The single module-eval derivation forced ~62 full nixosSystem fixtures live at once to compute its cases list: 10.6GB peak RSS / 5m25s to evaluate, by far the dominant cost in nix flake check. Splits it into 21 independent checks.module-eval-* derivations (1-7 fixtures each) sharing builders/helpers via module-eval/lib.nix, so no single derivation needs more than a handful of fixtures live at once. A few cases spanning two clusters carry a small duplicated fixture rather than threading shared state through lib.nix.
169 lines
6.8 KiB
Nix
169 lines
6.8 KiB
Nix
# `checks.module-eval-agent-queue-bao` — see ./lib.nix for the shared
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# rationale (why this suite exists, naming convention, "evaluates
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# not executes").
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{
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pkgs,
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lib,
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self,
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nixosSystem,
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}:
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let
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inherit
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(import ./lib.nix {
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inherit
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pkgs
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lib
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self
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nixosSystem
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;
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})
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agent
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agentWith
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runGroup
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agentHarness
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;
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# The agent side of the swarm queue. Both coordinates set is the only state
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# in which the harness unit declares a credential at all, so the pair and
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# the empty fixture beside it are the two arms worth having.
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agentQueue = agent {
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queue.natsUrl = "nats://10.42.0.1:4222";
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queue.tokenEndpoint = "https://auth.t.local/api/oidc/token";
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};
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agentNoQueue = agent { };
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# The agent side of the swarm secret store. The address is the whole switch —
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# it is both what generates the login check and what that check points at —
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# so it and the empty fixture beside it are the two arms worth having.
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agentBao = agentWith { services.hyperhive.agent.bao.addr = "https://bao.t.local:8200"; };
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agentNoBao = agentWith { };
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agentBaoIdentity = machine: machine.systemd.services.hive-agent-bao-identity;
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cases = [
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{
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# Both ids or neither: the secret authenticates nobody without the id it
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# belongs to, and the harness refuses to treat one of the two as a queue.
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name = "an agent with queue coordinates imports both halves of its credential";
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ok =
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let
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c = (agentHarness agentQueue).serviceConfig.LoadCredential;
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in
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builtins.elem "hive-queue-agent-secret" c && builtins.elem "hive-queue-agent-client-id" c;
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}
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{
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# `%d` and not a path under the state dir: the host file is `0600`
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# root-owned, so the only copy this unprivileged unit can open is the
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# one systemd puts in its own credentials directory.
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name = "the harness reads its queue credential out of the credentials directory";
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ok =
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let
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e = (agentHarness agentQueue).environment;
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in
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e.HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE == "%d/hive-queue-agent-secret"
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&& e.HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CLIENT_ID_FILE == "%d/hive-queue-agent-client-id";
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}
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{
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# An agent built before its hive was handed the queue's address. It
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# must declare nothing rather than name a credential that never
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# arrives — and the harness then reports "no queue coordinates"
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# instead of a half-set environment.
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name = "an agent with no queue coordinates declares no credential";
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ok =
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let
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u = agentHarness agentNoQueue;
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in
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!(u.serviceConfig ? LoadCredential)
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&& !(u.environment ? HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE)
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&& !(u.environment ? HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CLIENT_ID_FILE);
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}
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{
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# The three ids `hive_c0re::lifecycle::agent_identity` forwards under.
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# Neither end can discover the other's spelling, and a mismatch is a
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# credential that is simply not there — which this unit then reports as
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# a hive that delivered nothing.
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name = "an agent with the store enabled imports every half of its identity";
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ok =
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let
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c = (agentBaoIdentity agentBao).serviceConfig.LoadCredential;
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in
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builtins.elem "hive-agent-bao-cert" c
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&& builtins.elem "hive-agent-bao-key" c
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&& builtins.elem "hive-agent-bao-server-ca" c;
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}
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{
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# `%d` and not a path under the agent's state dir, for the reason the
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# queue arm above gives: the host file is `0600` to the hive daemon, so
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# the only copy this unprivileged unit can open is the one systemd puts
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# in its own credentials directory. The address is the option's value
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# rather than a literal that agrees with it today.
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name = "the identity check presents its certificate out of the credentials directory";
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ok =
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let
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e = (agentBaoIdentity agentBao).environment;
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in
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e.BAO_CLIENT_CERT == "%d/hive-agent-bao-cert"
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&& e.BAO_CLIENT_KEY == "%d/hive-agent-bao-key"
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&& e.BAO_ADDR == agentBao.services.hyperhive.agent.bao.addr;
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}
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{
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# Same 403-not-a-miss reason as the hive-side readers: the path
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# `swarm_secret_client::mtls::identity_path` builds is the one this
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# agent's own policy stanza covers, and a path outside it is refused
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# however correct it looks. Built from the agent's own name rather than
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# from a literal, because the name is what makes it this agent's path
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# and not some other agent's.
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name = "the identity check reads the agent's own path";
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ok =
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let
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m = agentBao;
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name = m.services.hyperhive.agent.user.name;
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in
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lib.hasInfix "secret/swarm/agents/${name}/bao-mtls" (agentBaoIdentity m).script;
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}
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{
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# The whole point of the unit, and the thing a quieter default would
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# undo: every arm of the check ends the unit non-zero, so an agent that
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# cannot authenticate as itself says so at boot instead of at whichever
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# pull needed the store first.
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name = "the identity check fails the unit rather than degrading";
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ok =
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let
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u = agentBaoIdentity agentBao;
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in
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lib.hasInfix "exit 1" u.script
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&& !(lib.hasInfix "exit 0" u.script)
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&& u.serviceConfig.Restart == "on-failure";
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}
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{
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# Nothing about the identity may be printed, and the read-back is where
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# that could slip: `bao kv get` on this path answers with certificate
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# material, and the object beside it is a private key. The check needs
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# only whether the read succeeded.
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#
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# The path goes through `lib.escapeShellArg` here for the same reason the
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# module passes it through one — that helper decides whether an argument
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# needs quotes at all, and this one (only `[a-z0-9/-]`) comes back bare.
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# Spelling the quotes in by hand asserts a rendering nixpkgs chooses
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# rather than the redirect this property is about.
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name = "the identity check discards what it reads back";
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ok =
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let
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m = agentBao;
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name = m.services.hyperhive.agent.user.name;
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arg = lib.escapeShellArg "secret/swarm/agents/${name}/bao-mtls";
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in
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lib.hasInfix "bao kv get -field=cert ${arg} >/dev/null" (agentBaoIdentity m).script;
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}
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{
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# The absence arm, and what makes the four above able to fail. An agent
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# whose swarm never minted an identity has nothing to log in with, and a
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# failed unit at every boot would be the loudest possible statement
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# about a deployment that never asked for one.
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name = "an agent told no store address runs no identity check";
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ok = !(agentNoBao.systemd.services ? hive-agent-bao-identity);
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}
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];
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in
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runGroup "agent-queue-bao" cases
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