hyperhive/swarm-authelia-bridge/src/store.rs
atlas 1885022d02 fix(#3422): give bridge-created identities an email too
#3414 fixed the missing-email defect in swarmctl only, so every identity
created by the bridge landed in users.yml with no `email`. A relying
party that asks for the claim does not degrade, it fails -- grafana's
OIDC login is the measured case (#3393).

Two writers of one file disagreeing about a field one of them treats as
required is not a difference worth keeping, and with the file shared the
result also depended on which tool wrote last.

Mutation-checked: removing the fill turns the new test red and nothing
else.
2026-08-18 10:31:48 +02:00

436 lines
18 KiB
Rust

//! The canonical user store this bridge owns, and the authelia users
//! database rendered from it.
//!
//! Deliberately its own copy, not shared code with `swarmctl::users` even
//! though the YAML shape is identical (same "factor out later if
//! duplication actually bites" reasoning as `swarm-controller::forge`
//! mirroring `hive-c0re::forge` — see the agent-identity-at-swarm-level
//! design thread). One real difference from `swarmctl`'s copy: this
//! store lives **wherever this
//! bridge runs** (inside the `swarm-authelia` container, alongside
//! `authelia-swarm`'s own state), not under `swarm-controller`'s state
//! dir — the two are not guaranteed to be the same host once
//! `swarm-authelia` and `swarm-controller` split across hosts, and this
//! bridge only ever runs where `swarm-authelia` does.
//!
//! # `users.yml` is the store, not a rendering of one
//!
//! There used to be a private `users.json` here, canonical, with `users.yml`
//! rendered from it — and `swarmctl` had its own pair against the *same*
//! physical `users.yml`. Two canonical stores for one file is a seam, and it
//! bit: a bridge whose own JSON was absent refused to write at all, because
//! it could not tell "nothing here yet" from "someone else's users".
//!
//! The JSON bought nothing. It was read back on every load, so the
//! round-trip it seemed to avoid was already being paid — the two files
//! differed only in *format*. One file removes the class: there is no second
//! store to disagree with, and the overwrite guard that policed them has
//! nothing left to do.
//!
//! ⚠️ Consequence, deliberate: this file is now **round-tripped**, so
//! comments and hand-formatting in it do not survive a write. An operator
//! editing it directly gets their *values* kept and their *comments* dropped.
//! Unknown keys are preserved (see `extra` below) so a field this binary does
//! not know about is not deleted by it.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::fs::{self, File, Permissions};
use std::io::Write as _;
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
use std::path::Path;
use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// The canonical store — this *is* `users.yml`, deserialised. `BTreeMap`
/// for a stable, diffable file: authelia does not care about key order, but
/// a human reading `git diff` does.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UserStore {
pub users: BTreeMap<String, User>,
/// Top-level keys this binary does not model, carried through a
/// round-trip untouched.
///
/// Two processes write this file and neither is authoritative about the
/// other's fields. Without this, whichever writes second silently
/// deletes anything the first added — the same shape as the bug that
/// made one file canonical in the first place, one level down.
#[serde(flatten)]
pub extra: BTreeMap<String, serde_norway::Value>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct User {
pub displayname: String,
/// The argon2 **digest**, never a plaintext password.
pub password: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub email: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
pub groups: Vec<String>,
/// Per-user keys this binary does not model (authelia's `disabled`, for
/// one). Same preservation rule as [`UserStore::extra`].
#[serde(flatten)]
pub extra: BTreeMap<String, serde_norway::Value>,
}
/// Same conservative charset `swarmctl::users::validate_username` already
/// enforces — usernames are YAML map keys, log lines, and access-control
/// subjects, so keeping them to plain ASCII means nothing downstream ever
/// has to reason about a name that needs quoting.
pub fn validate_username(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
if name.is_empty() || name.len() > 64 {
bail!("username must be 1..=64 characters, got {}", name.len());
}
if !name.starts_with(|c: char| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric()) {
bail!("username must start with an ASCII letter or digit: {name:?}");
}
if let Some(bad) = name
.chars()
.find(|c| !(c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '-' | '_' | '.')))
