The guard inspected the assembled file for any certificate. The system
store always holds certificates, so it passed unconditionally — including
in the one case it was written to catch, where the hive CA half
contributed nothing.
That half is the only one that matters here: every name these consumers
verify is issued by our own CA, so a bundle of nothing but public CAs is,
for this purpose, an empty bundle that measures as full. The failure is
silent and total — the unit reports success and every egress TLS call to
a swarm service then fails.
Counts the source on its own before assembling, and checks the result
carries what both halves brought, so a source truncated between the count
and the copy is caught too.
Scope is stated at the guard: it proves the anchor was contributed, not
that it is usable. A consumer reading only the first certificate ignores
it regardless, which is what took the swarm collector down, and no check
on this file can see that. Only a handshake can.
40557ffb74