`). Any other variant is a
/// host-admin / unknown request invalid on either socket.
async fn dispatch_orchestration(req: &Request, agent: &str, coord: &Arc<Coordinator>) -> Response {
match req {
Request::RequestSchedulePrompt(payload) => {
if let Some(err) = require_group(agent, "scheduling", "schedule a prompt") {
return err;
}
handle_request_schedule_prompt(coord, agent, payload)
}
Request::CancelSchedule { id, targets } => {
if let Some(err) = require_group(agent, "scheduling", "cancel a schedule") {
return err;
}
handle_cancel_schedule(coord, agent, *id, targets.as_deref())
}
Request::EditSchedule {
id,
body,
description,
interval_seconds,
next_fire_at_unix,
targets_add,
targets_remove,
} => {
if let Some(err) = require_group(agent, "scheduling", "edit a schedule") {
return err;
}
handle_edit_schedule(
coord,
agent,
*id,
EditSchedulePatch {
body: body.clone(),
description: description.clone(),
interval_seconds: *interval_seconds,
next_fire_at_unix: *next_fire_at_unix,
targets_add: targets_add.clone(),
targets_remove: targets_remove.clone(),
},
)
}
Request::ListSchedules => {
if let Some(err) = require_group(agent, "scheduling", "list schedules") {
return err;
}
handle_list_schedules(coord, agent)
}
Request::FireScheduleNow { id } => {
if let Some(err) = require_group(agent, "scheduling", "fire a schedule") {
return err;
}
handle_fire_schedule_now(coord, agent, *id).await
}
// Host-admin-only / unknown variants: never valid on either socket.
_ => Response::Err {
message: "request not handled on this socket".to_owned(),
},
}
}
/// Capability guard for the hive-wide orchestration verbs: the caller must
/// hold the given tool-group. The tool-group (c0re-owned `tool_groups.json`,
/// read server-side via [`crate::tool_groups::groups_for`]) is the grantable
/// capability — granting it to an orchestrator (e.g. the root) authorises
/// these verbs without any positional/hardcoded privilege. `action` is the
/// verb phrase for the message.
fn require_group(agent: &str, group: &str, action: &str) -> Option<Response> {
if crate::tool_groups::groups_for(agent)
.iter()
.any(|g| g == group)
{
None
} else {
Some(Response::Err {
message: format!("agent `{agent}` cannot {action}: requires the `{group}` tool group"),
})
}
}
/// `GetLooseEnds` — always the caller's own loose ends.
fn handle_get_loose_ends(coord: &Arc<Coordinator>, agent: &str) -> Response {
match crate::loose_ends::for_agent(coord, agent) {
Ok(loose_ends) => Response::LooseEnds { loose_ends },
Err(e) => Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// Handle `CancelLooseEnd` from a per-agent socket. Dispatches by kind, each
/// with its own auth check: reminder cancels are handled entirely in-container
/// (this arm should be unreachable in practice, kept only so the match stays
/// exhaustive) and approval cancels require the `approvals` tool-group (the
/// grantable capability) AND ownership — the canceller must be the approval's
/// submitter — so no positional / hardcoded privilege and no cross-agent
/// cancellation. (The operator's cancel-anything path is a separate handler.)
fn handle_cancel_loose_end(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
canceller: &str,
kind: hive_sh4re::inbox::CancelLooseEndKind,
id: i64,
) -> Result<(), String> {
match kind {
hive_sh4re::inbox::CancelLooseEndKind::Reminder => {
// Reminders are now agent-local (in-container store) — the
// agent-mcp `cancel_loose_end` tool branches on this kind and
// dials the agent's own socket directly, never forwarding to
// hive-c0re. This arm should be unreachable in practice; kept
// only so the match stays exhaustive.
Err(format!(
"reminder {id}: reminders are handled locally by the agent, \
not by hive-c0re"
))
}
hive_sh4re::inbox::CancelLooseEndKind::Approval => {
// Withdrawing an approval needs the grantable `approvals`
// tool-group (held by any approval-submitting orchestrator)
// AND ownership: only the agent that submitted the approval
// may withdraw it. Without the ownership check, any
// approvals-group agent could cancel any other's approval by
// id. A NULL submitter (legacy row predating the column) is
// treated as operator-initiated (no agent tracking predates
// the column).
check_can_cancel_approval(canceller)?;
let submitter = coord
.approvals
.submitter_of(id)
.map_err(|e| format!("{e:#}"))?