{
bail!("username may only contain [A-Za-z0-9._-], found {bad:?} in {name:?}");
}
Ok(())
}
/// Reject control characters rather than escape them — same reasoning as
/// `swarmctl::users::reject_control_chars`: a display name or email
/// carrying one is a bug or an injection attempt in every real case.
fn reject_control_chars(field: &str, value: &str) -> Result<()> {
if let Some(c) = value.chars().find(|c| c.is_control()) {
bail!(
"{field} contains control character U+{:04X}; refusing to write it",
c as u32
);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Render the store as authelia's YAML users database.
///
/// Serialisation is `serde_norway`'s — quoting an argon2 digest (`$`, `=`,
/// `,`, `/`) is exactly the kind of thing a real emitter gets right and a
/// hand-rolled one gets right until it doesn't.
///
/// ⚠️ **Still fallible, and that is the load-bearing part.** It re-validates
/// every value it is about to emit, so *"no control character ever reaches
/// this file"* stays a property of the **one path that writes it** rather
/// than a rule every caller has to remember. A bare `to_string(&store)`
/// would serialise perfectly and drop that guarantee silently.
pub fn render_yaml(store: &UserStore) -> Result<String> {
validate(store)?;
serde_norway::to_string(store).context("serialising the users database")
}
/// Everything [`render_yaml`] refuses to write. Separate so the rule can be
/// tested directly, and so a second writer can call it without going
/// through serialisation.
fn validate(store: &UserStore) -> Result<()> {
for (name, user) in &store.users {
validate_username(name)?;
reject_control_chars("displayname", &user.displayname)?;
reject_control_chars("password digest", &user.password)?;
if let Some(email) = &user.email {
reject_control_chars("email", email)?;
}
for group in &user.groups {
reject_control_chars("group", group)?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Load the users database, or start empty when it does not exist yet.
///
/// ⚠️ **There is deliberately no overwrite guard here any more.** The old
/// one refused to write when a private JSON store was missing but
/// `users.yml` held users — it existed to police *two* stores that could
/// disagree, and with one store there is nothing to disagree with. Reading
/// the same file we are about to write means we cannot clobber users we did
/// not know about: we just read them.
///
/// An absent or empty file is an empty store, not an error: first boot is a
/// legitimate state, and the seed document authelia's own unit writes
/// (`users: {}`) deserialises to exactly that with no special case.
pub fn load_store(users_file: &Path) -> Result<UserStore> {
match fs::read_to_string(users_file) {
Ok(raw) if raw.trim().is_empty() => Ok(UserStore::default()),
Ok(raw) => serde_norway::from_str(&raw)
.with_context(|| format!("parsing the users database at {}", users_file.display())),
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(UserStore::default()),
Err(e) => Err(e).with_context(|| format!("reading {}", users_file.display())),
}
}
/// Write the store + the rendered users file. **No restart** (the load-
/// bearing difference from `swarmctl::publish`): this bridge relies on
/// authelia's `authentication_backend.file.watch`, confirmed working
/// against the pinned 4.39.20 build during this design work — a
/// restart would drop every active SSO session, which mara ruled out for
/// agent creation specifically (not a rare, human-initiated event).
pub fn publish(users_file: &Path, store: &mut UserStore) -> Result<()> {
fill_missing_emails(store);
// One file, so there is no longer an ordering question between two
// writes — the old version wrote the JSON store first so a crash
// between them left something to repair from. That whole failure mode
// belonged to having two files.
let rendered = render_yaml(store)?;
write_atomic(users_file, &rendered)
}
/// Domain for an address this bridge invents — the same one
/// `swarmctl::users` uses, and the same one `hive-c0re` already gives every
/// agent's forge account. Never routable, deliberately: nothing sends mail
/// here, the address exists so a relying party asking for an `email` claim
/// gets one.
const SYNTHETIC_EMAIL_DOMAIN: &str = "hyperhive.local";
/// Give every user an address before the file is written.
