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hyperhive/swarm-secret-client/src/forge.rs
atlas 6170e74a31 swarm-bao: agent certificates issued by a store-generated agent CA
An agent's store identity was signed in swarm-controller's memory by a CA
a controller-host unit generated on disk, and the listener never trusted
that CA. Agent leaves now come from the store itself: a `pki-agents` PKI
mount whose root openbao generates internally, so the agent CA's key
never exists outside the store.

- swarm-bao-agent-pki (new, store host, as the bao granter): enables and
  tunes the mount, generates the root once (guarded on an empty issuer
  list, no replace branch), upserts the `swarm-agent` role (client
  certificates named `hive-agent-*` only, 90 days), caches the CA at
  /var/lib/swarm-bao-tls/agent-ca.pem and composes the listener bundle.
- The listener's tls_client_ca_file is a new listener-client-ca.pem
  (client-ca.pem, then the agent CA). Host cert-auth roles still pin
  client-ca.pem, so an agent leaf satisfies no host role. swarm-bao-certs
  composes the same bundle before openbao starts.
- openbao reads tls_client_ca_file only at start, so when the bundle
  changed after openbao started, swarm-bao-agent-pki restarts
  openbao.service in the container; under `seal = "shamir"` it prints
  the step instead. Once swarm-bao-certs has a cached CA, later boots
  start openbao with it and do not restart.
- The controller policy gains exactly `update` on
  pki-agents/issue/swarm-agent. mint_and_verify now asks that role for
  the leaf (the store generates the key), writes the agent's cert-auth
  role pinning the issuing CA bao returned, and writes the agent's
  policy as render_agent alone: the hive-shared queue credential stanza
  is gone.
- deploy.bao.agentPkiRoleName (must start `swarm-`, asserted with the
  other pki role names); swarm-controller gets
  SWARM_CONTROLLER_AGENT_PKI_MOUNT/_ROLE from the deploy.bao options.

Deleted: swarm-controller-agent-ca and its options (agentCaFile,
agentCaKeyFile), env, LoadCredential entries and assertion;
agent_identity's Authority, rcgen signing and validity window; the
rcgen and time dependencies of swarm-controller (rcgen leaves the
workspace); policy::render_agent_with_queue and its tests. The CN-prefix
assertion policy.rs said was owed is not: agent and host roles pin
different CAs.

Migration is re-creating each agent after deploy; that overwrites the
stale role and policy.

Closes #4756
2026-09-27 22:59:27 +02:00

137 lines
5.2 KiB
Rust

//! The forge agreement: where an agent's own forge token lives in the store,
//! and what the object at that path holds.
//!
//! `swarm-controller` mints the token with the forge's admin API and writes it
//! here; the agent container reads it back under its own certificate
//! (`nix/agent-modules/forge-token.nix`). Neither end is senior, so both halves
//! are stated once, here, beside [`crate::matrix`].
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::{
Error,
path::{Kind, principal_prefix},
};
/// The path holding `agent`'s own forge access token.
///
/// A flat leaf under the agent's prefix, like its controller-minted siblings
/// [`crate::queue::agent_queue_path`] and [`crate::mtls::identity_path`], so
/// the agent's own read stanza ([`crate::policy::render_agent`])
/// already covers it.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `agent` contains anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`,
/// which is what keeps one agent's name from addressing another agent's secret.
pub fn agent_token_path(agent: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
let prefix = principal_prefix(Kind::Agent, agent)?;
Ok(format!("{prefix}/forge-token"))
}
/// What an agent's forge-token path holds.
///
/// No `Debug` derive: `value` is a live forge credential, and a derived
/// `Debug` is one `{:?}` away from a log line.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Credential {
/// The token itself. `forge-token.nix` reads the store with
/// `bao kv get -field=value`, so this name is load-bearing for a reader
/// this crate does not control, the same as [`crate::matrix::Credential`]'s.
pub value: String,
/// The forge's name for the token — not secret. Stored beside the value
/// so whoever rotates it can name the token it replaces.
pub name: String,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for Credential {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("Credential")
.field("value", &"<redacted>")
.field("name", &self.name)
.finish()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn the_token_lands_under_the_agent_prefix() {
// Spelled out rather than rebuilt from the pieces the code uses: the
// nix reader spells the same string, and a rename here that moved it
// would leave that reader fetching nothing.
assert_eq!(
agent_token_path("atlas").expect("a plain name is legal"),
"swarm/agents/atlas/forge-token"
);
}
#[test]
fn a_traversal_in_the_agent_name_is_refused() {
for bad in ["../argus", "a/b", "atlas/../argus", "a.b", ""] {
let e = agent_token_path(bad).expect_err("a traversal is not legal");
assert!(matches!(e, Error::PathSegment { kind: "agent", .. }), "{e}");
}
}
#[test]
fn the_legal_charset_is_actually_reachable() {
// The control for the test above: a guard that refused everything
// would pass it for the wrong reason.
assert!(agent_token_path("a-b_C9").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn the_agents_own_read_grant_covers_the_path() {
// The agent reads this path under `hive-agent-<agent>`, and that
// policy is rendered elsewhere. If the path ever moved out from under
// it, the agent's fetch would 403 at boot, naming neither.
let path = agent_token_path("atlas").expect("legal");
let policy = crate::policy::render_agent("atlas").expect("legal");
let covered = policy.lines().any(|line| {
line.strip_prefix("path \"")
.and_then(|rest| rest.split_once("\" {"))
.and_then(|(p, _)| p.strip_suffix('*'))
.is_some_and(|prefix| format!("secret/data/{path}").starts_with(prefix))
});
assert!(covered, "no stanza in\n{policy}\ncovers {path}");
}
#[test]
fn another_agents_read_grant_does_not_cover_the_path() {
// Control for the test above: the prefix match must actually be
// discriminating, or it proves nothing.
let path = agent_token_path("atlas").expect("legal");
let policy = crate::policy::render_agent("argus").expect("legal");
let covered = policy.lines().any(|line| {
line.strip_prefix("path \"")
.and_then(|rest| rest.split_once("\" {"))
.and_then(|(p, _)| p.strip_suffix('*'))
.is_some_and(|prefix| format!("secret/data/{path}").starts_with(prefix))
});
assert!(!covered, "argus's policy must not reach atlas's token");
}
#[test]
fn the_value_field_matches_what_the_nix_reader_asks_for() {
let json = serde_json::to_string(&Credential {
value: "t".to_owned(),
name: "swarm-agent".to_owned(),
})
.expect("two Strings serialise");
assert_eq!(json, r#"{"value":"t","name":"swarm-agent"}"#);
}
#[test]
fn debug_never_prints_the_value() {
let c = Credential {
value: "0123456789abcdef".to_owned(),
name: "swarm-agent".to_owned(),
};
let shown = format!("{c:?}");
assert!(!shown.contains("0123456789abcdef"), "{shown}");
assert!(shown.contains("swarm-agent"), "{shown}");
}
}