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hyperhive/swarm-controller/src/matrix_account.rs
atlas 78d8d69c7f swarm-controller: mint each hive's matrix sender token
A hive whose homeserver runs on another host has no local
matrix-appservice-token, so hive-c0re's matrix sweep returned before
reaching the store read in ensure_hive_user: no @hive-<name>: token, no
Space, no chat room, no invites, and a sweep-health banner.

swarm-controller now mints @hive-<name>: with the swarm appservice
token for every hive in its directory, as a MintHiveSenderToken job
node queued by a five-minute pass, and stores it at
swarm/hives/<name>/matrix/sender-token, the same matrix::Credential
swarm-matrix-ctl writes there. It is keep-if-live, reusing agent_token's
classify/plan: a stored token whoami confirms as @hive-<name>: is left
alone, so only an absent or dead one is minted. agent_token's probe and
mint steps are lifted into probe_at/mint_at so both passes share them.

swarm-matrix-ctl mint still writes the path for its own hive when it is
empty. If both mint an empty path at once, one token is invalidated
(same pinned device); the next pass classifies it Revoked and re-mints.

hive-c0re's ensure_all no longer returns when there is no local
as_token. ensure_hive_user reads the store first on every sweep and
overwrites its token file when the store's token differs, keeps the
file when the store has none, mints with the local as_token only when
neither holds one, and fails with one error when there is nothing at
all. The decision is sender_source, unit-tested.

The controller's bao policy gains create/read/update on
swarm/hives/+/matrix/sender-token (`+`, since `*` is a glob only at the
end of a path), pinned in module-eval.

Refs #4427
2026-09-29 22:14:40 +02:00

678 lines
29 KiB
Rust

//! An agent's matrix accounts, from this daemon's two sides of them.
//!
//! **The internal one** — [`agent_token`] — is the agent's own `main` account on
//! the swarm's homeserver, minted with the swarm's appservice token and stored
//! where the agent's daemon reads it. See docs/swarm/credentials.md for why
//! `main` is the one name [`put_matrix_account`] refuses to write.
//! [`hive_sender`] mints each **hive's** sender account the same way, sharing this module's helpers with [`agent_token`].
//!
//! **The external one** — [`put_matrix_account`] and everything under it — is
//! an account somewhere else that an operator hands us a credential for: put it
//! in the swarm's secret store, then tell that agent's hive it is there.
//!
//! The hive end is `hive-c0re/src/workers/credential.rs`, which reads the
//! value under its own identity and writes it into the agent's state dir. The
//! notice carries only names, so the queue never holds the secret — see
//! [`swarm_queue_client::credential_subject`] for why that is a requirement
//! rather than a preference.
//!
//! ⚠️ Store first, notify second, and the order cannot be swapped: a notice
//! that overtakes its own write reaches a hive that reads nothing, and the
//! hive deliberately does not retry.
//!
//! Two credential modes, chosen by `PutMatrixAccountRequest::mode`: `token`
//! (default, back-compat with the original blind-store shape — the caller
//! already has a bearer token) and `password` (this daemon performs
//! `m.login.password` against the caller-given homeserver itself and stores
//! the resulting token; the password is never stored, and is not sent to the
//! hive either — only the derived token is). Done here so the browser never
//! has to hold the password long enough to call an arbitrary homeserver
//! directly.
use axum::Json;
use axum::extract::State;
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use swarm_queue_client::{CredentialNotice, credential_subject};
use swarm_secret_client::matrix;
use utoipa::ToSchema;
use super::{AppState, error_problem, swarm_hive};
pub mod agent_token;
pub mod hive_sender;
fn default_mode() -> String {
"token".to_owned()
}
/// Env var the controller's NixOS module sets from
/// `services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.matrixHomeserverUrl` — the
/// swarm-wide default `PutMatrixAccountRequest::homeserver` falls back to
/// when a caller omits one. Read via [`configured_default_homeserver`], not
/// directly — see that fn's doc.
///
/// Also the homeserver [`agent_token`] mints agents' own accounts on. Not yet
/// consulted by [`put_matrix_account`]: `homeserver_or_configured_default`
/// below exists for a later slice of this homeserver-default rollout to call.
pub(crate) const DEFAULT_HOMESERVER_ENV: &str = "SWARM_CONTROLLER_MATRIX_HOMESERVER_URL";
/// `caller`'s own homeserver, or `default` when the caller left it unset.