///
/// 🩸 **This bridge did not do it, and `swarmctl` did.** #3414 fixed the
/// missing-email defect in `swarmctl` only, so every identity created *here*
/// landed in `users.yml` with no `email` — and a relying party that asks for
/// the claim does not degrade, it fails (grafana's OIDC login is the
/// measured case, #3393). Two writers of one file disagreeing about a
/// required field is not a difference worth keeping, so the rule now lives
/// on both write paths.
fn fill_missing_emails(store: &mut UserStore) {
for (name, user) in &mut store.users {
if user.email.is_none() {
user.email = Some(format!("{name}@{SYNTHETIC_EMAIL_DOMAIN}"));
}
}
}
/// Replace `path`'s contents atomically. Unlike `swarmctl::write_atomic`,
/// this does **not** need to preserve a foreign owner via `chown` — this
/// process runs as `users_file`'s own owning user (see the module doc:
/// the whole point of this bridge is running as `authelia-swarm`), so the
/// temp file it creates is already correctly owned. Preserves the
/// existing mode, same reasoning as `swarmctl`'s version (conservative
/// default for a file of password hashes).
fn write_atomic(path: &Path, contents: &str) -> Result<()> {
let dir = path
.parent()
.with_context(|| format!("{} has no parent directory", path.display()))?;
fs::create_dir_all(dir).with_context(|| format!("creating {}", dir.display()))?;
let name = path
.file_name()
.with_context(|| format!("{} has no file name", path.display()))?;
let tmp = dir.join(format!(
".{}.swarm-authelia-bridge.tmp",
name.to_string_lossy()
));
let mode = fs::metadata(path)
.ok()
.map_or(0o600, |meta| meta.permissions().mode() & 0o7777);
let mut file = File::create(&tmp).with_context(|| format!("creating {}", tmp.display()))?;
file.write_all(contents.as_bytes())
.with_context(|| format!("writing {}", tmp.display()))?;
file.sync_all()
.with_context(|| format!("flushing {}", tmp.display()))?;
drop(file);
fs::set_permissions(&tmp, Permissions::from_mode(mode))
.with_context(|| format!("setting mode on {}", tmp.display()))?;
fs::rename(&tmp, path).with_context(|| format!("renaming {} into place", tmp.display()))?;
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// What the `swarm-authelia` module's first-boot unit writes into
/// `users.yml` when there is no database yet.
///
/// A test fixture rather than a production constant: nothing in this
/// binary writes a seed any more — the store deserialises whatever is
/// there and an absent file is an empty store. Keeping it `pub` in the
/// module would be a constant nothing reads, which is exactly the kind
/// of leftover that makes the next reader think the seed dance is still
/// load-bearing.
const SEED_USERS_FILE: &str = "users: {}";
fn user(password: &str) -> User {
User {
displayname: "atlas".to_owned(),
password: password.to_owned(),
email: None,
groups: Vec::new(),
extra: BTreeMap::new(),
}
}
/// The document `swarm-authelia`'s first-boot unit writes must load as
/// an empty store with no special case — otherwise a fresh hive's very
/// first `EnsureAgentIdentity` fails on a file we wrote ourselves.
#[test]
fn the_first_boot_seed_loads_as_an_empty_store() {
let store: UserStore = serde_norway::from_str(SEED_USERS_FILE).expect("seed parses");
assert!(store.users.is_empty());
assert!(store.extra.is_empty());
}
/// An argon2 digest is `$`, `=`, `,` and `/` — the reason a real
/// emitter replaced the hand-rolled one. Asserted by **round-trip**,
/// not by looking for quotes: how the emitter chooses to quote is its
/// business, that the value survives is ours.
#[test]
fn an_argon2_digest_survives_a_round_trip() {
let digest = "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=4$c29tZXNhbHQ$aGFzaA+/w==";
let mut store = UserStore::default();
store.users.insert("atlas".to_owned(), user(digest));
let out = render_yaml(&store).expect("renders");
let back: UserStore = serde_norway::from_str(&out).expect("reparses");
assert_eq!(back.users["atlas"].password, digest);
}
/// A key neither writer models must survive the other's write. Without
/// this, two processes sharing one file silently delete each other's
/// fields — the same class of bug as the two stores this replaced.