.unwrap_or_else(|| "operator".to_owned());
if submitter != canceller {
return Err(format!(
"cancel_loose_end: approval {id} was submitted by {submitter}, \
not {canceller}; only the submitting agent can withdraw it"
));
}
let approval = coord
.approvals
.mark_cancelled(id, canceller)
.map_err(|e| format!("{e:#}"))?;
tracing::info!(%id, %canceller, agent = %approval.agent, "approval cancelled");
let sha_short = approval
.fetched_sha
.as_deref()
.map(|s| s[..s.len().min(12)].to_owned());
coord.emit_approval_resolved(crate::coordinator::ApprovalResolved {
id: approval.id,
agent: approval.agent.as_str(),
approval_kind: <&str>::from(approval.kind),
sha_short,
status: "cancelled",
note: approval.note,
description: approval.description,
});
Ok(())
}
}
}
/// Capability guard on the `Approval` cancel arm: the caller must hold the
/// `approvals` tool-group (the grantable capability for approval-submitting
/// orchestrators), checked server-side via `tool_groups::groups_for`. Pulled
/// out so the auth check has its own focused unit test — exercising the full
/// `handle_cancel_loose_end` flow would need a `Coordinator` fixture (broker +
/// sqlite). Keys on a grantable capability, not a positional / hardcoded
/// privilege.
fn check_can_cancel_approval(canceller: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
const APPROVALS_GROUP: &str = "approvals";
if crate::tool_groups::groups_for(canceller)
.iter()
.any(|g| g == APPROVALS_GROUP)
{
Ok(())
} else {
Err(
"cancel_loose_end: cancelling approval rows requires the `approvals` tool group"
.to_owned(),
)
}
}
/// Field-named journal-query knobs for [`dispatch_host_journal`].
/// Borrows straight from the matched `GetHostJournal` request variant.
pub struct HostJournalArgs<'a> {
pub unit: &'a Option<String>,
pub container: &'a Option<String>,
pub lines: &'a Option<u32>,
pub priority: &'a Option<hive_sh4re::journal::JournalPriority>,
pub grep: &'a Option<String>,
pub since: &'a Option<String>,
pub until: &'a Option<String>,
}
/// Handle `GetHostJournal` from both the agent and manager sockets.
/// Capability-gated: the calling agent must hold `read_host_journal` in
/// `meta/capabilities.json`. Runs `journalctl` host-side and returns
/// the output as a `HostJournal` response.
///
/// The manager is not exempt - grant `read_host_journal` in
/// `meta/capabilities.json` to enable it for any agent including the manager.
pub async fn dispatch_host_journal(agent: &str, args: HostJournalArgs<'_>) -> Response {
let HostJournalArgs {
unit,
container,
lines,
priority,
grep,
since,
until,
} = args;
if !crate::capabilities::has_cap(agent, hive_sh4re::permissions::Capability::ReadHostJournal) {
return Response::Err {
message: "agent does not have the read_host_journal capability".to_owned(),
};
}
let n = lines.unwrap_or(30).min(100);
// A container (`-M`) read enters the container namespace and needs
// root, so it's delegated to hive-priv. A host read (no container)
// the unprivileged hive-core user can do directly via its
// systemd-journal group membership.
if let Some(c) = container {
tracing::info!(%agent, machine = %c, %n, "get_host_journal (container)");
return match crate::priv_client::read_container_journal(
c,
hive_priv_sock::JournalQuery {
lines: n,
unit: unit.clone(),
priority: priority.as_ref().map(|p| p.as_journald_str().to_owned()),
grep: grep.clone(),
since: since.clone(),
until: until.clone(),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
{
Ok((stdout, stderr)) => {
let content = if stdout.is_empty() { stderr } else { stdout };
Response::HostJournal { content }
}
Err(e) => Response::Err {
message: format!("journal read: {e:#}"),
},
};
}
let mut args: Vec<String> = vec![
"--no-pager".to_owned(),
"--output=short".to_owned(),
"-n".to_owned(),
n.to_string(),
];
if let Some(u) = unit {
args.push("-u".to_owned());
args.push(u.clone());
}
if let Some(p) = priority {
args.push("-p".to_owned());
args.push(p.as_journald_str().to_owned());
}
if let Some(g) = grep {
args.push(format!("--grep={g}"));
}
if let Some(s) = since {
args.push(format!("--since={s}"));
}
if let Some(u) = until {
args.push(format!("--until={u}"));
}
tracing::info!(%agent, ?args, "get_host_journal");
match tokio::process::Command::new("journalctl")
.args(&args)
.output()
.await
{
Ok(out) => {
let content = if out.status.success() || !out.stdout.is_empty() {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).into_owned()
} else {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
format!("journalctl exited {}: {stderr}", out.status)
};
Response::HostJournal { content }
}
Err(e) => Response::Err {
message: format!("journalctl spawn failed: {e:#}"),
},
}
}
/// Fan out one message to each recipient in `targets`. Skips the sender
/// itself. Returns a list of `"<agent>: <error>"` strings for any delivery
/// failures (empty = all good).
