30a2a2e9de
The host admin socket `/run/hyperhive/host.sock` was `0660 root:root` (no SocketGroup), so hivectl needed sudo. Group-own it by a new `hive-admin` group and add a `services.hyperhive.c0re.adminUsers` allowlist: listed users join `hive-admin` and drive hivectl without root. - `SocketGroup = "hive-admin"`, `SocketMode = "0660"` on the hive-c0re.socket unit. - `/run/hyperhive` -> `0751` (traverse-only, no listing) so the group can reach the socket path; the socket's own `0660 hive-admin` mode gates the connection, and the per-agent subdirs keep their own restrictive perms. - Empty `adminUsers` (the default) leaves `hive-admin` memberless -> root-only, as before. The admin socket is full hive control (spawn/kill/destroy/deploy), so `adminUsers` is an explicit, opt-in trust grant. Documented in docs/boundary.md (host admin socket access) + docs/tools/hivectl.md.
283 lines
14 KiB
Nix
283 lines
14 KiB
Nix
# The hive-c0re coordinator daemon (runs as the unprivileged
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# `hive-core` user), socket-activated at /run/hyperhive/host.sock.
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# Layout: ./options.nix (option declarations), ./theme.nix (stylix
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# frontend theming → `servedFrontend`), ./environment.nix (the daemon
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# unit's env attrset). The root privileged helper it delegates to is
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# its own module (../hive-priv.nix).
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{
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pkgs,
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lib,
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config,
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...
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}:
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let
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cfg = config.services.hyperhive.c0re;
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# Privsep splits ownership across users, so git/libgit2's dubious-
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# ownership guard trips on legitimate cross-user reads: hive-priv (root)
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# fetches the hive-core-owned meta/applied repos via nix, and hive-c0re
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# (hive-core) fetches the agent-owned proposed-config repos. Both
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# processes are trusted and can already read the files; this gitconfig
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# only satisfies the ownership guard. libgit2 honours the literal `*`
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# (mid-path globs aren't supported, so per-agent repos can't be listed);
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# in practice these processes only ever touch hyperhive's own repos.
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#
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# The agent config inputs now live on the forge
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# (`git+http://${forge.domain}/agent-configs/<n>.git`, see meta.rs render),
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# so hive-core's `nix flake update` of those inputs is an authenticated
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# `git+http` fetch. The `[credential]` stanza points git at the `hive-forge`
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# helper below (scoped to the forge host) so the fetch authenticates as the
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# forge `core` user with no token in any URL or lock.
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safeDirGitconfig = pkgs.writeText "hyperhive-safe-gitconfig" ''
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[safe]
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directory = *
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[credential "http://${config.services.hyperhive.forge.domain}"]
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helper = hive-forge
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username = core
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[http]
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# Abort a stalled fetch instead of blocking startup indefinitely. If a
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# git+http transfer (e.g. `nix flake lock` of the forge-hosted config
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# inputs) drops below 1 KiB/s for 30s -- forge unreachable / not ready
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# on cold boot -- git fails fast rather than hanging the whole daemon.
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# Pairs with GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 (no credential-prompt hang) and the
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# migration shellout timeout in migrate.rs.
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lowSpeedLimit = 1024
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lowSpeedTime = 30
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'';
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# git credential helper for hive-core's authenticated fetches of the
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# agent-config repos on the forge. Reads the live forge-core admin token
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# (`/var/lib/hyperhive/forge-core-token` — paths.rs `FORGE_CORE_TOKEN`) on
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# every invocation, so it never holds a stale copy and survives token
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# rotation. Scoped to the forge host by the `[credential]` stanza above;
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# implements the git credential-helper protocol (only `get` answers).
