| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
44572d1e1a
`forge_git_url` spliced `core:<token>@` between scheme and authority, and that URL is a process argument. `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` is mode 0444 — world-readable — so the core admin token, which provisions every agent's forge account, was published to any local user for the lifetime of each git child. Seven call sites built such a URL. The credential now travels in the environment instead: `git_command_authed` sets `http.extraHeader` via `GIT_CONFIG_*`, which git reads exactly like a config file, and `/proc/<pid>/environ` is 0400 — owner-only. Same credential, materially smaller audience. The remote is a plain `http://forge/<org>/<repo>.git`, and `forge_git_url` no longer takes a token, so the old shape cannot be rebuilt by accident. `knowledge`'s clone was the one place a credentialed URL was stored as a named remote — git persists the clone URL into `.git/config`, so the token sat on disk and every later `pull` authenticated from there. That is the case `forge::repos::push_config` documents as forbidden ("the tokenised URL ... deliberately never stored as a named remote"). `pull` now rewrites `origin` to the plain URL first, which also scrubs the persisted token from existing deployments, and authenticates from the environment when a token is available. The repo is public, so the pull still works without one. Three call sites also stopped spawning `Command::new("git")` directly, so they honour the `HYPERHIVE_GIT` path the NixOS module bakes in and the `kill_on_drop` every other git spawn gets. The two URL-shape tests now assert the *absence* of a credential, and a new one decodes the header back to `core:<token>` — without that, a malformed header would leave every forge operation silently anonymous with the other assertions still green. |
||
| .. | ||
| src | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
hive-c0re
The unprivileged host daemon (runs as hive-core). Owns the sqlite
broker, the approval/question/schedule queues, the generic job-DAG
queue, container lifecycle, gateway/forge/matrix provisioning,
per-container stats, and the axum operator dashboard. Largest crate in
the workspace — bin-only, no separate lib.
When to use it
Host-level, cross-container orchestration: spawning/rebuilding/
destroying agent containers, the approval flow, dashboard-visible
state, provisioning per-agent forge/matrix/gateway accounts. Agent-side
behavior (turn loop, MCP tools) lives in hive-agent/hive-agent-mcp
instead — this daemon only talks to agents over the socket wire types
in hive-sh4re.
Shape
Cohesive clusters live in directory submodules, each re-exported at
the crate root (crate::broker::… keeps resolving regardless of which
subdirectory a module actually lives in). One line each — read the
module's own //! doc-comment for real detail, don't expect this file
to track it:
dashboard/— the operator dashboard (containers, approvals, schedules, questions, logs, topology).job_queue/— the job-DAG queue + desired-state reconciliation (docs/coordinator.md).lifecycle/—nixos-containerlifecycle + per-agent config flake generation.stores/— sqlite-backed stores (broker, queues, audit, power).workers/— background sweeps (crash watch, scheduled prompts, auto-update, knowledge sync).agent_config/— per-agent registries (tool groups, capabilities, resource limits, topology).stats/— dashboard metrics aggregation + OTEL export.socket_server/— the unix-socket request server shared by per-agent + manager sockets.forge/— optional Forgejo wiring (docs/forge.md).coordinator.rs— top-level wiring forserve.meta.rs,migrate.rs— the meta flake + schema/state migrations.matrix.rs,gateway_nginx.rs,webhook_secret.rs,priv_client.rs— matrix provisioning, gateway vhosts, webhook secrets, and thehive-privclient respectively.
See the top-level CLAUDE.md/docs/ index for the full reading-path
map.