Grafana's OIDC client secret only existed where authelia did. One `ssoLocal` gate — `grafana.enable && authelia.enable` — decided the client registration, the minted secret's delivery and the whole `auth.generic_oauth` block, so a swarm whose authelia runs on another host got Grafana with no SSO wiring at all. The local login form is disabled unconditionally, so that is no way in. Split the one gate into the two questions it was conflating: - `ssoConfigured` — does this SWARM have an identity provider (`swarm.authelia.url`, which is swarm-wide and whose own description makes null mean "no SSO configured"). With a delivery route present this is what emits Grafana's OIDC block. - `ssoLocal` — is authelia on THIS host, now spelled as the forge and matrix modules spell it. It decides only which unit delivers the secret. Where authelia is elsewhere, `swarm-bao-grafana-oidc.service` reads the secret from the swarm secret store, shaped after glue-queue-agent-credential.nix: cert login fails loudly because a retry fixes every state it fails on, the read degrades quietly because no retry turns "no value there" into a value, and nothing writes a stand-in. The producer is the publisher that already runs on authelia's host, which gains the swarm's service clients beside the per-hive ones at `swarm/services/<id>/oidc/client` — with the write grant in swarm-bao.nix and the hive read grant in `policy::render` to match. Registration moved to glue-grafana-oidc-client.nix. It has to be declared where authelia's config is rendered, and swarm-grafana.nix's config block hangs off this host running Grafana. Two judgement calls stated rather than buried: a hive's read policy now grants the whole `services` prefix, because a service's path names the service and nothing swarm-wide records which hive runs it (cost recorded in docs/trust-boundary/security.md); and the client is registered on any authelia host, because no swarm-wide "this swarm has a Grafana" fact exists to gate it on. Refs #4234 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
221 lines
9.9 KiB
Nix
221 lines
9.9 KiB
Nix
# The unit that copies authelia's minted OIDC client secrets into the swarm's
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# secret store, so whoever needs one without hosting authelia can read it: a
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# hive its agents' credential, a swarm service its own.
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#
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# ⚠️ IT RUNS WHERE AUTHELIA DOES, and that is the whole reason it exists as a
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# separate thing. `deploy.authelia.hostClientSecretDir`'s own description says
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# why: the plaintext's other reader lives in a **different container**, and
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# containers that share this host's network namespace still have separate
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# filesystem roots, so "the host is the only place both trees are addressable".
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# A delivery step therefore runs on the host that mints — not on the store's
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# host, and not on the reading hive's.
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#
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# ⚠️ ITS OWN STORE IDENTITY, not swarm-controller's. That principal may rewrite
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# every hive's policy and login role; a unit whose entire job is copying one
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# file has no business holding it. ./swarm-bao.nix grants this one
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# `create`/`update` under the hive prefix and nothing else.
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#
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# ⚠️ THE SECRET NEVER REACHES `argv`. `bao` is an external binary, so every
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# argument is world-readable in /proc for the life of the call — the value is
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# passed as `@<path>` and read by bao itself. (`/knowledge/secret-hygiene.md`:
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# "a path keeps the secret out of the store, and reading it into a shell
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# variable puts it straight into argv".)
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{
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pkgs,
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lib,
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config,
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...
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}:
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let
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hyperhiveCfg = config.services.hyperhive;
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deployCfg = hyperhiveCfg.deploy;
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baoDeploy = deployCfg.bao;
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autheliaCfg = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.authelia;
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cfg = deployCfg.swarm-secret-publisher;
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# A reader is defined by holding a certificate the store accepts, never by
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# standing next to it — the rule ./glue-matrix-bao-token.nix states in full.
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# `deploy.bao.enable` here would be the co-location assumption itself.
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haveClientIdentity = cfg.baoClientCertFile != null && cfg.baoClientKeyFile != null;
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# Both halves have to be here: the mint (authelia, for the plaintext) and an
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# identity (for the store). Neither implies the other.
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active = hyperhiveCfg.enable && cfg.enable && deployCfg.authelia.enable && haveClientIdentity;
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hiveNames = lib.attrNames hyperhiveCfg.swarm.hives;
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# The client id agent containers present, per hive — composed exactly as
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# ./swarm-authelia.nix composes it, from the same two read-only options, so a
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# rename there cannot leave this spelling behind.
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agentClientId = hive: "${autheliaCfg.hiveClientPrefix}${hive}${autheliaCfg.agentClientSuffix}";
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# The swarm's own services, as opposed to its hives. One client for the whole
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# swarm rather than one per hive, so one value in the store rather than a copy
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# each: `swarm/services/<id>/oidc/client`, under the `services` kind
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# `swarm-secret-client`'s `path::Kind` declares.
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#
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# The ids come from `swarm.*`, which is identical on every host — that is what
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# lets this host name a service's client while running none of them, and it is
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# the same read the service's own module registers the client with. A swarm
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# that runs no Grafana mints no secret for it, so its entry skips below rather
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# than needing a condition here.
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serviceClientIds = [ hyperhiveCfg.swarm.grafana.oidc.clientId ];
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in
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{
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options.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-secret-publisher = {
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enable = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.bool;
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default = deployCfg.authelia.enable;
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defaultText = lib.literalExpression "deploy.authelia.enable";
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description = ''
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Publish the OIDC client secrets this host mints into the swarm's
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secret store, so a hive that does not run authelia can read its
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agents' credential and a swarm service elsewhere can read its own.
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Defaults to whether this host mints them, which is the only half of
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the question that is a property of *this* host.