#[test]
fn unknown_keys_survive_a_round_trip() {
let source = "\
users:
atlas:
displayname: atlas
password: \"$argon2id$x\"
disabled: true
some_future_top_level_key: 7
";
let store: UserStore = serde_norway::from_str(source).expect("parses");
let out = render_yaml(&store).expect("renders");
assert!(
out.contains("disabled"),
"a per-user key this binary does not model was dropped: {out}"
);
assert!(
out.contains("some_future_top_level_key"),
"a top-level key this binary does not model was dropped: {out}"
);
}
#[test]
fn usernames_outside_the_conservative_set_are_refused() {
for bad in ["", "-leading", "has space", "quote\"d", "sla/sh"] {
assert!(
validate_username(bad).is_err(),
"{bad:?} should be rejected"
);
}
for good in ["atlas", "svc-agent_1", "a.b"] {
validate_username(good).unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("{good:?} rejected: {e}"));
}
}
#[test]
fn a_control_character_is_refused_not_escaped() {
let mut u = user("$argon2id$x");
u.displayname = "bad\nname".to_owned();
let mut store = UserStore::default();
store.users.insert("atlas".to_owned(), u);
let err = render_yaml(&store).expect_err("must refuse");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("control character"));
}
/// `write_atomic` round-trips through a real temp dir — the property
/// under test is the rename-into-place, not just the render.
/// 🩸 The asymmetry this fixes: #3414 gave `swarmctl`-created humans a
/// synthetic address and left bridge-created **agents** with none, so
/// two writers of one file disagreed about a field a relying party
/// treats as required — grafana's OIDC login fails outright without it
/// (#3393) rather than degrading.
///
/// Asserted through the real write path, because that is where the rule
/// lives: `handle` inserts a user with `email: None` and nothing between
/// there and the file would notice.
#[test]
fn an_agent_identity_reaches_the_file_with_an_email() {
let dir = tempdir();
let users_file = dir.join("users.yml");
let mut store = UserStore::default();
store.users.insert("atlas".to_owned(), user("$argon2id$x"));
assert!(
store.users["atlas"].email.is_none(),
"the fixture must start with the state `handle` creates"
);
publish(&users_file, &mut store).expect("publish");
let reloaded = load_store(&users_file).expect("reload");
assert_eq!(
reloaded.users["atlas"].email.as_deref(),
Some("atlas@hyperhive.local"),
"an agent must not land in the file without an email"
);
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
#[test]
fn publish_then_load_round_trips_through_the_real_file() {
let dir = tempdir();
let users_file = dir.join("users.yml");
fs::write(&users_file, SEED_USERS_FILE).unwrap();
let mut store = UserStore::default();
store.users.insert("atlas".to_owned(), user("$argon2id$x"));
publish(&users_file, &mut store).expect("publish");
let reloaded = load_store(&users_file).expect("reload");
assert!(reloaded.users.contains_key("atlas"));
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
/// The bug this change closes: a `users.yml` holding users that this
/// binary did not write is **loaded**, not refused. The old code kept a
/// private store alongside it and bailed when the two disagreed.
#[test]
fn a_users_file_written_by_someone_else_is_read_not_refused() {
let dir = tempdir();
let users_file = dir.join("users.yml");
fs::write(
&users_file,
"users:\n mara:\n displayname: mara\n password: \"$argon2id$x\"\n",
)
.unwrap();
let mut store = load_store(&users_file).expect("must load a foreign users file");
assert!(store.users.contains_key("mara"));
// …and adding to it keeps the existing user rather than replacing.
store
.users
.insert("atlas".to_owned(), user("$argon2id$second"));
publish(&users_file, &mut store).expect("publish");
let reloaded = load_store(&users_file).expect("reload");
assert!(reloaded.users.contains_key("mara"), "existing user lost");
assert!(reloaded.users.contains_key("atlas"));
fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
}
/// Test-only temp dir under the OS temp root — disposable scratch for
/// one test's lifetime, not durable state (see `state-not-tmp`: this
/// is exactly the legitimate use, not a place we persist anything).
fn tempdir() -> std::path::PathBuf {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"swarm-authelia-bridge-test-{}-{}",
std::process::id(),
std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap()
.as_nanos()
));
fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
dir
}
}