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forgeCredHelper = pkgs.writeShellScriptBin "git-credential-hive-forge" ''
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[ "''${1:-}" = "get" ] || exit 0
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if [ -r /var/lib/hyperhive/forge-core-token ]; then
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printf 'username=core\n'
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printf 'password=%s\n' "$(cat /var/lib/hyperhive/forge-core-token)"
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fi
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'';
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# The `hive-c0re serve` config JSON. Keys are snake_case to match the
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# `ServeConfig` serde shape the daemon deserialises (the
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# container-injected HiveEnv fields, flattened, plus the hive-c0re-local
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# model_prices table); per-flag overrides still work for ad-hoc
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# invocations.
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#
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# Written to `/etc/hyperhive/serve.json` (managed by
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# `environment.etc`) rather than embedded as a store-path argument in
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# ExecStart. This keeps ExecStart byte-stable across deploys that only
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# change hyperhive module files (gateway, frontend, unrelated nix
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# modules) so systemd does NOT restart hive-c0re — and therefore does
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# NOT trigger a startup sweep that rebuilds every agent — unless the
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# c0re binary itself changes.
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serveConfigJson = builtins.toJSON {
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hyperhive_flake = cfg.hyperhiveFlake;
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hyperhive_docs_flake = cfg.hyperhiveDocs;
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nixpkgs_flake = cfg.nixpkgsFlake;
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dashboard_port = cfg.dashboardPort;
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operator_pronouns = cfg.operatorPronouns;
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context_window_tokens = cfg.contextWindowTokens;
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agent_cpu_quota = cfg.agentCpuQuota;
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agent_memory_max = cfg.agentMemoryMax;
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model_prices = cfg.modelPrices;
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build_slots = cfg.buildSlots;
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};
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in
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{
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imports = [
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./options.nix
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./theme.nix
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];
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config = lib.mkIf cfg.enable {
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environment.systemPackages = [
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cfg.package
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pkgs.git
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# XDG icons + .desktop entries so desktop environments can match
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# hyperhive processes to their icon (task managers, CPU monitors, etc.).
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cfg.xdgIcons
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];
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# Serve config at a stable /etc path so hive-c0re's ExecStart
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# doesn't embed a volatile store-path argument. See serveConfigJson
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# above for the rationale.
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environment.etc."hyperhive/serve.json".text = serveConfigJson;
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# Pull the per-container toplevels into the host system closure.
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# `system.extraDependencies` adds paths to the system build
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# without referencing them at runtime — nixos-rebuild fetches /
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# builds them, they end up in /nix/store, and the first
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# nixos-container update + start for an agent has nothing left to
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# do. Gated because the closure is sizeable and pinned to x86_64.
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system.extraDependencies = lib.optionals cfg.preBuildAgentTemplates [
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cfg.agentBaseToplevel
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cfg.managerToplevel
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];
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# Unprivileged coordinator user. hive-c0re runs as this user;
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# privileged operations are delegated to hive-priv which runs as
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# root, socket-activated at /run/hive/priv.sock (./hive-priv.nix).
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users.users.hive-core = {
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isSystemUser = true;
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group = "hive-core";
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description = "hive-c0re coordinator daemon user";
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};
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users.groups.hive-core = { };
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# Operators granted sudoless `hivectl`. Members of `hive-admin` can
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# connect to the host admin socket (group-owned by hive-admin via the
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# socket unit's `SocketGroup` below) without root. That socket is *full*
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# hive control (spawn/kill/destroy/deploy, docs/boundary.md), so this is
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# an explicit opt-in allowlist — empty by default (root-only).
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users.groups.hive-admin = {
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members = cfg.adminUsers;
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};
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# The gateway nginx is always the sole external entry point (it runs
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# alongside hyperhive), so the per-agent web-port range stays closed on
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# the host firewall. See `docs/gateway.md::Firewall posture (host-level)`.
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# NB: `services.hyperhive.domain` is required when hyperhive is
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# enabled — the canonical assertion lives in `hive-network.nix` (the
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# hive resolver is authoritative for `<domain>` and agents reach the
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# forge/matrix through the gateway by it). So the daemon environment
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# (./environment.nix) can treat it as non-null.