/// `caller` always wins — this only fills a gap it left, never replaces a
/// value it gave.
///
/// Takes `default` as a plain parameter rather than reading
/// [`DEFAULT_HOMESERVER_ENV`] itself: a caller wants that env read done once,
/// at the edge (see [`configured_default_homeserver`]), and keeping this fn
/// pure makes it testable without mutating shared process env — three tests
/// doing exactly that raced each other under `cargo test`'s default
/// parallelism in review.
pub(crate) fn homeserver_or_configured_default(
caller: Option<String>,
default: Option<String>,
) -> Option<String> {
caller.or(default)
}
/// Reads [`DEFAULT_HOMESERVER_ENV`] fresh each call — the one place this
/// crate touches that env var, so [`homeserver_or_configured_default`] above
/// can stay a pure function.
pub(crate) fn configured_default_homeserver() -> Option<String> {
std::env::var(DEFAULT_HOMESERVER_ENV).ok()
}
/// The credential to store for one agent's external matrix account.
///
/// No `Debug` derive: this carries a password and a token, so nothing may
/// `{:?}`-log it by accident.
#[derive(Deserialize, ToSchema)]
pub struct PutMatrixAccountRequest {
/// `"token"` (default, back-compat) or `"password"`. Token mode stores
/// `token` as given; password mode logs into `homeserver` with `user_id`
/// + `password` and stores the token that comes back instead.
#[serde(default = "default_mode")]
#[schema(example = "token")]
mode: String,
/// The access token. Required (and used as given) in token mode; ignored
/// in password mode, where the token comes from the login instead. Never
/// logged, and never returned by this route.
token: Option<String>,
/// Password-mode only: the matrix user id (or bare localpart) to log in
/// as.
user_id: Option<String>,
/// Password-mode only. Never logged and never stored — only the token
/// `m.login.password` returns is.
password: Option<String>,
/// The account's homeserver, when it is not this swarm's own.
///
/// Stored beside the token rather than sent on the notice: a notice is a
/// queue message, so a homeserver carried there would exist only in
/// flight, with nowhere to reconstruct it from on a re-delivery.
///
/// Optional in token mode (omitted means "resolve to the agent's own
/// `services.hyperhive.agent.matrix.url` on the hive side" — this route never needs to
/// know it itself for a blind store). **Required** in password mode:
/// logging in needs somewhere to log in against, and unlike token mode
/// there is no hive-side fallback to defer to.
#[schema(example = "https://matrix.example.org")]
homeserver: Option<String>,
}
/// `put_matrix_account`'s success body.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, ToSchema)]
pub struct PutMatrixAccountResponse {
/// The account's matrix user id, recovered from the login response in
/// password mode. `None` in token mode — the caller already knows which
/// account their own token belongs to, and this route does not spend a
/// `whoami` round trip validating a token it was simply handed.
user_id: Option<String>,
}
/// Store an agent's external matrix account credential and notify its hive.
///
/// Idempotent: the store keeps versions, so repeating a call replaces the
/// value the agent will next read rather than adding a second account.
#[utoipa::path(
put,
path = "/api/hives/{hive}/agents/{agent}/matrix-accounts/{account}",
params(
("hive" = String, Path, description = "hive whose agent receives the credential"),
("agent" = String, Path, description = "agent the credential is delivered to"),
("account" = String, Path, description = "the external account this credential authenticates as"),
),
request_body = PutMatrixAccountRequest,
responses(
(status = 200, description = "stored, and the hive has been told", body = PutMatrixAccountResponse),
(status = 400, description = "a name is not an identifier, the account name is not a single path segment, the account is 'main' (reserved), the mode is unrecognized, a mode's required fields are missing, or the hive is not in this swarm (problem+json)", body = String),
(status = 503, description = "no swarm queue is wired up, or it is not connected (problem+json)", body = String),
(status = 500, description = "the store write, the encode or the publish failed (problem+json)", body = String),
),
tag = "agents"
)]
pub async fn put_matrix_account(
State(state): State<AppState>,
axum::extract::Path((hive, agent, account)): axum::extract::Path<(String, String, String)>,
Json(req): Json<PutMatrixAccountRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<PutMatrixAccountResponse>, problem_details::ProblemDetails> {
// The queue first, so a deployment that has none answers 503 whatever the
// caller spelled — and before the store is touched, so a request that
// could never be delivered does not leave a credential behind.
let Some(status) = state.status.as_ref() else {
return Err(error_problem(
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"this deployment wired up no swarm queue, so there is no hive to notify",
));
};
let hive = swarm_hive(&state, &hive).map_err(|(s, d)| error_problem(s, &d))?;
let agent = hive_types::Ident::parse(&agent)
.map_err(|reason| error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, reason))?
