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hyperhive/nix/host-modules/swarm-ca.nix
atlas 5526daab97 hive-tls: issue the gateway leaf from bao with a per-hive identity
Every hive gets its own store identity (CN
<deploy.bao.hiveLeafCommonNamePrefix>-<hive>) and its own role on the
existing pki mount (<deploy.bao.hiveLeafPkiRolePrefix>-<hive>), whose
allowed_domains is the hive's domain and *.<domain>. The policy grants
update on that one issue path. swarm-bao-hive-leaf-policy writes role,
policy and cert-auth role for every hive in swarm.hives; the store's host
mints its own hive's identity in glue-bao-tls.nix and a new glue file
points deploy.hive-controller.tls.baoHiveIdentity{Cert,Key}File at it.
Hives on other hosts place it by hand. swarm.nix reserves the composed CN.

hive-tls-ca no longer generates a hive CA or signs a leaf: caGenScript,
signLeafScript/signHiveLeaf and the adoption block are gone, ca-key.pem
is deleted where it exists, and the unit only assembles trust-bundle.pem.
The retired ca.pem/ca-previous.pem stay in the bundle so leaves they
signed keep verifying.

hive-tls-resign becomes the bao issuance: at boot, on deploy and from a
daily timer it re-issues when the leaf is missing, past half the role's
lifetime, missing a name, or not chained to the store's pki root. Nothing
orders the gateway after it, so a valid leaf on disk never waits on the
store; a failed renewal leaves the leaf in place. A missing identity
fails the unit naming both options, as does the root fetch on a hive
fronting no swarm name, which now presents this identity instead of the
reader cert.

caValidityDays and leafValidityDays are removed (both spellings), since
nothing reads them.

Refs #4588
2026-10-04 19:45:14 +02:00

162 lines
6.6 KiB
Nix

# The swarm root CA: the anchor a whole swarm shares, and the issuer of
# each hive's own CA (which is where it gets used — see ./hive-tls.nix).
#
# One root rather than per-peer pinning, because cross-hive trust is then
# O(1): trust the root once and every present *and future* peer validates,
# instead of every hive having to name every other one.
#
# Two provisioning modes share ONE structure — what differs is who puts
# the artifacts on disk, never what the artifacts are. Which mode does
# what, and what moving between them costs:
# `docs/swarm/ca.md::Two provisioning modes, one structure`.
#
# ⚠️ Root key AND root cert are runtime files, never nix options. The key
# for the obvious reason; the cert as a consequence, and that one costs
# something real — nothing whose trust store is built at build time can
# name it: `docs/swarm/ca.md::Distributing the root`.
#
# ⚠️ This root no longer issues the swarm's SERVICE certificates, and the
# `swarm-services-ca` sub-CA that used to sit under it is gone rather than
# moved. Those come out of the secret store's own `pki` mount now, anchored
# on a root generated inside it (./swarm-bao.nix), and ./hive-tls.nix asks
# for them over the network instead of signing them here. What is left here
# is one job: the anchor each hive's own CA is issued under.
{
lib,
config,
pkgs,
...
}:
let
cfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.ca;
hyperhiveCfg = config.services.hyperhive;
# The subject CN is a label for a human reading a chain, not an
# identity anything authenticates against. Fall through swarm name →
# hive domain → a constant so a hive that has set neither still
# evaluates; a missing `domain` is reported by its own assertion in
# hive-network.nix, and shouldn't also surface here as a null.
swarmLabel =
if hyperhiveCfg.swarm.name != null then
hyperhiveCfg.swarm.name
else if hyperhiveCfg.domain != null then
hyperhiveCfg.domain
else
"hyperhive";
in
{
options.services.hyperhive.swarm.ca = {
autoConfigure = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.bool;
default = false;
example = true;
description = ''
Run the whole swarm CA on this one host: generate the swarm
root when it is missing, and issue this hive's CA under it.
`services.hyperhive.deploy.singleHostSwarm` turns this on as
part of the all-on-one-box mode. Set it here directly to run the
CA on a host that is not otherwise all-local.
**Off by default, deliberately.** A swarm's services and its
hives can live on different hosts, and this host has no way to
tell whether it is the one holding the root — so the swarm CA
is something an operator sets up, not something a host decides
it is. Turn this on for an all-on-one-host deployment (dev
boxes, single-hive swarms) and get the hierarchy for free.
With it off, both artifacts are operator-provided: the root
under `stateDir`, and this hive's CA under
`services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.tls.stateDir`. A hive
given neither keeps the self-signed CA it has always had — it
simply isn't part of a swarm's trust hierarchy, which is the
correct outcome for a hive nobody has federated yet.
'';
};
stateDir = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.str;
default = "/var/lib/swarm-ca";
description = ''
Host directory holding the swarm root CA: `root.pem` (the
anchor, safe to distribute — copy it to this same path on every
other host in the swarm) and `root-key.pem`
(0600, the one file that must never reach the nix store or
another host). The directory itself is 0700: nothing reads
out of it but the hive CA issuance in `hive-tls.nix`.
Moving the swarm CA to its own host is a matter of moving this
directory and setting `autoConfigure = false` here.
'';
};
validityDays = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.int;
default = 10950;
description = ''
Validity window of the swarm root CA in days (default ~30y).
Deliberately long: the root must outlive the hive CAs it issued, or those chains
expire out from under hives that are still perfectly happy with
their own intermediate. Rotating a root is the one operation in
this system with no partial-failure mode — it invalidates every
peer at once, paced by the slowest peer's rebuild — so it is
never automatic and this window is meant to be uneventful.
'';
};
};
config = lib.mkIf cfg.autoConfigure {
systemd.services.swarm-ca = {
description = "Generate the swarm root CA when absent";
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
path = [ pkgs.openssl ];
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
RemainAfterExit = true;
UMask = "0077";
# Pin the journal identity (else it's the `script` store-path wrapper).
SyslogIdentifier = "swarm-ca";
};
script = ''
set -euo pipefail
d=${lib.escapeShellArg cfg.stateDir}
install -d -m 0700 "$d"
root="$d/root.pem"
rootk="$d/root-key.pem"
# Note the asymmetry with the hive CA in hive-tls.nix, which
# regenerates itself once expired: a root is never replaced
# automatically, not even an expired one. Consumers hold this
# cert, so replacing it is a swarm-wide flag day that wants an
# operator running it deliberately, with both roots trusted
# across the overlap.
if [ -s "$root" ] && [ -s "$rootk" ]; then
echo "swarm root CA already present at $root — leaving it alone"
exit 0
fi
# Half a root is not a root. Generating a fresh key beside an
# already-distributed cert (or the reverse) leaves every
# consumer trusting an anchor that no longer signs anything —
# and it would look like it worked.
if [ -e "$root" ] || [ -e "$rootk" ]; then
echo "swarm root CA half-provisioned ($root / $rootk) — refusing to generate over it" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "generating swarm root CA at $root"
# pathlen:1 — the root signs hive CAs, which sign leaves. One
# intermediate below the root and no deeper.
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -sha256 \
-days ${toString cfg.validityDays} \
-keyout "$rootk" -out "$root" \
-subj "/CN=swarm-ca ${swarmLabel}" \
-addext "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:1" \
-addext "keyUsage=critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign"
chmod 0600 "$rootk"
chmod 0644 "$root"
'';
};
};
}