hyperhive/swarm-controller
Repository files (latest commit first)
Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
atlas 5202e5c5ba types: reserve the protocol names an agent must not be called
An agent's name was checked for shape and never for meaning:
`Ident::parse` is 1-63 chars of [a-z0-9-] and there was no reserved-name
list anywhere in the tree. So an agent could be called `operator`,
`forge` or `todo` -- names the message layer already produces as a
sender -- and a wake from that component became indistinguishable, at the
broker, from a message sent by the agent.

Adds `RESERVED_NAMES` + `is_reserved_name` to `hive-types`, the zero-dep
leaf both `hive-c0re` and `swarm-controller` already depend on, so
neither grows a dependency to use it.

Every entry is a value some component actually produces as a message
`from`/`to`, taken from `hive-sh4re`'s own sentinel constants rather than
guessed: operator, system, reminder, forge, scheduled, todo, compact,
graceful-stop. Two sentinels are deliberately absent -- `<parent>` and
`<children>` are unreachable as agent names because the charset rejects
them, and `ruth` is a real agent, so wanting that name is a name being
*taken*, which the roster answers.

Deliberately not enforced inside `Ident::parse`: parsing runs on every
read of an already-created name, so rejecting there would make existing
agents unreadable rather than un-creatable -- and it would be a refusal,
which is a stronger action than the warning this is used for today.

`create_agent` now warns on both halves -- a reserved name, and a name
that is also a hive in the roster -- and does not refuse. The warnings
ride on `CreateAgentResponse` rather than only the daemon's log, because
the person who can still fix the name in one keystroke is holding the
response, not reading the journal. `skip_serializing_if` keeps the
no-warning JSON byte-identical to before, so this is a non-breaking first
step toward refusing later.

`hive-sh4re` gains a drift test tying its sentinel constants to the list:
two crates that cannot import each other's intent now fail loudly if a
sentinel is added without being reserved. Mutation-verified -- forcing
the predicate false, forcing it true, and dropping a single entry each
turn a different test red.
2026-08-27 16:36:42 +02:00
..
src types: reserve the protocol names an agent must not be called 2026-08-27 16:36:42 +02:00
Cargo.toml swarm-controller: emit vcs commit/push otel counters from an instance-wide forge webhook 2026-08-24 20:54:49 +02:00
README.md docs(gateway): describe what is, not what changed 2026-08-11 18:09:51 +02:00

swarm-controller

The swarm-level daemon. Where hive-c0re owns the agents on one host, this owns what is true across hives — so a swarm runs one of them and most hives leave it off.

Opt-in per host via services.hyperhive.swarm.controller.enable, which is deliberately not derived from services.hyperhive.enable: turning it on is a statement about swarm topology, not about whether hyperhive is installed.

What it does today

Serves one /health endpoint and holds no state.

That is the whole intent of the first slice. The point is to make the unit real — service user, runtime and state directories, socket, nginx reachability — so the swarm-level surfaces that follow have somewhere to land. Inventing those surfaces before they are agreed would bake in a shape nobody chose. See #3066 and the hyperhive.swarm consolidation epic.

Why a unix socket, not a port

The hive-gateway's nginx is the only intended client and reaches the socket through a bind-mount. A listener that is never bound to an address cannot be reached from off-host by mistake.

The socket path is services.hyperhive.swarm.controller.socketPath, default /run/swarm-controller/controller.sock, exported to the process as SWARM_CONTROLLER_SOCKET.

⚠️ The socket's directory is its access control

The socket is 0666. It has to be: nginx runs as a different user and connect(2) needs write. This matches how hive-c0re publishes the per-agent sockets, and rests on the same argument — "the bind source dir is per-agent on host so blast radius is unchanged."

What keeps that safe is that the directory holds one socket. So:

Never point socketPath at a directory that carries anything else. /run/hyperhive above all — it holds host.sock, the host admin socket. Pointing nginx at that directory to reach this socket would put the admin socket within its reach too.

nginx is a host service, so nothing narrows what it can reach except the directory itself — that is the whole of the access control. A unit test pins the default path so a tidying edit fails instead of reviewing cleanly.

RuntimeDirectoryPreserve=yes and the daemon's stale-socket unlink on start are a pair: preserving the directory without the unlink means bind fails with EADDRINUSE after a restart.

Packaging

Built by the workspace derivation and extracted as its own package (nix build .#swarm-controller). Deliberately not in nix/packages' daemonBins — that list is the core stack and drives the bundle services.hyperhive.c0re.package points at, so folding this in would put a swarm-scoped service into every hive's closure.