hyperhive/swarm-queue-client
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Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
atlas 9b939f4626 refactor(#3255): one knowledge subject, single writer and many readers
Review call: the event was addressed per hive — `$SWARM.events.<hive>.knowledge`,
published in a loop over the roster, granted through a wildcard. It does not
need to be. The payload is empty and the event means the same thing to every
hive, so one publish to one subject delivers exactly what N publishes to N
subjects did, and core NATS already fans out to whoever is subscribed. A hive
that was down misses it either way and reconciles on its next periodic pull.

That deletes rather than reshuffles: the roster loop, the wildcard, and the
shared subject-building function whose entire purpose was keeping the grant and
the publish from drifting apart. With one literal there is nothing to disagree
about.

The per-hive shape was justified by the callout policy's rule that an extra
subject must contain the hive name. That rule governs `extra_hive_subjects` —
what a HIVE may publish. This subject lives in the controller's reader grant,
which the rule does not constrain, so a real rule was carried across into a
decision it had no authority over.

Knowledge becomes its own category rather than a leaf under a general event
namespace, since a namespace shaped for events that do not exist yet is a
decision made before there is anything to decide from. The empty config-PR match
arm goes with it: an arm with no body claims this is where the deploy path is
handled, and it is not.

The deny test stays and matters more, not less: with one shared subject a forged
event would reach the whole swarm where a per-hive one reached a single hive.
2026-08-19 21:05:52 +02:00
..
src refactor(#3255): one knowledge subject, single writer and many readers 2026-08-19 21:05:52 +02:00
Cargo.toml refactor(swarm-queue-client): share the hive-status bucket's name and shape 2026-08-16 13:12:59 +02:00
README.md refactor(swarm-queue-client): share the hive-status bucket's name and shape 2026-08-16 13:12:59 +02:00

swarm-queue-client

Connecting to the swarm message queue as an authenticated client. Shared by every process that participates: the swarm controller reads hive status out of the queue, a hive publishes its own status into it.

Why a crate and not a module per binary

The connect is identical for every participant — mint an authelia token, present it at CONNECT for the auth_callout responder to introspect, let async-nats re-run the callback on each connection attempt. Only the use differs.

Two copies of that would be two copies of credential handling, and a token-refresh fix would have to be found twice. The same reasoning already put hive-sock-client in its own crate rather than in each daemon that speaks to a unix socket.

The two properties that constrain the code

A token expires. Authelia issues client_credentials access tokens with expires_in: 3599. Authentication happens at CONNECT, so a long-lived connection is fine — but a reconnect an hour later needs a token minted an hour later.

The refresh therefore lives in the auth callback, not in a timer. async-nats invokes it per connection attempt, so there is no window in which the client holds a token it minted for a previous connection. The alternative — mint once, own the reconnect loop — fails in the way this subsystem exists to prevent: the process keeps serving while its data quietly stops moving, and nothing says so until someone reads a dashboard.

Configuration

QueueConfig::from_env(prefix) reads <prefix>_NATS_URL, <prefix>_OIDC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT, <prefix>_OIDC_CLIENT_ID and <prefix>_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE.

The prefix is a parameter because the variables belong to the consuming unit — a NixOS module sets them alongside its other options. What is shared is the rule, not the spelling: all four together or none at all. A half-set environment is a hard error, because the failure it would otherwise produce is the expensive kind — the process comes up "fine", never connects, and the data it was supposed to move silently stops.

The client secret is a path, not a value: putting it in the environment would publish it to anything that can read /proc/<pid>/environ. It is read per token request rather than cached, so a rotation the operator believes took effect actually did.

What this crate does not do

It ends at a connected client. jetstream/kv are off by default — what a consumer does with the connection is its own business, and its Cargo.toml is where that requirement should be visible. The auth-callout responder speaks the connect and nothing else, and pays for nothing else.

The one exception: the kv feature

kv adds status, which holds the name and the creation config of the hive-status bucket — nothing more.

It is here because that bucket has two ends in two crates: a hive writes its own key, the controller reads every key. The name being a repeated literal is the mild half of the problem; the sharp half is that either end may arrive first on a fresh swarm, so both create the bucket if it is missing. Two Configs that drift means whichever end created it wins and the other opens a bucket it did not ask for — no error, no log, just a retention policy nobody chose.

An agreement between two crates has to live in one of them, and neither end of this bucket is senior to the other. Behind a default-off feature, the consumer that needs none of it still pays nothing.