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systemd.services.hive-c0re = {
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description = "hyperhive coordinator daemon";
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wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
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# Socket unit must start before the service so hive-c0re receives the
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# pre-bound fd via LISTEN_FDS (socket activation). Without this
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# dependency, nixos-rebuild switch activates hive-c0re.socket while
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# hive-c0re.service is already running (started by multi-user.target),
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# and systemd refuses with "Socket service already active". Adding
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# requires+after causes systemd to stop the service, start the socket,
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# then restart the service -- clean transition on every config apply.
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requires = [ "hive-c0re.socket" ];
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after = [ "hive-c0re.socket" ];
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path = [
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pkgs.git
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# `git-credential-hive-forge` on PATH so git finds it when nix fetches
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# the forge-hosted agent-config inputs (helper = hive-forge).
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forgeCredHelper
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"/run/current-system/sw"
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];
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environment = import ./environment.nix { inherit lib config pkgs; };
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serviceConfig = {
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ExecStart = "${cfg.package}/bin/hive-c0re --socket /run/hyperhive/host.sock serve --config /etc/hyperhive/serve.json";
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SyslogIdentifier = "hive-c0re";
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# Migrate hive-c0re's *own* state to the service user after an
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# upgrade from a root-run install (systemd's StateDirectory only
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# chowns the top-level dir, not pre-existing files inside it). The
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# `+` prefix runs as root despite User = hive-core; `-` tolerates
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# failure. coreutils ships `chown` but no `sh`, so invoke the
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# binaries directly rather than through a shell.
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#
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# CRITICAL: exclude the per-agent `agents/` subtree. Its contents
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# (each agent's `claude/` OAuth creds, `state/`, `harness/`,
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# `config/`) are owned by the per-agent / manager users, and each
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# container's `hive-agent-user-migrate` activation script chowns
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# them back to that user on boot. Blanket-chowning them to hive-core
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# makes every agent's `~/.claude` unreadable — logging them all out
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# with no way to log back in. So chown everything *except* agents/,
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# plus the `agents/` dir node itself (not its contents) so c0re can
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# still create new per-agent subdirs.
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ExecStartPre = [
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# Install the safe.directory gitconfig at $HOME/.gitconfig
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# (HOME = /var/lib/hyperhive) so c0re's `git fetch`/`rev-parse`
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# against the agent-owned proposed repos pass the ownership guard.
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# Placed before the chown below so it's chowned to hive-core too.
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"+-${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/cp ${safeDirGitconfig} /var/lib/hyperhive/.gitconfig"
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"+-${pkgs.findutils}/bin/find /var/lib/hyperhive -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -not -name agents -exec ${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/chown -R hive-core:hive-core {} +"
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"+-${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/chown hive-core:hive-core /var/lib/hyperhive/agents"
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];
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Restart = "on-failure";
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RestartSec = 2;
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User = "hive-core";
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Group = "hive-core";
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SupplementaryGroups = [ "systemd-journal" ];
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RuntimeDirectory = "hyperhive";
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# 0751 (traverse-only, no listing) so `hive-admin` operators can reach
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# the host admin socket (`SocketGroup = "hive-admin"`, 0660) without
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# root. Others can traverse but not list; the socket + per-agent
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# subdirs gate access by their own perms. Matches the socket unit's
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# DirectoryMode.
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RuntimeDirectoryMode = "0751";
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RuntimeDirectoryPreserve = "yes";
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StateDirectory = "hyperhive";
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StateDirectoryMode = "0750";
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# OTEL auth-header secret, loaded onto hive-c0re's own unit so its
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# per-agent container-resource metrics exporter can read it
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# at $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/otel-headers — via systemd, not a world
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# path. Same secret the agent containers get (forwarded there via
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# nspawn --load-credential); this just also hands it to c0re itself.
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# Empty list (no credential) when otel is off or no header is set.
