| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
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b004ba3dc5
Per mara on the PR: *"split by hive. its not a security thing, just so hives dont get messages they dont care about."* She agreed with the finding and still wanted the split, which is the part worth recording. I measured that a per-hive subject gives no confidentiality — `sub` is unrestricted, so a hive that wanted another's messages could subscribe to them — and concluded it bought nothing. "Nothing" is a claim over every axis and I had checked one. The axis I never priced: every hive in the swarm being woken by every other hive's deploys. So `deploy_subject(hive)` replaces the single literal, and the payload drops `hive` to carry only the agent — the subject names the hive, and two places stating one fact are free to disagree. The hive subscribes to its own subject and no longer filters. The grant is a wildcard rather than a subject per hive because the responder has no roster: it cannot enumerate hives, and a grant that had to track one would be a second place to get the list wrong — the same argument `hive_name`'s doc makes about admission. The negative test gets stronger rather than merely adapted. Splitting the family makes "another hive's subject" and "its own" separate strings for the first time, so it now asserts a hive reaches neither, nor the wildcard. |
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| src | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
swarm-controller
The swarm-level daemon. Where hive-c0re owns the agents on one host, this
owns what is true across hives — so a swarm runs one of them and most hives
leave it off.
Opt-in per host via services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.enable, which is
deliberately not derived from services.hyperhive.enable: turning it on is
a statement about swarm topology, not about whether hyperhive is installed.
What it does today
Serves one /health endpoint and holds no state.
That is the whole intent of the first slice. The point is to make the unit
real — service user, runtime and state directories, socket, nginx
reachability — so the swarm-level surfaces that follow have somewhere to land.
Inventing those surfaces before they are agreed would bake in a shape nobody
chose. See #3066 and the hyperhive.swarm consolidation epic.
Why a unix socket, not a port
The hive-gateway's nginx is the only intended client and reaches the socket through a bind-mount. A listener that is never bound to an address cannot be reached from off-host by mistake.
The socket path is services.hyperhive.swarm.controller.socketPath, default
/run/swarm-controller/controller.sock, exported to the process as
SWARM_CONTROLLER_SOCKET.
⚠️ The socket's directory is its access control
The socket is 0666. It has to be: nginx runs as a different user and
connect(2) needs write. This matches how hive-c0re publishes the per-agent
sockets, and rests on the same argument — "the bind source dir is per-agent on
host so blast radius is unchanged."
What keeps that safe is that the directory holds one socket. So:
Never point
socketPathat a directory that carries anything else./run/hyperhiveabove all — it holdshost.sock, the host admin socket. Pointing nginx at that directory to reach this socket would put the admin socket within its reach too.
nginx is a host service, so nothing narrows what it can reach except the directory itself — that is the whole of the access control. A unit test pins the default path so a tidying edit fails instead of reviewing cleanly.
RuntimeDirectoryPreserve=yes and the daemon's stale-socket unlink on start are
a pair: preserving the directory without the unlink means bind fails with
EADDRINUSE after a restart.
Packaging
Built by the workspace derivation and extracted as its own package
(nix build .#swarm-controller). Deliberately not in nix/packages'
daemonBins — that list is the core stack and drives the bundle
services.hyperhive.c0re.package points at, so folding this in would put a
swarm-scoped service into every hive's closure.