| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
07852cabc1
The gateway's nginx + dnsmasq no longer run in their own nspawn container. `nix/host-modules/hive-gateway/default.nix` loses the `containers.hive-gateway` wrapper and everything that existed only to punch holes in it: `privateNetwork = false`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, five bind mounts, its own `stateVersion`, `networking.firewall.enable = false`, `networking.resolvconf.enable = false`, and the `hive-gateway-resolv` path+service pair. 465 -> 303 lines. The container never bought isolation here. It shared the host netns by necessity — nginx binds the host's :80/:443, dnsmasq answers on the bridge — so each of those settings was undoing a boundary the gateway could not afford in the first place. Four things made it more than a deletion, none of them visible in the nix diff: - The self-signed cert service also imports the hive CA leaf, so removing it with the container would have left nginx naming a missing cert file, which it refuses to load at all. - The nginx reload is a hive-priv verb. It still needs root, but no longer for the reason its doc gave, and `--machine=` was both transport and scope — so the unit name is now hard-coded in the helper as the containment. - The lifecycle verb named a container that stops existing. - `journalctl -M hive-gateway` had no machine to enter. Per the operator's ruling, the operator verb keeps working and agents lose it. `InfraContainer` answered three questions that used to share an answer; it now splits into `name()` (identity), `target()` (Container vs HostUnit), `service_unit()` (the systemd unit), and `agent_restartable()`, which the MCP restart path checks before the capability so the refusal cannot read as "ask for infra_admin". `SIBLING_CONTAINERS` drops the gateway — it gates the requests that name a container as a string — while `FromStr` still accepts it, because that answers what a name is, not who may act on it. The dashboard's gateway journal reads host journald filtered to `nginx.service`. Prose was corrected where it only named a location, and re-argued where the container was doing security work: a `0666` per-agent socket was safe because only the gateway container had the directory bind-mounted. There is no mount now, so the directory permissions are the whole of the access control — the constraint holds, its mechanism doesn't. Gate: nix fmt / clippy --all-targets -D warnings / cargo test all clean (710 tests); hivectl-cli.md regenerated from the clap tree. The nix eval was run in both TLS shapes at this commit: every delta in the rendered virtualHosts is one of the three intended path moves, dnsmasq settings are byte-identical, and the absence probe flips true -> false with bindMounts emptied. |
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| .. | ||
| src | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
hive-priv
The minimal root privileged-helper for hive-c0re. It runs as root and
exposes a narrow unix socket at /run/hive/priv.sock that accepts PrivRequest
JSON lines and performs only the handful of operations that genuinely require
root — bind-mount edits, nsenter into a container, btrfs subvolume ops. All
coordination logic (broker, HTTP, scheduling) stays in the unprivileged
hive-c0re process, which delegates here.
Why it exists
Privsep. hive-c0re runs as the unprivileged hive-core user so a bug or a
prompt-injection in the large daemon can't directly wield root. The few root
operations it needs are funnelled through this small, auditable helper instead.
See docs/boundary.md and docs/security.md for the privilege boundary.
Security model
- Strict allowlist. Every request is validated against a container-name
allowlist before any filesystem or process operation — only names matching the
hive convention (
h-*, the manager container, known sibling service containers) are accepted. - No pass-through. Every
PrivRequestvariant maps to a single known operation; there is no arbitrary-command escape hatch. - Socket-activated, always. systemd binds
/run/hive/priv.sock(SocketGroup=hive-core,0660) and passes the listener as fd 3 (LISTEN_FDS); the helper requires this and has no self-bind fallback, so dev and prod take the identical path and the group grant always holds.
The wire contract (PrivRequest / response types) lives in the separate
hive-priv-sock crate so this root binary depends on just the protocol shapes,
not the whole daemon-shared crate.