pub(crate) fn fan_out_send(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
from: &str,
body: &str,
in_reply_to: Option<i64>,
targets: &[String],
) -> Vec<String> {
let mut errors = Vec::new();
for target in targets {
if target == from {
continue;
}
if let Err(e) = coord.broker.send(&Message {
from: hive_sh4re::manager::trusted_sender(from),
to: target.clone(),
body: body.to_owned(),
in_reply_to,
}) {
errors.push(format!("{target}: {e}"));
}
}
errors
}
/// Common Send handler shared between dispatch arms. Applies the
/// 4 KiB body cap, then routes broadcast (`to == "*"`) / children fan-out
/// (`to == "<children>"`) / unicast through their respective broker calls.
/// `pub(crate)` so `dispatch_shared` can use it across both socket paths.
pub(crate) fn handle_send(
coord: &Arc<Coordinator>,
agent: &str,
to: &str,
body: &str,
in_reply_to: Option<i64>,
) -> Response {
if let Err(message) = crate::limits::check_size("send", body) {
return Response::Err { message };
}
if to == "*" {
let errors = coord.broadcast_send(agent, body);
return if errors.is_empty() {
Response::Ok
} else {
Response::Err {
message: format!("broadcast failed for agents: {}", errors.join(", ")),
}
};
}
// `<children>`: fan out to every direct descendant of the sender per
// topology.json. Bypasses the allow-list check — structural fan-out
// targets are never user-listed peers. No-op (returns Ok) for leaf
// agents that have no children.
if to == hive_sh4re::manager::CHILDREN_RECIPIENT {
let children = crate::topology::children_of(agent);
let errors = fan_out_send(coord, agent, body, in_reply_to, &children);
return if errors.is_empty() {
Response::Ok
} else {
Response::Err {
message: format!("children fan-out failed for agents: {}", errors.join(", ")),
}
};
}
// Resolve magic-recipient sentinels (`<parent>`) against topology.json;
// no-op for ordinary names. Lets agents address structural roles without
// learning the label — runtime reparenting propagates for free. See
// `docs/process/conventions.md::Recipient sentinels`.
let resolved = crate::topology::resolve_recipient(agent, to);
// Validate that the resolved recipient is a known local agent or the
// special "operator" recipient. Without this check a typo in `to`
// silently queues a message nobody will ever read.
//
// Cross-hive messaging (`name@hive` qualified names) is not routed
// through the broker — use the Matrix MCP tools for that instead.
if resolved.contains('@') {
return Response::Err {
message: format!(
"send failed: cross-hive recipient `{resolved}` is not supported \
via the broker — use Matrix MCP tools for cross-hive messaging"
),
};
}
if resolved != hive_sh4re::manager::OPERATOR_RECIPIENT {
// A name that doesn't parse as an Ident can't be a local agent, so
// it collapses into the same "unknown recipient" error as a valid
// name with no state dir.
let exists = hive_types::Ident::parse(&resolved)
.is_ok_and(|id| crate::paths::agent_state_dir(&id).exists());
if !exists {
return Response::Err {
message: format!(
"send failed: unknown recipient `{resolved}` \
(no agent with that name exists on this hive)"
),
};
}
}
match coord.broker.send(&Message {
from: hive_sh4re::manager::trusted_sender(agent),
to: resolved,
body: body.to_owned(),
in_reply_to,
}) {
Ok(()) => Response::Ok,
Err(e) => Response::Err {
message: format!("{e:#}"),
},
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn approval_cancel_rejects_callers_without_the_approvals_group() {
// A caller that doesn't hold the `approvals` tool-group must not be
// able to cancel approval rows even if it invents an id. The guard is
// server-side so client cooperation is irrelevant — and it keys on a
// grantable capability (the tool-group), not on any agent name.
// `groups_for` of a name with no tool_groups.json entry is empty.
let err = check_can_cancel_approval("nobody-with-no-groups").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.contains("approvals` tool group"), "{err}");
}
}