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LoadCredential = lib.optional (
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config.services.hyperhive.otel.enable && config.services.hyperhive.otel.headersCredential != null
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) "otel-headers:${config.services.hyperhive.otel.headersCredential}";
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# Sandboxing. hive-c0re is unprivileged (runs as hive-core, never
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# setuid), makes HTTP requests to forge/matrix/Anthropic (keeps INET),
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# and delegates all privileged ops to hive-priv via a Unix socket.
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# These directives deny the subset of kernel capabilities it
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# provably doesn't need without restricting its network or
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# filesystem access (RestrictAddressFamilies deferred — needs a
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# watched deploy to verify no AF_UNIX/AF_INET gaps in socket paths).
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NoNewPrivileges = true; # already runs as unprivileged user
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PrivateTmp = true; # uses StateDirectory for tmpfiles, not /tmp
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ProtectHome = true; # HOME = /var/lib/hyperhive; no /home/* access needed
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# "strict" makes the entire filesystem read-only except for
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# StateDirectory (/var/lib/hyperhive) and RuntimeDirectory
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# (/run/hyperhive), which systemd keeps writable. No
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# ReadWritePaths needed beyond the managed directories because:
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# - nix is invoked directly (lifecycle, meta, flake_check), but
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# NIX_REMOTE=daemon routes all store writes through the host
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# daemon — hive-c0re never writes to /nix itself.
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# - flake.lock ops land in the meta worktree under StateDirectory
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# (kept writable by systemd).
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# - nix build worktrees live in PrivateTmp, not /tmp.
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# - /etc writes (bind-mount edits) go through hive-priv via the
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# privileged socket; /etc/hyperhive/serve.json is read-only.
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ProtectSystem = "strict";
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ProtectKernelTunables = true; # no sysctl writes
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ProtectKernelLogs = true; # reads logs via systemd-journal group, not /dev/kmsg
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ProtectControlGroups = true; # cgroup writes go through hive-priv, not c0re directly
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RestrictNamespaces = true; # namespace creation goes through hive-priv
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LockPersonality = true; # no personality changes needed
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RestrictRealtime = true; # no real-time scheduling
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};
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};
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# Socket unit for the hive-c0re admin socket. systemd creates and holds
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# `/run/hyperhive/host.sock` before hive-c0re starts, then passes the fd
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# via LISTEN_FDS (socket activation). Benefits: `hivectl` can connect
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# the moment the socket unit is active — no racy retry window — and a
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# hive-c0re restart never drops the socket inode, so queued commands
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# drain cleanly.
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#
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# `hive-c0re serve` reads LISTEN_FDS via the `listenfd` crate and
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# accepts the fd in preference to its own `bind()` path. When invoked
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# directly (dev, CI, without the socket unit) LISTEN_FDS is absent and
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# the traditional bind path runs unchanged — no regression.
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systemd.sockets.hive-c0re = {
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description = "hive-c0re admin socket";
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wantedBy = [ "sockets.target" ];
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socketConfig = {
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# Must match the `--socket` arg passed to `hive-c0re serve`.
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ListenStream = "/run/hyperhive/host.sock";
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# `0660 root:hive-admin` — group-owned by `hive-admin` so operators in
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# that group (services.hyperhive.c0re.adminUsers) drive `hivectl`
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# without root; an empty adminUsers list leaves the group memberless,
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# so it stays effectively root-only. See docs/boundary.md.
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SocketMode = "0660";
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SocketGroup = "hive-admin";
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# `0751` (traverse-only, no listing) so hive-admin can reach the socket
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# path — the socket's own `0660 hive-admin` gates the connection, and
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# the per-agent subdirs under here keep their own restrictive perms.
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# Must match the service unit's RuntimeDirectoryMode. DirectoryMode is
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# only consulted when the dir is absent at socket-unit activation.
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DirectoryMode = "0751";
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};
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};
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};
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}
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