.into_string();
// Built before the store is reached, so a malformed account name costs a
// parse and not a login. `account_path` is the validator: the store's
// charset is its rule to state, not this handler's to restate.
let secret_path = matrix::account_path(&agent, &account)
.map_err(|e| error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, &e.to_string()))?;
// `main` is the hive-internal account `nix/agent-modules/matrix.nix`
// declares per agent from `services.hyperhive.agent.matrix.url` — the
// module owns that `matrixAccounts` entry, which is why this route
// refuses to write one: an extra account literally named `main` would
// not overwrite the real one (it lands at a different token-file suffix)
// but would confuse anything that lists accounts by name. Checked
// before any mode-specific work (including a network login) runs.
if is_reserved_account(&account) {
return Err(error_problem(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
"'main' is the hive-internal account, declared per agent from \
services.hyperhive.agent.matrix.url — it cannot be set through this route.",
));
}
// Password mode's network call happens here, before the store is
// touched, so a failed login leaves no partial state behind.
let (token, homeserver, user_id) = resolve_credential(&req).await.map_err(|b| *b)?;
// A queue that is configured but not yet (or no longer) connected does
// not fail the `publish`/`flush` further down outright — it *hangs*
// them, per `swarm_queue_client::ensure_connected`'s own doc. Checked
// here, immediately before the store is touched, so a request that
// cannot be delivered never leaves a credential behind — the same
// ordering rule the module doc states for "store first, notify
// second", extended one step earlier.
let client = status.queue_client();
swarm_queue_client::ensure_connected(&client).map_err(|e| {
error_problem(
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
&swarm_queue_client::chain(&e),
)
})?;
let store = crate::store::connect().await.map_err(|e| {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "connecting to the swarm secret store failed");
error_problem(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, &e.to_string())
})?;
store
.write(
&secret_path,
&matrix::Credential {
value: token,
homeserver,
},
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
// The path names the agent and the account; the value is not in it.
tracing::warn!(path = %secret_path, error = %e, "writing the credential failed");
error_problem(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, &e.to_string())
})?;
let notice = CredentialNotice {
agent: agent.clone(),
account: account.clone(),
};
let payload = serde_json::to_vec(&notice).map_err(|e| {
error_problem(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
&format!("encoding the credential notice failed: {e}"),
)
})?;
let subject = credential_subject(&hive);
client
.publish(subject.clone(), payload.into())
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error_problem(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
&format!("publishing to {subject} failed: {e}"),
)
})?;
// Flushed for the reason `publish_deploy` flushes: `publish` hands the
// message to the connection's write buffer and returns, so without this
// the response can outrun the notice it reports as sent.
client.flush().await.map_err(|e| {
error_problem(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
&format!("flushing the credential notice to {subject} failed: {e}"),
)
})?;
tracing::info!(%subject, %hive, %agent, %account, "credential stored; hive notified");
Ok(Json(PutMatrixAccountResponse { user_id }))
}
/// Whether `account` is the agent's own account, which [`agent_token`] mints
/// and `nix/agent-modules/matrix.nix` declares per agent — see the call site's
/// own comment for why this route must never write one.
fn is_reserved_account(account: &str) -> bool {
account == agent_token::ACCOUNT
}
/// Token-mode's only requirement: a token was actually given. Split out of
/// `resolve_credential` (with `password_fields` below) so each mode's
/// validation is unit-testable directly — only the actual network login in
/// `resolve_credential` itself needs an async runtime to exercise. Returns a
/// plain `&'static str` rather than a `ProblemDetails` — `clippy::result_large_err`
/// (this workspace runs `pedantic = deny`) flags a private fn returning one of
/// those directly; `put_matrix_account` itself is exempt only because it is
/// `pub` (clippy's `avoid-breaking-exported-api` default), which these
/// helpers are not.
