| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
8caf688ee4
A per-agent queue credential is minted at agent creation and nothing has ever removed it. An agent declared destroyed loses its container and keeps its credential: a bearer secret recovered from a snapshot or a stale capture still authenticates as that agent, so the set of usable credentials only grows. Delete the path the mint published, on the one transition that ends an agent's life. It mirrors step 3 of `mint_and_verify` and no other step: the leaf, the ACL document and the cert role are what a hive uses to collect an agent's secrets and are re-minted on every run of the mint. Every version, not the newest. The mint rewrites the path when the principal it names needs correcting, so KV v2's plain delete would leave the identical secret readable at ?version=N. That is a separately-ACL'd path, hence the second stanza in the controller's grant -- `delete` on metadata discloses nothing, and `update` on the data path already lets this principal destroy any agent credential's usability. The destroy is not blocked by a failed revocation: the declaration is already published and refusing the call would leave an operator with an agent they cannot tear down. The failure is logged at error instead, naming the agent, since a silent orphan is the fault being removed. |
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| .. | ||
| src | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
swarm-controller
The swarm-level daemon. Where hive-c0re owns the agents on one host, this
owns what is true across hives — so a swarm runs one of them and most hives
leave it off.
Opt-in per host via services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.enable, which is
deliberately not derived from
services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.enable: turning it on is a statement
about swarm topology, not about whether this host runs a hive.
What it does today
Serves one /health endpoint and holds no state.
That is the whole intent of the first slice. The point is to make the unit
real — service user, runtime and state directories, socket, nginx
reachability — so the swarm-level surfaces that follow have somewhere to land.
Inventing those surfaces before they are agreed would bake in a shape nobody
chose. See the hyperhive.swarm consolidation epic.
Why a unix socket, not a port
The hive-gateway's nginx is the only intended client and reaches the socket through a bind-mount. A listener that is never bound to an address cannot be reached from off-host by mistake.
The socket path is services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.socketPath, default
/run/swarm-controller/controller.sock, exported to the process as
SWARM_CONTROLLER_SOCKET.
⚠️ The socket's directory is its access control
The socket is 0666. It has to be: nginx runs as a different user and
connect(2) needs write. This matches how hive-c0re publishes the per-agent
sockets, and rests on the same argument — "the bind source dir is per-agent on
host so blast radius is unchanged."
What keeps that safe is that the directory holds one socket. So:
Never point
socketPathat a directory that carries anything else./run/hyperhiveabove all — it holdshost.sock, the host admin socket. Pointing nginx at that directory to reach this socket would put the admin socket within its reach too.
nginx is a host service, so nothing narrows what it can reach except the directory itself — that is the whole of the access control. A unit test pins the default path so a tidying edit fails instead of reviewing cleanly.
RuntimeDirectoryPreserve=yes and the daemon's stale-socket unlink on start are
a pair: preserving the directory without the unlink means bind fails with
EADDRINUSE after a restart.
Packaging
Built by the workspace derivation and extracted as its own package
(nix build .#swarm-controller). Deliberately not in nix/packages'
daemonBins — that list is the core stack and drives the bundle
services.hyperhive.c0re.package points at, so folding this in would put a
swarm-scoped service into every hive's closure.