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⚠️ Deliberately **not** `deploy.bao.enable`. That asks whether the
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store stands here, and a publisher beside a remote store, holding a
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leaf issued out of band, is a deployment this exists to serve —
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defaulting on co-location would leave exactly that shape silently
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publishing nothing. Whether the wiring is complete is the client
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identity's job (see `baoClientCertFile`), not this option's.
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Turning it off leaves every non-co-located hive without a delivery
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path, which is the state this exists to end — so the honest reason
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to set it false is a deployment delivering those secrets by some
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other mechanism it owns.
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'';
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};
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baoClientCertFile = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
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default = null;
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description = ''
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Client certificate this publisher presents to the store. Its subject
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must be {option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.secretPublisherCommonName`
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— cert auth matches on the CN, and the role accepts nothing else.
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No default: a module that guessed would be holding the CA opinion
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./swarm-bao.nix deliberately does not hold.
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./glue-secret-publisher-bao-identity.nix points it at the leaf
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./glue-bao-tls.nix mints, where this host mints one.
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'';
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};
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baoClientKeyFile = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
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default = null;
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description = ''
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Private key for {option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-secret-publisher.baoClientCertFile`.
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Both or neither — the unit does not exist unless each is set.
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'';
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};
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};
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config = lib.mkIf active {
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services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.journaldUnits = [ "swarm-secret-publish" ];
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# Re-publish when authelia rotates a secret. The mint writes the file, so
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# the file is the event — there is no signal from authelia to subscribe to.
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systemd.paths.swarm-secret-publish = {
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description = "watch for minted OIDC client secrets to publish";
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wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
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pathConfig = {
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PathChanged = deployCfg.authelia.hostClientSecretDir;
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Unit = "swarm-secret-publish.service";
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};
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};
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systemd.services.swarm-secret-publish = {
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description = "publish minted OIDC client secrets to the swarm secret store";
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wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
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after = [ "network.target" ];
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path = [
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baoDeploy.package
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pkgs.coreutils
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];
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serviceConfig = {
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Type = "oneshot";
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RemainAfterExit = true;
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# Bounded here rather than left to systemd's default, so the number a
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# boot waits on is in the file that waits. A sealed store answers on
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# the port and never answers the write.
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TimeoutStartSec = 60;
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Restart = "on-failure";
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RestartSec = 30;
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};
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environment = {
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BAO_ADDR = "https://${hyperhiveCfg.swarm.bao.domain}:${toString hyperhiveCfg.swarm.bao.port}";
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BAO_CLIENT_CERT = cfg.baoClientCertFile;
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BAO_CLIENT_KEY = cfg.baoClientKeyFile;
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}
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// lib.optionalAttrs (baoDeploy.serverCaFile != null) {
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BAO_CACERT = baoDeploy.serverCaFile;
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};
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script = ''
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set -euo pipefail
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# Cert auth is a login, not a transport setting. The `BAO_CLIENT_*`
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# variables above only decide which certificate the TLS handshake
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# presents; without a token `bao` asks its token helper instead, and
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# that is a `sh` this unit's `path` does not carry. `-token-only`
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# answers on stdout and skips the helper on both sides.
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#
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# Unhandled on purpose: `Restart=on-failure` above is what a store that
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# cannot authenticate this host should get. Degrading here would report
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# "published 0" as an ordinary quiet day.
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BAO_TOKEN="$(bao login -method=cert -token-only)"
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export BAO_TOKEN
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published=0
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skipped=0
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${lib.concatMapStringsSep "\n" (hive: ''
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src=${lib.escapeShellArg "${deployCfg.authelia.hostClientSecretDir}/${agentClientId hive}.secret"}
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if [ -s "$src" ]; then
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# `value=@$src` hands bao the PATH: bao opens the file itself, so
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# the plaintext is never an argument of this process. Writing it as
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# `value="$(cat "$src")"` would publish it to /proc for anyone on
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# the host to read.
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bao kv put ${lib.escapeShellArg "secret/swarm/hives/${hive}/queue/agent"} \
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value=@"$src" \
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client_id=${lib.escapeShellArg (agentClientId hive)}
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published=$((published + 1))
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else
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# Not an error: authelia mints on its FIRST BOOT, so an absent file
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# is "not yet", and the path unit above re-runs this when it lands.
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echo "no minted secret at $src yet; the path unit will re-run this" >&2
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skipped=$((skipped + 1))
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fi
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'') hiveNames}
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${lib.concatMapStringsSep "\n" (id: ''
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src=${lib.escapeShellArg "${deployCfg.authelia.hostClientSecretDir}/${id}.secret"}
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if [ -s "$src" ]; then
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# `value=@$src` for the same reason as the hive loop above: bao
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# opens the file itself, so the plaintext is never an argument of
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# this process.
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#
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# No `client_id` field beside it, unlike a hive's credential: that
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# one is derived per hive and has to be reconstructable from the
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# store alone, whereas a service's client id is the swarm-wide
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# option both ends already read.
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bao kv put ${lib.escapeShellArg "secret/swarm/services/${id}/oidc/client"} \
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value=@"$src"
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published=$((published + 1))
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else
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# Not an error, and the ordinary state of a swarm that runs this
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# service nowhere: nothing registered the client, so authelia minted
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# nothing to publish.
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echo "no minted secret at $src yet; the path unit will re-run this" >&2
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skipped=$((skipped + 1))
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fi
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'') serviceClientIds}
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echo "published $published client secret(s), skipped $skipped"
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'';
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};
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};
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}
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