fn token_credential(
req: &PutMatrixAccountRequest,
) -> Result<(String, Option<String>), &'static str> {
let Some(token) = req.token.clone() else {
return Err("token mode needs a token");
};
Ok((token, req.homeserver.clone()))
}
/// Password mode's required fields, validated present, with the
/// homeserver's trailing slash already trimmed — this is what actually
/// reaches `matrix_password_login`, not the caller's raw string, so the
/// login URL below never ends up with a doubled `//`.
struct PasswordFields<'a> {
homeserver: String,
user_id: &'a str,
password: &'a str,
}
fn password_fields(req: &PutMatrixAccountRequest) -> Result<PasswordFields<'_>, &'static str> {
let (Some(homeserver), Some(user_id), Some(password)) = (
req.homeserver.as_deref(),
req.user_id.as_deref(),
req.password.as_deref(),
) else {
return Err("password mode needs homeserver, user_id, and password");
};
Ok(PasswordFields {
homeserver: homeserver.trim_end_matches('/').to_owned(),
user_id,
password,
})
}
/// Resolve a request's credential mode to a concrete `(token, homeserver,
/// resolved user id)`. Extracted out of `put_matrix_account` to keep that
/// function under `clippy::too_many_lines`, and so the mode branching has
/// something to unit-test directly (via `token_credential`/`password_fields`
/// above) instead of only through the full route.
///
/// `Box`ed error for the same `result_large_err` reason `token_credential`'s
/// doc explains — this fn is private too, so it does not get `put_matrix_account`'s
/// exported-API exemption. Unboxed at the one call site instead of changing
/// `put_matrix_account`'s own (exempt, and part of the route's documented
/// contract) return type.
async fn resolve_credential(
req: &PutMatrixAccountRequest,
) -> Result<(String, Option<String>, Option<String>), Box<problem_details::ProblemDetails>> {
match req.mode.as_str() {
"token" => {
let (token, homeserver) = token_credential(req)
.map_err(|e| Box::new(error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, e)))?;
Ok((token, homeserver, None))
}
"password" => {
let fields = password_fields(req)
.map_err(|e| Box::new(error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, e)))?;
let (token, resolved_user_id) =
matrix_password_login(&fields.homeserver, fields.user_id, fields.password)
.await
.map_err(|e| Box::new(error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, &e)))?;
Ok((token, Some(fields.homeserver), Some(resolved_user_id)))
}
other => Err(Box::new(error_problem(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
&format!("unknown mode {other:?} (want token|password)"),
))),
}
}
/// Bound on reaching the homeserver.
const HTTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(5);
/// Bound on one whole homeserver round trip, body included. A password
/// login makes the homeserver hash the password before it answers, so this
/// is looser than a plain API call needs.
const HTTP_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
/// A client with both homeserver bounds applied.
fn http_client() -> Result<reqwest::Client, String> {
reqwest::Client::builder()
.connect_timeout(HTTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
.timeout(HTTP_TIMEOUT)
.build()
.map_err(|e| format!("build HTTP client: {e}"))
}
/// `what` failed with `e`; a timeout names the bound that fired.
fn http_error(what: &str, e: &reqwest::Error) -> String {
if e.is_connect() && e.is_timeout() {
format!("{what}: connect timed out after {HTTP_CONNECT_TIMEOUT:?}")
} else if e.is_timeout() {
format!("{what}: timed out after {HTTP_TIMEOUT:?}")
} else {
format!("{what}: {e}")
}
}
/// POST `m.login.password` to `<homeserver>/_matrix/client/v3/login`.
/// Returns `(access_token, user_id)`.
///
/// Deliberately its own copy rather than a shared crate with
/// `hive-c0re::dashboard::matrix_accounts`'s near-identical helper: the two
/// log in on behalf of different callers (a hive's own dashboard vs. this
/// swarm-wide provisioning route) and share no other code — four lines of
/// JSON construction do not justify a dependency edge between them.
async fn matrix_password_login(
homeserver: &str,
user_id: &str,
password: &str,
) -> Result<(String, String), String> {
let url = format!("{homeserver}/_matrix/client/v3/login");
let body = serde_json::json!({
"type": "m.login.password",
"identifier": { "type": "m.id.user", "user": user_id },
"password": password,
"initial_device_display_name": "hyperhive",
});
let resp = http_client()?
