hyperhive/swarm-controller
Repository files (latest commit first)
Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
atlas 676c45bc93 swarm: mint, publish and login-verify an agent's store identity at create
`swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls` did not exist, and neither did any
per-agent identity at the secret store: `policy::agent_object_name`,
`render_agent` and `render_agent_with_queue` had been written and never
called outside their own tests. An agent's only "per-agent" secret today
is read under the HIVE's certificate, through a wide grant on
`swarm/agents/*` — so "per-agent" was presentational.

The swarm now mints the certificate, so no hive ever needs the capability
to mint one. `swarm-controller` is the service that does it: it already
logs in to the store, and its existing grant already covers exactly the
three objects written here (`create/update` on
`secret/data/swarm/agents/*`, `sys/policies/acl/hive-*` and
`auth/cert/certs/hive-*`). No new bao grant, and nothing co-located — a
cert-auth role pins its authority by value, per role, so the controller
issues from its own CA on its own host and pins that CA in the role it
writes. No existing role changes.

The mint node does not report success on a write. After publishing it
connects again, with the leaf it just issued and under the role it just
wrote, and reads the path back — so the policy, the role, the common name
and the leaf are exercised in production on every agent creation. A
certificate this code mints that the role this code writes will not accept
turns the job node red at creation time instead of surfacing later as an
agent container that cannot start.

`TriggerDeploy` gains an `after_any` edge on the mint, not `after_ok`: a
hive cannot pass down a certificate the swarm has not published, but a
host with no authority configured must still create agents exactly as it
does today.

The private key is generated in memory and never written to disk on the
controller — `SecretStore::connect_with_identity` takes the PEM the minter
is already holding, so nothing is written out purely to be logged in with.

Refs #4137
2026-09-18 15:05:24 +02:00
..
src swarm: mint, publish and login-verify an agent's store identity at create 2026-09-18 15:05:24 +02:00
Cargo.toml swarm: mint, publish and login-verify an agent's store identity at create 2026-09-18 15:05:24 +02:00
README.md check-issue-refs: catch full forge issue URLs too, drop internal links from docs entirely 2026-09-09 21:15:28 +02:00

swarm-controller

The swarm-level daemon. Where hive-c0re owns the agents on one host, this owns what is true across hives — so a swarm runs one of them and most hives leave it off.

Opt-in per host via services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.enable, which is deliberately not derived from services.hyperhive.enable: turning it on is a statement about swarm topology, not about whether hyperhive is installed.

What it does today

Serves one /health endpoint and holds no state.

That is the whole intent of the first slice. The point is to make the unit real — service user, runtime and state directories, socket, nginx reachability — so the swarm-level surfaces that follow have somewhere to land. Inventing those surfaces before they are agreed would bake in a shape nobody chose. See the hyperhive.swarm consolidation epic.

Why a unix socket, not a port

The hive-gateway's nginx is the only intended client and reaches the socket through a bind-mount. A listener that is never bound to an address cannot be reached from off-host by mistake.

The socket path is services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-controller.socketPath, default /run/swarm-controller/controller.sock, exported to the process as SWARM_CONTROLLER_SOCKET.

⚠️ The socket's directory is its access control

The socket is 0666. It has to be: nginx runs as a different user and connect(2) needs write. This matches how hive-c0re publishes the per-agent sockets, and rests on the same argument — "the bind source dir is per-agent on host so blast radius is unchanged."

What keeps that safe is that the directory holds one socket. So:

Never point socketPath at a directory that carries anything else. /run/hyperhive above all — it holds host.sock, the host admin socket. Pointing nginx at that directory to reach this socket would put the admin socket within its reach too.

nginx is a host service, so nothing narrows what it can reach except the directory itself — that is the whole of the access control. A unit test pins the default path so a tidying edit fails instead of reviewing cleanly.

RuntimeDirectoryPreserve=yes and the daemon's stale-socket unlink on start are a pair: preserving the directory without the unlink means bind fails with EADDRINUSE after a restart.

Packaging

Built by the workspace derivation and extracted as its own package (nix build .#swarm-controller). Deliberately not in nix/packages' daemonBins — that list is the core stack and drives the bundle services.hyperhive.c0re.package points at, so folding this in would put a swarm-scoped service into every hive's closure.