hyperhive/nix/templates/harness-base.nix
müde 67e4242b9f per-agent send allow-list via hyperhive.allowedRecipients
new NixOS option in harness-base.nix:
  hyperhive.allowedRecipients = [ 'alice' 'manager' ];  # whitelist
  hyperhive.allowedRecipients = [ ];                    # default = unrestricted

module writes the list as JSON to /etc/hyperhive/send-allow
.json at activation. AgentServer::send reads the file before
issuing the broker request; if the list is non-empty and
`to` isn't on it, the tool returns a claude-readable refusal
string without touching the broker. the manager is always
implicitly permitted regardless of the list — otherwise a
misconfigured allow-list could strand a sub-agent without an
escalation path.

enforcement is in the in-container MCP server (not on the
host's per-agent socket) because the agent's nix config is the
trust boundary anyway — the operator audits agent.nix at
deploy time, the activation-time /etc/hyperhive/send-allow
.json is r/o under /nix/store, so the agent can't tamper at
runtime without going through a new approval.

agent prompt mentions the option + tells claude to route
through the manager when refused. retires the matching TODO
under Permissions / policy.
2026-05-16 03:59:28 +02:00

131 lines
5 KiB
Nix

{ pkgs, lib, config, ... }:
{
# Shared scaffolding for any hyperhive harness container — both
# sub-agents (`agent-base.nix`) and the manager (`manager.nix`) extend
# this. The systemd service that actually runs the harness binary
# differs per role and lives in the child module.
options.hyperhive.allowedRecipients = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
default = [ ];
example = [ "alice" "manager" ];
description = ''
Names this agent is allowed to `send` to via
`mcp__hyperhive__send`. Empty list (the default) means
unrestricted the agent can message any peer, the
operator, or the manager. Non-empty list constrains the
surface: only the listed names + the manager (always
allowed) get through; anything else returns an error
string to claude without touching the broker. The
operator (`operator`) needs to be in the list if the
agent should be able to surface output on the
dashboard.
Useful for sandboxing untrusted sub-agents set
`[ "manager" ]` to scope them to manager-only chatter.
The manager itself is always exempt; this option only
affects sub-agent `send`.
'';
};
options.hyperhive.extraMcpServers = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.attrsOf (lib.types.submodule {
options = {
command = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.str;
description = "Absolute path to the MCP server binary. Use `\${pkgs.foo}/bin/foo` or `/run/current-system/sw/bin/foo`.";
};
args = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
default = [ ];
description = "Args passed to the MCP server binary.";
};
env = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.attrsOf lib.types.str;
default = { };
description = "Environment variables for the MCP server child process.";
};
allowedTools = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
default = [ "*" ];
example = [ "send_message" "join_room" ];
description = ''
Tool names this MCP server is auto-approved to call via
`--allowedTools`. Single entry `"*"` (the default) means
"every tool from this server" convenient but trusting.
Tighten to a specific list when you only want a subset.
Names are bare (e.g. `send_message`); the harness prepends
`mcp__<server-key>__` at build time.
'';
};
};
});
default = { };
example = lib.literalExpression ''
{
matrix = {
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/mcp-matrix";
args = [ "--config" "/state/matrix.toml" ];
env.MATRIX_HOMESERVER = "https://matrix.example.org";
allowedTools = [ "send_message" "join_room" ];
};
}
'';
description = ''
Extra MCP servers claude sees alongside the hyperhive tool surface.
Keys are the server names (claude addresses tools as
`mcp__<key>__<tool>`). Rendered to `/etc/hyperhive/extra-mcp.json`
at activation time; the harness reads that file at boot and merges
it into `--mcp-config` + `--allowedTools`. Take effect on the
agent's next harness restart (no operator approval needed beyond
whatever brought the new agent.nix into deployed/*).
'';
};
config = {
environment.etc."hyperhive/extra-mcp.json".text =
builtins.toJSON config.hyperhive.extraMcpServers;
environment.etc."hyperhive/send-allow.json".text =
builtins.toJSON config.hyperhive.allowedRecipients;
boot.isNspawnContainer = true;
# `claude-code` is unfree. Each per-agent container's nixosConfiguration
# evaluates its own `nixpkgs` instance, so the operator's host-level
# `nixpkgs.config.allowUnfreePredicate` does not propagate into here —
# we have to allow it inside the container's config as well.
nixpkgs.config.allowUnfreePredicate = pkg: builtins.elem (pkgs.lib.getName pkg) [ "claude-code" ];
environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
hyperhive
claude-code
bashInteractive
coreutils-full
# procps for pkill — used by the web UI's /api/cancel to SIGINT the
# in-flight claude turn.
procps
];
# Git is needed by claude's Bash tool (for the agent <-> manager config
# request flow) and by hive-c0re's own setup_applied / setup_proposed.
# The per-agent `applied/<name>/flake.nix` overrides `user.name` and
# `user.email` with the agent's identity — values here are `mkDefault`
# so the per-agent override wins without needing `mkForce`.
programs.git = {
enable = true;
config = {
user = {
name = lib.mkDefault "hyperhive";
email = lib.mkDefault "hyperhive@local";
};
init.defaultBranch = lib.mkDefault "main";
};
};
# claude's Bash tool refuses to run without a POSIX shell + $SHELL set.
environment.variables.SHELL = "${pkgs.bashInteractive}/bin/bash";
system.stateVersion = "25.11";
};
}