.post(&url)
.json(&body)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| http_error("POST /login", &e))?;
let status = resp.status();
let json: serde_json::Value = resp
.json()
.await
.map_err(|e| http_error("parse /login response", &e))?;
if !status.is_success() {
let err = json
.get("error")
.and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
.unwrap_or("login failed");
return Err(format!("/login HTTP {status}: {err}"));
}
let token = json
.get("access_token")
.and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
.ok_or_else(|| "login response missing access_token".to_owned())?;
let uid = json
.get("user_id")
.and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
.ok_or_else(|| "login response missing user_id".to_owned())?;
Ok((token.to_owned(), uid.to_owned()))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{
PutMatrixAccountRequest, homeserver_or_configured_default, is_reserved_account,
password_fields, resolve_credential, token_credential,
};
fn request(mode: &str) -> PutMatrixAccountRequest {
PutMatrixAccountRequest {
mode: mode.to_owned(),
token: None,
user_id: None,
password: None,
homeserver: None,
}
}
// `homeserver_or_configured_default` takes its default as a plain
// parameter rather than reading the env var itself, so these are pure
// — no process env mutation, and so no risk of racing each other (or
// any other test in the crate) under `cargo test`'s default parallelism.
#[test]
fn caller_supplied_homeserver_wins_even_with_a_default_configured() {
let result = homeserver_or_configured_default(
Some("https://caller.example.org".to_owned()),
Some("https://default.example.org".to_owned()),
);
assert_eq!(result.as_deref(), Some("https://caller.example.org"));
}
#[test]
fn falls_back_to_the_configured_default_when_the_caller_omits_one() {
let result =
homeserver_or_configured_default(None, Some("https://default.example.org".to_owned()));
assert_eq!(result.as_deref(), Some("https://default.example.org"));
}
#[test]
fn none_when_neither_caller_nor_default_is_set() {
assert_eq!(homeserver_or_configured_default(None, None), None);
}
#[test]
fn main_is_reserved_but_nothing_else_is() {
assert!(is_reserved_account("main"));
assert!(!is_reserved_account("ops-relay"));
// Case-sensitive on purpose: `matrixAccounts` is a nix attrset, so
// `Main` is a distinct, legal key from the reserved `main`.
assert!(!is_reserved_account("Main"));
}
#[test]
fn token_mode_needs_a_token() {
assert!(token_credential(&request("token")).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn token_mode_passes_through_token_and_homeserver_unchanged() {
let mut req = request("token");
req.token = Some("t0k3n".to_owned());
req.homeserver = Some("https://matrix.example.org".to_owned());
let (token, homeserver) = token_credential(&req).expect("token + homeserver both given");
assert_eq!(token, "t0k3n");
assert_eq!(homeserver.as_deref(), Some("https://matrix.example.org"));
}
#[test]
fn password_mode_needs_all_three_fields() {
let mut req = request("password");
assert!(password_fields(&req).is_err(), "none given");
req.homeserver = Some("https://matrix.example.org".to_owned());
assert!(
password_fields(&req).is_err(),
"still missing user_id + password"
);
req.user_id = Some("@a:matrix.example.org".to_owned());
assert!(password_fields(&req).is_err(), "still missing password");
req.password = Some("hunter2".to_owned());
assert!(password_fields(&req).is_ok(), "now all three given");
}
#[test]
fn password_mode_trims_a_trailing_slash_off_the_homeserver() {
let mut req = request("password");
req.homeserver = Some("https://matrix.example.org/".to_owned());
req.user_id = Some("@a:matrix.example.org".to_owned());
req.password = Some("hunter2".to_owned());
let fields = password_fields(&req).expect("all three fields given");
assert_eq!(fields.homeserver, "https://matrix.example.org");
}
#[test]
fn password_mode_leaves_a_homeserver_with_no_trailing_slash_unchanged() {
let mut req = request("password");
req.homeserver = Some("https://matrix.example.org".to_owned());
req.user_id = Some("@a:matrix.example.org".to_owned());
req.password = Some("hunter2".to_owned());
let fields = password_fields(&req).expect("all three fields given");
assert_eq!(fields.homeserver, "https://matrix.example.org");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_credential_token_mode_end_to_end() {
let mut req = request("token");
req.token = Some("t0k3n".to_owned());
let (token, homeserver, user_id) = resolve_credential(&req)
.await
.expect("token mode with a token given");
assert_eq!(token, "t0k3n");
assert_eq!(homeserver, None);
assert_eq!(user_id, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_credential_rejects_an_unknown_mode() {
assert!(
resolve_credential(&request("carrier-pigeon"))
.await
.is_err()
);
}
// ── the connected-but-not-yet-connected queue ───────────────────────
/// A client that exists but has never connected — the `Pending` state
/// `ensure_connected`'s own doc says a `Disconnected` check would miss.
/// `retry_on_initial_connect` is what makes `.connect()` return
/// immediately instead of blocking on a handshake that will never
/// succeed against a loopback port nothing listens on.
async fn disconnected_client() -> async_nats::Client {
async_nats::ConnectOptions::new()
.retry_on_initial_connect()
.connect("127.0.0.1:1")
.await
.expect("retry_on_initial_connect returns without waiting for a real connection")
}
/// Bare-minimum `AppState` for a handler test: one hive, no queue-backed
/// helpers beyond `status` (the field this handler actually reads), and
/// an empty in-memory job graph the endpoint under test never touches.
fn state_with_status(status: super::super::status::StatusReader) -> super::super::AppState {
super::super::AppState {
hives: std::sync::Arc::new(vec![super::super::HiveEntry {
name: "pr1ma".to_owned(),
domain: "pr1ma.example".to_owned(),
}]),
links: std::sync::Arc::new(Vec::new()),
status: Some(std::sync::Arc::new(status)),
wanted: None,
agent_status: None,
agent_icons: None,
jobq: std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(hive_jobq::scheduler::Scheduler::new(
hive_jobq::Graph::new(),
hive_jobq::resources::ResourceTable::new(),
))),
webhook_secret: None,
config_prs: None,
swarm_name: None,
auth: None,
forge: None,
create_gate: std::sync::Arc::default(),
}
}
/// The defect this whole PR exists to close: a queue that is
/// configured but not connected must not let this handler reach the
/// store write at all.
///
/// `BAO_ADDR`/`BAO_CLIENT_CERT`/`BAO_CLIENT_KEY` are asserted unset
/// first — not incidental setup, but the control that makes the 503
/// meaningful. If `put_matrix_account` reached `crate::store::connect()`
/// with those unset, *that* call fails too, and would also answer with
/// a `problem+json` body (500, "connecting to the swarm secret store
/// failed"). A 503 here is therefore proof execution never got past
/// `ensure_connected`, not a coincidence of two paths landing on the
/// same status family.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_disconnected_queue_answers_503_and_never_reaches_the_store() {
for var in ["BAO_ADDR", "BAO_CLIENT_CERT", "BAO_CLIENT_KEY"] {
assert!(
std::env::var(var).is_err(),
"{var} must be unset for this test to prove anything"
);
}
let reader = super::super::status::StatusReader::new(
disconnected_client().await,
std::time::Duration::from_mins(1),
);
let state = state_with_status(reader);
let result = super::put_matrix_account(
axum::extract::State(state),
axum::extract::Path((
"pr1ma".to_owned(),
"atlas".to_owned(),
"workaccount".to_owned(),
)),
axum::Json(PutMatrixAccountRequest {
mode: "token".to_owned(),
token: Some("t0k3n".to_owned()),
user_id: None,
password: None,
homeserver: None,
}),
)
.await;
let problem = result.expect_err("a disconnected queue must refuse, not hang or 500");
assert_eq!(
problem.status,
Some(axum::http::StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE),
"{problem:?}"
);
}
/// The control for the test above: a client that starts in `Pending`
/// but genuinely never connects is exactly what `ensure_connected` is
/// specified to reject — proving the 503 above tracks the connection
/// state and is not simply what every call through this handler
/// returns. Same client shape, mode rejected before either queue or
/// store is touched, so it exercises a different early return
/// (`is_reserved_account`) and confirms the handler still validates
/// normally on a path that never reaches `ensure_connected`'s sibling
/// checks.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_reserved_account_name_is_still_refused_before_any_queue_check_matters() {
let reader = super::super::status::StatusReader::new(
disconnected_client().await,
std::time::Duration::from_mins(1),
);
let state = state_with_status(reader);
let result = super::put_matrix_account(
axum::extract::State(state),
axum::extract::Path(("pr1ma".to_owned(), "atlas".to_owned(), "main".to_owned())),
axum::Json(PutMatrixAccountRequest {
mode: "token".to_owned(),
token: Some("t0k3n".to_owned()),
user_id: None,
password: None,
homeserver: None,
}),
)
.await;
let problem = result.expect_err("'main' is reserved regardless of queue state");
assert_eq!(
problem.status,
Some(axum::http::StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST),
"{problem:?}"
);
}
}